210. Entick. v.1.

5 vols.

91-1

Minto

Entricks

Z - 6

First Edition.

5 vols.

41 portraits

8 maps.


The Rev.d JOHN ENTICK, M.A.
Burgess fecit.
Benoist fculp.

THE GENERAL

HISTORY of the Late WAR:

CONTAINING IT'S

Riſe, Progreſs, *and* Event,

IN

EUROPE, ASIA, AFRICA, and AMERICA.

AND EXHIBITING

The STATE of the Belligerent Powers at the Commencement of the War; their Intereſts and Objects in it's Continuation; and REMARKS on the Meaſures, which led GREAT BRITAIN to Victory and Conqueſt.

INTERSPERSED WITH

The CHARACTERS of the able and diſintereſted STATESMEN, to whoſe Wiſdom and Integrity, and of the HEROES, to whoſe Courage and Conduct, we are indebted for that

NAVAL and MILITARY

Succeſs, which is not to be equalled in the Annals of this, or of any other Nation.

AND WITH

Accurate Deſcriptions of the SEAT of WAR, the Nature and Importance of our CONQUESTS, and of the moſt remarkable BATTLES by Sea and Land.

Illuſtrated with

A Variety of HEADS, PLANS, MAPS, and CHARTS, Deſigned and Engraved by the *beſt Artiſts*.

VOL. I.

Hiſtorici eſt: nequid falſi, audeat dicere: nequid veri, non audeat.
POLIB.

By the Rev. JOHN ENTICK, *M. A.*
And other GENTLEMEN.

LONDON:
Printed for EDWARD DILLY, in the Poultry;
And JOHN MILLAN, at Charing-Croſs.
M.DCC.LXIII.

TO

The RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM PITT, Esq;

LATE

One of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State;

A Man

Honoured by his KING, Rever'd by the PEOPLE,
Dreaded by our ENEMIES;

UNDER WHOSE ADMINISTRATION

All Parties united for the common Good, Confidence between the Court and Country was restored, a respectable Militia was established, the natural Strength of the Nation was exerted by Sea and Land, the Terrors of an Invasion were removed, Public Credit was carried to the greatest Height, the British Arms triumphed in every Quarter of the Globe, Trade and Navigation were promoted and protected, and France was humbled, and reduced to the Necessity of suing for a Peace;

THIS HISTORY

Is most humbly Inscribed,

With a grateful Sense of that glorious Part, which by his Wisdom, Vigour, and Firmness, He has acted in the Course of the late War,

BY

His most devoted and obedient Servant,

John Entick.

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

THE INTRODUCTION.

ALL the writers on the laws of nature and nations lay it down, as a maxim, not to be departed from, That arms or force ſhould never be employ'd, without an intention thereby to obtain an honourable and laſting Peace. But, the Machiavelian politicks, which have been adopted by the enemies of our nation, and the diſturbers of the repoſe of Europe, and have prevailed in the formation of treaties of pacification, within the preſent century, depart from that deſirable end of a juſt and neceſſary war; and ſhew that their intention is not, in the leaſt, to decide the contentions of jarring intereſts; to curb

Modern politicks.

the exceedings of ambition; to reconcile or abate implacable hatred; to prevent craft, double-meaning and inſiduous conferences in negociations, nor to give ſufficient ſecurity for the performance of treaties.

To this depravation of politicks, in the cabinets of our enemies, we may place an account of thoſe prodigious ſums of money, and that moſt ſurpriſing loſs of men, expended by Great Britain, and ſacrificed to eſtabliſh peace in Europe, and to preſerve this iſland and its dependencies from the power, tyranny, encroachments, dilapidations, intrigues and perfidy of her own natural, and Europe's common enemy.

Treaty of Utrecht.

The war with France, which terminated with the treaty of Utrecht, coſt this nation upwards of ſixty millions in the whole, and left it fifty millions in debt: beſides, after repeated victories, as well as unexpected ſucceſs, put the Engliſh, and their poſterity, in a worſe condition, not only than any of their allies, but even their conquer'd enemies. The national intereſt was not provided for in any better manner by the treaty of peace, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle. Matters rather devolved into worſe. At Utrecht the confederates with Great Britain obtained a valuable augmentation of territory, and a barrier, againſt the French, in the Netherlands: But by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which left the enormous debt of eighty millions upon the Britiſh nation, their Auſtrian ally was obliged to cede ſeveral conſiderable poſſeſſions. And tho' the war with Spain was avow-

Of Aix-la-Chapelle.

edly

edly commenced to obtain an uninterrupted navigation in South-America, and to procure a proper ſatisfaction for our South-Sea company; yet the definitive treaty was couched in ſuch indefinite terms, that nothing was ſtipulated with any preciſeneſs, but a ſuſpenſion of arms between the two crowns, and the re-eſtabliſhment of commerce, between their ſubjects reciprocally, without mentioning a word of what gave riſe to the war, in regard to America.

Let the treaty itſelf vouch the truth.

It was on the 7th of October 1748 the Britiſh, French and Dutch plenipotentiaries ſign'd the general and definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle, as did the Spaniſh plenipotentiaries on the 9th. In the preamble we find this remarkable fallacious expreſſion; "Europe *now* ſees the happy day ſhine "forth, that the divine providence had pointed "out for the eſtabliſhment of her repoſe;" when it is certain, from the meaſures immediately purſued by the French court, that war remained in their heart. However, under this deception, it is ſet forth in the *firſt* article, That there ſhall be a chriſtian, univerſal and perpetual peace, and a ſincere and inviolable friendſhip preſerved between the contracting parties: that no hoſtilities of what nature or kind ſoever ſhall be permitted, on either ſide, or on any cauſe or pretence whatſoever; induſtriouſly avoiding all things for the future that might any ways diſturb or alter the union eſtabliſhed by this peace; and that they ſhould uſe their utmoſt endeavours to procure, on all occa-

ſions, whatever may contribute to their mutual glory, intereſt and advantage, without giving the leaſt aid or aſſiſtance, directly or indirectly, to any perſons whomſoever, who would willingly injure or prejudice any of the high-contracting powers whatſoever.

By the third article, the treaties of Weſtphalia in 1648; of Madrid in 1667, 1678 and 1679; of Ryſwick in 1697; of Utrecht in 1713; of Baden in 1714; at the Hague in 1717; of the quadruple alliance at London in 1718, and the treaty of Vienna in 1738, are renewed and admitted to ſerve as a baſis of the preſent treaty. By the fifth article all the parties renounce all right and claim, by what title or pretence whatſoever, to the places they mutually covenant to reſtore. By the ninth article his Britannic Majeſty reſtores Cape Breton and all the conqueſts made by his arms in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies; and agrees to give hoſtages for the faithful performance of this covenant. By the ſixteenth article the Catholic King allows the aſſiento of negroes, and the annual ſhip for the ſouth ſeas, to continue for four years. The ſeventeenth article demoliſhes Dunkirk on the ſea ſide, conformable to antient treaties; and allows it to remain fortified on the land ſide. By the eighteenth article we have a true ſpecimen of French prevarication; for, by leaving certain points or demands open, not regulated by the plenipotentiaries, nor inſerted in the preſent treaty, but to be ſettled amicably, by commiſſaries nominated for that purpoſe, on each ſide, or otherwiſe,

wiſe, as it ſhall be agreed on by the intereſted powers; we ſhall find that this chriſtian, univerſal, and perpetual peace, and ſincere and inviolable friendſhip, ſo artfully and pompouſly ſet forth at the beginning of this treaty, is entirely enervated and expoſed to the intrigue, caprice and ambition of our enemies, whenever they might want a pretence to break it. And by the nineteenth and twentieth articles all the contracting powers guarantee the ſucceſſion of Great Britain and the Electoral dominions of his Britannic Majeſty.

Behaviour of France and Spain.

Let us now enquire how conformable the French and Spaniſh monarchs behaved to theſe engagements, ſo ſolemnly ſign'd and ratified. France put on the maſk of ſincerity, and engaged Spain to make the firſt demur to the faithful execution of her part of the definitive treaty. Notwithſtanding the advantages of the ſixteenth article, which grants only four years, inſtead of nine non-enjoyment of the *aſſiento* contract, the Spaniſh miniſtry were now as refractory in ſatisfying the demands of the Engliſh South-Sea company [a], as they were before the commencement of the war; tho' the Britiſh troops and ſubjects had formally evacuated the iſland of Ratan. They were even ſo untractable, as to reject all the expedients offer'd on this ſubject by Mr. Benj. Keene, the Britiſh miniſter at their court, who made the ſtrongeſt ſollicitations for compromiſing the differences un-

[a] Which, by their account deliver'd to the ſecretary of ſtate, amounted to the ſum of 1,300,000l.

adjuſted by the definitive treaty, until the fifth of October 1750; when they were pleas'd to ſign what they called a definitive convention. In which, after a fallacious preamble (ſetting forth the deſire of their reſpective ſovereigns to adjuſt the *diſputable* points, which at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle remain'd unſettled, in regard to their reſpective pretenſions, and to the commerce of their ſubjects, and declaring their willingneſs to terminate all things thereunto relating, by a friendly *compenſation)* it was agreed to acquieſce in the following articles:

Spaniſh definitive convention upon that treaty.

I. His Britannic Majeſty cedes to his Catholic Majeſty his right of enjoyment of the aſſiento of negroes; and of the annual ſhip, during the four years ſtipulated by the ſixteenth article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

II. His Britannic Majeſty, for a compenſation of 100,000l. ſterling [b], which his Catholic Majeſty promiſes and engages to pay at Madrid, or at London, to the royal aſſiento company, within the term of three months or ſooner, from the day of the ſignature of this treaty, cedes to his Catholic Majeſty all that might be due to the ſaid company in any manner, on account of the ſaid aſſiento: inſomuch that this compenſation ſhall be eſteemed and regarded as a full and entire ſatisfaction on the part of his Catholic Majeſty, and ſhall extinguiſh for the preſent, for the future,

[b] Inſtead of 1,300,000l. demanded on a fair account by the South-Sea company.

and

and for ever, all rights, pretenſions, or demands, which might be form'd in conſequence of the ſaid aſſiento or annual ſhip, directly or indirectly, either on the part of his Britannic Majeſty, or on the part of the company.

III. The Catholic King cedes to his Britannic Majeſty all that he might demand, in conſequence of the ſaid aſſiento or annual ſhip, as well with regard to the articles already liquidated, as thoſe, which might be eaſy or difficult to liquidate; ſo that neither on one ſide, nor on the other, is ever the leaſt mention to be made thereof.

IV. His Catholic Majeſty conſents that the Britiſh ſubjects ſhall pay no greater or other duties for the merchandizes, which they import or export at the different ports of his Catholic Majeſty, than thoſe, which they pay'd, for the ſame merchandize, in the time of Charles II. of Spain, regulated by ſchedules and ordinances of the ſaid King, or of his predeceſſors: And, tho' the *Pie del Fardo* was not founded upon any royal ordinance, his Catholic Majeſty declares nevertheleſs, that he wills and ordains, that it be obſerved for the preſent, and the future, as an inviolable law, and that all the ſaid duties be levied with the ſame advantage and eaſe to the ſaid ſubjects.

V. His Catholic Majeſty permits the ſaid ſubjects to take ſalt in the iſland of Tortuga, without any moleſtation, as they did in the time of King Charles II.

VI. His Catholic Majeſty conſents, That the ſaid ſubjects ſhall not pay any other duties, than

thoſe paid by the ſubjects of his Catholic Majeſty in the ſame place.

VII. His Catholic Majeſty grants the ſaid ſubjects all the rights, privileges, franchiſes, exemptions and immunities whatſoever, which they enjoyed before the laſt war, in virtue of ſchedules or royal ordinances, by the articles of the treaty of peace and commerce made at Madrid in 1667. The ſaid ſubjects ſhall be treated in Spain on the ſame footing with the moſt favoured nations. In conſequence no nation ſhall be rated at leſs duties for the merchandize they ſend into or carry out of Spain by land, than the ſaid ſubjects pay for ſuch as they import or export by ſea. All the rights, privileges, franchiſes, exemptions, and immunities, that are permitted to any nation, ſhall be granted to the ſaid ſubjects: And his Britannic Majeſty conſents, that the ſame thing be granted and permitted to the ſubjects of Spain in the kingdoms of his ſaid Britannic Majeſty.

VIII. His Catholic Majeſty promiſes to take all the care poſſible, on his part, to aboliſh all the innovations, which have appeared to be introduced in the commerce; and in order to avert them for the future, his Britannic Majeſty promiſes likewiſe, on his ſide, to take all poſſible care to prevent all innovations of that kind.

IX. Their Catholic and Britannic Majeſties confirm by the preſent treaty, that of Aix-la-Chapelle, and all other former treaties; which are hereby confirmed in all their articles and clauſes, excepting ſuch as are derogated from by

by the preſent treaty; as alſo the treaty of commerce concluded at Utrecht in 1713, except thoſe articles which are found contrary to the preſent treaty, which become aboliſhed and of no force, namely, the three articles of the ſaid treaty of Utrecht, commonly called *explanatory*.

X. All the reciprocal differences, rights, demands, and pretenſions, which have ſubſiſted between the two crowns of Spain and Great Britain, wherein no other nation hath any part, intereſt or right of intervention, being hereby accommodated; the two ſerene Kings mutually engage for the punctual execution of this treaty of reciprocal compenſation, which ſhall be ratified by their ſaid Majeſties, and the ratifications exchanged within the term of ſix weeks, from the day of the ſignature hereof, or ſooner if poſſible.

Its deficiency in regard to the principal objects of the war.

It was reaſonable to expect that this definitive convention would have determined the diſputable points, not regulated, nor ſettled by the definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle; ſome of which were nothing leſs than the very points, which had occaſioned ſo long and expenſive a war; to the mutual injury of Great Britain and Spain. Theſe points were, 1. What the common voice included in the words NO SEARCH, and ſignifies free trade and navigation, in Britiſh bottoms, with our Weſt India colonies, without being ſubject to be boarded by Spaniſh guarda coſtas, in open ſeas, and rummaged or ſearched by them for Spaniſh goods, of the growth or manufacture of New Spain or other

other territories, iſlands and places bordering on thoſe ſeas, and ſubject to the crown of Spain. By which right claimed by the Spaniards, our navigation from Jamaica, eſpecially, was rendered precarious; it being impoſſible for thoſe iſlanders to make proper returns, without ſelling, or bartering, for Spaniſh money, or goods, brought to their markets by Spaniſh agents; and almoſt as impoſſible for our ſhipping to make a ſafe voyage, without making the coaſt of Cuba in their way to Great Britain; as might be inſtanced in the many depredations made upon them by the guarda coſtas. Except we are to underſtand the Spaniſh renunciation of this right, under the ambiguous terms in the eighth article of this convention; where the Catholic King promiſes to take all the care poſſible, on his part, to aboliſh all the *innovations*, which have appeared to be introduced in the commerce. Such no doubt were the practices of the guarda coſtas; but not ſo ſufficiently and definitely here deſcribed and acknowledged, as to regulate and ſettle this diſputed point, which had been the cauſe of ſo much bloodſhed and expence. So that Spain was left in a condition to revive this dormant right, and to return to their depredations in thoſe ſeas, without breach of treaty; and from the ſilence of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, &c. to inſiſt upon *ſearching* all Britiſh bottoms, which ſailed near their coaſts. Secondly, Another point in diſpute was our right to cut logwood in Campechy and Honduras. A trade of the utmoſt im-

port-

portance to Great Britain; for, without this wood, ſeveral conſiderable branches in trade and manufacture would be at a ſtand. A right ſo well eſtabliſhed upon the cleareſt title, as ſet forth by our board of trade and plantations in the reign of George I. that, the only means for the Spaniards to avoid its acknowledgment, was to decline its diſcuſſion, and thereby to leave the foundation of another quarrel. Which, notwithſtanding the formal ratification of former treaties, and the particular ſtipulations and promiſes, concerning rights, privileges, franchiſes, exemptions, immunities, and favours in regard to duties, appears, and ſhall be proved, in the courſe of this hiſtory, to have been the intention of Spain, as well as of France, at the time of ſigning the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Why.

Thus the French ſucceeded in their ſcheme to ſtrike up a peace, at a time their maritime intereſt had ſuffer'd extremely, and they ſaw their own ruin inevitable, ſhould they neglect the pacific diſpoſition of the preſent miniſtry of Great Britain, and riſque all to the chance of more warlike and vigorous meaſures, to which his Britannick Majeſty was perſonally more inclin'd. Yet they kept two things in view to ſecure the confidence and affections of their allies: and to keep Great Britain embarraſſed, both abroad and at home. They faithfully protected the territorial property of their confederates; whereas we conſented to, or rather obliged the Queen of Hun- French motives for a peace.

Hungary to cede Silesia to the King of Prussia, and a large territory to Don Philip in Italy. And by prevailing with the Spaniards not to admit the British right to a free navigation and to cut log-wood, they ruin'd the British ministry in the affections of the people: so that by raising a jealousy between the court and the country, they gain'd time to carry their perfidious plan into execution; having consented to a peace only to prepare and strengthen France for the renewal of war.



THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

BOOK I.

Shewing the provocations leading thereunto, and the means to prevent it.

THE treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle having tied the hands of Great Britain, France immediately improved the preſent moment. Her emiſſaries were diſpatched throughout all the world. She re-exerted her political intrigues at Conſtantinople, where ſhe procured the depoſition of the Mufti, the diſgrace of the Grand Vizir, and endangered the ſafety of the Sultan, by irritating the janizaries againſt all, who had recommended or favoured a pacific diſpoſition during the wars of chriſtendom: and ſhe reigned ſtill predominant at Stockholm; and renewed the ſubſidy treaty with his Daniſh majeſty. New alliances were ſought:[a] ſubſi-

A. D. 1748.

France's conduct after the peace.

[a] By promoting the marriage of the Infanta Donna Maria of Spain with Victor Amadæus Maria Prince of Piedmont, a treaty

A. D. 1748. subsidiary treaties were renewed: her militia well regulated and disciplined: her armies [b] kept up: her fortifications repaired, and a more than ordinary effort was made to recruit and to establish her marine [c] in a more respectable condition, than heretofore.

Examples of French faith.

But what does this vary from the constant practice of the French at other times, when perhaps they had not such a plausible defence for their breach of faith? Not content with the acquisition of Alsace by the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, under the restriction of maintaining the privileges and liberties of ten imperial cities situate in that extensive and important country, the French monarch invaded their freedom, abolished their privileges, and by force obliged them to submit to the laws of his own will, as soon as he found the guarantees of that treaty disarmed. The means by which the French got a footing in Flanders contrary to the treaty of the Pyrenees: the wanton-

After the treaty of Westphalia.

Pyrenees.

a treaty was brought about between France, Spain and Sardinia, under a pretence of maintaining the peace of Italy: it was agreed to comprehend the King of the Two Sicilies, the Duke of Modena, the Republic of Genoa, and the Infant Duke of Parma and Placentia, with engagement by France and Spain to furnish 30,000 men, should any of the contracting parties stand in need of assistance.

[b] In Sept. 1749, her forces consisted of 150,000 effective men, ready for action; besides the militia.

[c] A plan was formed by M. Rouille to have 111 ships of the line, 54 frigates, 22 bomb ketches and 25 fire ships—always ready in time of peace to put to sea. Twenty millions of *livres* were appropriated for this service, annually.

neſs with which Lewis XIV. violated the treaty of Nimeguen almoſt *before* it was definitively ſigned: and the ſtory of the partition treaty, which was abandoned by France, as ſoon as it was ſolemnly ratified, are eternal mementos of French perfidy. To theſe add the conduct of Lewis XV. in regard to the pragmatic ſanction, whoſe guaranteeſhip was purchaſed at the extraordinary price of the dutchy of Lorrain, annexed to the crown of France: yet upon the demiſe of the Emperor Charles VI. the armies of this perfidious nation were prepared, and actually aſſiſted the Elector of Bavaria, to overturn that very treaty, and to dethrone the Auſtrian heireſs, whom their King had ſo lately ſworn in the name of the Holy Trinity to protect and defend from all her enemies. And in regard to Great Britain alone, the treaty of Utrecht furniſhes ſufficient ideas of that nation's intentions, when our intereſt and their own interfere with each other. By that treaty (twelfth article) "All Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient "limits, and with all its dependencies, is ceded to "the crown of Great Britain." And (fifteenth "article) "The ſubjects of France, inhabitants "of Canada, and elſe where, ſhall not diſturb or "moleſt, in any manner whatever, the five Indian "nations, which are ſubject to Great Britain, "nor its other American allies."

A. D. 1748. Nimeguen. Partition treaty. Pragmatic ſanction. Utrecht.

Clear as theſe articles may ſeem to be, it is certain that the French never intended to ſubmit to their contents. They, ever ſince they thought trade and commerce an object worthy of their attention, have kept two capital views in ſight, whenever

Two objects of French politics.

A. D. 1748. whenever America has been the object of conſideration. The one was to extend themſelves from Canada ſouthwards, through the lakes, along the back of our colonies: in order to cut off our communication with the Indian nations, and to open a communication for themſelves between the rivers St. Lawrence and Miſſiſſippi; and thus to join, as it were, their colonies of Canada and Louiſiana. The other, and indeed the moſt important to them and moſt fatal to the Engliſh, was to gain a communication with the ocean; the only acceſs to Canada being commonly ſhut up half the year.

Therefore full of this project of American empire; for, that is the aim of the French, whereever they gain a footing; they, in defiance of the treaty of Utrecht, began, ſoon after its ratification, to violate thoſe ſolemn conceſſions, by large encroachments, &c. In the year 1720, they ſeized upon the important paſs of Niagara, ſituate in the country of the five Indian nations, from which they were expreſly excluded by the fifteenth article; and fortified it, with a view to defend their encroachments already made and deſigned to be carried on with force upon the Britiſh empire in North America; they being able by this uſurpation to command the lakes, and at leiſure to extend themſelves to the Ohio, and to continue a chain of forts and ſettlements down to the Miſſiſſippi.

Encroachments in North America begun.

The plan of uſurpation on the back of our colonies, from henceforward, went on gradually and ſucceſsfully, from year to year. The Indians, acknow-

acknowledged by the treaty of Utrecht to be under the dominion of the Britiſh crown, were debauched from our intereſt and their allegiance, and ſpirited up to maſſacre and ſcalp the Engliſh: So that in the year 1731 the French had the inſolence to erect the fort of *Crown Point* in the centre of the *Five Nations*, and actually within the limits of the province of New York; in order more effectually to expoſe our moſt valuable colonies to Indian maſſacrees and French uſurpation, and more eaſily to open a communication with the great ocean, as may be ſeen by caſting an eye upon its advantageous ſituation for theſe purpoſes. Yet ſuffered to proceed without any reſentment on the part of the Britiſh miniſtry! A. D. 1748. Seduce the Indians.

The infidelity of the French, in regard to Nova Scotia or Acadia, kept pace with their other conduct in North America. This Peninſula, (as it were deſerted by the Britiſh court, which never thought of ſettling it for the national intereſt, till after the peace of Aix la Chapelle, and where the French foreſaw no reſiſtance, whenever it ſhould ſuit them beſt to make a total ſeizure thereof for completing their American plan of empire) laid expoſed to whatever uſes they thought proper to put it. They formed a plan, during this long interval, to rob us of this extenſive country, whenever they ſhould be able to bring the Britiſh miniſtry into a temper to ſubmit the title, given us by treaty, to the uncertain determination of commiſſaries, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter; reſolved at the ſame time, if they ſhould not be able to carry Their claim to Nova Scotia or Acadia.

A. D. 1748. their point, in that way of negociation, to ſtrengthen themſelves upon the premiſes, and to ſupport a bad argument by force of arms.

Such was the ſituation of affairs in America, and the moſt certain index of the meaſures taken by the French, upon the ſigning of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; in which they gained this ſingular advantage, to encourage them to proceed in their uſurpations in North America; namely, That, notwithſtanding it was notorious to all the world, that the increaſe of their territory and the diminution of our power, on that continent, had been the object of the French councils, ever ſince the treaty of Utrecht; and that hoſtilities were commenced in thoſe parts, before the war; the Britiſh miniſtry, neither availed themſelves of the war to diſpoſſeſs the French of our property; nor, when they were negociating a peace, does it appear, that they paid any regard to a point of the laſt importance to Great Britain. If his Majeſty's plenipotentiaries received no inſtructions on that head, it could not be owing to the want of intelligence; for it is certain that repeated remonſtrances were tranſmitted from the Governors of our colonies againſt the practices of the French; which ſcarce can be thought to have miſcarried; or to have been deſtroyed or neglected by them in power.

Weakneſs of the Britiſh miniſtry.

Great Britain, ever credulous, was the only power that diſarmed, and could not believe any latent evil deſign, in the meaſures taken, by her perfidious neighbours, to break the peace. Even his

Britiſh conduct after the peace.

his moſt gracious Majeſty, in his ſpeech to both houſes of parliament on 13 June 1749, was ſo thoroughly ſatisfied, That he ſays, "All the "powers concerned have declared themſelves in "ſo clear and friendly a manner, on this ſubject, as "leaves no room to doubt of their ſincere diſpoſi-"tion to render the peace laſting in all parts." The ſailors were diſcharged, the ſhips of war laid up: The ſhipwrights paid off, and permitted to enter, as did our ſeamen, into the ſervice of France and Spain. Our army was reduced to 18,000 men; and, what was equally as impolitic, we had diſguſted our late allies; diſpoſed them to receive overtures from our natural enemy, and took no regard to ſecure any others; except Bavaria, which was engaged by an annual ſubſidy of 40,000 l. two thirds to be paid by Great Britain, and the other by Holland, to keep 6,000 men in pay to march at the requiſition of thoſe powers, for ſix years; but not to be employed againſt the Emperor, nor the Empire; with promiſe of indemnification by the maritime powers, in caſe Bavaria ſhould ſuffer any damage on this account. A. D. 1749.

The affairs of the North, which threatened to break out into troubles on the expected death of the King of Sweden, favoured the political conduct of France, always ready to ſnatch every advantage from the quarrels of other nations. The conſequences of France's interfering in thoſe troubles, on one ſide or other, might be no leſs than the flames of a new war; which might by treaties involve us again in connections, that would en- Troubles in the North improved by France.

A. D. 1749. tirely deprive us of the benefits of peace, and of the means to reſent, or provide againſt the armaments and hoſtilities of France, either in Europe or America. This ſeems to have been foreſeen by the Britiſh court; and Colonel York, the Britiſh miniſter, at that time, at Paris, was ordered [d] to ſound the Marquis of Puyſieux, the French miniſter, concerning the premiſes, and the diſpoſition of his royal maſter in caſe of a rupture between Ruſſia and Sweden. To whom that miniſter replied in ſuch terms, as left no room for doubting of the French monarch's readineſs to take a part in thoſe troubles. He ſaid, "That as "future events are in the hands of Providence, "time only could diſcover whether that part of "Europe was really deſtined for the renewal of "broils, and the calamities of war; to ward off "which his Majeſty [Lewis] would neglect no "means in his power. But that in caſe all his "pains and endeavours ſhould prove fruitleſs, and "his Majeſty be called upon to fulfill his engage-"ments with Sweden, it was (from his Majeſty's "well known character) needleſs to inform him "[Colonel York] that he muſt anſwer the de-"mand with the exactneſs and punctuality, which "the execution of ſolemn treaties requires."

Why the King of Pruſſia kept up his army.

A few days after (March 18) appeared the following expoſition of the motives, that determined the King of Pruſſia to keep his army [e] in readineſs to march on the firſt warning: "The

[d] In the beginning of March 1749.

[e] Then conſiſting of 150,000 men, well provided.

"King

" King conſidering peace and union among the A. D.
" Princes of Europe, as the greateſt happineſs 1749.
" they can aſpire to, his Majeſty greatly rejoiced
" to ſee the foundations thereof laid at Aix-la-
" Chapelle by the contracting parties in the late
" treaty of peace.—There was nothing wanting
" in order to render this happineſs univerſal; but
" the diſperſion of the clouds, which ſeemed to
" be gathering in the North. The King labour-
" ed as effectually, as he poſſibly could, to prevent
" the effects thereof.—Nevertheleſs thoſe clouds
" are ſtill lowring, and give reaſon to fear that
" they may, this approaching ſpring, be produc-
" tive of ſome event capable of diſturbing the
" tranquillity of the North; unleſs the wiſdom of
" Divine Providence preſerves Europe from this
" diſaſter.—The extraordinary movements made
" in the dominions of ſome neighbouring powers, [f]
" the armaments and preparations carried on
" there, ſufficiently intimate, thoſe powers are
" filled with the ſame apprehenſions, as the King,
" in regard to the interruption of the public tran-
" quillity.—It becomes the prudence of Sove-
" reigns, when they foreſee events, which may, in
" their conſequences, influence the tranquillity of
" their dominions, and of their ſubjects, to take,
" long beforehand, the neceſſary precautions
" againſt a ſudden ſurprize.—Such then is the
" motive, which has made the King judge it ne-

[f] Alluding to Ruſſia, Sweden, Denmark, and Auſtria, who all pretended to arm with the ſame views; and to the declaration and meaſures of the French.

A. D. 1749. "ceſſary that he ſhould make likewiſe diſpoſitions "for putting his army in a condition to act, in "order to keep at a diſtance from his dominions "all the unforeſeen dangers, that might diſturb "the repoſe of his faithful ſubjects, &c."

French ſeize upon the neutral iſlands.

France made ſo ſure of embroiling Great Britain with a northern war, that, inſtead of complying with the directions and obligations of the late treaty, which had delivered her from the power of our arms, her miniſters were encouraged to raiſe freſh difficulties, and to employ force to defeat the real intention of the conferences ſtipulated to be held by commiſſaries on the diſputable points not ſettled by treaty. For, before the day [g] of ſolemn thankſgiving for the peace, the nation was alarmed with the following act of hoſtility upon the iſlands, whoſe right had been ſubjected to the determination of the ſaid commiſſaries.

The ordinance of the General of the French windward iſlands in America, of the 7th of December [h] 1748, N. S.

French Governor's ordinance thereon.

CHarles de Thebieres, de Levi, de Peſtel, de Grimoard, Marquis of Caylus, Knight of the order of St. John of Jeruſalem, and of the royal and military order of St. Lewis, Commander in Chief of his Majeſty's ſhips, his Governor and Lieutenant General of the iſlands of

[g] 25 April 1749.

[h] Only one month and 26 days after the ſigning of the definitive treaty at Aix-la-Chapelle.

Marti-

Martinico, Guardalupe, Grande and Petite Terre, Deſeada, Mary Galant, the Saints Dominico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bequia, Canaouan, Cairiouacon, Grenade, and of all the iſlands and iſlets commonly called the Granadillos, Tobago, St. Bartholomew, St. Martin, Cayan, and the Continent comprehended between the rivers of the Amazons and Oronoque. A. D. 1749.

The iſland of TOBAGO commonly called *Tobacco*, one of thoſe under our government, *indiſputably* belonging to his Majeſty, and the property which he has in it having been authenticly acknowledged by treaties, and no Prince or ſovereign power whatever laid any pretenſion to the ſovereignty, or dominion of the ſame; has obliged us to give no credit to an information we have received, that a ſmall frigate, ſtiling herſelf Engliſh, and authorized by certain pretended powers iſſued from the Governor of Barbadoes, ſhould have been about a month ſince at the ſaid iſland of Tobago; and there clandeſtinely ſtuck up to trees in different parts of the ſame a pretended proclamation, importing, that Mr. Greenville, Governor of Barbadoes, who in the ſame proclamation calls himſelf, without any foundation, Governor of St. Lucia, Dominico, St. Vincent and Tobago, together with all the iſlands, colonies, and plantations in America, commonly called or known by the name of the Caribbee iſlands (which iſlands and plantations, nevertheleſs indiſputably belonging to his Majeſty) had ordered the inhabitants of Tobago, who are *all ſubjects* to his Majeſty, to

A. D. 1749. quit the ſame in the ſpace of 30 days, giving them to underſtand, that they muſt expect military execution in caſe of their non-compliance; the nature of ſuch an act, and the terms, in which it is conceived, puts it out of all doubt that it could never have proceeded from the Governor of Barbadoes, but is the work of ſome evil diſpoſed perſon, and determines us to wave the demanding any ſatisfaction from the pretended author of it, who in all probability had no hand in it.

Nevertheleſs, it being neceſſary to hinder any perſon, of what quality, condition, and nation ſoever they may be, from falling into the ſnare laid for them: We declare to all the ſubjects of his Majeſty, who are ſettled upon the ſaid iſland of Tobago, as well whites, as Indians, Negroes, Mulattoes, Meſtees, and all others, that it may concern, that we will defend them againſt the attempts, that any nation, ſtrangers to us, may form againſt the ſaid iſland; and that we will ſend them ſuch a quantity of ammunition and proviſions, as they may ſtand in need of.

We prohibit their having any correſpondence or dealing with the neighbouring colonies, belonging either to the Engliſh, Dutch, or Danes; nor to ſuffer any of them to continue amongſt them; or to permit their coming on ſhore in the ſaid iſland of Tobago, until ſuch time, as we ſhall have ſent a commanding officer with regular troops, for their protection and defence.

It is our will, that theſe preſents be read, publiſhed, and ſet up in all the quarters of the ſaid iſland

iſland of Tobago, that no perſon whatever may plead ignorance of the ſame. A. D. 1749.

Given under our ſeal at arms, and the counterſign of our firſt Secretary at Martinico, the 7th day of December 1748.

Le Marquis DE CAYLUS.

By his Lordſhip's command.

MOURET.

This ordinance was ſupported by two French frigates, one of 40 guns, the other of 36. In the interim his Britannic Majeſty's ſhip, the Boſton of 20 guns, Captain Wheeler, arrived at the ſame place.[i] The French commander demanded his buſineſs there, (which was for wood and water, aud to prevent the uſurpations of the French on that neutral iſland) and forbid him to ſend his boat on ſhore, or to give any diſturbance to the French in that iſland; adding that they were ſurpriſed Mr. Greenville would take upon him to order any of the inhabitants to withdraw from off that iſland, which belonged to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and that if they found him there again, they would repel him by force.[k] At the ſame time the French, to prevent any ſurprize, erected a battery of twelve guns, and began another of equal force. Maintained by force.

The like hoſtilities began now alſo to be practiſed in Nova Scotia or Acadia, whoſe limits were

[i] Gourlanders Bay.

[k] Advice from Barbadoes, dated 21 January 1748-9.

referred

A. D. 1749. referred to the deciſion of commiſſaries. Cape Breton having been given back by the treaty to France, the people of New England repreſented the importance and neceſſity of cultivating or colonizing this country ſo effectually, by deſcribing its produce, capacious and ſafe harbours for ſhips of any burden, and ſhewing that by its ſituation, it might be made not only a barrier againſt all the ſchemes and forces of the French in thoſe parts, for extending their trade; but a key to their fur-trade and cod-fiſhery, and to counteract any attempts made againſt our ſettlements on that coaſt, by the greateſt power France is able to equip at Cape Breton; that plans were form'd, and his Majeſty approved [1] of one for the better peopling and ſettling the province of Nova-Scotia in America, and for extending and improving the fiſhery thereof, and eſtabliſhing a civil government.

The importance of Nova Scotia.

Ordered to be ſettled.

Amongſt other arguments to forward this reſolution of the Britiſh council, it was urged, That the reſtoration of Louiſbourg might prove very fatal to us in another war, unleſs the government could be prevailed upon to ſettle and fortify Nova-Scotia, which, as it would be a barrier to all our northern provinces, and, as it might be made a check upon Louiſbourg and the French encroachments in the fiſhery, would, in time, be of more ſervice to the nation, than half the colonies already ſettled. That it has a very large extent of ſea-coaſt, abounding with fine rivers, bays, and har-

For what reaſons.

[1] In council on 7 March 1749. O. S.

bours,

bours, and is ſurrounded with ſuch fiſhing banks for cod and other fiſh, as are to be found in no other part of the world: That the ſoil is vaſtly prolific in all ſorts of herbage, grain and fruit, and abounds with excellent timber. That its trade, when properly ſettled, would be the greateſt ſeminary, we can have, for ſeamen; and add a conſiderable weight to our commercial intereſt, and greatly enrich his Majeſty's kingdoms; the climate being healthy and agreeable, perfectly adapted to the Engliſh conſtitutions; that it would want but little encouragement more than a proper protection under the form of a civil government, and a humane governour. A. D. 1749.

Tranſports were provided, and proper encouragement offer'd to ſuch as would venture upon the ſettlement and cultivation of this colony; and General Cornwallis was appointed their governour, with a ſufficient number of forces, and directions to fortify the country, and to aſſure the French, that ſhould be found within the limits of the Britiſh dominion, in that province, that they ſhould be protected in their ſettlements, on the ſole condition of taking an oath of fidelity to his Britannic Majeſty. The number of families, which entered voluntarily for this colony were three thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty, and upwards; which ſailed from England in the beginning of May 1748, and arrived at the harbour of Chebuctou, the place of their deſtination, to erect fortifications and to build a regular town, ſurrounded with a ſtrong palliſade, on the ſhore of one

A large colony tranſported thither.

Their arrival.

A. D. 1749. one of the moſt ſecure and commodious havens in the whole world, and ſituated about midway between cape Canſeau and cape Sable. Which town was named HALLIFAX in honour of the noble Earl of that title, who then preſided over the board of trade and plantations, and had in a particular manner diſtinguiſhed his judgment and capacity in executing the plan, and his patriotic zeal in the remarkable diligence and trouble with which he cheriſh'd and eſtabliſh'd that infant colony [m].

Town of Hallifax, why ſo called.

Immediately upon the appearance of this powerful body, reinforced with two regiments from Cape Breton, and a company of rangers from Annapolis, the only fort at that time belonging to Great Britain, on the peninſula, the French ſettlers, who, in time of peace, had affected to call themſelves *Neutrals*; but, upon every diſpute between the two crowns, intrigued with the Indians, and join'd with their own countrymen in ſupport of their uſurpations, encroachments and hoſtilities; either were compelled by M. de la Corne, or they rejected the protection of Great Britain, drove away their cattle, burnt their houſes, and withdrew to St. John's, &c.

Diſturbed by the French.

This was follow'd by open hoſtilities. A party of French and Indians, in their intereſt, ſeized upon a veſſel belonging to Boſton, in New England, *Beath*, Maſter, at or near Canſeau; and Cap-

[m] The expence incurred this year, by the new colony of Nova-Scotia, appears by the eſtimates laid before parliament to exceed 76,000l.

tain



Hall sculp.t

EARL OF HALLIFAX.

tain Donnel was attack'd at the head of the bay of Fundy, near Chebuctou: he was wounded, and had three of his men killed. Every day produced freſh complaints of the hoſtile behaviour of the French and Indians under their influence: which obliged the governor to employ force in his own defence. He detached 1000 regular forces under the command of Major Lawrence, with four ſloops of war to Chignecto, to drive out the Indians, who had been engagd by the French to annoy the Engliſh ever ſince their firſt landing. Theſe Indians mixed with the neutral French, to the number of about 800, being entrenched behind ſtrong banks and paliſadoes, made cannon-proof, obſtructed their landing. But Major Lawrence, at the head of a hundred choſen men, made a ſecond attempt about a mile and half from their entrenchment; where alſo the enemy detached a ſufficient party to receive him with their ſmall arms; but he landed in the midſt of their fire, without returning it, till his men had run up to their noſes; by which means a great number of the enemy were killed, before they had time to load again. The remains fled with great precipitation under the protection of a French commander, encamped on the ground acroſs the river, and claim'd by France [n]. Major Lawrence deſired a parley with the French commander: in which he demanded to know, "why the French inhabitants had ſhaken off their allegiance to the King of Great

A. D. 1749.

Meaſures of defence by the government.

[n] He had built a fort here by the name of Beau Sajour.

Britain:"

A. D. 1749. Britain:" but could get no other anſwer than, he had orders to defend that poſt; which he was reſolved to obey.

Thus the French were determin'd to ſeize upon all Nova-Scotia, beyond the bay of Fundi, from the river Chignecto to the river St. John. But both their actions and intentions, in this province, will more fully appear in the memorial delivered to the French court by the Earl of Albemarle.

Memorial concerning Nova Scotia.

THE under-written Ambaſſador-extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from his Majeſty of Great Britain, has orders from the King his maſter; dated Hanover the 26th of laſt month, to repreſent to the court of France, how much he is ſurpriſed at hearing the violent proceedings of the French in America, under the authority and direction of M. de la Jonquiere, who has readily avowed them.

M. Cornwallis, Governor of Nova-Scotia, has informed the Duke of Bedford, by a letter dated the 1ſt of May this year, that the French have taken poſſeſſion of all that part of Nova-Scotia beyond the bay of Fundi, from the river Chignecto to that of St. John, making the firſt the limits of that province.

They have reduced Beubaſſin to aſhes, and carried to the other ſide of the river the inhabitants with their effects; compelled them to take up arms, and form'd them into companies; ſo that the Sieur La Corne, a French officer, has at that place, under his command, a body of 2500 men,

made up of regular troops, Canadians and Indians. A. D. 1749.

The Sieur La Corne and father Loutre, a French miſſionary, have made uſe of repeated and innumerable promiſes and menaces, in order to perſuade all the inhabitants of the province to leave the country.

The inhabitants declare openly their abhorrence of theſe proceedings; but the Sieurs La Corne and Loutre threaten them with a general maſſacre from the Indians, if they remain in the province. They ſupport and protect openly the Indians, our declared enemies; who inliſt under the banners of France. They detain the King's ſubjects, his officers and ſoldiers priſoners. They excite the King's French ſubjects to rebellion, and thoſe, who remain loyal, they threaten with deſtruction. They ſend their Indian ſlaves all over the country, where they are guilty of all ſorts of outrages.

They have ſet fire to the town acknowledged by themſelves to appertain to his Britannic Majeſty.

Governor Cornwallis ſent the Sieur Lawrence, Major of foot, with a detachment to Chignecto; where he arrived on the 20th of laſt April. They ſaw the French ſet fire to the town of Chignecto, French colours planted on the ditches, and the Sieur De la Corne at the head of his detachment, braving Major Lawrence, and declaring that he would defend, to the laſt, that ground as belonging to France.

The

A. D. 1749. The Sieur De la Corne having ſent to deſire a conference with the Sieur Lawrence, the latter, accompanied by two captains of foot, went to meet him, and demanded by whoſe orders he had thus come into his Britannic Majeſty's territories, and committed ſuch acts of violence. The Sieur De la Corne anſwer'd: it was by thoſe of M. De la Jonquiere, who had alſo commanded him to take poſſeſſion of Chippodi, John's river, Mamram, Cooke, Pitcordiack, and of all that country, as far as the river, which was on the right hand of Major Lawrence, as belonging to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; or, at leaſt, that he was to keep and defend it as ſuch, till ſuch time as the limits were ſettled by commiſſaries appointed for that purpoſe.

Though the Sieur Lawrence had under his command a detachment of regular troops, very little inferior to that commanded by Sieur De la Corne, he forebore committing any hoſtilities, in obedience to the King of Great Britain's orders for that purpoſe.

The King cannot perſuade himſelf that theſe acts of violence have been committed with the knowledge of the court of France, and he is ſo fully convinced of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's equity, and his deſire to maintain a good underſtanding between the two crowns, that he aſſures himſelf the moſt Chriſtian King will readily ſhew his diſapprobation of ſuch conduct.

Governor Cornwallis has never made, nor deſigned to make any ſettlements out of the limits of

of the Peninſula, which the French before never pretended to belong to them: the King of Great Britain having had no intention in forming a ſettlement in his province of Nova Scotia, to encroach on the rights of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, or to take forcible poſſeſſion of a country, of which the King had referred the right of property to the deciſion of commiſſaries appointed for that purpoſe, before it was poſſible for them to have met in order to proceed to the ſettling of the limits. A. D. 1750.

The under-written ambaſſador has orders to demand, that the conduct of M. de la Jonquiere be diſavowed; that poſitive orders be ſent to him immediately to withdraw his troops and the Indians under his authority, from the places which belong to Great Britain; that amends be made for the acts of violence which have been committed, and the damages which the King's ſubjects have ſuffered: And his Majeſty is perſuaded that the court of France will make no difficulty, to give the under-written Ambaſſador a duplicate of the orders, which will be ſent to the governor of Canada, that he may tranſmit them to his court.

Done at Compeigne the 7th of July 1750.

Sign'd ALBEMARLE.

The Marquis of Puyſieulx anſwered this memorial, by a letter to the Earl of Albemarle, dated the 23d of July 1750. in the form following.

SIR,

A. D. 1750.

The answer by the court of France.

SIR,

IN the memorial, which your excellency has given me concerning the complaints of M. Cornwallis, Governor of Acadia, are contained many facts, so contrary to the equity of his Majesty, the instructions of M. De la Jonquiere, and that, if they are found to be such, as they are represented, the King will take care justice shall be done to his Britannic Majesty's subjects, and will give such fresh orders, as will prevent the rise of any dispute of what kind soever between the two nations, his Majesty being thoroughly persuaded his Britannic Majesty will give, on his side, orders to the same purpose.

Give me leave, Sir, to tell you, I cannot be prevailed upon to believe, but that the facts are exposed with too much exaggeration, and from my knowledge of M. de la Jonquiere's prudence, and the instructions which he has, I am sorry M. Cornwallis has not applied for redress, before he had made complaints to his court. I sent your memorial, as soon as I receiv'd it, to M. Rouille, and desir'd he would take the proper steps, to be inform'd in a speedy and precise manner, of what has passed at Canada, so as I may be enabled to give your excellency a more positive answer. I have the honour to be, &c.

Sign'd PUYSIEULX.

Soon after the French ministry gave the Earl of Albemarle a letter, wrote by M. Rouille to M. De la Jonquiere, in which he was desired to forbear hostilities upon the subjects of England; which entirely

entirely anſwered the ends of the court of France, to keep Great Britain inactive, and to gain time to execute their own perfidious ſchemes. For M. Cornwallis was not properly reinforced, to drive the French from their encroachments, and they kept their ground, and continued their hoſtilities, till the year 1755. when they were driven out by the New England troops. A. D. 1750.

The French inſincerity on this occaſion is very eaſily to be gathered from this evaſive anſwer. But on the 15th of September following the French miniſtry delivered a memorial to Lord Albemarle; by way of confutation of that delivered on the part of his Britannic Majeſty; in which counter-memorial they deny moſt of the facts laid to the charge of their governor and officers in Canada and Acadia; and ſpeak of the limits of the province of Nova Scotia in the moſt quibbling manner.

Other operations of the French court in North America.

The French did not confine their operations of war to the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia. This was only the fagg end of their grand American ſcheme. The ſtrength and riches of their mother country were found to increaſe in proportion to their power and trade in the Weſt Indies: and they were as fully ſatisfied, that their ſugar iſlands could not be ſupported, with the deſirable advantage, unleſs they could be ſupplied with proviſions, lumber and other neceſſaries from the plantations, under the dominion of France in North America. Such is the natural connection of thoſe two parts of the new world; which puts

A. D. 1750. our enemies upon meaſures to procure thoſe conveniences by intrigue, breach of faith, miſinterpretation of treaties, unjuſt claims, uſurpations and encroachments in times of peace, which they could not obtain by treaty, or by force and arms. They purſued this plan, for many years, by erecting a cordon of forts and garriſons on our back ſettlements, from the bay of Fundy, in Nova Scotia, to fort du Queſne, on the confines of Virginia: and, when they diſcover'd the inattention of the Engliſh miniſtry towards thoſe encroachments, at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, they immediately prepared to carry on their approaches towards the ſea; ſtrengthen'd and increas'd their fortifications; augmented their forces on the continent, and proceeded in every other manner, as people determin'd to carry their point by ſurpriſe; as thoſe regions on the ſouth of the bay of St. Lawrence did not [o] fall under the article of diſputable points to be decided by commiſſaries: tho' the ſeveral provinces under the Britiſh dominion had, from time to time, remonſtrated to their court, in the ſtrongeſt terms, againſt the French practices amongſt our Indian allies, and their encroachments on our territories.

Theſe new friends, to confirm us in a belief of their ſincerity, not only took theſe early ſteps to eſtabliſh their own trade and intereſt upon more certain grounds, than the faith and courteſy of their neighbours; but they glanced at every object, which appeared in favour of Great Britain,

[o] See 15th article of the treaty of Utrecht.

to

to render it abortive, and to avail themſelves of our miſcarriages. A. D. 1750.

Immediately upon the concluſion of the peace, the miniſtry attempted to efface ſome of the popular diſlike, they had incurr'd thereby, with certain parliamentary regulations for the improvement of commerce. Amongſt theſe was the monopoly of our African trade to the coaſt of Guinea; by which our plantations and ſugar iſlands are ſupplied with negroes; and a very extenſive traffic is carried on for Britiſh manufactures. This monopoly, in the African company, was become extremely obnoxious to the nation in general; but more particularly to the merchants adventurers in thoſe ſeas; who having made their allegations good before parliament, the trade was made free and open, and the protection of that navigation and trade was committed to the crown. Parliamentary reſolutions concerning the African trade.

The benefits of theſe national reſolutions ariſing to our ſugar iſlands, plantations and manufactures could not eſcape the envy of the French. They look'd upon this parliamentary act to be intended for the ſupport of an excluſive right to the trade of Guinea, to which the French could pretend no claim by right of diſcovery: but now inſiſt upon a ſhare, under the ſole argument, that as the ſea is free, they have a right to trade on that coaſt, as well as the Engliſh. M. Durand was ſent to London from Paris on this errand, to try what might be done by intrigue and bold aſſertions: And in the mean time the French court encouraged their merchants to fit out ſhipping for the African The French take umbrage thereat. Endeavour to get it from England.

A. D. 1750. and Guinea trade, with promiſes to ſupport them with ſufficient force againſt the Engliſh [p].

Thus France was covering her hoſtile deſigns under the proſpect of a fallacious peace, and preparing to act with vigour, could Great Britain be lulled aſleep in an inſidious ſecurity, or chain'd down to the continent of Europe, by the part ſhe would be obliged to take in the quarrels of the northern and German powers, could their diſputes be, in any wiſe, blown up into a ſtorm.

Remonſtrances from America againſt their hoſtile behaviour.

The affair of Tobago, and the like uſurpations on St. Lucia, and the other neutral iſlands, were repreſented by the Governor, &c. of Barbadoes to our court [q]. The Governor of the infant colony of Nova Scotia tranſmitted his complaints of the hoſtile obſtructions thrown in the way, by the French, to the peaceable ſettling of that province. And ſuch remonſtrances were ſent from the other colonies in North America, as repreſented the imminent danger, to which they were expoſed, from the continual encroachments of the French.

Tranſmitted to Paris.

The Britiſh court tranſmitted theſe accounts to the Earl of Albemarle, their ambaſſador at Paris,

[p] The French ſent twelve merchant ſhips, under convoy of two men of war, to the coaſt of Guinea, on which were embarked 250 pieces of cannon, and a large quantity of ammunition and proviſions, to eſtabliſh forts, &c. in thoſe parts.

[q] Having firſt tried to bring the Marquis de Caylus to reaſon, by ſending the Cheſterfield and Richmond men of war, and Speedwell ſloop, to deter him from ſuch proceedings, but without effect.

with

with proper inſtructions on the reſpective heads of complaint againſt thoſe acts of violence; ſo contrary to the letter and tenor of the late treaty, and to the conduct of Great Britain. And by this time the ſtorm, which had ſeemed gathering in the North, on which depended the final reſolution of the French miniſtry, in regard to the meaſures they were to keep with Great Britain, being blown over, or rather prevented by the vigilance, activity and ſtrength of the King of Pruſſia, whoſe deſtruction appears to have been threatened by a treaty ſigned, about this time, between Vienna[r] and Peterſburg; though the Czarina's intermedling with the ſucceſſion of Sweden, and its form of government was the public pretence for ſo many armaments; they took the ſhorteſt way to exculpate themſelves to our Ambaſſador, by abſolutely diſavowing the proceedings, of their Governor Caylus, on Tobago, &c. and of their Commander in Acadia; and further the French miniſtry promiſed, that, if it ſhould be proved that any thing of ſuch a nature was in agitation, immediate orders ſhould be given to put a ſtop thereunto. And in order to induce a belief of their ſincerity in this declaration, they indirectly accuſed the Governor of Barbadoes's account of fiction or miſrepreſentation, by aſſuring our miniſter, that no body had been ſent to Tobago from Martinico;

A. D. 1750.

Diſavowed by France.

[r] Importing, that if either power ſhall be attacked in any part of its dominions, by chriſtians, or infidels, the other ſhall immediately march 50,000 auxiliaries according to the terms ſtipulated in the convention.

A. D. 1750. tinico; and that they were well informed, that the battery complained of, and the two ſhips of war, which were upon the coaſt, to defend the entry, were the ſole work and property of certain privateers, lately put out of commiſſion; and that meaſures ſhould be taken to puniſh them, and to prevent the like for the future.

No redreſs, but further grounds of complaint.

Nevertheleſs the Marquis de Caylus continued to keep poſſeſſion and to fortify Tobago, in the ſtrongeſt manner, and with the utmoſt diligence. For, by advices from Barbadoes, dated July the 24th 1749, it appears, that ſeveral families were then tranſporting themſelves and effects from Martinico, and that the French Governor had declared, he would not give it up. And when Commodore Holbourne, with the Roſe Captain Bladwell, and the Jamaica ſloop Captain Galbreath ſailed to Martinico, with the King of France's orders, as delivered to our Ambaſſador at Paris, to be forwarded by the Britiſh miniſtry, by the way of Barbadoes, to M. Caylus, for the immediate evacuation of the iſlands of St. Lucia, Dominico, St. Vincent and Tobago, and appeared with thoſe diſpatches on the coaſt of that iſland; a boat was ſent off, to forbid their landing. Whereupon the Commodore ſent his diſpatches aſhore by his ſecretary and Captain Bladwell, charging them to enquire the reaſon, why they were not permitted to land? To which the commanding officer, that acted upon the occaſion, anſwered, that it was by the order of M. Caylus, who was repreſented to be a conſiderable diſtance from his place of reſidence,

at

at that juncture; and that the Commodore ſhould have a final anſwer in twelve hours. But this was only a fineſſe in the Governor to gain time: For M. Caylus was really upon the ſpot: who, after ſome conſultation, ſent orders for the Engliſh ſhips of war to depart from that coaſt, he [M. Caylus] having no orders from his maſter about evacuations. A. D. 1750.

Commodore Holbourne withdrew, and ordered the Taviſtock to call by the way at the iſland of St. Lucia; where alſo the Captain had the mortification to ſee the Britiſh flag inſulted with a command from the French to depart in twelve hours: which he was obliged to obey. Such was the good faith of our new friends.

M. Caylus, having thus eluded the orders of his court, tranſmitted by the way of England: but ſatisfied, that, if an expedient could not be ſoon deviſed, in favour of his maſter's pretenſions, he ſhould be obliged to comply with a repetition of the late orders, had recourſe to a treaty of accommodation, by which he endeavoured to draw the Governor of Barbadoes into a direct acknowledgment of the French King's equal right and title to that iſland of Tobago, with his Britannic Majeſty, by a clauſe importing, "That the Kings "of Great Britain and France, ſhall entirely pre-"ſerve their reſpective pretenſions to this iſland, "&c." By which Great Britain would have been miſled into a conceſſion of a right claimed by the French to that iſland, and given the conferences of their commiſſaries greater weight in that caſe, than

M. de Caylus's attempt to draw us into a conceſſion prejudicial to his Britannic Majeſty's right and title.

A. D. 1750. than all the proofs drawn from hiſtory and treaties; and furniſh'd them with a plauſible pretence at any time to ſeize upon that iſland, ſhould nothing be concluded by the commiſſaries. However, though the deception was ſeen through, this negociation ſo far anſwered the purpoſes of the French, as to procraſtinate and puzzle, as much as poſſible, in expectation of a more favourable opportunity, or to gain ſome advantage by equivocal, or unguarded expreſſions.

During this negociation another incident happened, which was the death of M. Caylus, to drive off the evacuation. For, advices from Barbadoes of the 24 June following relate, That not only Caylus, but his ſucceſſor M. Point Sable was alſo dead, without taking one ſtep to evacuate the iſlands; and that the French continued to clear the lands in Tobago, and to complete their ſettlements with negroes, and every neceſſary for people determined to maintain their footing.

The inclination of the French court for the neutral iſlands put them upon another expedient, when they had ſpun their thread of negociation, as long as it would bear, at Martinico. A demand of ſatisfaction for an inſult pretended to be committed upon the Galathea, a French frigate, by the Governor of Nevis, was thrown in the way, and magnified in ſuch a manner, as to make it a ſufficient remora to the above mentioned evacuations.

The behaviour of the French in regard to Nova Scotia was equally as trifling, inſincere and fallacious.

cious. The Britiſh court backed their remonſtrances with the moſt authentic and unconteſtable proofs [s] of their King's title to Acadia within its ancient limits. The French temporized; it was not yet a time to renew the war. They endeavoured to ſtop the preſent clamour with ſtrong aſſurances of preventing the like to come. But, theſe promiſes and orders were made and executed with juſt as little ſincerity and punctuality, as thoſe relative to the neutral iſlands. Inſtead of laying down their arms and withdrawing from their encroachments, the French built a fort on the neck of the Peninſula called Bay Verte, another on the north of Bay Fundy, and a third on the river St. John, within the limits of Nova Scotia; and added both force and treachery to diſturb and to diſcourage the new ſettlers in that province. For, Captain Bartlo reconoitring the country about Chiconecto, with a party of Rangers, fell into an ambuſh of French Indians, who killed him, took an enſign, and alſo took, and killed, 13 private men; and then joined Monſ. Le Corne, who hoiſted the French flag on the other ſide of the river, and declared he had orders to defend all to the northward, as the property of the French

A. D. 1750.

The French continue their hoſtilities in Nova Scotia.

[s] The Lords of trade and plantations produced an act whereby it appeared that *all* the Indian Chiefs within the whole extent of Acadia, took an oath of fidelity to King George I. in 1725, agreeable to the treaty of Utrecht, which was tranſmitted with the remonſtrances againſt the French encroachments, to the Earl of Albemarle for the peruſal of the French court.

A. D. 1750. Treacherous dealings towards Captain Cobb.

King. Captain Cobb, who commanded a ſloop in the public ſervice, hovering off St. John's in Nova Scotia, had alſo like to have fallen a ſacrifice to thoſe ſame people. The French decoyed him aſhore under a friendly pretence. But he was preſently ſurrounded, and made a priſoner by a band of Indians, who threatned to kill him. In the mean time a French officer, going aboard, attempted to get poſſeſſion of the ſloop by way of ſecurity or ranſom for the Captain's life; which ſo exaſperated the mate, or Lieutenant, that he declared his reſolution to defend the ſloop; and further, that he would hang him, meaning the French officer, as a treacherous villain, if Captain Cobb was not immediately releaſed, and ſent on board: which had its deſired effect.

Ignorance of the Britiſh m—y concerning the bounds of North America.

As for their other encroachments and uſurpations, our miniſtry were ſo deficient in their knowledge concerning the juſt limits of the Britiſh provinces on the ſouth of St. Lawrence's, and for many years ſo regardleſs of their ſecurity and protection; and the French ſo artful in their deſcriptions, and pertinacious in their claims, that they paſſed almoſt unnoticed, till the Ohio company rouſed them from that American lethargy, which had for many years ſeized upon the Britiſh cabinet.

Ohio company a means to inform them.

The merchants intereſted in that company, ſeconded the remonſtrances of the provincials ſo warmly, that the miniſtry began ſeriouſly to ſet about the means to ſettle the differences left undecided by the definitive treaty, and to enquire into

into the nature and reality of the French encroachments, especially on the banks of the Ohio. Of which we may look upon the following act of hostility committed by the Governor of Canada, and the proceedings thereupon to be full evidence. A. D. 1750.

In the year 1750, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, Governor of Canada, sent several detachments of troops, not only to Acadia or Nova Scotia, but to the country upon the Ohio; where they seized four English traders, confiscated their goods, and sent them by the way of Quebec to Rochelle in Old France, where they were cast into the common goal. These prisoners having found means to represent their case and situation to Lord Albemarle then at Paris, his Lordship transmitted the same to Lord Holderness, Secretary of State, at London, in the manner following: Hostilities begun by the French on the Ohio.

Paris March 1, 1752.

"I must acquaint your Lordship, that in the month of November last, I received a letter from three persons, signing themselves, John Patton, Luke Irwin and Thomas Bourke; representing to me, that they were Englishmen, who had been brought to Rochelle, and put into prison there, from whence they wrote; having been taken by the French subjects, who seized their effects, as they were trading with the English and other Indians on the Ohio, and carried prisoners to Quebec; from whence they have been sent over to Rochelle; where they were hardly used. Lord Albemarle's letter concerning three English prisoners taken on the Ohio.

Upon

A. D. 1750. Upon this information I applied to M. St. Conteſt, and gave him a note of it, claiming them as the King's ſubjects, and demanding their liberty, and the reſtitution of their effects, that had been unjuſtly taken from them.

Theſe three perſons, I find by the paper your Lordſhip has ſent me, are of the number of thoſe demanded of the French by Mr. Clinton, and named in M. de la Jonquiere's letter. I have wrote to a merchant at Rochelle to enquire after them, and to ſupply them with money, to make their journey hither, if they are not gone; that I may receive from them all the informations neceſſary, on my ſeeing M. St. Conteſt next Tueſday. I will repreſent the caſe to him, in obedience to his Majeſty's commands, that la Jonquiere may have poſitive orders to deſiſt from the unjuſtifiable proceedings complained of; to releaſe any of his Majeſty's ſubjects he may ſtill detain in priſon, and to make ample reſtitution of their effects. And I ſhall take care to ſhew him the abſolute neceſſity of ſending inſtructions to their ſeveral Governors, not to attempt any ſuch encroachments for the future."

Another letter on the ſame account. Accordingly Lord Albemarle, by a letter dated the 8th of March, further writes to Lord Holderneſſe, "That he had ſeen M. Rouille, delivered to him a note of the ſeveral complaints he had orders to make againſt M. de la Jonquiere's conduct, and told him, in general, the contents of it; inſiſting, for the preſervation of a good under-

underſtanding between the two crowns, upon the neceſſity of ſending ſuch poſitive orders to all their governors, as might effectually prevent, for the future, any ſuch encroachments on his Majeſty's territories, and committing ſuch violence on his ſubjects, as had been done in time paſt; adding to this remonſtrance, that he hoped, they would be taken into conſideration quickly, that he might be able to give him an anſwer next week, or as ſoon afterwards as he poſſibly could. A. D. 1750.

That M. Rouille had promiſed to uſe his beſt endeavours for that purpoſe; and aſſured him that it was the intention of the court of France to prevent any diſputes ariſing that might tend to alter the preſent correſpondence between the two nations, and it might be depended upon that ſuch orders ſhould be ſent to their Governors accordingly." M. Rouille promiſes redreſs.

At the ſame time Lord Albemarle mentioned this affair to M. Rouille his Lordſhip delivered him a memorial, which among other things, complained, "Of the French encroachments on the Ohio, and demanded that the moſt expreſs orders ſhould be ſent to M. de la Jonquiere to deſiſt from his unjuſt proceedings, and in particular to cauſe the fort, which they had undertaken to build on the river Niagara, to be immediately razed, and the French and others in their alliance, who may happen to be there, to retire forthwith; as likewiſe to ſet the ſix Engliſhmen, whom they had made priſoners at liberty, and to make them ample ſatisfaction for the wrongs and loſſes they Lord Albemarle's memorial.

have

A. D. 1750. have ſuffered; and laſtly, that the perſons who have committed theſe exceſſes, be puniſhed in ſuch a manner as might ſerve for an example to thoſe, who ſhould venture on any like attempt."

Though theſe remonſtrances and complaints were founded upon the moſt notorious acts of hoſtility; they produced no other effect than the releaſe of the 3 priſoners at Rochelle. No reſtitution, nor reparation of damages was ever made, or intended by France for the loſſes ſuſtained by the Britiſh ſubjects. And the French court were ſo far from calling Jonquiere to an account, or reſtraining him from purſuing his encroachments, that he was encouraged to complete the uſurpations he had begun on the back of all our provinces in North America: for he had prepared a conſiderable army for that ſervice, and was, when death prevented him in March 1752, to execute his intentions for that purpoſe: and it might have convinced the Britiſh miniſtry of the inſincerity of the court of France in all their anſwers to our grievances, that the blame did not reſt upon M. de la Jonquiere; for, his ſucceſſor M. du Queſne was immediately diſpatched with the ſame inſtructions; and did not abate, in the leaſt, the diligence, with which his predeceſſor had ſpread the terror of the French power in that vaſt continent; and carried their encroachments every day further and further; confiding in their ſucceſs of deceiving the Britiſh court with fair promiſes.

Commiſſaries appointed

Commiſſaries were appointed, and ſent to Paris well inſtructed and provided with irrefra-

gable proofs of his Britannic Majeſty's right and title to the diſputable articles, referred to their cognizance and determination by the definitive treaty; the Lords of trade and plantations having ſearched every treaty and record, both on the part of England and France, that could be produced equitably in that debate, by way of proof. A. D. 1750. to ſettle limits, &c.

France, which never intended to terminate an affair, in which they were ſure to be worſted, had avoided, as much as poſſible, this appointment; and received the Engliſh commiſſaries with ſo much coolneſs and backwardneſs, as promiſed no happy iſſue to their conferences. How reliſhed by France.

William Shirley and William Mildmay, Eſqrs. opened their commiſſion at Paris, on the 21ſt of September 1750, with a memorial reciting the twelfth article of the treaty of peace concluded at Utrecht, the 11th of April 1713; "Whereby "the moſt Chriſtian King agreed, amongſt other "particulars, to yield and make over by ſolemn "and authentic letters, or inſtruments, all Nova "Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient boundaries; "as alſo the city of Port Royal, now called An-"napolis Royal, and all other things in thoſe "parts, which depend on the ſaid lands, &c." And that in conformity to this treaty, the ſaid moſt Chriſtian King by his letters and authentic acts, ſigned with his own hand at Marli, dated in the month of May 1713, "did yield up for ever "to the ſaid late Queen of Great Britain, the "ſaid country of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in its "entire, conformable to its ancient limits, as alſo Commiſſion opened by Britiſh commiſſaries.

A. D. 1750. "the city of Port Royal, now called Annapolis "Royal, and generally all that depends on the "ſaid lands, &c, to be poſſeſſed for the future in "full ſovereignty and propriety, with all the "rights acquired by him the ſaid King, and his "ſubjects, by treaty or otherwiſe, by the ſaid "Queen, and the crown of Great Britain, mak- "ing over to her, to this effect, full and entire "poſſeſſion for ever."

Bounds of Nova Scotia or Acadia demanded by his Britannic Majeſty.

Then the ſaid commiſſaries declared what thoſe limits are, which they demanded on the part of Great Britain, as the true boundaries of the ſaid territories of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in its entire, conformable to its antient limits; namely—"On "the weſt towards New England, by the river "Penobſcot, alias Pentagoet, beginning at its en- "trance and from thence drawing a ſtraight line "northward to the river St. Lawrence, or the "great river of Canada.—On the north by the "ſaid river of St. Lawrence, going along the "ſouth ſide of it to Cape Roſiers, ſituated at its "entrance.—To the eaſt by the great gulph of "St. Lawrence, from the ſaid Cape Roſiers, "running ſouth-eaſtwards by the iſlands of Ba- "calao or Cape Breton, leaving theſe iſlands at "the right; and the gulph of St. Lawrence and "Newfoundland, with the iſlands belonging "thereto, on the left, unto the Cape or Promon- "tory called Cape Breton.—And to the ſouth by "the great Atlantic ocean, drawing to the ſouth- "weſt from the ſaid Cape Breton, by the Cape "Sable, taking in the iſland of that name, round

"about

" about the bay of Fundi, which goes up eaſtward " to the country, at the entrance of the river Pe- " nobſcot, alias Pentagoet." A. D. 1750.

Theſe were the limits, which they offer'd to prove were the ancient boundaries intended by the treaty above-mention'd: And agreeable thereto the Britiſh commiſſaries demanded all the lands, continents, iſlands, bays, coaſts, rivers and places, compriſed within the ſaid limits, or dependant on the ſaid Nova Scotia or Acadia, bounded as above, with the ſovereignty, &c. which the Chriſtian King, &c. ever had in the ſaid lands, &c. as belonging to the crown of Great Britain, by virtue of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, without reſervation or diminution; including alſo the lands or territories weſtward, between the rivers Penobſcot and Kennebequi, which the French had pretended, at divers times, to be a part of the ſaid Acadia; tho' the ſaid lands did always belong to the crown of Great Britain.

Then the commiſſaries concluded with a demand, That neceſſary orders ſhould be diſpatched for the due execution of the ſaid twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, agreeable to the true intention and ſpirit of the ſame, as alſo for the withdrawing of all the eſtabliſhments made by the ſubjects of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, if any there might be within the limits, as above [t].

On the part of France were appointed La Galliſſoniere and De Silhouette, who by a reſcript of Commiſſaries on the part of France, their anſwer.

[t] See the memorials of the Engliſh and French commiſſaries, 4to. vol. I. p. 3, &c.

A. D. 1750. the ſame date pretended and affirm'd, That by ceding Annapolis Royal, diſtinctly by itſelf, it appears not to have been compriſed within the ancient limits of Acadia, according to the moſt ancient deſcriptions of the country, and conſequently, that the ancient Acadia made but a part of the peninſula ſo called. That the iſland of Canſeau being ſituated in one of the embouchures of the gulph of St. Lawrence, could not be ceded by his Chriſtian Majeſty, as part of Acadia: And that nothing had been altered by the treaty of Utrecht, in regard to the limits between New France and New England, from what they were before that treaty. And by another memorial theſe French negociators fix the ancient limits of Acadia, from the extremity of la Baye-françoiſe, depuis le Cap de Sainte-Marie, or le Cap Fourchu, then along the coaſt as far as Cap Canſeau [u].

Limits of ancient Acadia, according to the French account.

This proceeding obliged the Britiſh commiſſaries to deſcend to particulars, and on the eleventh of January 1751, they deliver'd a very long memorial [w] concerning the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, to evince the truth of thoſe limits, deſcribed, and demanded, by them, in their memorial of the 21ſt of September laſt, and to demonſtrate his Britannic Majeſty's juſt title to all the lands, &c. comprehended within them, by authentic facts and concluſive evidence; they being able to ſupport every part of their claim, not only from ſeveral declarations and acts of ſtate, on the part of the crown of France; but alſo,

The nature of the proofs for the King of Great Britain's claim.

A. D. 1751.

[u] Ibid. p. 10, 11. [w] Ibid. p. 13, &c.

from

from the uniform poſſeſſion of that crown, for many years, both before and after the treaty of Breda; which crown, as often as it claim'd and poſſeſs'd Acadia, claim'd and poſſeſs'd it in that extent, and with the ſame limits they demand it. A. D. 1751.

The French commiſſaries, in their memorial [x], above-mention'd, by way of diſcouragement, held out a plan to ſhew the difficulties, with which they could embroil, and the length, into which they were able to protract theſe conferences; and thereby the little ſucceſs the Engliſh had to expect from them. They, to the looſe manner, in which they anſwered our demand of the entire country of Nova Scotia or Acadia, added a memento of the claims their maſter had on us in other places: and that the definitive treaty did not confine their conferences to the limits of Acadia only, but empower'd them to ſettle the limits of all their other colonies, and all other matters left undecided at Aix-la-Chapelle. The evaſive reply of the French.

But inſtead of diſcouraging, they hereby drew from the Engliſh commiſſaries the following ſpirited declaration: "With reſpect to the boundaries of any other dominions belonging to the two crowns in America, it is ſufficient for us to ſay, That the preſent diſcuſſion is confin'd ſingly to the limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia: But ſhould any difference of opinion hereafter ariſe in deciding what are the limits of any other of his Britannic Majeſty's territories in North The ſpirited anſwer of the Engliſh commiſſaries.

[x] See ibid. p. 11.

A. D. 1751. "America, our maſter, the King of Great Britain, deſirous on the one hand, in no inſtance, "to break in upon the rights of his neighbours, "will on the other be found ready to aſſert and "vindicate his own [y]." Concluding their long memorial, which has connected, in a moſt judicious and impartial manner, every fact and evidence eſſential to the matter in queſtion, with this juſt and ſenſible challenge [z]: "As the poſſeſſion "of Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient limits, was finally determin'd to Great Britain, "by the execution of the treaty of Utrecht; "what were thoſe ancient limits is the only matter now in diſpute; and as we have aſcertain'd "the limits, with which his Majeſty claims Acadia or Nova Scotia, under that treaty, and produced our proofs of that claim, it is equally "incumbent on the commiſſaries of the court of "France to ſet forth particularly the limits, "which the court of France would aſſign as the "true limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, and to "produce their proofs in ſupport of them."

Thus ſtood the caſe of the diſputable article concerning the limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, ſeemingly more embarraſs'd, by the French tenaciouſneſs, than ever; which join'd to the complaint of their not having fulfilled that article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, concerning the demolition of Dunkirk, prognoſticated no long continuance of the peace between the two crowns.

[y] Ibid. p. 65. [z] Ibid. p. 81.

To

To ſpin theſe conferences out to the greateſt length, the French commiſſaries, without taking any notice of the affair of Acadia or Nova Scotia, produced on the 11th of February 1751, N. S. a memorial concerning the neutral iſland of St. Lucia, only; which is ſet off with a preface or preamble to prejudice the reader in favour of the French claim to St. Lucia and Tobago, and to diveſt Great Britain of all right to St. Dominico and St. Vincent; alledging, with a good grace, that they could produce ſufficient proof of the former; and that they did not doubt, but it would be admitted, That the two nations had guaranteed the two latter to the native Caribbees, under the protection of France. A. D. 1751. French memorial concerning their King's title to St. Lucia, &c.

They argue firſt from priority of diſcovery; and, laying that title down, as valid by the laws of nations, they attempt to prove an equal good title from a poſſeſſion taken of any country or iſland deſerted, and not reclaim'd, by the other nation, in whom was the original right of diſcovery. Their proof founded upon deſertion.

To ſhew this to be the caſe of the iſland of St. Lucia, they affirm, That the Engliſh had been driven off, and had abandoned that iſland; having ſuffered a maſſacre by the natives: and that the French ventured their lives to ſecure its poſſeſſion, and had maintain'd their footing againſt the ſavages, twenty years before the Engliſh reclaim'd any right to the ſaid iſland; pretending that this poſſeſſion had been acknowledged by ſeveral treaties: That the Engliſh had made uſe of the French

A. D. 1751. to make their peace with the ſavage Caribbee iſlanders; and that the French had never quitted the iſland of St. Lucia; but had always kept up a ſucceſſion of governors and commanders upon it, without any impeachment of their right; and promiſe to prove theſe aſſertions by evidence from cotemporary hiſtories, and from authentic inſtruments and papers.

Their political inſinuation about ſincerity.

But, with a craft peculiar to thoſe, who intend to deceive, the French commiſſaries put on an air of uncommon ſincerity and reſpect, "deſiring "the Engliſh to read this memorial and the others, "intended to be laid before them, without pre- "judice, without partiality, with that ſpirit of "equity which ought to direct the actions of two "ſuch great and puiſſant nations. That being "the only means to arrive at the truth, whoſe "diſcovery would be of infinite importance for "their reciprocal good and tranquillity, and "which the commiſſaries of each nation ought to "make their only object." [a]

Detected.

How far we may admit of the ſincerity of the French commiſſaries in this addreſs, their candour in the recital of facts will explain. They ſuppreſs the orignal diſcovery of St. Lucia by the Engliſh, and won't allow any account thereof, till Sir Thomas Warner took poſſeſſion of it in the year 1626; and that by this Warner's agreement a French adventurer, D'Eſnambuc, who divided St. Chriſtopher's with him, return'd to France, and obtain'd for himſelf and others a charter, not only for the iſland of St. Chriſtopher, but for Barbadoes

French pretences to a right by diſcovery alſo detected.

[a] Ibid. vol. II. p. 7, &c.

and

and the other neighbouring iſles, from eleven degrees to twenty, within which parallel lies the iſland of St. Lucia. Whereas it was not till the year following, that the firſt public and authentic act appeared for the eſtabliſhment of the Engliſh property of this iſland, by a charter granted to the Earl of Carliſle. A. D. 1751.

This being their only proof for poſſeſſion and title by priority of diſcovery; their next attempt is to ſhew that in the infancy of our adventures amongſt theſe iſlands of the new world, both the Engliſh and French would frequently attempt a ſettlement, and be obliged to leave it for a nation more able than themſelves to maintain its poſſeſſion. Thus, ſay they, the French tried to ſettle Antigua and Montſerrat; but theſe firſt adventurers abandoning theſe iſlands, the Engliſh entered upon and kept them. So in like manner, they infer, the Engliſh attempted in 1639 to ſettle St. Lucia, but not being able to ſupport themſelves againſt the native ſavages, they were forced to abandon it in the year following: And the French immediately took poſſeſſion of the ſame.

As the whole of the argument in ſupport of the French claim, turns upon this principle [b], let us cut it ſhort, and, after ſtating the right, which the King of Great Britain has to that iſland of St. Lucia, examine its validity by authentic facts, and ſtrictly juſt concluſions drawn from them.

The Engliſh commiſſaries replied [c], with a be-

[b] See the memorial in vol. II. p. 3, &c.

[c] Ibid. p. 45, &c.

coming

A. D. 1751. coming dignity, That they were perfectly convinced, that while they conſider'd the memorial with temper, diſintereſtedneſs and a ſpirit of equity, recommended to them by the French commiſſaries, and preſerved this temper, they were conforming to the intentions, and executing the commands of their maſter, who came into this negotiation from the motives of juſtice and friendſhip; deſirous on the one hand, in no inſtance to encroach on the rights of France, determined on the other to maintain his own; and ſenſible at the ſame time, that in all caſes, where two ſtates, at peace and in alliance, have inconſiſtent pretenſions on the ſame dominion and territory, nothing is more ſure to preſerve that peace, and to perpetuate the alliance, deſired by both, than the bringing ſuch claims to an amicable deciſion.

Equity and ſincerity of the Engliſh.

They then proteſt againſt the pretended guarantee of the iſlands of St. Dominico and St. Vincent, and produce evidence that St. Lucia was diſcovered by three ſhips fitted out by the Earl of Cumberland in 1593, and ſettled in 1605 and 1606 by a colony of Engliſh, under the direction of Sir Oliph Leaph: which was ſtrengthen'd a few years after by another colony ſent by Sir Thomas Warner, in 1626, who appointed major Judge Governor of that iſland. This deſtroys the French title by priority of poſſeſſion or diſcovery.

Anſwer every argument of the French memorial.

By ſhewing our priority of diſcovery.

As to the commiſſion or patent to d'Eſnambuc and others, it is, ſay the Engliſh commiſſaries, worded in ſuch a manner as to induce a belief, that

St.

St. Lucia was not ſo much as known to the French at that time (1626). It does not ſo much as mention the name of ſuch an iſland, which appears in the Earl of Carliſle's, under the form of an old colony; and therefore no title can be drawn from that commiſſion; whoſe ſilence of ſuch a place ſhews at leaſt, if it was known to the French, that they conſider'd it to belong to the Engliſh. A. D. 1751.

As to acquiring a right of poſſeſſion by the removal of a prior ſettlement, it is anſwer'd in this caſe; That in the year 1640, in the month of Auguſt, the ſavage natives of St. Lucia overpowering the Engliſh colonies, killed the Governor, and deſtroyed all that came in their way with fire and ſword. Such, as eſcaped this maſſacre, fled away to Montſerat. Which is the forſaking or abandonment, the French chiefly found their title upon. For, it was immediately [d] after, in this very year 1640, that M. du Parquet, not without ſuſpicion of being a chief abettor in that bloody ſcene, carried a colony of 35 or 40 effective people to St. Lucia, and built a fort, &c. to protect them, and to aſſure their uſurpation againſt the Engliſh, ſhould they return with force. By denying the deſertion of St. Lucia.

It is undeniably evident, That the deſertion of the iſland, by the Engliſh, was not voluntary, but forc'd upon them by an unhuman maſſacre, and therefore the property could not be loſt by the flight of thoſe who eſcaped; but it remain'd in the nation, to which they were ſubjects, to reclaim and repoſſeſs, when time and opportunity ſhould

[d] Within a month. See ibid. p. 69, 71.

ſerve.

A. D. 1751.

ſerve. Accordingly Lord Carliſle, in the midſt of our deſtractions at home, ſent over ſeveral Engliſh in the years 1644 and 1645: But neither theſe, nor another armed force, ſent againſt thoſe uſurpers in 1657, were able to make good their landing: who kept their uſurpation till the year 1664; when Col. Carew, with a regiment of ſoldiers, drove the French off, regain'd poſſeſſion, and was made Deputy-Governour of the iſland under Lord Willoughby [e].

What is the law of derelic-tion.

Now, as to the law of dereliction: That ſuch a law is neceſſary, is allow'd; but then it muſt be a law, eſtabliſhed on the conſent of all nations, to prevent extenſive countries from being withheld from the common utility of all people, upon a pretence, in any one, of a right to that which they uſe not, and to prevent frequent wars being perpetually carried on in ſupport of uncertain and revived titles. And this law is not to be founded upon an act of neceſſity; but upon an act of choice and conveniency [f].

Therefore, there can be no abſolute dereliction of a country, but where the laſt poſſeſſor leaves it voluntarily, and without any apparent neceſſity. To make ſuch dereliction in one people a foundation of right in any other coming after them, it is neceſſary that the acquieſcence of the firſt power under the poſſeſſion of the latter, be an acquieſ-

[e] Ibid. p. 73.

[f] Pro derelicto habetur, quod dominus eâ mente abjecerit, ut id in numero rerum ſuarum eſſe nolit; ideoque ſtatim dominus ejus eſſe deſinet. Ibid. p. 83.

cence intended voluntary and clearly manifeſted. So that a deſertion, forced upon any people by an enemy, or a temporary acquieſcence under that expulſion, occaſion'd by neceſſity, cannot extinguiſh the right of any people to the country they ſo abandon. Which was the very caſe of the Engliſh in the year 1640 at St. Lucia [g]. And in conſequence, all the arguments drawn from a ſucceſſion of Governors, and bargains and ſales, &c. are of no conſideration. A. D. 1751.

As to the whole of their argument we may form the beſt conceptions of their evidences from the declaration, with which the Engliſh commiſſaries wind up their reply; "We, ſay thoſe commiſſaries, "have gone thro' the hiſtory of his Majeſty's an- "tient, uniform, and clear right to the iſland of "St. Lucia: We have ſhewn that this right began, "and was eſtabliſhed, by a diſcovery and ſettle- "ment made many years before the French, upon "the teſtimony of their own writers, had any "knowledge of the Caribbee iſlands; and that it "was uninterruptedly continued and kept up by "all proper and ſufficient acts of government, "and, in later times, it has more than once re- "ceived the final ſanction of treaties; at the ſame "time making it appear, That the commiſſaries "of France have nothing to oppoſe to this right, "but pretences of early diſcovery and poſſeſſion, "which their own hiſtorians overturn; or, a "temporary ſettlement, gained by an uſurpation, "which the law of nations will not juſtify; or, Obſervations on all the French proofs.

[g] See ibid. p. 85.

"a re-

A D. 1751. "a remote conſtruction of treaties, inconſiſtent "with both the letter, intention and ſpirit of "them: and therefore think themſelves warrant- "ed to conclude with a renewal of that aſſertion "they began with," That "*the right to the iſland* "*of* St. Lucia *is not in the crown of* France, *but* "*in the crown of* Great Britain." [h]

Conduct of the French in theſe conferences.

The expedition of theſe conferences being now entirely in the power of the French commiſſaries, they did not deliver in their memorial of proofs concerning the moſt Chriſtian King's title to Nova Scotia or Acadia, till the fourth of October 1751, and then it was made up of ſuch materials as both, for their matter and form, ſhew'd that they paid no regard to truth, and were only intended to gain time for backing their negociations with an effectual naval and military power, ſent, in the moſt ſecret manner, to cover and ſecure, for the French crown, the places under debate.

Hoſtilities continued by the French in the Weſt Indies.

During theſe conferences the French kept up the ſame hoſtile ſpirit, as before. They pretended that his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty had willingly agreed to a proviſional and conditional evacuation of the Neutral Iſlands: but this boaſted evacuation amounted to no more, than a ſuſpenſion of arms; for the French ſtill kept poſſeſſion of their forts and ſettlements on thoſe iſlands.

In Nova Scotia.

Their Indian allies alarmed the very city of Halifax by an incurſion [i] to the town of Dartmouth,

[h] See the memorial preſented by the Engliſh commiſſaries, 15th of Nov. 1751. p. 149. vol. II. printed at London.

[i] 27th of March 1751.

oppo-

oppoſite to that metropolis, which they plundered, and left reeking with the blood of the Engliſh inhabitants, beſides making a number of captives. A. D. 1751.

And they made ſuch progreſs in their practices with our Indian allies on the back of the other provinces in North America, that theſe alſo received arms from the French, and were perſuaded by them to break their treaties with England, and not only to commit the moſt horrid murders and outrages upon the outſettlers, but to penetrate within a few miles of Charles Town, in South Carolina. [k] On the Ohio.

On the coaſt of Guinea Commodore Buckle, in his Majeſty's ſhip Aſſiſtance, with the St. Alban and Sphynx, in the beginning of 1752, found three French men of war, one of 64, the others of 54 and 24 guns, tampering with our friendly natives at Anamaboa, by preſents and an offer of 15,000l. ſterling, for liberty to build a fort there. Commodore Buckle obliged them to deſiſt and retire. But the French promiſed the natives better preſents and more money, and to viſit them in ten months time. Their attempt on the coaſt of Guinea. A. D. 1752.

By this time alſo the malignity of the intentions of the French in the Eaſt Indies was detected by ſeveral authentic accounts of their hoſtilities, renewed againſt the Engliſh and their allies. M. Dupleix had acquired great power and riches for himſelf, and gained ſuch an acquiſition of ſtrength and trade for his country by a new alliance [l] with the Marattoes, that it was determined, in all outward appearance, to make uſe of theſe allies to ruin the Engliſh Eaſt India company. In the Eaſt Indies.

[k] In September and October 1751.

[l] In 1750.

A. D. 1752. The contended ſucceſſion to the government and kingdom of Arcot gave the French Governor of Pondicherry a favourable opportunity to diſguiſe his real intentions, and to ruin the Engliſh on that coaſt under the name of juſtice, and of auxiliaries to an exiled family: a game, which the French court has often played in Europe, by invaſions and rebellions in Great Britain and Ireland. M. Dupleix in poſſeſſion of the Pretender to the kingdom of Arcot, at the time peace was concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, and foreſeeing the vaſt advantages ariſing from the improvement of ſo lucky an incident, when he had no oppoſition to fear from the Engliſh, fettered by the faith of the late treaty, he joined the Pretender Muzapherzing with ſix hundred Europeans and a train of artillery.

Upon what pretence.

The reigning Nabob was ſlain in the defence of his capital: his eldeſt ſon fell into the hands of the French and their allies; Mahomed Allee Cawn eſcaped to Tritchinopoly; and Arcot, and the whole province, ſubmitted to the arms of the invaders; who, afraid to alarm the Engliſh too much, at once, returned to Pondicherry, till Admiral Boſcawen, who was ſtill on that coaſt, and expreſſed himſelf with great reſentment againſt the French Governor on this occaſion, ſhould ſail for Europe.

The Engliſh fleet under that Admiral's command departed for England on the 21ſt of Oct. 1749; and next day the French and their allies took the field, and raiſed contributions all over the

Take the field.

the country. The French troops were commanded by Mr. Law, nephew of the famous Miſſiſippi Law. The King of Tonjore refuſing to acknowledge the uſurper Muzapherzing, they beſieged his capital, which was defended with much bravery; till the Engliſh, finding it neceſſary to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the French, and to prevent an increaſe of power in an oppreſſive neighbour, that muſt at laſt have proved their ruin, and were ſolicited by Mahomed Allee Cawn to aſſiſt him in defence of his right, ſent Captain Cope with a detachment from Fort St. George to Trichinopoly; who, being joined [m] by a large army of horſe [n] under the command of Nazirzing, Vice Roy of the Deckan, obliged them to raiſe the ſiege and to return to Pondicherry. A. D. 1752. Oppoſed by the Engliſh.

Being reinforced with 2,000 Europeans, a numerous body of Sepoys, and a large train of artillery under the command of M. d' Auteuil, they again took the field, and marched to ſeek Nazarzing. This obliged the Engliſh to ſend another detachment from Fort St. George, conſiſting of 600 men, under the command of Captain Lawrence, who has favoured the world with this account, accompanied by Mr. Weſtcott, one of the council, by way of commiſſary, to manage the conduct of the allies for the intereſt of his nation.

Nazirzing appointed Captain Lawrence Generaliſſimo of his army; and both armies were ready to engage, when the French General's heart, begin-

[m] At Waldore, in February 1750.
[n] 30,000 men, 800 cannon.

A. D. 1752. ning to fail him, had recourſe to ſtratagem, in hopes of prevailing with the Engliſh to ſtand neuter in the time of action. M. d' Auteuil ſent a meſſenger to General Lawrence, to acquaint him,

French ſtratagem to defeat the Engliſh. "That although they were engaged in different "cauſes; yet it was not his deſign, nor inclina- "tion, that any European blood ſhould be ſpilt: "but that, as he did not know the poſt of the "Engliſh, he could not be blamed ſhould any of "his ſhot come that way, and hurt the Engliſh." To which General Lawrence ſent back this anſwer: "I have the honour of carrying the Engliſh co- "lours on my flag-gun; which by a proper look- "out will direct where the Engliſh are poſted. "But whatever your deſign and inclination may "be, I am reſolved, if any ſhot come my way, "to return them; though I ſhould alſo be very "loath to ſpill European blood."

The cannonading began, and M. d' Auteuil, like a true Frenchman, fired a ſhot directly over the heads of the Engliſh: which General Lawrence ordered to be returned by three guns well pointed, to convince him, that the Engliſh were not to be cajoled or terrified into a ſtate of inactivity, at ſo critical a juncture, when a defeat of their friendly Indians would put the French in poſſeſſion of all the inland country, circumſcribe the Engliſh within the walls of their ſea ports, and cut off their commercial intercourſe with the natives.

Miſcarries. This reſolution had its effect. M. d' Auteuil having nothing to hope for, from his ſtratagem to keep the Engliſh inactive; and not daring to riſk

the

the iſſue of a battle with ſuch a numerous army, ſo well ſupported by the Engliſh, he decamped, and retreated with his Europeans and Sepoys, in the night, leaving behind eleven pieces of heavy artillery, with part of his artillery-men, in order to conceal his real deſign; for, he gave out that he was marching to alarm the camp of the enemy, by night, and would be back in the morning. A. D. 1752.

Thus deſerted, the French allies were immediately attacked and routed with a moſt ſhocking carnage by Nazirzing; and it was with the utmoſt difficulty that the Engliſh ſaved ſome of the French gunners from the fury of the Moors. The Engliſh General committed the wounded to the care of his own ſurgeons; and provided for them all with a humanity and generoſity becoming an Engliſhman. But in return for this friendly diſtinction, M. Dupleix laid hold of it, by way of proof that the Engliſh had broke the peace, by making them priſoners; and wrote a long proteſt againſt General Lawrence for that purpoſe. Which the poor French artillery-men, that ſurvived, ſenſible of their obligation to the Engliſh, effectually confuted, by gratefully acknowledging their tender uſage of them, and confeſſing that their lives were entirely owing to the forcible interpoſition of the Engliſh General. Humanity of the Engliſh.

Nazirzing had in his army a body of 3,000 men under the command of one Morarow, a kind of freebooters, and ready to execute any deſperate ſervice. Having completed his victory over the forces of his native enemies, he the ſame

A. D. 1752.

night diſpatched this corps in purſuit of M. d' Auteuil, whom he overtook and obliged him with great loſs to haſten his march into Pondicherry.

M. Dupleix's plot.

From this moment M. Dupleix, convinced he ſhould never be able to carry his point, againſt the Engliſh and their friendly Indians, by a ſuperiority in the field, determined to try the ſucceſs of intrigue, and the baſeſt treachery. He engaged Muzapherzing to make an inſidious ſubmiſſion to Nazirzing, that he might be always at hand to facilitate the intended conſpiracy againſt the Vice Roy's life; which M. Dupleix looked upon to be the greateſt obſtacle to his ſucceſs. He alſo found means by fair promiſes of aid and great rewards, to gain Nazirzing's prime miniſter, and the Nabobs of Cadapah and Condanore, to be parties in the treaſon againſt their ſovereign; while they amuſed the Vice Roy with flattering hopes of an accommodation by Ambaſſadors, ſent with a public character, that they might more effectually concert meaſures with the chiefs of the conſpiracy, at his court.

Means to carry it into execution.

The only thing the conſpirators dreaded was the power of the Engliſh auxiliaries; Therefore means muſt be contrived to get rid of them: which the prime miniſter, the Vice Roy's favourite, undertook to bring about, without giving his maſter any ſuſpicion of a deſign to weaken his army. He knew that the Engliſh could not be prevailed with, in ſuch circumſtances, to leave their ſettlements and frontier bounds expoſed to their enemy's force; which would be the caſe, provided they ſhould follow

follow his maſter's army to Arcot. He therefore, A. D. 1752.
ſo wrought upon his maſter's paſſions, that determined him to take the rout of that city, and to leave the Engliſh under a neceſſity to return home.

At Arcot the court was ſo conducted, as to gratify his paſſions for women and hunting, and to take away his attention from buſineſs, and the deſigns plotted againſt him. In which ſtate of ſecurity the Vice Roy was kept, till rouſed by freſh hoſtilities, which attacked the corps of Morarow, and put them to rout; and ſurprized the fortreſs of Trividy, only 16 miles weſt from Fort St. David.

A new requiſition was made by Nazirzing for a detachment of Engliſh from Fort St. George; who marched under the command of Captain Cope: but the Vice Roy poiſoned by his prime miniſter, treated them with ſuch indifference and prevarication, that they, for want of pay, were ſoon obliged to ſeparate from his army, commanded in chief by the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn. As ſoon as the departure of the Engliſh was known, the French and their allies attacked the Nabob's camp, and gained a complete victory; the Nabob himſelf eſcaping with great difficulty. This victory was followed with the ſurrender of the ſtrong town of Gingee. The conſpirators improved this loſs ſo pathetically, as to make it an argument for Nazirzing to take the field in perſon to oppoſe the progreſs of his enemies. Thus under the pretence of recovering Gingee, and chaſtiſing his enemies, they brought the Vice Roy

A. D. 1752. before that town, in the teeth of the French and their allies, encamped under the cover of the guns on the ramparts. The tragical ſcene here began.

The plot executed. The French had agreed to attack that part of the camp occupied by the two traitorous Nabobs; and their troops had inſtructions to make no reſiſtance. The Nabobs had alſo perſonally engaged, on their part, to aſſaſſinate their Sovereign Nazirzing, at his firſt appearance on the alarm. The attack was no ſooner begun, but the two Nabobs made directly for Nazirzing's tent, and meeting him, as he came out, intreated him to mount his Elephant, and haſten to puniſh the rebels. But whilſt the credulous and unfortunate Prince was preparing to follow their advice, one of them ſtabbed him with a poinyard, and the other ſhot him with a piſtol. His head was immediately ſevered from his body, fixed upon a ſpear, and carried to his competitor Muzapherzing, whom the murdered Prince had brought with him, as a ſtate priſoner; and whom the rebels, taking the advantage of the confuſion and panic of the army, placed upon the Elephant prepared for the deceaſed, and proclaimed him Vice Roy of the Deckan, without any material oppoſition; every friend of his country endeavouring to provide for his own ſafety, at a time they did not know, who were to be truſted. While the natives were thus employed, the French puſhed forward to Nazirzing's tents, where they found vaſt riches in money and jewels; out of which they raiſed immenſe fortunes; but none ſo great

as

as M. Dupleix's; who from this time looked upon himſelf to be the richeſt ſubject in Europe. And ſuch was his ambition, that in memory of this maſſacre he cauſed a town to be built upon the ſpot, called *Dupleix Fatea bat*, the place of victory. A. D. 1752. How M. Dupleix got immenſe riches.

The conſequences of this ſucceſs to the French were moſt extraordinary. The government of Arcot, with its dependencies, was given to their faſt friend Chunda Saib, and Dupleix himſelf was aſſociated by the new Vice Roy to ſhare the government with him.° His Power.

Nothing ſeemed now to ſtand in the way of the French ſcheme of ſuperiority, but the eſcape of Mahomed Allee Cawn, who, at the firſt hearing of the aſſaſſination, made the beſt of his way, without any attendants, and got ſafe to Trichinopoly; imploring the aid of the Engliſh, who ſent him a ſtrong detachment under Captain Cope. By this aſſiſtance Trichinopoly was defended, this whole year: and by another detachment of about 300 Europeans and 500 Sepoys, officered by gentlemen, that had never been employed in a military capacity, under the command of Captain Clive, the city of Arcot, the capital of the province, was ſurprized on the 1ſt of September. This was made more glorious by the defence of their conqueſt; in a ſiege of two months by a large army, and conducted by European engineers. At laſt the town was aſſaulted in breach, in three different places; but Clive's little garriſon beat the enemy Captain Clive's heroic actions begun.

° January 1751.

A. D. 1752. off with considerable loss; and the Captain taking advantage of their confusion, sallied out, and following the blow, took all their cannon and levelled their trenches: Being immediately reinforced with a detachment from Trichinopoly, he pursued the French and their allies till he gave them a total overthrow at Cauverypauk, in the month of March 1752, and did not halt till he had reduced the Forts of Timery, Cauverypauk, Aranie and Conjeveram.

The conspirators disagree and quarrel.

But this was not the only mortification of the enemy. The two Nabobs, that assassinated Nazirzing, thinking themselves neglected in the distribution of rewards, and growing jealous of the power of the French and their connection with Muzapherzing, mutined in their march to Aurengabad, the usual residence of the Princes of the Deckan; and though not strong enough to master the French, who consisted of 600 Europeans, 3,000 Sepoys and a large train of artillery under the command of M. Bussy, charged with a commission to place Muzapherzing in possession of his new acquired Vice Royship; they fell upon the flank of Muzapherzing's troops, defeated them and killed Muzapherzing himself; with a great loss of their own party and the life of the Nabob of Condanore, one of Nazirzing's murderers.

From this time the war was continued with various success. The French and their allies, attempting to prevent Colonel Lawrence's entrance into Trichinopoly, were severely handled, and obliged to retreat, and soon after to surrender prisoners of

war

war to the ſaid officer, who took meaſures, when reinforced, to cut off the enemy's communication with the country, from whence they were ſupplied with proviſion. They were commanded by Mr. Law, and according to Mr. Dupleix's account were 20,000 in all, including 600 Europeans, Topaſſes and Coffrees. A. D. 1752.

This was followed with the ſurrender of the poſt of Elmiſeram, after a faint reſiſtance. But the French having, by a falſe report of a large convoy of ſtores to be on a certain day at Outatour, about 15 miles from a Pagoda, where Mr. Clive had taken poſt, drawn out that active officer with the chief part of his men, in expectation to ſurprize it; they, adviſed of his march, detached a conſiderable number from their army, with orders to march after dark, and to make their attack on the party left for defence of the Pagoda, at day light. Captain Clive not finding at Outatour any advice of a convoy, as reported, ſuſpected the report as it was really intended; and therefore after refreſhing his men, returned with the utmoſt expedition, and regained his poſt at the Pagoda about eleven at night; no enemy appearing, his men went to reſt, and himſelf retired to his Pallankeen. So that at four in the morning, when the French arrived before this poſt, they found all quiet; and ignorant of Captain Clive's return, they advanced, and by the help of deſerters from the Engliſh, they deceived the guard left there in the morning; who having challenged them, and being anſwered

Captain Clive's bravery, danger and ſucceſs.

friends,

A. D. 1752. *friends*, were not convinced of their miſtake till the Sepoys began to fire.

The firing rouſed the garriſon: Capt. Clive ran immediately to the place of action, and was ſo confuſed, at firſt, that he ran amongſt the French Sepoys, who were puſhing into the Pagoda, and, thinking they were endeavouring to ſkreen themſelves from an attack, repremanded them in their country language, demanding what they were firing at. A French officer cut at him with his ſword; but Mr. Clive cloſing with the Frenchman, received the blow from him ſo near the hilt, that it did no execution: and one of his own Sepoy officers, coming accidentally to his relief, cut the French officer down.

Captain Clive thus providentially ſaved and diſengaged, hurried in ſearch of his own men, and found them under arms. But the French had got poſſeſſion of the poſt. He then formed his detachment, marched to the Pagoda, and after ſummons to ſurrender, which the French rejected, he prepared to ſtorm it. But the French made a ſally, in which their officer was killed, with a few more: the reſt ſurrendered at diſcretion. The Sepoys in the French intereſt, who remained without the Pagoda, endeavoured to eſcape by flight, but were purſued by the Marratta cavalry, and cut all to pieces.

The ſiege of Pitchunda was undertaken; and the garriſon in three days ſurrendered themſelves priſoners of war. A party [p] of French, under

[p] Thirty officers, five men, 300 ſepoys, and 300 horſe.

the

the command of M. D'Auteuil, were firſt driven by Captain Dalton from Outatour, which the French deſerted in the night, and were made priſoners, with a large quantity of ſtores, at Volconda by Capt. Clive, on the 29th of March. A. D. 1752.

Such a ſeries of misfortunes, which had deprived the French allies of ſupplies both in proviſions and money, determined great numbers of the Indian army in the French intereſt to come over to us. Amongſt whom was one of their Generals, Coop Saib, with a thouſand horſe, a large body of Sepoys and fourteen elephants. Even Chunda Saib, the grand partizan of the French, was ſo diſpirited, as to throw himſelf into the hands of our allies; who thinking it unpolitic to let ſuch a dangerous man go out of their poſſeſſion, but not agreeing to whoſe care he ſhould be committed, ſome of Monagee's, the King of Tanjore's General's people, cut off his head [q], unknown to the Engliſh commander. French deſerted by ſome of their allies.

Capt. Law, who defended Seringham, ſurrendered by capitulation to the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn, on the ſame day Chunda Saib was decolated, and Captain Dalton took poſſeſſion of that town, in which he found 30 pieces of cannon, ten of which were 18 and 12 pounders, the reſt field pieces; two large mortars, a number of cohorns, and a great quantity of ammunition, and all kinds of warlike ſtores.

M. Dupleix was not eaſily caſt down. His pride ſupported him, and at the ſame time, ſays M. Dupleix's conduct.

[q] On the 3d of June.

my

A. D. 1750.

my author[r], his mind was full of reſources. The injuſtice of his cauſe never diſturbed him; and provided he could gain his ends, the means never gave him any concern. His council was chiefly compoſed of his own creatures, who never diſputed what he propoſed. He was married to a woman, endowed with as much ſpirit, art and pride, as himſelf; born in the country, miſtreſs of all the low cunning peculiar to the natives, and well ſkilled in their language.

At the ſeaſon Law was obliged to ſurrender, the ſhips from Old France arrived with a large reinforcement; which, as it indicated the hoſtile intentions of the French court, encouraged M. Dupleix to proceed with the utmoſt vigour to execute their grand project of dominion. And that he might not want a pretence for his hoſtile conduct, which ceaſed with the life of Chunda Saib, lately beheaded, Dupleix raiſed up another Pretender to the province of Arcot; and that he might ſeem to have an unbounded right to appoint, whom he pleaſed, he gave out that the Mogul had ſent him commiſſions, declaring him Governor of all this part of the Carnatick, from the river Kriſtnah to the ſea. Which was a mere forgery.

Uſurped power.

The young Pretender was Raja Saib, the ſon of Chunda Saib; but this youth having neither money, nor intereſt with his country-people, was ſoon obliged to reſign his Nabobſhip to the Governour of Velloure, whom Dupleix, by virtue of

[r] Col. Lawrence's Narrative, p. 41.

his

his pretended commiſſions from the Mogul, raiſed to that dignity for a valuable conſideration in money. But after truſting Dupleix with three lack of rupees, not finding any effect likely to enſue to his own advantage from a mere title, he ſtopt his hand. A. D. 1752.

The French forces were now conſiderably augmented, not only by the reinforcements from Europe, but by preſſing all the ſailors from the China ſhips, that touched at Pondicherry, committing their navigation to Laſcars. Our force was rather upon the decline. Nevertheleſs the Governour of Madraſs concerted the ſiege of Gingee; a ſtrong place by art and nature, on the weſt of Pondicherry, well garriſoned and well provided; beſides being moſt difficult of acceſs amongſt mountains well fortified: which ended in a repulſe, with conſiderable loſs of men and officers. Major Kinner, who commanded the detachment, was wounded, and died of a fever and flux, before he was recover'd of his hurt. Siege of Gingee concerted, and miſcarries.

This advantage ſo puffed up the French Governour, that he order'd all his forces to take the field, and to march cloſe to the bounds of Fort St. David. Which motion alarmed the Engliſh. The troops in St. David's were order'd to encamp without the walls, and Capt. Schaul's company of Swiſs were ſent from Madraſs in boats; but were intercepted by a ſhip ſent by M. Dupleix, carried into Pondicherry, and there detained priſoners of war, in open violation of the peace [s] between England and France. M. Dupleix's orders to ſeize Engliſh troops.

[s] In Auguſt 1752.

Such

A. D. 1752. Such an open hoſtility only ſerved to animate the Engliſh; as it made the French principals in the Indian war, and would juſtify our more vigorous operations againſt their forces. General Lawrence took the field before St. David's on the 7th of Auguſt with 400 Europeans, 1700 Sepoys, 4000 of the Nabob's troops and nine pieces of cannon. The French army, commanded by M. de Kerjean, nephew of M. Dupleix, conſiſted of 400 Europeans, 1500 ſeapoys and 500 cavalry, encamped at Trichanky Pagoda; who being ſo near, as to diſcover our preparations for an attack, ſtole away in the night to Bahoor; and, ſeeing themſelves purſued, they retreated to Villanour, within three miles of Pondicherry. But, finding it impoſſible to force them to an action, unleſs he ſhould follow them into their own bounds, which he had no orders to do, the Engliſh Commander had recourſe to a ſtratagem, to decoy the French back again, with a ſuppoſition, that his retreat from their bounds was a token of fear and want of courage: and accordingly M. Dupleix ſwallowed the bait, and by a peremptory order obliged his nephew to purſue the Engliſh to Bahoor, two miles from fort St. David, and to riſque a battle.

Conduct of the Engliſh on that occaſion.

Defeat the French. This was juſt what the Engliſh Commander wanted; who on the 26th of Auguſt at two in the morning, got under arms, and march'd up to the enemy's camp, and advanced firing; the French ſtanding their ground, till our bayonets met. Then our grenadiers puſh'd with ſuch fury, that the

the French threw down their arms and ran for it, leaving the Engliſh maſters of the field, all their baggage, eight pieces of cannon, and all their ammunition, tumbrils and ſtores, with the loſs on our ſide of one officer killed, four wounded, and 78 men killed and wounded. A. D. 1752.

This victory was followed by the ſurrender of fort Covelong, about 16 miles S. of Madraſs, and fort Chengalaput, about 40 miles from that ſettlement; which, tho' exceeding ſtrong, almoſt encompaſſed by a moraſs and ſurrounded with two walls, whoſe ramparts are 16 feet thick, a wet ditch fenced with ſtone ſixty feet wide, quite round the outward fort, and another half round the inner, ſurrendered on the firſt of Auguſt, to a ſmall party commanded by Capt. Clive. Its conſequences.

In Europe the countenance with which the court of Spain tolerated the ſeizure, and ſearch of Britiſh ſhips in the Weſt Indies; and the notorious advantage given to the French trade in Spain, in preference to the Engliſh; and the diligence, with which the navy of Spain was order'd to be increaſed; exemplified of how great power the influence of the French was, at that time, in the court of Spain; and that the Spaniſh miniſtry were reſolved, ſooner or later, to join all their force with France againſt Great Britain, ſhould matters end in a rupture between thoſe crowns, and France ſtand in need of the navy and treaſure of Spain, as the event has ſhewn, to extricate her from the arms of the conqueror. Conduct of Spain towards Great Britain.

Every

A. D. 1752.

Barbarities of the guarda coſtas.

Every packet, from the Weſt Indies and our plantations, brought freſh accounts of the obſtruction our commerce, in thoſe parts, met with from the Spaniſh guarda coſtas, which had been civil for a while. Theſe arm'd veſſels ſwarm'd on the coaſt of Coracoa, and in the ſummer 1752 took all veſſels, that fell in their way, without reſpect of perſons, amongſt which was a ſloop belonging to Coracoa coming from Aruba [t]. John Gaſney, maſter of the ſhip Eagle of Boſton, ſailed from Port Royal in Jamaica on the 20th of May 1750, bound for Coracoa in ballaſt and five negroes; but meeting with tempeſtuous weather, violent ſquals and tornados, with calms and a ſtrong current weſtward, was forced to the leeward of the iſland of Ratan, where he fell in with a Spaniſh half galley of eight guns and ſixty-five men, and a ſloop of eight guns and ſeventy men, commanded by Don Publo Gracia Tolon, who fir'd four ſhot thro' his ſails and rigging, and order'd him immediately to lie too, and go on board of his ſloop, or he would board him and cut him and his people to pieces. The maſter, furniſhed with proper papers to ſhew he was upon a lawful trade, complied with the Don's commands. But was detain'd on board the Spaniard in a hoſtile manner: and while he was kept under arreſt, the Spaniards ſeized his boat, went on board the Eagle, then eight leagues from the ſhore; robb'd and plunder'd the ſhip's ſtores and proviſions; broke locks and cheſts, and in a wanton and ma-

[t] By letter from New York, Sept. 23, 1751.

licious

licious manner tore and deſtroyed every thing, that did not ſeem of ſervice to them [u]. But this was mild treatment compared with the caſe of Patrick Roney of the ſhip Diamond, who in his voyage from Port Royal in Jamaica to Charles town in South Carolina, was brought to, and boarded, off Cape Nicholas, by a Spaniſh ſloop; carried into Cape Nicholas Mole; rummaged, plundered of 3000 l. in money, and after being obliged, by threats to have his ears cut off, to ſign a paper he did not underſtand, was put on board a ſchooner and ſent to Jamaica [w]. A letter, dated July 16, this ſame year, from Providence in North America, relates, That the Cool from Jamaica to cape Fear, was arrived there in diſtreſs, occaſioned by her ill uſage from a Spaniſh guarda coſta, which brought her to, in the windward paſſage, and after a ſtrict ſearch, finding no money on board, the Spaniards were ſo exaſperated, that they uſed the people with ſuch cruelty, that there were only three men able to ſtand the deck; which obliged them to ſteer for Providence, to get able hands to carry the veſſel to the northward. All which depredations were approved of by the Spaniſh court. A. D. 1752.

In Spain itſelf our merchants in vain inſiſted upon the privilege of being treated with the ſame regard, as was paid to the moſt friendly nations Behaviour in Spain to Britiſh merchants.

[u] John Gaſney's depoſition at Kingſton in Jamaica.

[w] As appears by the oaths of Patrick Roney, John Holt, and Francis Welſh, ſworn before Thomas Hibbert, at Kingſton in Jamaica, 11th of January 1752.

A. D. 1752. settled in her ſea-ports, or elſewhere. For, advantageous tariffs were made with France, and the Britiſh commerce was loaded with ſo much more at the cuſtom-houſe, as enabled our chief rival in trade to under-ſell our manufactures and goods in the Spaniſh markets.

The appointments for the marine, and the meaſures purſued for making it reſpectable, promis'd, in a ſhort time, to fulfil their wiſhes. In 1752 it was confidently given out that the Spaniſh navy, before the end of the winter would conſiſt of 64 ſhips, from 60 guns and upwards, and 28 frigates.

The ſtrength of the Spaniſh navy.

Naval preparations in France.

The naval preparations were carried on in France with ſo much diligence and vigour, that, at Rochelle, it was denied a private Engliſh gentleman the requeſt to view the great dock at that port, in which only there laid, in the winter 1751, fifty ſail of men of war and frigates, beſides ſeveral ſhips of force upon the ſtocks.

Theſe accounts, it might be thought, ſhould have awakened the Britiſh miniſtry; to take into conſideration the actual ſtate of the naval forces of France and Spain, and the continual attention of thoſe powers to augment their marine, which could not poſſibly be intended againſt any other nation, than Great Britain. Beſides the French troops, ordered for the year 1753, which together made 211,755 men, diſcovered their hoſtile intentions.

Yet, his Majeſty at the opening of the parliament, on the eleventh day of January 1753, informed them, by a ſpeech from the throne, "That

A. D. 1753.

"all

"all his views and negociations had been calcu- A. D. 1753.
"lated and directed to preſerve and ſecure the
"duration of the general peace." And added, The King's ſpeech.
"That he had the ſatisfaction to be aſſured of a
"good diſpoſition in all the powers, that were
"his allies, to adhere to the ſame ſalutary object."
But as it could not be hid, that a war was una-
voidable, and that this nation was at the very eve
of a rupture, with her moſt formidable enemy,
the addreſs did not paſs in the Houſe of Com- How re-
mons, without ſome ſevere animadverſions on the ceived.
inconſiſtency of the ſpeech, with the real ſtate of
affairs in Europe; nor without many ſpirited de-
clamations againſt French perfidy and continental
connections.

But, ſo little regard was paid by the miniſtry Conduct of the miniſ-
to the apprehenſions of the nation, alarmed by try.
the meaſures purſued by France and Spain, in de-
fiance of the late treaty, that our forces by ſea
and land were continued in the low ſtate of the
preceding year. However, the parliament pro- Parlia-
vided for the maintenance of Nova Scotia [x] and mentary ſupplies.
Georgia, for the ſupport [y] of the caſtles on the
coaſt of Guinea, and for erecting [y] a new fort at
Anamaboe, where the French laſt year had at-
tempted, and threaten'd to return and to make
a ſettlement.

In the courſe of this year the French ordered French practices to keep up their pretenſions to the Neutral Iſlands.
croſſes and copper-plate inſcriptions, faſtened upon
large poſts, to be erected on the Weſt Indian
iſlands, not already ſettled by Europeans, con-

[x] 94,615l. 12s. 4d. [y] 16,000l.

A. D. 1752. taining the French King's arms, and theſe words, "A Continuation of the Poſſeſſion of Lewis XIV. King of France 1753." Which being diſcovered on Turk's iſland, Caicos and Haneaga, by Captain Julian Legge, of his Majeſty's ſhip Shoreham, he cut them all down, and brought them away: and leaſt the French ſhould miſuſe the Bermudians, who were on thoſe iſlands, when they ſhould find the marks taken away, he left the following declaration at each place; "To prevent "any violence being uſed to any of the people "who live on Grand-key, Salt-key or Seal-key, "it is thought proper to leave this declaration, "that we cut down the arms of the moſt Chriſ-"tian King, and the croſſes that were ſet up as "marks of poſſeſſion upon the ſaid iſlands, and "carried the ſame away, purſuant to inſtructions "for ſo doing: and further, That his Britannic "Majeſty will not ſuffer any marks of poſſeſſion "to be put up on any of the keys or iſlands "known by the name of Turk's-iſlands."

Conduct of the Engliſh on this occaſion.

On the 23d of January 1753. the Engliſh commiſſaries delivered their reply to a long, tedious and fallacious memorial of proofs produced by the commiſſaries of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty on the 4th of October 1751. In this reply they, in general, accuſe the French of going into a variety of conſiderations, not immediately connected with the point in diſcuſſion, and of an attempt to puzzle the debate by a confuſed method of dividing and arranging their materials. And, in particular, they in the firſt place proteſt againſt

Britiſh commiſſaries reply to the French memorial concerning Nova Scotia.

the leading principle in the diſcuſſion laid down by the French commiſſaries, That becauſe the peace of Utrecht ceded the country of Nova Scotia or Acadia to Great Britain, therefore no additional lights and evidence are to be brought from acts of government, treaties between two nations, or ſimilar ceſſions of the ſame territory, previous to the treaty of Utrecht, to clear up and enforce the true meaning and real intention of that treaty. A. D. 1753.

Then they proceed to ſhew, That the deſign of the crown of Great Britain, in the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, was not to ſecure an excluſive fiſhery, but to gain poſſeſſion of all Acadia or Nova Scotia, as a territory that would give ſtrength and intireneſs to the Britiſh ſettlement in North America [z]: and that the commiſſaries of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, by treating the object of the twelfth article concerning the territory of Acadia, and the thirteenth article concerning the fiſhery as one, they reſtrain the ſenſe of one part of theſe articles by confounding it with the other; firſt miſrepreſenting the views of Great Britain at the time of the treaty, and afterwards ſupporting their miſconſtruction of the words of the treaty by the help of that very miſrepreſentation.

But for as much, as the French commiſſaries accuſe the Engliſh of producing evidences foreign to the queſtion, in proof of their interpretation of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, concerning the antient limits of Acadia or Nova Scotia, they appeal to, and ſhew from the treaty of

[z] See Memorials, vol. I. p. 244, &c.

A. D. 1753. St. Germains, by which this ſame country was, with its antient limits, reſtored to France, that England then ceded the very ſame territory, and within the ſame limits, as now they claim under the title of the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht. They alſo refer to the treaty of Breda, where the crown of France made the very ſame claim upon Nova Scotia or Acadia, as Great Britain now does, and ſupported it upon the very ſame method of argument, and ſort of proof, which Great Britain now alledges, and which the French commiſſaries now condemn as foreign to the queſtion [a].

The French commiſſaries threw out ſeveral inſinuations, as if the King of Great Britain had no intention to come to any accommodation, for the mutual advantage of the ſubjects of the two crowns, inhabiting countries ſo diſtant from their reſpective ſovereigns: And that this claim, founded on the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, diſcovers an inclination in Great Britain to open a way to Canada, that ſhe might ſeize it on the firſt favourable opportunity.

The ſincerity of his Britannic Majeſty in this negociation.

The Engliſh commiſſaries reply, "That his "Britannic Majeſty was fully ſenſible of the ex"pediency and extreme ſatisfaction, that would "ariſe to the ſubjects of both crowns in North "America, from a final aſſertainment of the "boundaries of their reſpective dominions: that "he was alſo extremely deſirous of ſtrengthening "and perpetuating the preſent peace and good

[a] Ibid. p. 249.

cor-

" correſpondence, which ſubſiſts between the two " crowns, and of promoting, by every method in " his power, the amicable ſettlement of every " matter in diſpute between them; but then the " more important that intereſt is which his Ma- " jeſty hath in this queſtion, and the more re- " mote his ſubjects in America are from his per- " ſon, and the immediate reſidence of his govern- " ment, the more neceſſity does he judge it to " be, to maintain his actual rights, and to pre- " ſerve his juſt dominions in America intire, for " the encouragement, advantage and ſecurity of " thoſe very ſubjects; and that his Majeſty had " given the ſtrongeſt proofs of his willingneſs to " take proper meaſures in concert with France " for adjuſting all differences, when he acceded " to the preſent negociation, and continued to " act, to that moment, according to the ſtricteſt " juſtice and candour, when he claimed no other " poſſeſſion of Nova Scotia or Acadia in conſe- " quence of the treaty of Utrecht, than the crown " of France actually enjoyed by the treaty of " Breda, making the claim of France in conſe- " quence of that treaty, and the poſſeſſion of " France in conſequence of that diſputed claim, the " rule and boundary of his own pretenſions [b]."

A. D. 1753.

As to the inſinuation of Great Britain's hoſtile deſigns againſt Canada; the commiſſaries " ap- " peal to the late counſels and meaſures of Great " Britain, and the part ſhe has acted both in Eu- " rope and America: in many inſtances the pro- " tectreſs, but in none the invader of the rights

Had no hoſtile deſign againſt Canada.

[b] Ibid. p. 254, &c.

A. D. 1753. "of other nations, and who has never, at any juncture, or in any inſtance broke in upon the poſſeſſions of France in America, contrary to the laws of peace, and to the faith of ſtricteſt alliance and friendſhip." And then very ſenſibly and juſtly obſerve, "That the rights of one nation are not to be determined upon the apprehenſions of another: nor is Great Britain to have her poſſeſſion of Nova Scotia or Acadia narrowed or pared down to the idea of the French commiſſaries, and reduced to the ſouth-eaſt part of the peninſula, merely becauſe, if fully poſſeſſed and improved by Great Britain, it might give umbrage to the French ſettlements in Canada. Which would be to make Great Britain to hold this country by a ſtill more precarious and barren tenure, not even by the treaty of Utrecht, as the French commiſſaries themſelves explain it; but by the comparative ſtate of the French colonies in North America [c]."

The French commiſſaries charge the Engliſh of having poſſeſſed themſelves of Acadia in 1629 and 1654, times of full peace. This, ſay the Engliſh commiſſaries, was owing to a want of attention to the hiſtory of thoſe times. For, England declared war againſt France in 1627, which continued to the year 1632. And it is well known that Cromwell treated France, and looked upon her, as an open enemy from the year 1652 to 1655 [d].

[c] See Memorials, vol. I. page 257.

[d] Ibid. p. 259. See alſo Lettre de M. d'Eſtrades, vol. I. p. 289. Baſnage Annales des Provinces Unies, p. 352.

The

A. D. 1753. Anſwer to their proofs from maps.

The firſt proof produced againſt our claim is from certain maps of Acadia; which the French commiſſaries preſume to ſay are all on their ſide. In reply, it is urged, that this kind of evidence, in the caſe before us, is very inconcluſive: but nevertheleſs that it may be proper, *ad rem*, to obſerve that the moſt antient map extant of this territory, publiſhed by Eſcarbot in 1609, does not ſo much as mention the name of Acadia; therefore can't be produced in evidence by either party. But the map, which followed this in 1625, printed in the fourth volume of Purchaſe's Pilgrim; and is the firſt antient map that has the marks of knowledge and correctneſs in it, gives both the boundaries of every territory within it, and the limits of Nova Scotia or Acadia, in every particular, contrary to the deſcription of that country by the French commiſſaries: and therefore confutes the ſyſtem of the court of France, ſo far as the authority of one map goes.

Having ſupported this part of their reply by the maps of Laet in 1633, under the title of *Indiæ occidentalis Tabula Generalis* [e]: Of Berry, intitled, *North America divided into its principal* [f] *Parts*, in King Charles II's time: Of *Morden*'s *Engliſh Empire on the Continent of America* [g], in the ſame reign: Of Thornton, intitled, *A New Chart of the Sea Coaſt of Newfoundland, New Scotland, New England*, &c. [h]; which coincide with the

[e] See Memorials, vol. I. p. 269. [f] Ibid. p. 271.
[g] Ibid. [h] Ibid.

antient

A. D. 1753. antients limits demanded by Great Britain; and by four French maps[i] publiſhed by De Liſle, Bellen and d'Anville, which confine the country of New France to the northſide of the river of Canada, and mark out the limits between Acadia and New England to the weſtward according to the claim of his Britannic Majeſty; and the fourth by Champlain, which carries Acadia beyond the Peninſula, and makes Pantagoet the weſtern boundary of it; they further ſay, That Hennepin in his travels marks Acadia on the continent, between New England and the river St. Lawrence: That de Fer[k] the French King's geographer, in his Atlas, makes Nova Scotia and Acadia one and the ſame country; extending it to Canada northwards, and aſſigning the ſame extent of limits to them both; terminating the weſtern limit at the river Pantagoet: and that Gerdreville[l] in his Atlas makes Acadia to extend from the Kennebec to the iſland called Perſée at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence.[m]

Then having ſhewn what little authority the maps of Mr. Halley, Popple and Salmon are of,[n] the Engliſh commiſſaries conclude this part of the argument with the following obſervations:[o] That the more ancient maps abſolutely contradict and deſtroy the idea, which the French commiſſaries have of the ancient limits of Acadia: that there

[i] See Memorials, Vol. I. p 271.
[k] A. D. 1705.
[l] A. D. 1719.
[m] See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 275.
[n] Ibid.
[o] Ibid. p. 281.

is

is not a ſingle map to be found, not even amongſt the French maps, which does not expreſly confute the main and eſſential part of the ſyſtem of the French commiſſaries: That though they do not exactly mark out the antient limits, as the commiſſaries of his Britannic Majeſty contend for them, yet every map is a diſtinct and clear anſwer to the opinion of the French commiſſaries, as founded upon maps; becauſe every map differs from their deſcription of the antient limits, in ſome eſſential point, and all of them are inconſiſtent and irreconcileable with their general idea of them:——That many antient and modern maps in different countries ſupport the claim of his Britannic Majeſty, but no one can be found to authenticate in any degree, or in any one particular, the pretenſions of France. [P] A. D. 1753.

The ſecond authority, produced by the French commiſſaries in this caſe, is taken from Denys, Champlain and Eſcarbot, hiſtorians of North America.

From hiſtorians.

To which the Engliſh commiſſaries reply with a previous obſervation, That their adverſaries have cited theſe authors in a very uncommon and broken manner; and that the proof pretended to be drawn from theſe authors are founded upon general obſervations on their title pages, on marginal notes found in their works, and incorporated into them by the French commiſſaries; frequently on ſingle expreſſions detached from the context,

[P] See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 283.

and

A. D. 1753. and ſometimes upon the mere omiſſions of the name of Acadia, rather than upon the full and entire ſenſe of any paſſage in theſe writers fully and ſatisfactorily cited. By which means books may be made to carry any appearance.[q] They then proceed and examine each of theſe hiſtorians by taking every paragraph in queſtion entire;[r] and having gone through each author diſtinctly, they ſum up their evidence in theſe words: "We have "now examined all the French hiſtorians cited "by his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's commiſſaries to "eſtabliſh their ſyſtem of the ancient limits of "Acadia, and we think ourſelves authoriſed to "ſay, from this view of their ſeveral works, "that the Sieur Deny's commiſſion in 1654, and "that clauſe in particular which grants him the "ſedentary fiſhery on the coaſt of Acadia, marks "out the ſouthern bank of the river St. Law-"rence, as the northern boundary of Acadia, "and makes it extend as far to the weſt as New "England: That Mr. Champlain agrees with "the Sieur Denys in the northern limit of Acadia, "and makes *Sainte Croix within the weſtern limit "of it:* That Aſcarbot never aſſigns any limits "to Acadia, or even mentions the country: "And that, therefore, one of the only two hiſto-"rians, from which any evidence at all can be "collected, is a very full evidence in ſupport of "the whole claim of Great Britain; and the other "by aſſigning the ſouthern bank of the river St.

[q] See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 283.

[r] Ibid. p. 285.

"Lawrence

" Lawrence, as the northern, is authority alſo for " the weſtern boundary we aſſign as far as *Ste.* " *Croix*; and both confute the aſſertion of the " French commiſſaries, That theſe writers con- " fined the bounds of Acadia to the Peninſula."[s] A. D. 1753.

The French commiſſaries have recourſe to a proof founded upon this circumſtance, That ſeveral parts of the country, which his Britannic Majeſty claims as Acadia, have always paſſed under diſtinct names.[t] A method of proof calculated rather to confound than to confute: however the Engliſh commiſſaries put even this prolix and confuſed kind of evidence upon a thorough and diſtinct examination: and having refuted each particular, conclude, " That there is no real weight " in that argument founded upon the particular " names, which particular parts of Acadia have " borne different from the general country: And " that *New France* has from very early times been " the name given by the French writers, the " people and crown of France, to the French " territory in North America."[u]

Then they enter into a particular examination into the ſtate of the hiſtory of Acadia and the revolutions[w] it underwent from the year 1632, the date of the treaty of St. Germains, to the treaty of Utrecht: and upon the whole conclude their reply in this ſummary way: " All the evidence " brought by the French commiſſaries, in ſupport

The ſum of this argument.

[s] See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 325, &c. p. 327 to p. 399. p. 399 to 521.

[t] Ibid. from

[u] Ibid. p. 395.

[w] Ibid.

" of

A. D. 1753. " of their ſyſtem, has been demonſtrated to be " deſtructive to it, and applied in the ſtrongeſt " manner in maintenance of the claim of Great " Britain. And it appears upon the whole, that " the King of Great Britain, bringing no evi- " dences from ſources, that are not authentic, is " ſupported in his claim by every tranſaction be- " tween the two crowns for above a century paſt; " and that in claiming the country from Pantagoet " to the River St. Lawrence, as Acadia, his Bri- " tannic Majeſty demands no more than what " France has always received under that name in " the moſt general reſtitution; than what, if the " antient limits of it be determined upon maps, " hiſtorians, the uniform deciſions of the two " crowns for above one hundred years together, " and upon the declarations of the crown of " France at the treaty of Utrecht itſelf, the " crown of France muſt in all equity and fairneſs " acknowledge to be a juſt claim upon the words " of *ceſſion* in the treaty of Utrecht."

" The French commiſſaries, on the contrary, " are equally incapable of ſupporting their ſyſtem " and their limits upon the maps and hiſtorians " they cite, and upon the proceedings of govern- " ment, treaties and better evidence produced by " us. They dare not abide by any poſſeſſion ever " taken by France in conſequence of the moſt " general words of reſtitution; nor by the poſ- " ſeſſion of France for above an hundred years " ſucceſſively; nor by any declarations made by " the crown of France at the time of the treaty

" of

" of Utrecht; but ſetting aſide all theſe evidences, A. D. 1753.
" taken from times of certainty and preciſeneſs,
" they are obliged to have recourſe to maps and
" hiſtorians of leſs certainty in point of time, and
" leſs preciſeneſs from the nature of them: both
" which, when they come to be ſtrictly examined,
" abſolutely deſtroy their ſyſtem, fall in with the
" ſenſe and operation of the better and latter evi-
" dence of treaties and tranſactions between the
" two crowns, and become ſo many auxiliary
" proofs in ſupport of the claim of the crown of
" Great Britain." [x]

Here reſted the argument upon the claim of his Britannic Majeſty upon Acadia or Nova Scotia, according to the antient boundaries of that country, ceded by France in the treaty of Utrecht, and demanded by the Engliſh commiſſaries, as ſet forth in the premiſes [y].

French reply to the Britiſh memorial concerning St. Lucia.

It was the latter part of the year 1754 before the French commiſſaries delivered their reply to the Britiſh memorial concerning the title of his Britannic Majeſty to the iſland of St. Lucia: ſpun out to ſuch a length, as to prevent the amicable deciſion of that point by a clear and juſt examination of the matter it contained; for the French court had now ſo far entered into hoſtile meaſures, to defeat the ſtrength of the moſt convincing evidence in favour of his Britannic Majeſty's right, that the Britiſh commiſſaries were obliged to break up the conferences, and to return home,

[x] See Memorials, Vol. I. p. 541, &c. [y] See p. 50.

A. D. 1753. before they had time to examine and confute the pretended proofs of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's claim; in which the French had employed the like arts of chicanery and cavil, as you have ſeen in the caſe of Nova Scotia or Acadia.

Their proceedings in North America on the Ohio. M. du Queſne, who ſucceeded M. de la Jonquiere in the government of Canada, being charged with an immediate and vigorous execution of the expedition to ſubdue the country on the Ohio to the crown of France, detached the Sieur de St. Pierre early in the year 1753 with a ſufficient force to make a lodgment and to maintain his ground on the river Beuf, or Beef river, till reinforced: which St. Pierre performed; and he built a fort upon the ſpot in honour to M. du Queſne. Such a diſagreeable neighbour ſoon notified his acceſſion by the outrages committed on the back ſettlements of Virginia and Philadelphia, and more particularly by cutting off the Indian trade, and ſeizing upon our traders and their goods.

A meſſenger diſpatched from Virginia to the French at river de Beuf. In October 1753 the Governor and council of Virginia, having orders from England to repel force by force, diſpatched a meſſenger to examine the territory behind their ſettlement, and to explore the French encroachments and operations; who brought back an account, That there had been 1500 regular forces ſent to thoſe parts from Old France: That the French had built three forts upon the *Ohio*, on the lands lately granted to certain gentlemen in London, by the crown. That, as the French met with no oppoſition, they were reſolved to maintain their ground. This

advice

advice concluded with obſerving, That unleſs means were uſed to drive off the French, and likewiſe forts built on the banks of the Miſſiſippi by the Engliſh, the French would fortify themſelves in ſuch a manner, that it would not be in our power to expel them. A. D. 1753.

This report made by the provincial meſſenger appeared of ſuch an intereſting nature to the crown of Great Britain, that Governor Dinwiddie immediately [z] ſent the following letter by Major George Waſhington to the French Commander in Chief, at the fort on the river Du Beuf.

SIR,

THE lands upon the river Ohio, in the weſtern parts of the colony of Virginia, are ſo notoriouſly known to be the property of the crown of Great Britain, that it is a matter of equal concern and ſurprize to me, to hear that a body of French forces are erecting fortreſſes and making ſettlements upon that river, within his Majeſty's dominions. The *many* and *repeated* complaints I have received of theſe acts of *hoſtility* lay me under the neceſſity of ſending, in the name of the King my maſter, the bearer hereof, George Waſhington, Eſq; one of the adjutants general of the forces of this dominion; to complain to you of the encroachments thus made, and of the injuries done to the ſubjects of Great Britain, in violation of the law of nations, and the treaties now ſub- Governor Dinwiddie's letter to the French commander on the river du Beuf.

[z] October 31, 1753.

A. D. 1753. ſiſting between the two crowns. If theſe facts be true, and you think fit to juſtify your proceedings, I muſt deſire you to acquaint me, by whoſe authority and inſtructions, you have lately marched from Canada with an armed force, and invaded the King of Great Britain's territories, in the manner complained of; that according to the purport and reſolution of your anſwer, I may act agreeably to the commiſſion I am honoured with, from the King my maſter. However, Sir, in obedience to my inſtructions, it becomes my duty to require your peaceable departure; and that you would forbear proſecuting a purpoſe ſo interruptive of the harmony and good underſtanding, which his Majeſty is deſirous to continue and cultivate with the moſt Chriſtian King, &c.

ROBERT DINWIDDIE.

Major Waſhington's inſtructions and enquiries in his journey to river du Beuf.

Mr. Waſhington was alſo inſtructed to make a further and diligent enquiry into the French encroachments and deſigns. For this purpoſe, it appears by his journal on this occaſion, that he travelled by the way of Frederickſburg, Winchester and Will's Creek, and thence to the mouth of Turtle Creek on the river Monongahela; where he was informed of the death of the French General in Chief in thoſe parts; and of their troops returning into winter quarters.[a] From thence he paſſed to the forts of the Ohio, about 10 miles diſtant, where the Monongahela is joined

[a] It being the 22d of November.

by

by the river Alligany. On the 25th of November he met with a few French deſerters, from whom he got intelligence, That they were part of 100 men, ſent with eight canoes laden with proviſions, from New Orleans to Kuſkaſkas, with a promiſe of being joined there by an equal number of French from the Miſſiſippi, to convoy them and their ſtores up the river. That the French had built four ſmall forts, between New Orleans and the Black iſlands, garriſoned by 30 or 40 men, and a few ſmall pieces of cannon in each. That at New Orleans, near the mouth of the Miſſiſippi, there were 35 companies of 40 men each, with a fort of ſix carriage guns: And at Black iſlands,[b] a fort with eight guns, and ſeveral companies. They alſo acquainted him, that there was a ſmall palliſadoed fort on the Ohio, at the mouth of the Ouabach or Wabaſh;[c] a river, which heads near the weſt end of Lake Erie, by which the French on the Miſſiſippi, communicate with thoſe on the Lakes. A. D. 1753.

With theſe deſerters was an Indian trader, named Brown, who informed him further, that at Shanaoh town, he had met with a King of the *Six Nations*, from whom he learnt, That the French had built a fort on Lake Erie, and another on a ſmall Lake, about 15 miles aſunder, with a large waggon road between. That three nations of French Indians had taken the hatchet againſt the Engliſh. That the French had called all the

[b] Diſtant 130 leagues above the mouth of the Ohio.

[c] About 60 leagues from the Miſſiſippi.

A. D. 1753. Mingo's, Delawares, &c. together, and told them, that they had intended to be down the river, this fall, but were obliged by the inclemency of the ſeaſon, to defer their march till the ſpring, when they would certainly come with a much greater number; and threatning them with military execution, in caſe they would not remain neuter: for that they expected to fight the Engliſh three years, and did not doubt of ſucceſs, and of conquering all the lands on the Ohio.

Major Waſhington's arrival at the French ſtation, and reception.

Mr. Waſhington arrived at Verango, on the 4th day of December 1753, an old Indian town at the mouth of French Creek on the Ohio; where he found the French colours hoiſted at a houſe, from which they had driven Mr. John Frazer, an Engliſh ſubject; and met with Captain Joncaire, who was the French Commander of the Ohio; who received him courteouſly, and referred him to the General Officer of the next fort with his letter. However Joncaire kept him at ſupper, and after the glaſs had paſſed about chearfully, the French Captain told him, That it was their abſolute deſign to take poſſeſſion of the Ohio: And by G-- they would do it: For, though they were ſenſible the Engliſh could raiſe two men for their one, yet they knew their motions to be too ſlow and dilatory to prevent any undertaking of theirs; grounding the right of France to the river, upon a diſcovery made by one La Salle, about 60 years before: And agreeable to this converſation, they had ſeized all ſtraggling Engliſh traders, and had orders to make every perſon priſoner, who attempted

attempted to trade on the Ohio, or the waters of it: and now the Commandant returned the following anſwer to the Governor's letter. A. D. 1753.

SIR,

AS I have the honour of commanding here in chief, Mr. Waſhington delivered to me the letter, which you wrote to the Commander of the French troops. I ſhould have been glad, that you had given him orders, or that he had been inclined, to proceed to Canada to ſee our General; to whom it better belongs, than to me, to ſet forth the evidence and the reality of the rights of the King my maſter, to the lands ſituate along the river Ohio, and to conteſt the pretenſions of the King of Great Britain thereto. I ſhall tranſmit your letter to the Marquis Duguiſne, or du Queſne. His anſwer will be a law to me. And if he ſhall order me to communicate it to you, Sir, you may be aſſured, I ſhall not fail to diſpatch it forthwith to you. As to the ſummons you ſend me to retire; I do not think myſelf obliged to obey it. Whatever may be your inſtructions, I am here by virtue of the orders of my General; and, I intreat you, Sir, not to doubt one moment, but that I am determined to conform myſelf to them with all the exactneſs and reſolution, which can be expected from the beſt officer. I do not know that in the progreſs of this campaign, any thing has paſſed, which can be reputed an act of hoſtility, or, that is contrary to the treaties, which ſubſiſt between the two crowns; the continuation

The French commander's anſwer to Gov. Dinwiddie's letter.

A. D. 1753. whereof as much intereſteth, and is as pleaſing to us, as the Engliſh. Had you been pleaſed, Sir, to have deſcended to particularize the facts, which occaſioned your complaint, I ſhould have had the honour of anſwering you in the fulleſt, and, I am perſuaded, the moſt ſatisfactory manner, &c.

From the Fort Sur la Riviere au Beuf, December 15, 1753.

LEGARDEUR DE ST. PIERE.

British court complains of theſe hoſtilities, without effect.

Theſe hoſtilities were alſo tranſmitted to the court of Great Britain: and the complaints againſt them were exhibited in a memorial by the Earl of Albemarle the Britiſh miniſter at Paris: but without any other effect, than deluſive promiſes to curb and withdraw the cauſes of thoſe complaints. And the Britiſh miniſtry ſtill gave ſo much ear to thoſe vain pretences and excuſes, that they prevented his Majeſty, at the opening of the parliament on the 15th of November 1753, from taking proper notice of the French conduct towards his American ſubjects; and permitted him to declare, "That the continuance of the public tran-

King's ſpeech.

"quillity, and the general ſtate of Europe re-
"mained upon the ſame footing, as when they
"laſt parted; and aſſured them of his ſteadineſs
"in purſuing the moſt effectual meaſures to pre-
"ſerve to his people the bleſſings of peace."

A. D. 1754. The Governor of Virginia was convinced otherwiſe; and endeavoured, with a true Britiſh ſpirit, to prevail with the Virginians, and his neighbouring governments, to arm in their own defence, and to erect a fort on the Forks, to curb the French

French encroachments, and to defend the Britiſh traders and property. But for want of a national countenance and ſuccour, this ſcheme failed, and, inſtead of deterring the French from their deſigns, it ſerved only as a means to provide them with arguments to make the native Indians jealous, and to oppoſe the Engliſh. A. D. 1754.

Governor Dinwiddie prevailed at laſt with his province to raiſe 10,000l. and 300 men, to protect their frontiers: and the command of this ſmall regiment was given to Mr. Waſhington, a brave and prudent young gentleman, who began his march on the 1ſt of May, and on the 28th came up with a party of the French, took 20 priſoners, killed ten, and put the reſt to flight. Having learnt from his priſoners the real ſtrength of the enemy in thoſe parts, under the command of the Sieur de Contrecœur, in chief on the Ohio, and informed by his ſcouts, that this Commander in Chief, informed of the advantage he had gained over the French party on the 28th, had ſent the Sieur de Villers with 1000 French, and 200 Indians, to attack him, and diſlodge him from a little fort he had run up, called Fort Neceſſity, as a temporary defence, and cover for his handful of men, till ſome troops, which had been promiſed to follow him from New York, might arrive; he made the beſt diſpoſition poſſible for one in his circumſtances, to maintain his poſt, and to beat off an enemy, if any ſuch ſhould attempt to diſturb him. Which came to paſs on the 3d of July, when the body of 1200 men above men- Colonel Waſhington's expedition.

A. D. 1754. tioned marched up to the attack of his little camp and fort. The Engliſh were by this time, by one caſualty or other reduced to 200; but they ſuſtained the enemy's whole force for upwards of three hours. and laid 200 of the enemy dead in the field. So much reſolution greatly diſcouraged the French; and put their General upon ſome leſs dangerous method of diſlodging the Engliſh. Thus, at the time Colonel Waſhington expected nothing better than to be ſurrounded and put to the ſword, the enemy called a parley; which ended in an honourable capitulation for the brave remains of our provincial troops; of whom 30 had been killed, and 70 wounded: The enemy had 300 killed and wounded. For our men behaved with ſingular intrepidity, determined not to aſk for quarter, but with their bayonets ſcrewed, to ſell their lives, as dear as they poſſibly could.

Capitulates.

His capitulation.

The capitulation was, That each ſide ſhould retire without moleſtation; and that the Engliſh army ſhould march away with all the honours of war, and with ſtores, effects and baggage. But, after Colonel Waſhington had marched out of Fort Neceſſity, the Indians, whom the French had ſeduced from their allegiance to the King of Great Britain, attacked them, plundered their baggage, and made a great ſlaughter of the men, cattle and horſes. And, when the French Commander was applied to, he pretended to be extremely concerned, drew his ſword, and ran amongſt the Indians; but, inſtead of uſing means to ſtop their breach of the capitulation, he encouraged

couraged them to plunder and murder the Engliſh. A. D. 1754.

The importance and diſtreſs of our Provinces at this time, and the great neglect there was ſomewhere in England, to relieve and to ſupport them againſt thoſe violent meaſures, which the French executed with impunity, are well deſcribed in the following letter, wrote about this time, from Williamſburg to a merchant in London.

SIR,

IN the name of curioſity, what are you about in England? If we might judge of you by the rules of good ſenſe and policy, I ſhould imagine you to be in all the hurry of preparation for war: for, you will not ſurely ſuffer the moſt notorious and repeated violations of rights and treaties to go unrevenged. The French have long ſince, commenced actual hoſtilities againſt us here; have not only entred upon our territories *manu forti*, but have taken from us our forts, and ſtrong holds, ſuch as they were. In ſhort, all our colonies are in the utmoſt hurry and confuſion from the approaching danger. By this ſituation of our affairs, you, gentlemen merchants of the mother country, muſt expect to be in great meaſure affected with us: For, whilſt we are ſending our youth, to the repulſion of the enemy, and recovery of our frontiers, cultivation muſt be, and is, neglected: And without a full attention to our produce, how ſhall we be able to make the proper returns to England. What will really be the conſequences

The importance and miſerable ſtate of the colonies.

A. D. 1754. ſequences of theſe proceedings, God only knows. But certainly you ought not to be indifferent, as to the danger, becauſe at preſent it is at a diſtance from you.

It requires not a very great degree of knowledge and judgment to comprehend, that on the ſecurity and proſperity of the colonies, depends the preſent flouriſhing condition of the mother country. The immenſe quantities of goods, which are annually imported into America from England, to the amount of ſome millions ſterling; the greater number of ſhipping and hands employed in the exportation of them, make up, I doubt not, the moſt conſiderable part of your preſent trading intereſt: and by manufacturing the materials for this particular commerce, what number of individuals, nay families are wholly ſupported in England!——In ſhort, Great Britain is chiefly indebted to us, that ſhe makes ſo rich, ſo potent and reſpectable a figure in Europe. A truth that, however evident, we have reaſon to ſuppoſe, from the tenor of their paſt conduct, has not been ſo obvious to your miniſtry; or, in other words, to thoſe in power, whoſe immediate duty it was to inform themſelves concerning it.

It does not eſcape our notice here, how ready and generous England has been, and ſtill is, to grant ſubſidies upon every paltry alarm, to ſome petty German Princes, to the tune of ſome hundreds of thouſands, merely for the ſake of preſerving, as the miniſters call it, the balance of power. How much has been done to preſerve the

the balance of trade, or even our undoubted rights in America, let them declare, who know it. In ſhort, and to tell the plain truth in few words, we are looked upon by your great men, as a ſubject too low for their ſublime politics; by your country 'ſquires and coxcombs, as a ſet of tranſports and vagabonds; and by your boards, as unruly children, that want more to be corrected than encouraged. Thanks to their wiſdom in taking ſo little care of our breeding! A. D. 1754.

It has been for many years paſt, that the French have uninterruptedly been forming a force on the back of our colonies, from the Miſſiſippi to Canada, by gaining over the Indians to their intereſt and erecting forts at proper diſtances, which might open a ready communication from north to ſouth. They had a triple policy in this. (1.) That by ſecuring the alliance of the Indians, they might engroſs the peltry and fur-trade. (2.) That by ſuch a chain of forts and ſtrength, they might not only prevent the extenſion of our colonies, but even ſtraiten and diſtreſs them at pleaſure. (3.) That by ſuch an eſtabliſhment and poſſeſſion, they might be able to preſerve the back parts of America by negociation and treaty, whenever our miniſtry might be provoked to look into our rights; and take up the reſolution of calling them to account for ſuch a procedure.

As far as my obſervation has gone, it has ever been through negligence and negociation, that Britain has, firſt, permitted her proper rights and advant-

A. D. 1754. advantages to become diſputable, by ſuffering them to be invaded, without an immediate proper reſentment: and after ſhe has come to the reſolution of aſſerting them, ſhe has too eaſily condeſcended to a treaty; and at length been contented, or made ſatisfied, with a diviſion. It is this kind of conduct, that I doubt we ſhall have more reaſon to be afraid of, hereafter, than we ſeem to be at preſent, leaſt the miniſtry ſhould not grant us a ſubſidy. For, after all the inconveniences which we muſt inevitably go through, after the great expences and loſſes we muſt actually ſuffer, as well in lives, as in matters of property, before we ſhall be able to regain our forts and frontiers; if there ſhould be any compoſition made with the French, as to the lands on this ſide the Miſſiſippi, it will be only protracting the evil day, and prove to be ſo much blood and treaſure expended to little purpoſe. For how can our colonies be ever ſafe with a French enemy on their backs? Or, whilſt ſuch a danger is hanging over them, what ſecurity can be given to the induſtrious, that they ſhall reap the fruit of their own labours?

To conclude, we deſire to be conſidered only as a petty German Prince, with relation to your liberality; but with reſpect to the rights of the Britiſh empire, and the rights of induſtrious ſubjects, we hope to be empowered and encouraged not only to aſſert, but to recover, to defend and enjoy them in their full and juſt extent, in ſpite of

of all the power, perfidy and ſtratagem of the French, and even of the devil himſelf, ſhould he think fit to join them. I am, Sir, &c. &c. A. D. 1754.

This ſeaſonable and ſenſible repreſentation, of the danger and importance of our American plantations, deſerves a ſerious attention, as it contains many intereſting remarks concerning the value of thoſe provinces to the mother-country; the means of preſerving and improving them, and the hazard this nation runs by every neglect to drive off encroachments, and by any compoſition or diviſion of the lands behind thoſe ſettlements; which were daily extending their limits, eſpecially into the fertile and delightful country of the Twightees, inhabiting the plains on the Ohio; by a company of merchants at London. Who have obtained a grant from the crown to ſettle that tract of land under the protection of Great Britain, with an excluſive privilege of trading with the Indians on the banks of the river Ohio.

The Ohio company eſtabliſhed with an excluſive right.

This grant was made ſoon after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: and it no ſooner tranſpired, than the French Governor of Canada wrote to the Governors of New York and Penſylvania; giving them to underſtand, "That as the Engliſh "inland traders had encroached on the French "territories and privileges, by trading with the "Indians under the protection of his Sovereign, "he would ſeize them, wherever they ſhould be "found, if they did not immediately deſiſt from "that illicit practice." This menace not being regard-

Its effects in regard to the French.

A. D. 1754. regarded, he next year cauſed three Britiſh traders to be arreſted. Their effects were confiſcated and their perſons ſent, by the way of Quebec, to Rochelle in Old France, and there impriſoned: As already related more at large [c].

In regard to the Indians. This grant produced another unlucky effect [d]. The new company not only neglected to gain the conſent of the native Indians, on the back of the royal patent, which might have been done at a trifling expence, and what has been uſual on like occaſions; but they ſent a perſon to ſurvey their country in ſuch a dark myſterious manner, as gave a people, naturally jealous, too much room for ſuſpicion and diſcontent. Which diſpoſed them to receive any overtures, with more willingneſs from the French, offered by way of protection. Beſides, the jealouſy of the Indians was greatly heightened by the traders from Penſylvania and Virginia, who foreſaw that they themſelves would be great loſers, in that valuable branch of traffic, from which they were to be excluded by the royal privilege of a new monopoly.

French court's behaviour at the complaint about Fort Neceſſity. The action at Fort Neceſſity being tranſmitted to London; it was repreſented by the Britiſh Ambaſſador at Paris, as an open violation of the peace. Which did not meet with the ſame degree of reſpect, as on former occaſions of complaint; the time now nearly approaching for the French to pull off the maſk of moderation and peace. For, inſtead of diſavowing the conduct

[c] On page 44, &c. [d] Ibid.

of

of their American Commander, orders were expedited for reinforcements of men and ammunition to perfect their pernicious designs on that Continent. A. D. 1754.

As all this could not be concealed from the British ministry, which was known to all the people; the nation murmured greatly at their supine inactivity; whose only care of that vast and important Continent amounted to no more than some cautionary instructions transmitted to the Governors of our provinces; and for them to unite in their own defence. The instructions ran thus; "It is his Majesty's command, that in case the subjects of any foreign Prince should presume to make any encroachments in the limits of his Majesty's dominions, or to erect forts on his Majesty's lands, or to commit any other act of hostility; and should, upon a requisition made to them to desist from such proceedings, persist in them, they should draw forth the armed force of their respective provinces, and use their best endeavours to repel force by force." The Governors were likewise ordered to form a political confederacy. And the Governor of New York was appointed to confer with the Chiefs of the Indians, and by presents, and other means, to keep them steady to the British interest. Instructions sent to our Colonies to unite in one confederacy.

This, to be sure, was a desirable union, and a measure that, if effectually executed, might have answered the intention of preventing further encroachments; but, such is the bad policy of British subjects, that they, by their own contentions, fre- How they were frustrated.

A. D. 1754. frequently fruſtrate the beſt concerted meaſures. Thus, when unanimity and activity were moſt neceſſary, the national intereſt was neglected, and obliged to give way to the religious and political diſputes of the Provinces. The aſſembly of Virginia quarrelled with Dinwidde their Governor, about a fee he demanded for every grant he ſhould paſs for land. The Penſylvanian Repreſentatives waſted their time in vain deliberations and violent diſputes with their Proprietaries, while the enemy invaded their frontiers, and fortified themſelves. New York was divided into factions by ſome men of property, but of turbulent ſpirits, who exerted their influence to diſtreſs the views and deſigns of the Government. A congreſs was appointed and held for that purpoſe at Albany, by Commiſſioners from all the Britiſh Provinces. But few Indians attended, and they behaved with ſo much indifference, that, though they accepted of the preſents, renewed treaties, and demanded aid to drive the French from their territories, it appeared plainly, that they were gained over to the French intereſt, and thought the Engliſh would be obliged to deliver up their country to the French. Though they ſeemed to be very well pleaſed with their preſents, which were much more conſiderable than ever had been known, they, in their ſpeech to Mr. Lancey, Lieutenant-Governor of New York, ſpoke with great warmth, ſeverely blaming the neglect and indolence of our nation, and in praiſe of the French for their diligence and care to fortify and maintain their

Speech of the Indians.

their garriſons, while the Engliſh left both their ſettlements and their allies expoſed to invaſion and deſtruction. They particularly recriminated upon us the deſertion of our fort at Saraghtoga, in the laſt war; repreſented the defenceleſs condition of our frontier city of Albany; and concluded with ſeaſonable and rational advice to defend ourſelves, and to encounter the French with more ſpirit and conduct for the future. A. D. 1754.

In this congreſs a plan was concerted, after long debates, for executing that ſalutary meaſure of a general union of the Britiſh colonies, and for creating a common fund to defray all military expences: and it was agreed to lay this plan before his Majeſty and council; but, it was never carried into execution. General union agreed upon.

During the ſitting of this congreſs Mr. Shirley, Governor of Maſſachuſet's bay prevailed with the aſſembly of his Province to build a ſtrong fort near the head of the river Kennebeck, and to provide 800 men for that ſervice, to protect the Province from the incurſions of the French and Indians. In purſuance of this reſolution of the aſſembly, Mr. Shirley, in the ſummer 1754, marched with the troops to the eaſtern frontier, and, with the conſent of the Indians, built Fort Weſtern, about 37 miles from the mouth of the river Kennebeck, and Fort Hallifax about 54 miles down the ſame river; of which proceedings when Governor Shirley tranſmitted an account to the miniſtry at home, he alſo repreſented the imminent danger to which Nova Scotia was expoſed, from Forts built, &c. by New York.

A. D. 1754.

Remonſtrances about Nova Scotia.

the encroachments and fortifications of the French, which had extended themſelves to the very neighbourhood of the Engliſh ſettlements; and from any ſudden attack, which might eaſily be formed againſt that Province from St. John's Iſland, Cape Breton, and Canada.

Approved of.

This remonſtrance ſeemed to carry ſome weight: for Governor Shirley received not only the approbation of his Majeſty and Council for the ſervice he had performed on the river Kennebeck, but a command alſo to concert meaſures with Mr. Lawrence, Lieutenant-Governor and Commander in Chief of the Province of Nova Scotia, for attacking the French forts in that Province. But nothing could be done in this ſervice till the next ſummer; except raiſing 2000 men in New England, and receiving 2000 ſtands of arms from London.

General Braddock appointed.

It was alſo reſolved in his Majeſty's Council to appoint a Generaliſſimo for the ſervice of North America. This command was conferred on General Braddock, whoſe courage and military diſcipline had recommended him, as of ability for ſo great a truſt. At the ſame time orders were iſſued for raiſing two regiments, of two battalions each, in North America, to be commanded by Sir William Pepperel and Mr. Shirley, and for the embarkation of Halklet's and Dunbar's regiments of foot, to ſail with all expedition with General Braddock for Virginia; but they did not get from Ireland till the 14th of January 1755.

Though

Though it was not poſſible to fix upon any plan to unite the Provinces effectually, for their common ſafety under theſe perilous circumſtances, the Governors and principal Planters repeated their repreſentations to the miniſtry in England, of the bad ſtate of their reſpective colonies, aſſuring them that they muſt inevitably fall a prey to the French invaders, if not ſpeedily and powerfully aſſiſted by their mother country. And poſterity will review with aſtoniſhment the negligent remiſneſs with which the Britiſh Miniſtry ſuffered the cauſe of thoſe complaints to continue, and thoſe valuable territories, which make ſo conſiderable a part of the Britiſh dominions, to remain in ſo expoſed and defenceleſs a condition. All that can be urged to exculpate ſuch a neglect, is the ſuppoſition, That the Provinces had a ſufficient internal ſtrength to defend themſelves. But, this is a fallacious way of reaſoning: for, though it be allowed, that the inhabitants of the Britiſh empire on the Continent of North America, exceeded the French and Canadians, at the rate of ten to one, it ought to be remembered alſo, that, while theſe provinces or governments continue in ſeparate ſtates, with ſeparate intereſts, without any connection with one another, their ſtrength is divided, and might, one after another, fall a prey to the combined force of the French, Canadians and Indians. However, though the Provinces might have done more at this time for their common defence, than they did, that is no excuſe for the Britiſh miniſtry, who ought either to have

A. D. 1754.

A. D. 1754. compelled them to ſubmit to ſuch impoſitions, as the legiſlature might find neceſſary for their mutual intereſt in time of danger and war; or, to have protected them with regular forces ſent from Europe.

In this they would only have imitated the enemy, who, by every ſhip to Louiſbourg and Quebec, kept continually ſending regular troops to encourage and to ſtrengthen their ſubjects and allies. By theſe Col. Waſhington was defeated; and with the ſame force the French improved that defeat, by ſeizing all that fine country on the Ohio, and its branches.

The pacific temper of the court of Spain.

However, Spain ſeemed ſo much inclined, (upon the change of her miniſtry, this year, when the Marquis De la Enſenada was forced to reſign to Mr. Wall) to maintain the peace with England, that the diſputes about our cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras were amicably adjuſted between the ſaid Mr. Wall, the Spaniſh Prime Miniſter, and Sir Benjamin Keene, the Britiſh Ambaſſador.

Mr. Pitt's conduct in regard to Spain defended.

No wonder, therefore, that Mr. Pitt did afterwards treat the Franco-Spaniſh memorial, in which the cutting of logwood was pretended, amongſt other grievances, to be a principal article to obſtruct the pacific negociations, then carrying on, between Great Britain and France, with the indignity ſuch an after-claim deſerved. And he had good reaſon, from ſuch a change in the conduct of Mr. Wall towards Great Britain, to believe him frenchified, and to be ſeeking an opportunity to join the enemy of our country, under the

the ſpecious pretence of maintaining the rights of his own nation, in a point they had already given up and adjuſted. A. D. 1754.

This year had not yet produced any remarkable alteration in the affairs of the northern powers, ſo as to affect the intereſt of Great Britain; though it was very certain, that no court in Europe, ever ſo obſcure, had eſcaped the attention of France, and being tempted to adhere to her intereſt, either by promiſes, threats, or ſubſidies: And at the ſame time repreſenting the complaints and meaſures of Great Britain, againſt their encroachments in America, in a moſt diſadvantageous light. Affairs in the north.

In the Eaſt Indies, M. Dupleix, aſſuming the port and character of an Eaſtern Monarch, under his forged commiſſion from the Mogul, continued the war, with all his power, to diſtreſs the Britiſh intereſt. But notwithſtanding his riches, ſuperiority of men, and connections with the natives, he could not, all this time, ſtrike any effectual ſtroke againſt our ſettlements; but, on the contrary, was obliged to ſubmit to many diſappointments and rebuffs from the conduct and courage of our troops. Affairs in the Eaſt Indies.

The Britiſh miniſtry, during this ſummer (1754) had managed the national affairs without the help of a Primier, which place was laſt vacated by the Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Eſq; brother to the Duke of Newcaſtle, who departed this life in the beginning of March. And his Majeſty, on the fourteenth day of November opened the parliament with informing them, "That the general Death of the Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Eſq;

A. D. 1754. King's ſpeech.

" ſtate of Europe had undergone very little alter-
" ation ſince their laſt meeting: That he had
" lately received the ſtrongeſt aſſurances from
" his good brother the King of Spain of friend-
" ſhip and confidence: That his principal view
" ſhould be to ſtrengthen the foundation, and
" ſecure the duration of a general peace; to im-
" prove the preſent advantages of it for promoting
" the trade of his good ſubjects, and *protecting*
" *thoſe poſſeſſions* [North America] which conſti-
" tuted one great ſource of their wealth and
" commerce.

Remarks thereon.

Though his Majeſty avoided mentioning the particular encroachments of France, in order to prevent debates upon the addreſs, it is evident that he ſaid enough to convince the nation, of his reſolution to humble the inſolence of that perfidious neighbour. Thus alſo was he underſtood by the parliament, which unanimouſly granted for the ſervice of the enſuing year 4,073,729 l. of which one million was expreſly given for augmenting the forces by ſea and land. They alſo voted 32,000 l. ſubſidy to the King of Poland, and 20,000 l. to the Elector of Bavaria, on a ſuppoſition that ſuch ſubſidiary allies were neceſſary to defeat, or prevent, any after game, to be played by France againſt Hanover, ſhould that perfidious nation drive Great Britain to an open rupture.

Supplies granted.

Behaviour of the French on this occaſion.

Such public acts, as theſe, convinced the French, that the Engliſh were in good earneſt to exert themſelves againſt their encroachments in America:

And, as they, with all their diligence, were not in a condition to complete their intended armaments, by ſea and land, for that ſervice, to be time enough to ſecure their poſts on that Continent, before the Britiſh forces might arrive at the places of their deſtination, they took great pains, once more, to amuſe the Britiſh miniſtry with general declarations, that no hoſtility was intended, nor the leaſt infringement of the treaty: which declarations were communicated to the court of London, by the Marquis de Mirepoix, their own Ambaſſador at the Britiſh court, the Earl of Albemarle being lately dead at Paris. A. D. 1754.

Mirepoix, on this occaſion, played the part of the Archbiſhop of Ambrune, the French Ambaſſador at Madrid, in the laſt century. The French King, by the Pyrenean treaty, had guaranteed all the Spaniſh dominions, to the ſucceſſor of the King, upon the throne; the King of Spain, with whom that treaty was made, dies within ſeven years, and leaves a ſon and ſucceſſor, a minor, on the throne, whoſe ſiſter had been married to the Dauphin, with the expreſs condition of her renunciation of all right and title to any part of her father's dominions, together with the conſent, approbation and ratification of the French King and her huſband. But Lewis XIV. in defiance of renunciations, ratifications, treaties and every other motive for maintaining good faith, kept up a powerful army, and as ſoon as he heard of the King's death, made the neceſſary diſpoſitions to ſeize upon Flanders, a part of the Spaniſh mon- The artful conduct of the French Ambaſſador. Mirepoix.

A. D. 1754. archy, and to add that fine country to his own dominions. Theſe preparations and intentions reaching the court of Spain, the Queen mother queſtioned his Grace the Archbiſhop? Who, either deceived by his inſtructions from France, or prepared to keep the Spaniſh court in a ruinous ſtate of ſecurity and inactivity, by the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of his royal maſter's reſolution to maintain the faith of the late treaty, and not to invade any part of the Spaniſh dominions, during the young King's minority, continued, with the moſt ſolemn proteſtations of ſincerity and friendſhip, to amuſe the Queen mother and her miniſtry, till the very news of the French having invaded Flanders arrived at the court of Madrid. Thus the Marquis de Mirepoix was ordered, (whether in the ſecret or not) to amuſe the Britiſh court, and, if poſſible, to delay, or ſlacken their armaments for America, till the French had ſufficiently ſtrengthened their uſurpations from Europe.

It is certain Mirepoix acted his part extremely well: even ſo far, as when facts were daily alledged to confront his pacific declarations, this thorough-paced politician pretended to be ſtruck with aſtoniſhment and chagrin, and to repair to Verſailles to upbraid that miniſtry for making him the tool of their diſſimulation.

Repairs to his own court for further inſtructions.

This conduct of the French Ambaſſador, has been urged in favour of his candour and ſincerity: But, if we conſider it with all its circumſtances, and compare it with the Archbiſhop of Ambrune's behaviour, in a ſimilar caſe; this aſtoniſhment, chagrin,

Remarks thereon.

chagrin, rage and departure of Mirepoix, will appear to have been a concerted fineſſe to gain that time by ſuſpence, which they were not able to obtain by prevarication. Mirepoix's reputed honour and the politeneſs, with which he had ingratiated himſelf at the Britiſh court, conduced greatly to fill ſome of our ſtateſmen with hopes of accommodating matters, by his preſence at Verſailles: And, at his return to London, they triumphed greatly at the pacific intentions of his royal maſter, which he declared were delivered to him by the King himſelf: Which aſſurances, having been long detected of falſhood, could find no other means to gain credit, but on the good opinion the Britiſh Court entertained of the Marquis de Mirepoix. A. D. 1754.

France, ever watchful of the proceedings between our King and parliament, eaſily foreſaw the reſolution of his Britannic Majeſty, and the determination of the parliament to ſupport him againſt the French violation of treaties. Therefore, not to be behindhand, the French miniſtry ordered a powerful armament to be immediately fitted out at Breſt, for North America; and took other meaſures, which prognoſticated their intention to ſtrike ſome important blow, that might ſerve for a declaration of war. Conduct of the French miniſtry at this time.

De Coſne, the ſecretary of our embaſſy at Paris, by letter dated the 1ſt of January 1755, informed Sir Thomas Robinſon, Secretary of of State, That 17 men of war, the Admiral's ſhip of 70 guns, were ordered to be equipped at Breſt, A D. 1755.

A. D. 1755. Breſt, and that the greateſt part of that fleet was deſtined for *America*, with regular troops on board. By another letter of the 8th, he ſpecifies the number of ſhips to be 16 of the line, and five frigates; and the troops to be 3000 men: and adds, that they would be ready to ſail by the end of March. On the 23d, he writes, That there were eight ſhips more to join them from Rochfort and Rochelle, which would make in all 30 ſhips of war, 20 of which were of the line, and would take on board 6000 forces; and that they were working night and day to get to ſea.

By the ſame hand, the miniſtry were informed on February 16 and 23, That M. Macnamara was to command this expedition. And in a few days after, the Earl of Holderneſs was informed, That in all theſe armaments there appeared a plain deſign to make ſettlements and to build forts: beſides, that, it was given out, they reſolved to augment the fortifications at Louiſburg, and to build more forts on the Ohio.

But thoſe armaments were not confined to Breſt, &c. For Mr. Birtles our conſul at Genoa, ſent advice dated February 10, That the French had 24 ſhips of war at Toulon, beſides three on the ſtocks, and one of 70 guns careening; that they were ordered to be got fit for ſea with all expedition; and that the magazines and ſtores were in ſuch order and readineſs, as to make it poſſible to ſend all thoſe ſhips to ſea in a very ſhort time. Which intelligence, as well as that, which followed from Mr. Banks, our conſul at Carthegena,

on

on the 12th of March 1755, that the Great Admiral of France was to have the chief command, and that tranſports were taken up for a great number of land forces; it ſhews that they had already planned the invaſion and conqueſt of Minorca. A. D. 1755.

On the 17th of March ſix ſhips of the Breſt ſquadron got into the road: but the advices of the 25th ſaid, that they could not ſail before the beginning of April, and that they would endeavour to ſlip away, without noiſe, with ſuccours for America; and that the M. now Duke of Mirepoix's negociation was only to gain time, till the French might arrive at the places of their deſtination, and be provided to declare open war. Accordingly it was diſcovered that ſix of the Breſt ſquadron, had ſailed in the night between the 17th and 18th, privately, with troops for America. Six others took their ſtation in the road, and received on board a number of regular troops; among whom were many Scotch and Iriſh officers. And five more ſhips were ordered to be expedited with the utmoſt diligence.

Our diligent Secretary at Paris further informs, That the frigate La Diane had been diſpatched and ſailed from Rochfort, on the 27th of March, to Louiſbourg and Quebec, with adviſe of theſe ſuccours: that eight more ſhips of the line were ordered to be victualled and fitted for ſea in two months, and that M. Macnamara, who had reſigned the command of the fleet already ſailed, to M. de la Mothe, upon account of his great age,

A. D. 1755. age, had received orders to ſail with a ſquadron on the 16th of March.

The Britiſh court thus informed, ſaw through the artifice of Mirepoix, and the fallacious word of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; and entered upon ſuch meaſures, as they ſuppoſed effectual to prevent the fatal effects of the French armaments.

Proclamation for raiſing ſeamen.

A proclamation was iſſued [e] to encourage ſeamen to enter themſelves on board his Majeſty's ſhips of war; offering a bounty of 30s for every able bodied ſeaman, between 20 and 50 years of age, and 20s. for every ordinary ſeaman. The ſame night there was a warm preſs below bridge; warrants for the ſame purpoſe were diſpatched to the outports; and public notice was given at Greenwich hoſpital, for all the ſeamen, who were willing to go to ſea, to give in their names, and that they ſhould not fail of the uſual encouragements. Another proclamation [f] was publiſhed, for recalling all maſters of ſhips, pilots, mariners, ſeamen, ſhipwrights and other ſea-faring men, his Majeſty's natural born ſubjects, from the ſervice of all foreign Princes and States, and prohibiting ſuch perſons from entering their ſervice. And this proclamation increaſed the bounty for ſeamen from 30s. to 3l. and from 20s. to 2l. who ſhould voluntarily enter before the 10th day of March next following: and further promiſed 2l. reward to any perſon diſcovering any able ſeamen, and 30s. for ever ordinary ſea man, who ſhould ſecrete

For calling home ſea-faringmen.

Encouragment for ſeamen.

[e] On January 23, 1755. [f] February 8.

them-

themſelves, ſo that ſuch ſeaman ſhould be taken, for his Majeſty's ſervice, by any ſea officer, employed for raiſing men. A. D. 1755.

In March 1755 his Majeſty ſent a meſſage by Sir Thomas Robinſon, then Secretary of State, to inform his parliament, "That having at the beginning of the ſeſſion declared, that his principal object was to preſerve the public tranquillity, and at the ſame time to *protect thoſe poſſeſſions*, which conſtitute one great ſource of the commerce and wealth of his kingdoms; he now finds it neceſſary to acquaint the houſe of commons, that the preſent ſituation of affairs makes it requiſite to augment his forces by ſea and land, and to take ſuch other meaſures, as may beſt tend to preſerve the general peace of Europe, and to ſecure the juſt rights and poſſeſſions of his crown in America; as well as to repel any attempts whatſoever, that may be made to ſupport or countenance any deſigns, which may be formed againſt his Majeſty and his dominions; not doubting, but that his faithful commons would enable him to make ſuch augmentations, and to take ſuch meaſures for ſupporting the honour of his crown, and the true intereſts of his people, and for the ſecurity of his dominions, in the preſent critical juncture, as the exigency of affairs may require."— A meſſage from the King to the parliament.

This meſſage was anſwered with a warm and affectionate addreſs: and the miniſtry in the cabinet as if they were fully reſolved to execute the neceſſary meaſures in ſuch a critical juncture, ordered a body of forces to America, to act in con- How received by both houſes of parliament.

A. D. 1755. junction with the provincial troops. Which order produced an extraordinary clauſe to the mutiny bill, to render it more clear, extenſive and uſeful for the national ſervice: wherein it was provided,

Mutiny bill extended to North America.

"That all officers and ſoldiers of any troops, "being muſtered and in pay, which are or ſhall "be raiſed in any of the Britiſh provinces in "America, by authority of the reſpective governors "or governments thereof, ſhall at all times, and "in all places, when they happen to join or act "in conjunction with his Majeſty's Britiſh forces, "be liable to martial law, and diſcipline, in like "manner, to all intents and purpoſes, as the "Britiſh forces are, and ſhall be ſubject to the "ſame trial, penalties and puniſhments."

A ſpeech in parliament by a general officer.

A General officer, who on this critical occaſion was called up in the houſe of commons, by a ſpirit, becoming a true patriot, expreſſed himſelf in the following manner; "We ſeem, ſaid he, to be driven upon the edge of a high mountain; on every ſide a dreadful and tremendous precipice: too much expence makes us bankrupts: too little makes us ſlaves. Some years ago, the French were by no means a match for the Five Nations: now they have a communication, by a range of forts, from the river St. Lawrence, in Canada, to the Ohio, near the Miſſiſippi. Hence it is, that they hold our colonies between the two ends of a net, which if they tighten by degrees, they may get all of them into the body of it, and then drown them in the ſea. When the ſhip is ſinking, the man at the helm in vain lays the blame upon

upon the labourer at the oar, or, the labourer at the oar, recriminates upon the man at the helm: we are all in one veſſel: it is our intereſt as well as our duty, to unite heartily in the common cauſe; and laying aſide private ambition and animoſity, to act with alacrity and confidence, and to perform every thing in our power, for the preſervation, honour and happineſs of our country. A. D. 1755.

So many men were provided for the ſea ſervice, by proper means, that a ſquadron of 11 ſhips of the line, and one frigate, bearing in all 5,945 men, was got ready and ſailed for America, on the 22d day of April, under the command of Vice Admiral Boſcawen. This ſquadron had on board a conſiderable body of land forces [g] to attend the motions of the enemy: And the Admiral's inſtructions to attack the French fleet, where ever he ſhould meet them, was notified to the Duke de Mirepoix. To which that polite ambaſſador replied, "That his royal maſter would "conſider the firſt gun, fired at ſea in an hoſtile "manner, to be a declaration of war." Admiral Boſcawen ſails for N. America. Mirepoix's behaviour on this event.

This language, ſo reverſe to his pacific conferences, ſeemed to whet the reſentment of our councils, ſo as to redouble their preparations for war: and the public began to think, that the miniſtry were come to a reſolution to fulfil their deſires for the defence of America, and to oppoſe all other machinations of the French againſt their trade, navigation and poſſeſſions; ſo that the How it operates upon the miniſtry.

[g] Two regiments, which he took up at Plymouth.

moneyed

A. D. 1755. moneyed men ſubſcribed 3,880,000 l. immediately, inſtead of 1,000,000 l. required to be raiſed by way of lottery.

The French ſquadron ſent to N. America.

Our miniſtry had certain advice [h] from M. de Coſne, That the fleet from Breſt and Rochfort, conſiſted of one ſhip of 90 guns, three of 74, four of 70, ſeven of 64, one of 58, one of 50, and five of 30 guns, from Breſt; two of 64 guns, one of 50, one of 30, and one of 26 guns, from Rochfort: Together 18 ſhips of the line, and nine frigates; in all 27. But ten of theſe line of battle were converted into tranſports, and mounted no more than from 18 to 22 guns a piece, under the command of M. Macnamara and M. Bois de la Mothe.

This united fleet had orders to be ready to ſail by the 18th or 20th of April, with 11 battalions on board; but it was wind bound, till the 3d of May: Of which M. de Coſne did not fail to give immediate notice, adding, That it was generally believed, that Macnamara's orders were only to convoy the ſhips that ſerve for tranſports, to a certain diſtance, and then to let them purſue their voyage without him.

Remarks on the Britiſh miniſtry at this time.

Here it may be ſeaſonable to enquire, what was done on the part of Great Britain, beſides the proceedings in parliament, to counteract the vigorous meaſures of our enemy? It is evident from all theſe advices, and from the facts themſelves, that theſe kingdoms had nothing to fear from an inva-

[h] Dated the 15th of April 1755.

ſion:

sion: For, though France had a few more ships in the ports of Brest and Rochfort, fit for service, they had neither sailors, nor ordnance, nor provisions, nor ammunition to fit them for sea; nor any number of vessels capable of transporting an army into this island, as all accounts from abroad agreed, had they ever so seriously meditated a descent in favour of the Pretender, as Mr. Barnham from Dover had intimated his suspicion: which, by other advices, was treated with contempt. Why then was there not a more powerful fleet ordered in time, not to fight the French convoy under Macnamara in the American seas, or to block up, or intercept their fleet at Louisbourgh, or Quebec, but at Brest and Rochfort? What must be thought of such management, that, out of the numerous navy, which Great Britain had at this time in pay, they could spare, or, were afraid to suffer, no more than 11 ships of the line and one sloop to defeat the French embarkation for America; and to be at the extraordinary expence and hazard of sending a squadron to do that work in the American ocean, which, in all probability, could have been done with little or no risk and much less expence, near the chops of the British channel. Such an appointment was very wide of the utmost exertion of our power in defence of our colonies, and to maintain the dominion of the seas; when the ministry, duly and certainly informed of the force under sailing orders at Brest, confined their own strength to a squadron under Mr. Boscawen, of a little more A. D. 1755.

A. D. 1755. than half the force of the enemy; and paid no manner of regard to the equipment of the naval preparations at Toulon, of which they had poſitive advice on the 14th of April; nor to the intelligence from Conſul Banks, on the 12th of March, who gave it, as his confirmed opinion, that there would be a powerful expedition with land forces from that port.

The only ſtep taken to remedy theſe egregious omiſſions, or whatever you may pleaſe to call them, in the Britiſh politicks, was to riſk ſix ſhips of the line and one frigate, under Admiral Holbourne, to follow and ſtrengthen Admiral Boſcawen; who not ſailing till the 11th of May, when the chance of his falling in with Macnamara's ſtrong ſquadron, which ſailed but eight days before, was againſt him, the national diſguſt with the miniſtry daily increaſed.

King's ſpeech at the end of the ſeſſion. On the 25th day of April his Majeſty cloſed that ſeſſions of parliament by a moſt gracious ſpeech, wherein he told the two houſes, "That "the zeal they had ſhewn, for ſupporting the ho- "nour, rights and poſſeſſions of his crown, had "afforded him the greateſt ſatisfaction: That "his deſire to preſerve the public tranquility had "been ſincere and uniform: That he had reli- "giouſly adhered to the ſtipulations of the treaty "of Aix-la-Chapelle, and made it his care not to "injure or offend any power whatſoever; but "that he could never entertain a thought of "purchaſing the name of peace at the expence "of ſuffering encroachments upon, or of yield-

"ing

"ing up, what juſtly belong'd to Great Bri- A. D.
"tain, either by antient poſſeſſion, or by ſolemn 1755.
"treaties: That the vigour and firmneſs of his
"parliament, on this important occaſion, had
"enabled him to be prepared for ſuch contingen-
"cies as might happen: That if reaſonable and
"honourable terms of accommodation could be
"agreed upon, he would be ſatisfied, and, in all
"events, rely on the juſtice of his cauſe, the ef-
"fectual ſupport of his people, and the protection
"of divine providence."

The parliament was prorogued to the 25th of May: A regency was appointed, and his Majeſty departed for his German dominions on the 28th of April. Departs for his German dominions.

M. Macnamara returned into Breſt with nine ſhips on the 20th of May, which were victualled for ſix months, and ſailed again on the 4th of June under the command of M. Du Guay, on a cruize near the ſtreights of Gibraltar, and in ſuch parts of the Atlantic ocean as might favour the return of La Mothe and Salvert, his coajutor, in caſe of bad news from North America. The other ſhips in Breſt and Rochfort, for ſome time, wanted both men and cannon; and when they got ſupplies it was ordered that they (15 in all) ſhould not ſail till the court had certain advice of the fate of their fleet in America. Thus it appears that the whole attention of the French councils was taken up with their American intereſt, or at leaſt to favour the return of their ſhips from Canada: and that Britain had nothing to fear of an invaſion, Attention of the French towards North America.

A. D. 1755. from any preparation at Breſt or its neighbouring ports.

Advice concerning the Toulon ſquadron.

In the mean time the Lords of the Admiralty received advice from Captain Buckle, of the Unicorn, dated May 9th, in Genoa-mole, That eleven days before, there had been orders publiſhed, by beat of drum, for ſailors to repair to Toulon; and that orders were likewiſe ſent to Toulon; to fit out all the ſhips in that harbour.

But, though it was confirmed by letters to Lord Holderneſs, dated July 19th, and received on the 22d, that no ſhips were fitting out at Breſt; and that they were equipping with expedition nine ſhips at Toulon, with orders for the ſailors not to depart from thence; the Britiſh miniſtry contented themſelves, as we ſhall ſhew more fully hereafter, with ſending Sir Edward Hawke on the 24th of July, to cruiſe till September, only to endeavour to intercept Du Guay's ſquadron in its return from Cadiz; or any ſhips, which might eſcape the vigilance of Mr. Boſcawen, and attempt to recover any port in France: His whole force being no more than twenty-one ſhips of the line, and five frigates; whereas, if there was any credit to be given to our intelligence, it was probable that he might have met with Du Guay's ſquadron of ten ſhips, joined by five ſhips from Rochfort, ten ſhips from Breſt, and the ten ſhips in their return from America? By which it appears that this fleet was commanded upon a very hazardous ſervice; and all the advices concerning

Admiral Hawke ſails on a cruiſe.

Very hazardous.

the

the naval preparations in the Mediterranean were diſregarded. A. D. 1755.

The equipments in the port of Toulon, which hitherto had been carried on with more artifice, began now to appear openly, and to keep pace with the armaments facing the Britiſh ſhore; formed merely to give umbrage to the Engliſh; and with the motion and augmentation of their troops. For, letters of the 6th of Auguſt declare expreſly, that orders had been ſent to Toulon to equip, with all expedition, all the new ſhips, and to get the old ones alſo in a condition for ſervice; that theſe orders were then purſued with great diligence, and that they were to take on board ſeveral companies of land forces, beſides mariners. They further adviſed, that ſince the arrival of two expreſſes at Toulon, which had cauſed the holding of two extraordinary councils, attended by the principal officers of the marine, the hands, which were at work in fitting out the nine ſhips there, were doubled, and ſix other ſhips of the line put in commiſſion, and ordered to be equipped with the former nine, ſo as to be able to put all the fifteen ſail to ſea before the 18th or 20th of Auguſt, and to be victualled only for three months. Which letter concluded: "Tho' "the deſtination of this ſquadron is not known, "it is generally conjectured to be intended againſt "Gibraltar: But be that as it will, never was there "a greater hurry in that port, than at preſent." At the ſame time it ought to be obſerved, that we had no force in thoſe ſeas to prevent Du Guay's The armaments at Toulon expedited.

A. D. 1755. squadron, which did not ſail from Cadiz till the beginning of Auguſt, from joining the Toulon ſquadron.

His Majeſty's conduct in Germany. It cannot be ſuggeſted that his Majeſty remained as indolent, as this regency appeared to be; for he was trying, abroad, every prudent meaſure to obviate the difficulties that might ariſe, in the courſe of a war from the French againſt his German dominions. To cover theſe from any inſults and attacks, on account of their connections with Great Britain, and which already threatened the Electorate of Hanover by French magazines erected in Weſtphalia, under the juriſdiction of the Elector of Cologn, and to guard againſt the effects of a ſecret treaty, which he grew jealous of, and was carrying on between Vienna and Verſailles,

Concludes a treaty with Heſſe Caſſel. his Britannic Majeſty concluded a ſubſidiary treaty, on the 18th of June, with the Landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel; by which his ſerene Highneſs engaged to hold in readineſs, during four years, a body of eight thouſand men, for his Majeſty's ſervice, to be employ'd, if required, upon the Continent, or in Great Britain, or Ireland; but not on board the fleet, or beyond the ſeas: And alſo, if his Britannic Majeſty ſhould judge it neceſſary, or advantageous, for his ſervice, to furniſh and join to this body of 8000 men, within ſix months after they ſhould be demanded, four thouſand more; of which ſeven hundred to be horſe or dragoons, and each regiment of infantry to have two field pieces of cannon.

At

At the ſame time his Majeſty propoſed to renew the treaties with Bavaria and Saxony. But the connections of theſe two houſes with France, though no bar to their receiving a ſubſidy from Great Britain in time of peace, would not let them hearken to any renewal, at the eve of a war with that crown. However Ruſſia accepted of ſubſidiary overtures for a large body of troops, which, though not carried into the form of a treaty, before his Majeſty left Hanover, may be properly noted in this place, That the Empreſs of Ruſſia ſhould hold in readineſs in Livonia, and upon the frontiers of Lithuania, a body of forty thouſand infantry, with the neceſſary artillery, and 15,000 cavalry: And alſo on the coaſt of the ſaid Province, 40 or 50 galleys with the neceſſary crews; to be ready to act, upon the firſt order, in his Majeſty's ſervice, in caſe his Majeſty's dominions in Germany ſhould be invaded on account of the intereſts or diſputes, which regard his kingdoms: But that neither theſe troops nor gallies were to be put in motion unleſs his Britannic Majeſty, or his allies, ſhould be ſome where attacked. This treaty was to exiſt four years, from the exchange of the ratifications. But it was unluckily inſerted, in the ſeventh article, That conſidering the proximity of the countries wherein the diverſion in queſtion will probably be made, and the facility her troops will probably have of ſubſiſting immediately in an enemy's country, ſhe takes upon herſelf alone, during ſuch a diverſion, the ſubſiſtence and treatment of the ſaid troops, by ſea

A. D. 1755.

Bavaria and Saxony refuſe to treat.

Treaty with Ruſſia begun.

A. D. 1755. and land. And in the eleventh article it was further ſtipulated, That all the plunder, which the Ruſſian army might take from the enemy, ſhould belong to them.

Operations of the French on the Ohio continued.

The operations of the French on the banks of the Ohio had been carried on, all the winter, with great diligence and activity; and with powerful reinforcements from Old France: For, by advice dated the 2d of January 1755, from Philadelphia it was notified, That about 6000 men of the beſt troops of France, ſelected and ſent over upon this particular ſervice, were juſt arrived at the lower fort on the Ohio, and were employed, even in that rigorous ſeaſon, in fortifying that country. Thoſe troops were ſent by the way of Quebec, and from thence were ſeen, by the Indian traders, to croſs the lakes Oſwego and Erie, in a prodigious number of battoes, of which the ſeveral Governors received notice.

Notwithſtanding this the aſſembly of Penſylvania continued as obſtinate as ever, there being no probability of their granting any money towards the expence of the neceſſary armaments in this time of danger; although they were to adjourn within two days. The Governor repreſented, in the ſtrongeſt terms, the defenceleſs ſtate of their Province, and recommended the eſtabliſhment of a regular militia; but to no purpoſe.

It was alſo obſerved, that the activity of the French, in the depth of winter, was a convincing proof, that they were forming ſome grand deſign in regard to that Continent; and that it ſeemed

ſeemed probable, their firſt attack would be upon Penſylvania, as being in the center, and not only the moſt plentiful, but the moſt defenceleſs and unweildy of all his Majeſty's colonies: And, having once got footing there, they might iſſue forth upon the colonies on each ſide; which had not a ſingle regiment from Europe to defend them. A. D. 1755.

Accordingly we find, that the French made ſuch good uſe of the time, we remained inactive, that in the beginning of the year 1755, they had advanced with their camps and forts within 225 miles of Philadelphia.

This account, without any proſpect of meaſures to put a ſtop to the encroachments of our enemies, filled every lover of his country with dire forebodings for the ſafety of their American brethren: When the nation received ſome glimmerings of better things from the diſpatches of Admiral Boſcawen, who by letters dated off Louiſbourg, on the 22d of June 1755, informed the miniſtry, That on the tenth of that month, the Alcide, a French man of war of 64 guns, and 480 men, commanded by M. Hockquart, and the Lys, commanded by M. Lageril, pierced for ſixty-four guns, but mounting only 22, and having eight companies of land forces on board, being ſeperated from the French ſquadron commanded by M. Bois de la Mothe, fell in with the Engliſh fleet off the banks of Newfoundland, they refuſing to pay the uſual compliment to the Britiſh flag, and, that his Majeſty's ſhips, the Dunkirk and

The Alcide and Lys taken.

A. D. 1755. and Defiance, after an engagement of five hours, in which they fought ſo cloſe, that a man killed on the yard of a French man of war fell into the Dunkirk, had obliged them to ſtrike, and brought them into the fleet. The Dunkirk loſt 90 men. The Lys had on board 76,000l ſterling in money to pay their troops, and eight companies of ſoldiers, beſides ſeveral general officers and engineers. He alſo gave advice, that he had been joined by Rear-Admiral Holbourne, with whom he ſailed, the ſame day, within a mile of Louiſbourg harbour: where ſeeing four large ſhips and two frigates lately arrived from Europe, under the command of M. du Perrier, he ſtationed Rear-Admiral Holbourne off that harbour with five or ſix ſhips, and proceeded to his own rendezvous, being the beſt adapted for preventing M. de la Mothe's ſquadron getting into the gulph of St. Lawrence, had not the fogs and hard gales of winds diſappointed him, and carried them ſafe to Quebec, the place of their deſtination.

Admiral Boſcawen joined by Adm. Holbourne.

Immediately upon this, though much beneath the ſanguine expectations conceived of the proweſs and ſtrength of Mr. Boſcawen and his fleet, the ſpirit of the nation revived, and the French Ambaſſador, the Duke of Mirepoix, was ordered to depart the kingdom in twenty-four hours, and accordingly he ſet out for his own country betimes in the morning of the 24th of July, to avoid the inſults of the mob.

Mirepoix departs without ceremony.

The expedition againſt the French in Nova Scotia, which by his Majeſty's command, had been concerted

certed between Governor Lawrence and Governor Shirley was carried into execution, with the aid of 2000 New Englandmen, and had its desired effect. For by a letter [i] from Lieutenant-Governor Lawrence, our government were informed, that the French fort of Beausejour surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Monkton, by capitulation, after four days bombardment, before his Majesty's forces had mounted a single cannon upon their batteries, though that fort had twenty-six cannon well mounted. The same fate befel a small fort upon the river Gaspereau, running into the bay Verte, where the French had their principal magazine for supplying the French inhabitants, and Indians with provisions, arms and stores of all kinds.—He proceeds, and says, "At Colonel "Monkton's first arrival the French had a large "number of inhabitants and Indians, four hun- "dred and fifty of which were posted at a block- "house, which they had on their side of that river "Messaguash, to defend the pass of the river: "Here they had thrown up a strong breast-work "of timber, for covering their men, and had "cannon mounted on the block-house. At this "place they made a stand for about an hour, but "were forced by our troops, with some loss, "leaving the block-house and the pass of the "river, clear for our people, who marched with- "out further interruption, to the ground intended "for their encampment. As we had not men

A. D. 1755. Transactions in Nova Scotia.

Several forts, &c. taken.

[i] Dated the 28th of June 1755, at Hallifax in Nova Scotia.

"enough

A. D. 1755. "enough to inveſt the fort intirely, ſeveral got "away; and when the fort ſurrendered, there "remained 150 regulars, and about 300 inha- "bitants, ſeveral of which, with their officers, "were wounded. We do not yet exactly know "the number that were killed in the fort; but "we believe their loſs has not been trifling, as "ſeveral laid half buried upon the parade. Co- "lonel Monkton has new-named the fort, and "called it Fort Cumberland."

By this means Colonel Monkton diſarmed 15,000 Acadians. And in the mean time Captain Rous, being ordered to attack the fort, the French had lately erected at the mouth of St. John's river, the enemy abandoned it, at the appearance of his ſmall ſquadron; having burſted their cannon, blown up their magazine, and all the works they had raiſed, as much as time would permit them to do.

By means of the New England reſolutions.

This ſucceſs was greatly owing to a vigorous reſolution taken, in the beginning of this year, by the aſſembly of Maſſachuſet's bay in New England; which had prohibited all correſpondence with the French at Louiſbourg, and, beſides the large detachment of troops ſent under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Monkton, abovementioned, had fitted out three frigates and a ſloop, under the command of Captain Rous, to favour their operations, by covering the coaſt.

While the New Englandmen aſſiſted in the reduction of Nova Scotia or Acadia, which was effected with the loſs of only twenty men killed,

and about the ſame number wounded, the Virginians built a fort, likewiſe called Fort Cumberland, and formed a camp at Will's Creek, in order to attack the French on the Ohio. Which promiſed ſucceſs, had this provincial meaſure been effectually backed by Major-General Braddock, and his two regiments of regulars from Ireland. This little army landed ſafe in Virginia before the end of February. A. D. 1755. Fort Cumberland built by the Virginians. General Braddock and his troops land in Virginia.

As ſoon as he poſſibly could, the general ſummoned the ſeveral Governors on that continent to meet him at Alexandria in Virginia, to conſult upon the buſineſs of the approaching campaign. In which convention, after much debating, it was agreed, That for the preſervation of Oſwego, and reduction of Niagara, Shirley's and Peperel's regiments ſhould march to lake Ontario; on which lake one or more armed veſſels, of about 60 tons each, ſhould be built to command that lake: And Mr. Shirley was charged with the execution of this part of the ſervice. General Braddock undertook their next reſolution, which was to attack Fort Du Queſne: And General Johnſon was ordered to inveſt Crown Point with the Provincial troops. Summons a council. Reſolutions.

Theſe reſolutions and plans were commendable: But how far they anſwered in the execution of each, is matter of the greateſt aſtoniſhment and concern.

Mr. Braddock had neither proviſions nor carriage for a march of ſo conſiderable a length, which was greatly increaſed and embarraſſed by his orders to take the rout of Will's Creek; which road,

A. D. 1755. road, as it was the worſt provided with proviſions, more troubleſome and hazardous, and much more about, than by the way of Penſylvania; and the long delay, occaſioned by the contractors for the army, who had neither provided a ſufficient quantity of proviſions for the troops, nor a competent number of carriages for the army, overturned the expedition. Mr. Braddock ſhould certainly have landed in Penſylvania: And the contract for ſupplying his troops would have been beſt made with ſome of the principal planters of that Province, who, both in regard to convenience in carriage, and in plenty of proviſions, could have performed their engagements with more eaſe and punctuality. For, ſuch is the attention of the Virginians towards their ſtaple trade of tobacco, that they ſcarce raiſe as much corn, as is neceſſary for their own ſubſiſtence; and their country being well provided with water-carriage in great rivers, an army which requires a large ſupply of wheel-carriages and beaſts of burden, could not expect to be furniſhed with them in a place, where they are not in general uſe. But Penſylvania abounds with corn, and with moſt ſorts of proviſions, and its inhabitants carry on moſt of their buſineſs with carts, waggons and horſes. Beſides, had he encamped near Franc's town, or ſomewhere upon the ſouth-weſt borders of this Province, his road to Fort Du Queſne would have been as practicable, and fifty miles nearer than from his camp at Will's Creek. This is not mere ſpeculation, but what is ſtrongly confirmed by facts, and from the

Bad meaſures purſued in his operations.

ſeaſon-

ſeaſonable and generous aſſiſtance of ſome gentlemen in Penſylvania, who at laſt were applied to, and did make up the deficiency of the Virginian contractors, without which it was not poſſible for the army to proceed. A. D. 1755.

His conduct blamed.

It has alſo been hinted, that much of the diſappointment in this expedition was owing to the General himſelf, in point of conduct. The plan was laid, and his inſtructions ſettled, in ſuch a manner, as to put him always upon his guard againſt ambuſcades, which were to be expected in a march thro' woods, deſerts and moraſſes. But this gentleman, placing all his ſucceſs upon the ſingle point of courage and diſcipline, behaved in that haughty, poſitive and reſerved way, that he ſoon diſguſted the people, over whom he was to command. His ſoldiers could not reliſh his extreme ſeverity in matters of diſcipline: And, not conſidering the nature of an American battle, he ſhewed ſuch contempt towards the Provincial forces, becauſe they could not go through their exerciſe, with the ſame dexterity and regularity, as a regiment of guards in Hyde-Park, that he drew upon himſelf their general reſentment.

The difficulties he had to ſurmount.

Give this General his due, it is certain that his ſervice was attended with many unforeſeen and unconceivable difficulties. He was obliged to march his army through a rugged, pathleſs and unknown country, a-croſs the Allegheny mountains, through unfrequented woods and dangerous defiles, rendered more dangerous by almoſt every thing he had to do with the Provinces, as more particu-

A. D. 1755. particularly appears in his letters to the Britiſh miniſtry, complaining of the neglect and diſaffection of all employed to ſupply neceſſaries for the troops, and ſetting forth the continual labour and fatigue of his ſoldiers to cut out roads acroſs mountains and rocks of an exceſſive heighth, ſteep, and divided by rivers and torrents.

Put all theſe together, what was extraordinary in his conduct, and what was extraordinary in the way of the ſervice, there could be formed no good idea of the iſſue of ſuch an untoward expedition.

His march to the attack of Fort du Queſne.

He arrived ſafe, and without any manifeſt decreaſe of his ſtrength, at Fort Cumberland, and being informed that the French, at Fort du Queſne, lately built on the river, near the conflux of the Monangahela, were expecting a reinforcement of 500 regular troops, which, as it required all the expedition, he could prudently make, to prevent ſuch an increaſe of ſtrength in the enemy, determined him to puſh forward by forced marches. But the impetuoſity of his temper kept him from paying that due regard to the repreſentations of his officers, and to the hazard of entering woods and thickets without reconnoitring the enemy, which proved his ruin.

Leaves his baggage, &c. at Fort Cumberland, with orders to follow.

The General marched from Fort Cumberland on the 10th of June 1755, with 1400 men, and the greateſt part of the ammunition and artillery; having, for greater diſpatch, left Colonel Dunbar, with 800 men to eſcort the proviſions, ſtores and baggage, with as much expedition, as the nature of

of the ſervice would allow. Thus Braddock with ten pieces of cannon, and neceſſary proviſions and ammunition, marched without delay or fear of danger through the woody deſert; and arrived on the 8th of July, within 10 miles of Fort du Queſne; without meeting any oppoſition. A. D. 1755.

He was now 40 miles encamped a-head of his corps of reſerve, under Colonel Dunbar, and muſt expect all the ſtratagems and force of an inſidious enemy; which was expreſſed to him in the ſtrongeſt terms, eſpecially by his Colonel Sir Peter Halklet, who earneſtly deſired him to proceed with caution on ſuch hoſtile and dangerous ground, and to order the Indians, to reconnoitre, by way of ſcouts or advanced guards, in caſe of an ambuſcade, for which that country was ſo well adapted. But, as if courage could do the whole work of a ſoldier, the General paid no regard to their wholeſome and ſeaſonable advice. He commanded his men to reſume their march next day, without endeavouring to inform himſelf of the ſituation or diſpoſition of the enemy, and without detaching ſcouts to preſerve him from the ſurprize of ambuſcades, though ſurrounded with woods. So that, having proceeded with this unpardonable careleſsneſs through a defile of the enemy, ſo artfully concealed behind the trees and buſhes, that not a man of them could be ſeen, his little army, about noon, was ſurprized by a general fire upon his front, and along his left flank: which obliged the van-guard to fall back immediately upon the main body; and in an inſtant a panic and con-

Rejects, and is deaf to all advice.

Is ſurprized in an ambuſh.

Put into confuſion.

A. D. 1755. fuſion ſeized the regulars: who diſguſted with their commander, could not be prevailed upon, either by promiſes, intreaties or commands to keep their ground; yet ſome of the officers did honour to their country by their gallant behaviour under ſuch deſperate circumſtances. A few remained by their General's perſon. But moſt of thoſe brave officers and men, that ſtood till the laſt, remained only to be ſacrificed to the General's further miſconduct. For, inſtead of ordering a retreat, when he found his men flying with precipitation, till he could ſcour the avenues lined by the enemy, with grape ſhot, from ten pieces of cannon, he had with him; or ordering the Indians to advance, in flanking parties, againſt the hidden enemy; he obſtinately continued upon the ſpot, where he firſt received their fire, till he was almoſt left alone, with his officers and men killed about him; his obſtinacy increaſing with the danger. At laſt, having had five horſes ſhot under him, a muſket ſhot, through his right arm and lungs, gave him a mortal wound. He was carried off the field by the bravery of Lieutenant Colonel Gage, and another of his officers; but ſurvived only four days.

Routed.

Killed.

The confuſion of the few that remained was now turned into a real and diſorderly flight; and though not purſued, and no enemy in ſight, they deſerted and left all their artillery, ammunition and baggage, and amongſt the reſt the general's cabinet, a prey to the enemy; in which the French found all Braddock's letters and inſtructions,

Baggage, &c. loſt.

tions, made uſe of afterwards by their miniſtry in printed memorials and manifeſtoes, to throw the breach of peace upon Great Britain. A. D. 1755.

It is but juſtice due to the behaviour of the Provincial troops, under Braddock, in this action, to obſerve, That they were not ſo affected with the panic, as the regulars; though the enemy's fire fell as heavy upon them, as upon any of the reſt of the army: And, that when the regulars could not be prevailed upon to ſtand their ground, nor to fight with brakes and buſhes lined with unſeen deſtruction, the Provincials bravely formed, offered to cover the fugitives, and, by advancing alone againſt the Indians in the wood, prevented the regulars from being all cut off. Behaviour of the Provincial troops.

The panic of thoſe that fled infected them with ſuch terrors, that they never ſtopt till they met the rear diviſion; which receiving the infection, they all retreated without ſtopping, till they arrived at Fort Cumberland: Though the enemy never attempted to purſue, or ever appeared in ſight, either in the battle, or after the defeat.

The loſs of the Engliſh in this unfortunate affair, amounted to 700 men, beſides the baggage, artillery, &c. The officers ſuffered moſt in proportion; the Indians being good marks men had picked them out. Sir Peter Halklet, at the head of his regiment, fell at the firſt fire. The French will allow that they loſt no more than 400 men, moſtly Indians. The loſs of men on both ſides.

Thus ended this tragical expedition, whoſe bad conſequences to the Britiſh intereſt were rendered

A. D. 1755. worſe by increaſing the ſpirit and activity of our enemies, and riveting the Indians more firmly in the intereſt of their new allies. On the contrary, the Indians in the Britiſh intereſt, deſpiſed us for not being able to protect ourſelves: and ſuch an univerſal panic ſeized on all our colonies, that they ſeemed, for ſome time, to give up all for loſt.

At home great pains was taken by the public to fix the cauſe of this misfortune. Some caſt the whole blame upon the General; others were as ſanguine againſt the miniſtry. But a little impartiality and cool attention, will diſcover both the general and miniſtry faulty. The capital miſtake was his orders to land in Virginia inſtead of Penſylvania, for the reaſons already given. Then his march would have been ſhortned ſix weeks and performed with leſs fatigue and expence. His obſtinacy, ſeverity and inattention to the advice of his officers, &c. his contemptuous behaviour towards the provincials, and his neglect to reconnoitre the enemy, and to make a proper diſpoſition and uſe of his artillery on the day of action, fell heavy upon Braddock.

Dunbar leaves the back ſettlements expoſed.

Nothing now could prevent the outrages and encroachments of the Indians and French on the back of Virginia, Maryland and Penſylvania, except a reſpectable garriſon left at Fort Cumberland, well fortified: which ought to have been done by the remains of Braddock's army; who might have fortified themſelves againſt any ſurprize, during the reſt of the ſummer, and, in the winter, would have been a ſufficient check upon the French

and

and their ſcalping Indians. But, inſtead of ſo prudent a meaſure, the Commander in Chief left only the ſick and wounded, under the care of two companies of provincial militia, at Fort Cumberland, and, with 1600 men, marched on the 2d of Auguſt, for Philadelphia, where their preſence could be of no ſervice. General Shirley, upon whom, by the death of Braddock, the chief command in America devolved, ordered theſe troops from Philadelphia to Albany, in New York. A. D. 1755.

Retires with his 1600 men to Philadelphia.

Is ordered to Albany.

Yet this is the expedition and battle, upon which the French court laid that ſtreſs, as to fix upon Great Britain the odium of beginning the war. Which invention to reproach our miniſtry with giving Braddock inſtructions, inconſiſtent with their declaration to the French ambaſſador, denying that Braddock had orders to act hoſtilely, or invaſively; of all the inſtances of French ingenuity, and of abuſive groundleſs declamation, with which they have endeavoured to inodiate our nation to all Europe, there is not a more flagrant, or a more eaſily refutable one.

The French make this the firſt act of hoſtility between the two nations.

To ſay no worſe, the French diſcovered a ſtrong and immediate inclination to attack our American Provinces; had built forts, and formed camps upon territories, from which they were excluded by treaty, and had very lately attackt and defeated a body of Virginians, guarding their own frontiers, and demoliſhed their fort. The Provinces apply to their mother country for relief and defence. Braddock is ſent with a ſmall force to their aſſiſtance, and with inſtructions how to be-

Refuted.

A. D. 1755. have, and to purſue incidentally the advantages of war, or to oppoſe force to force, ſhould the French perſiſt in their unjuſtifiable extenſion of the country, they called Canada, upon the ſame motive of ſelf-intereſt, as they had endeavoured to contract Acadia. Such a declaration, therefore, made to the French ambaſſador at London, that the deſtination of the forces ſent to the ſuccour of our oppreſſed, threatned and defenceleſs colonies, in North America, had nothing in it, but what was literally and rigorouſly true, both in fact and inference, was purely pacific; for nothing is more univerſally allowed, than that a preparation for defence and offence, is the moſt ſure expedient towards preſerving and reſtoring public peace. That Braddock then ſhould be furniſhed eventually, both with defenſive and offenſive inſtructions, with plans of operation adapted to contingencies, was plainly matter in courſe of his expedition, and of which the French could not have the leaſt reaſon to complain, unleſs they would ingroſs to themſelves an excluſive right to invade their neighbours, or ſuppoſe us meek, or paſſive enough not to reſent their hoſtilities, when they had dared us by their encroachments and forcible entry, to defend our poſſeſſions. In this fair and obvious ſenſe, what contradiction, what prevarication, can be laid to the charge of the Engliſh government, (whilſt they openly ſent that reinforcement to their colonies, which the proceedings of the French themſelves had made an indiſpenſible meaſure;) for their vouchſafing an

aſſurance

aſſurance and declaration of pacific intentions? Was this, by any conſtruction, other, or more, than telling them, that nothing on our part was intended to break the general peace, ſhould the French deſiſt from provocations, and from giving us reaſon to ſupport our rights by arms, or to exact ſatisfaction for future injuries? That Braddock then was equipped with all the inſtructions neceſſary for the moſt determinate war, is not in the leaſt repugnant to the moſt ſincere profeſſions of wiſhing and meaning nothing but peace. As a man, who puts on a ſword, may for all that, deſire nothing ſo much, as not to be compelled to draw it, or to make uſe of his fencing maſter's inſtructions. A. D. 1755.

What is ſtill more ſurprizing, though Virginia, Maryland and Penſylvania, were by theſe means left entirely deſtitute of all protection, from their hoſtile enemies behind them, the uſual diſputes between their governors, aſſemblies, &c. got the better of their reaſon, and ſo divided their councils, that they came to no effectual reſolutions for the public ſafety. It is true Penſylvania was at laſt excited to vote 50,000 l. for the defence of their weſtern frontier; but this trifling ſum was rendered abortive by the governor poſitively refuſing to give his aſſent to the act of the aſſembly for raiſing that ſum; becauſe they had rated the proprietaries eſtate equal with thoſe of the inhabitants. By which miſcarriage the Province was left defenceleſs, to the deſtruction of many of the poor ſettlers upon the weſtern frontier. Beſides Diſſentions in the Provinces continue. Their effects

A. D. 1755. such inactivity and neglect of their own poſſeſſions impreſſed the Indians with a very contemptible opinion of the Engliſh, and made them either eſteem, or fear, the French invaders.[k]

Conduct of New York. The people in New York acted more for their own and the common intereſt. Their aſſembly laid a prohibition upon all proviſions, being ſent to any port, ſettlement or iſland belonging to the French, on, or adjacent to, the continent of North America: and voted 45,000 l. for the defence of their colony, expoſed moſt of any other to an invaſion of the French, from Crown Point. With this little ſupply, and the aſſiſtance of other colonies to the eaſt of them, together with the ſmall body of troops, ordered thither by General Shirley from Penſylvania, under Colonel Dunbar, it was reſolved, as the beſt way to keep the enemy from invading their Province, to undertake the two expeditions, one againſt the French fort, at Crown Point, the other againſt Niagara, between the lakes Ontario and Erie, as had before been concerted with General Braddock at Alexandria.

Two expeditions propoſed.

By whom commanded. The expedition againſt Crown Point was committed to the care of Colonel, afterwards General Johnſon, an Iriſhman by birth, but an old inhabitant in the weſtern parts of New York. He had ſettled on the Mohock river, and not only acquired a conſiderable eſtate, but was univerſally beloved both by the Inhabitants and the neighbouring Indians: whoſe language he had learnt,

[k] See the Indian ſpeech, p. 112, 113.

and

and whoſe affections he had gained by his faithful and humane behaviour towards them. General Shirley took upon himſelf the command of the expedition againſt Niagara. A. D. 1755.

Albany was appointed for the rendezvous of the troops for both expeditions: which arrived in good time, towards the end of June. This army conſiſted of near 6000 men, beſides Indians, raiſed by the government of Boſton, Connecticut, New-Hampſhire, Rhode iſland and New York, and ſoon after marched forward, about 60 miles from Albany, under the command of Major General Lyman. But the artillery, battoes, proviſions, and other neceſſaries for the attempt upon Crown Point, were not got ready till the 8th of Auguſt, when General Johnſon ſet out with them for Lake George, where he met and joined his army; that had been employed to build a fort at the landing place, on the eaſt ſide of Hudſon's river, called Fort Edward. He marched 14 miles more northerly, and encamped at the ſouth end of Lake George, alias Sacrament, in a very ſtrong ſituation, covered on each ſide by a thick woody ſwamp, with the Lake in his rear, and by a breaſt work of trees in front; to wait for his battoes, and then to proceed to Ticondaroga, diſtant 15 miles from Crown Point, which the French called Fort Frederick. Carried into execution. General Johnſon arrives at Lake George.

The Baron de Dieſkau, who arrived at Quebec in the ſpring with Monſ. de Vaudrevil, and troops to defend Canada, had inſtructions to make his firſt attack upon Oſwego, and to reduce it, The inſtructions of the Baron de Dieſkau.

which

A. D. 1755. which the French court thought to be of ſingular conſequence for facilitating their grand ſcheme of forcing a way through our colonies to the great weſtern ocean. According to theſe inſtructions the Baron, without delay, proceeded to Montreal, and detached 700 troops up the river, intending himſelf to follow and join them with the remainder. But in this interval the Indians alarmed the inhabitants of Montreal with an account of a numerous army aſſembling near Lake Sacrament, alias Lake George, for the reduction of Fort Frederick; from whence the victors might eaſily penetrate into the heart of Canada. This advice occaſioned a grand council, by which the Baron was prevailed upon with great difficulty to ſuſpend his firſt intention, as directed by his inſtructions, againſt Oſwego, and to proceed directly thro' Lake Champlain, for the defence of Fort Frederick. Where he waited ſome time, expecting that General Johnſon would advance and give him battle. But being diſappointed of his expectations, he embarked his men in battoes, and landed at the South Bay, about 16 miles from Johnſon's camp, intending firſt to reduce Fort Edward at the carrying place, and then to proceed and attack the Engliſh camp under General Johnſon; and reſolving, if he ſhould ſucceed in both attempts, to lay waſte all our northern colonies, burn the towns of Albany and Schenectady to aſhes, and ſo to cut off all communication with Oſwego.

Why he departed from them.

This

This embarkation from Fort Frederick landed without oppoſition, or the leaſt diſcovery. But, when they were advanced ſome miles from the ſhore, the ſcouts brought General Johnſon intelligence, that a conſiderable number [l] of the enemy where on their march from Ticondaroga,[m] by way of the South Bay, towards that fortified camp, ſince called Fort Edward, built and garriſoned, with upwards of 400 of the New Hampſhire and New York men, by General Lyman at the Carrying Place, Colonel Johnſon gave notice thereof to Colonel Blanchard, the commander, with orders to call in all his out parties, and to keep his whole force within the entrenchments. He was further informed by his ſcouts, about 12 o'clock at night, that they had ſeen the enemy, about four miles only from the camp at the Carrying Place; but he took no meaſures for the ſupport of Colonel Blanchard, till next morning;[n] though he perfectly knew the importance of that camp's defence, for the ſafety of his whole army. Early in the morning General Johnſon called a council, in which it was reſolved, to detach only 1000 men, with a number of Indians, to intercept the enemy in their retreat, either as victors, or defeated in their attempt: though they had no account of the

A. D. 1755.

Reinforcement ſent to Fort Edward.

[l] It was found, on their defeat, that they conſiſted of 2000 men, including 200 granadiers, 800 Canadians, the reſt Indians of divers nations.

[m] Situated on the Iſthmus, between the north end of Lake George, and the ſouthern part of Lake Champlain.

[n] On the 8th of September.

number

A. D. 1755. number or ſtrength of the enemy; neither could they get any certainty thereof, from the Indian ſcouts; becauſe thoſe ſavages have no diſtinct words or ſigns, whereby to expreſs large numbers, otherwiſe than pointing to the ſtars in the firmament, or to the hair of their head, which ſometimes may denote 10,000, when at another time, it may ſignify not more than 1000, or an inferior number.

According to this reſolution, Colonel Williams marched between eight and nine o'clock in the morning with 1000 men, and 200 Indians. But, the French General having been deceived, by the information of deſerters from General Johnſon's camp, with an opinion of its want of cannon, and of its defenceleſs ſtate, which made it more expoſed and much eaſier to be ſurprized than Fort Edward, where ſeveral pieces of cannon were mounted, he was prevailed upon by the common voice of his troops (when he was within four miles and a half, from Fort Edward, the firſt object of this expedition) to proceed to the attack of the camp, which he expected to be without cannon, and without lines and breaſt-work.

Though this alteration in the enemy's rout, did in all probability ſave Fort Edward; it had like to have cut off the whole detachment, under Colonel Williams. For, Williams had not marched two hours, before his detachment fell into the very mouths of the French. However, the Colonel behaved with great gallantry and prudence, and maintained his ground for a conſiderable time,

The detachment defeated.

time, till obliged by numbers to fall back. Hereupon began ſome confuſion: ſeveral companies fled, and made the beſt of their way to the camp; which had been already alarmed, at firſt, by their firing in the ſkirmiſh, and more effectually by the fugitives. So that the General detached Lieut. Colonel Cole with 300 freſh men, who came time enough to ſtop the enemy's purſuit, and to cover the retreat of the Engliſh, who otherwiſe might have been entirely cut off. This alarm gave Johnſon time to ſtrenghthen his front with heavy cannon, to take poſſeſſion of ſome eminencies on his left flank, and to fix a field piece in a very advantageous ſituation. A. D. 1755.

The French, fluſhed with this advantage, puſhed forwards in a very regular order towards the center; and had they attacked the camp, which was then all in confuſion, it is probable, they might have ſucceeded and obtained an eaſy victory. But Providence had ordained better things for us: The enemy, without any apparent reaſon, inſtead of attacking the breaſt-work directly, halted at about 150 yards from the camp, and began the attack at ſuch a diſtance with plattoon-firing, that it did no execution againſt troops covered by a ſtrong breaſt-work; and this ineffectual fire ſo raiſed the ſpirits of the Engliſh forces, that, having prepared their artillery, during the time the enemy halted, (which was ſerved well under the direction of Captain Eyre) they ſoon diſperſed the Indians and Canadians, by a briſk diſcharge of grape ſhot, who fled into the woods on each ſide French attack Gen. Johnſon's camp.

the

A. D. 1755. the camp, and fought for defence from the trees and bushes, behind which they hid themselves.

Deserted by the Indians and Canadians.

The French, deserted by the Indians and Canadians, instead of retreating, as prudence directed, fell into another error. Their General, not able with his small number of regulars to make a close attack upon the front of the camp, which he, contrary to his intelligence, found well fortified and lined with cannon, attempted in vain to penetrate the breast-work, first on the left, and then on the right. These several attempts served only to weaken and dispirit his men, who suffered greatly by the fire from the camp: and they being at last thrown into confusion, General Johnson's men, and his Indians, about four o'clock,[o] without waiting for orders, jumped over their breast-work, attacked the enemy on all sides, killed between seven and 800,[p] took 30 prisoners, and dispersed those, that were able to fly with the most speed.

Repulsed and defeated.

Their Gen. taken.

Amongst the prisoners was their General, the very Baron Dieskau, who sailed with the fleet from Brest, and escaped Admiral Boscawen, under favour of thick fogs and hard gales of wind, in his voyage to Quebec. He was found alone, dangerously wounded, and supporting himself on the stump of a tree, a little distance from the field of battle. The loss on our side chiefly fell

[o] On the 8th of September, 1755.

[p] Amongst whom was Mons. St. Pierre, who commanded all the Indians, and the most useful officer the French had in all their expeditions in those parts, and in their treaties with the Indian natives.

upon

upon Colonel Williams's detachment. In which skirmish we lost almost 200 men killed: amongst whom was Colonel Williams, Major Ashley, six captains, and many subalterns. In the camp the loss was very small, and no person of distinction fell but Colonel Titcomb, who was killed. The General and Major Nichols were wounded. Our Indians mourned for the death of the brave old Hendrick our fast friend, the Sachem or chief captain of the Mohocks.[q] They also lost 40 private men. A. D. 1755. Loss on our side.

The commander at Fort Edward, getting information of the attack, which had been intended against himself, being turned and fallen upon General Johnson's camp, detached, about eight o'clock at night, 120 of the New Hampshire regiment, and 90 of the New York regiment, under the command of Captain M'Ginnes, from his garrison to reinforce the General. But the Indians and Canadians, which had escaped from the slaughter of the French army in the morning, having collected themselves into a body of about 400, and rendezvoused at the place where Williams was defeated, in order to scalp the dead left on that spot, intercepted this detachment about four in the morning. Our brave men, says General Johnson, in his letter to Governor Wentworth, fought them for near two hours, and made a con- Detachment from Fort Edward. Intercepted by the flying enemy.

[q] The other Indians, upon the approach of the French, retired from the camp, and did not join General Johnson till the battle was over; which shews, that they were determined to join the conqueror, French or English.

A. D. 1755. Defeat the enemy.

ſiderable ſlaughter amongſt them, and extricated themſelves with the loſs of no more than two killed, 11 wounded and five miſſing. Amongſt the wounded was Captain M‘ Ginnes, whoſe wounds proved mortal; of which he died in a few days at General Johnſon's camp, whereunto he conducted his party.

M. Dieſkau's character.

Monſ. le Baron de Dieſkau, the French General, was wounded in his leg, and through both his hips; a man in years, an experienced officer, and a perſon of high conſideration in France. He had brought 3171 regular troops under his command, to Quebec, in the late fleet; and had diſpoſed of them partly to garriſon Crown Point, and partly in encampments at Ticondaroga, and other advantageous paſſes between Lake George and Crown Point.

General Johnſon's conduct.

The ſkirmiſh Captain M‘Ginnes had with the remains of the French army, and the certain account Gen. Johnſon had from Dieſkau and the officers, in his cuſtody, of the number of regular troops encamped between him and Crown Point, put him greatly upon his guard againſt a ſurprize, and to provide the beſt in his power againſt a more deſperate attack. This determined him not to purſue the fugitives, beyond the probability of a ſafe retreat. The enemy, he was convinced, were in a diſpoſition to rally, and had reinforcements near at hand: therefore he was watchful to maintain the advantages he had gained, without weakening himſelf by detaching parties in purſuit of an enemy, whom it might be dangerous to meet: and for ſeveral days,

till



A. Walker sculp.

Sr. WILLIAM JOHNSON.

till he was thoroughly convinced by his ſcouts, that there appeared no intentions of the enemy to give him further trouble, he kept his men conſtantly upon their arms by day, half the whole upon guard by night, and the reſt laid down armed and accoutred. A. D. 1755.

Fruitful minds have endeavoured to leſſen the merit of the two Generals, that commanded in chief, on this occaſion. Dieſkau's conduct is highly arraigned for departing from his firſt plan of operation, by leaving Fort Edward at the Carrying Place, and attacking the main body of the Britiſh forces encamped under the command of General Johnſon. They ſay, that the garriſon of Fort Edward did not exceed four or 500, and that the loſs of this fort would ſo have diſtreſſed the main camp, as to prevent its proceeding further, and its ſubſiſtence where it was. So that the French might have had an opportunity to harreſs it, in its retreat. What diſſuaded the French General from his firſt opinion was, a certain information that Fort Edward was well garriſoned, and mounted ſeveral pieces of cannon, of which he was in want: That ſhould he be detained before that fort, which could not be expected to yield to his ſummons, its vicinity to the main camp made him liable to be put between two fires, of the cannon of the fort, and of the army under General Johnſon, who would certainly endeavour to relieve it: that the army laid expoſed in an heedleſs ſecurity, without either cannon mounted, or breaſt works thrown up to prevent a ſurprize, Both Generals defended. Firſt, M. Dieſkau.

A. D. 1755. which was the real caſe three days before, when thoſe deſerters, that gave him the information, fled from their colours: And that it was more agreeable to the Canadians and Indians to engage an enemy in the woods, where they had no cannon, than in a fort, where their buſh-firing could do them no ſervice. Under theſe circumſtances, the moſt prudent reader will allow that Deiſkau ought to be acquitted of miſconduct, when he engaged in that attack, which, in the nature of things, promiſed him more ſure ſucceſs; both in regard to the chance of the iſſue, the inclination of his whole army, and to the want of artillery, or heavy cannon to reduce the fort.

Second, General Johnſon. As for General Johnſon. They accuſe him of loſing the opportunity of totally deſtroying the French army, by a too reſerved reſtraint upon his men, whom he would not ſuffer to purſue the flying enemy; and of neglecting to improve his victory by advancing to the attack of the main object of his expedition at Crown Point. But there is no need of refutation or apology, more than that General himſelf furniſhes in his letter to Governor Wentworth; which ſhews plainly, that he had reaſon to ſuſpect a renewal of the attack; that it was dangerous to weaken his main body by detachments to ſcour the country; that the paſſes to Crown Point were ſo well provided with regular troops and Indians, that he would find work enough for his ſtrength, to force his way through them, if at all, and then could not, after ſo much fatigue, and perhaps great loſs of men and ammunition,

munition, hope to be in a condition to reduce Crown Point, where their chief force was lodged. Reaſons, however they may appear to the captious, ſufficiently commended by his Majeſty's parliament and government: And for which ſervice, the King created General Johnſon a baronet, and the parliament voted him a preſent of 5000l. in reward of his merit. A. D. 1755.

General Johnſon apprehending that he had done all in his power, at a ſeaſon of the year, which very ſoon would prevent his keeping the field, and having good reaſon to think, before he reſolved upon his decamping to return home, that the enemy was in no condition to do more than remain upon the defenſive, he made the neceſſary preparations to break up his camp, and returned to Albany, leaving only a ſmall garriſon of militia, in a little Stockaded fort, at the higher end of Lake George, to aſſert the right of his Britannic Majeſty to the country round about. General Johnſon returns home.

General Shirley, who took upon himſelf the command of the expedition againſt Niagara, did not meet with the like approbation at the Britiſh court. His dilatory and defective preparations, on this occaſion, at his firſt ſetting out promiſed no great advantages to the common cauſe. His ſucceſs chiefly depended upon an early march to the object of his armament. But time was conſumed ſo laviſhly, that his firſt diviſion, Colonel Schuylar's New Jerſey regiment did not march from Albany till the beginning of July; and it was near the end of that month, before Shirley's Expedition againſt Niagara. General Shirley's conduct cenſured.

A. D. 1755. and Pepperel's regiments followed; and then they were ſo diſpirited by the news of Braddock's ſhameful defeat, that many of the troops deſerted; and the battoemen in particular were ſtruck with ſuch a pannic, that there could not be found enough to carry the neceſſary ſtores for the army. However, General Shirley ſet out with his regiment, and, in his way to Oſwego from Albany, endeavoured to ſtrengthen his forces, by applying to the Indians of the Six Nations for their auxiliary aid. But very few joined his army; excuſing themſelves, as a trading people, from taking any part in the quarrel between the French and Engliſh; and inſiſting that Oſwego, being a place of trade, traffic and peace, ought not to be diſturbed by either party.

Excuſe of the Indians not to ſerve in the war.

Army arrives at Oſwego.

Under theſe diſappointments General Shirley arrived at Oſwego [r] on the 18th of Auguſt; but the reſt of his troops and the artillery did not get up there before the laſt day of that month; and ſo badly provided with proviſions, that it was impoſſible for them all to proceed to Niagara. He then reſolved to draw out ſix hundred men, and with them to attack Niagara, and to leave 1400 at Oſwego, to prevent a ſurprize from the French fort Frontenac, which was very powerful, and could eaſily make a deſcent, a-croſs the lake On-

In want of every thing.

[r] About 300 miles weſt from Albany, where there were 250 men in garriſon, under Captain Broadſtreet, beſides workmen to be employed in building ſloops on the lake.

tario,

tario, upon Oſwego[s]. But it was the 26th of September before proviſions could be provided for ſo ſmall a force; and to leave only twelve days ſhort ſubſiſtence for the troops left behind: And the boiſterous rainy ſeaſon having begun, which drove many of the Indians home, and made the navigation of the lake Ontario very dangerous; it was by a council of war, after weighing all circumſtances, unanimouſly reſolved to defer the attempt upon Niagara, till the next year; and to employ the troops, then at Oſwego, in building barracks, and two new forts, one on the ſide of the river Onondaga, 450 yards diſtant from the old fort, to command the entrance of the harbour, by the name of Ontario Fort, and the other at the diſtance of 450 yards weſt of the old fort, and to bear the name of Oſwego New Fort. Theſe were wiſe diſpoſitions againſt the ſuperior power of the French Fort Frontenac, which was too ſtrong for Oſwego Fort alone. But General Shirley mar'd all the benefit of thoſe councils, by marching on the 24th of October to Albany, and leaving no more than ſeven hundred men, under Colonel Mercer, both to garriſon Oſwego, and to complete the two forts, not near finiſhed; and without any poſſibility of relief in caſe of a ſiege by the enemy in the winter.

A. D. 1755.

Reſolved to return home.

Leaves the country, &c. expoſed to the enemy.

[s] Situated on the ſouth bank of the lake, conſiſting of a ſtone wall, and mounted with five cannon, three or four pounders, and otherwiſe in a very bad defenceleſs condition, when General Shirley arrived there.

A. D. 1755. General Shirley ſummons's all the Governors to Albany.

General Shirley ſet out from Oſwego in a whale boat on the 24th of October, attended by ſome battoes, and arrived at Albany on the 4th of November. On the 2d of December he, by circular letters, ſummoned the ſeveral Governors upon the Continent, as far weſtward as Virginia, to meet him there, in order to form a council of war, which, by his Majeſty's inſtructions to him, was to conſiſt of as many Governors and Field-Officers of his Majeſty's troops, as could attend.

This council met on the 12th, but conſiſted of a very few. Mr. Shirley laid before them his Majeſty's inſtructions to General Braddock, and then delivered his own ſentiments to the board, which were, at all events, to ſecure the navigation of lake Ontario; that 6000 troops ſhould be employed to reduce the French forts on that lake, and 10,000 againſt Crown Point: to which they agreed. There was a propoſal to renew the expedition againſt Fort du Queſne, and to attack the French in the river Chaudiere, but that was conſented to only conditionally, provided it could be done without interfering with the two principal expeditions. The council then unanimouſly declared it to be their opinion, that it would be impoſſible to recover and ſecure his Majeſty's juſt rights without an additional number of regular forces, beſides thoſe already upon that Continent, and, as the French were building veſſels of force at Frontenac, they ordered a ſnow, a brigandine

and


LABRADOR OR
NEW BRITAIN
JAMES
BAY
FRANCE
OR
CANADA
NOVA
SCOTIA
NEW
FOUND
LAND
LAURENCE
G. OF S.T
THE
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Fishing Banks of Nova Scotia
Great
Fishing Bank
of New
foundland
Bermudas
Isles
A
New & Accurate MAP of
NORTH AMERICA,
Including the
British Acquisitions gaind
BY
the late WAR.
1763.

and a sloop to be built with all diligence at Fort Oswego. A. D. 1755.

As many passages in the American war, which will come under your eye and consideration, must lose their proper effect, and be rendered abstruse and unsatisfactory in regard to the right, importance and limits of the British Empire upon the Continent of North America, it will be necessary to give you some account of the manner Great Britain became possessed of those territories in the new world; to explain their benefit to their mother country, and to describe the limits of the several provinces, and the nature of the French encroachments, with some topographical remarks on those particular places, which more immediately come under the cognizance of this History. An account of North America.

To fix the original right to our possessions in North America, it is necessary to go back to the age, in which the powers of Europe were first inspired with the spirit of making discoveries in what was, at that time, the unknown world. When this new world was first discovered.

Columbus, who first offered his service to our Henry the Seventh, to sail in quest of a new part of the globe, being neglected in England, had alarmed Europe with his discoveries in the service of Spain; by which tenure only the Spaniards hold their islands and that vast extent of territory, which were, in a course of years and various attempts, discovered in South America, from whence they drew such immense riches, as amaze the whole world. Two years after Cabot, a Vene- By Columbus.

A. D. 1755. By Cabot.

tian born, but ſettled at Briſtol, a maritime port, at that time of great repute in the weſtern parts of England, being well ſkilled in coſmography and navigation, naturally inferred from the diſcoveries made by Columbus in the ſouth-weſt, that there was as much probability of ſucceſs in ploughing the Atlantic Ocean towards the north-weſt, preſented a memorial to King Henry VII. ſetting forth, that he made no doubt, but if his Majeſty would pleaſe to employ him, he could make ſome uſeful diſcoveries, in his name, and find out iſlands and countries abounding with rich commodities, no ways inferior in value to thoſe already diſcovered by Columbus in the ſervice of the King of Spain.

King Henry VII. hearkened to the propoſal, and commiſſioned John Cabot [t] and his three ſons [u] to ſail in queſt of unknown lands, and to annex them to the crown of England; with this clauſe, *which before this time have been unknown to all Chriſtians* [w]. His firſt eſſay, as related by Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who was employed in the like ſervice afterwards by Queen Elizabeth, was to diſcover a north-weſt paſſage to Cathay or China; in which voyage he ſailed very far eaſtward, with a quarter of the north, on the north ſide of *Terra de Labrador*, till he came into the

[t] See Peter Martyr Hiſt. Ind. Occiden. and Rapin.

[u] Hackluit's Voyages, vol. III. p. 4. and Rymer's Fœdera, A. D. 1496.

[w] This commiſſion was dated the 5th of March, in the 11th year of Henry VII.

north

north latitude of ſixty-ſeven degrees and a half. In his next voyage, which was made with his ſon Sebaſtian, in the year 1497, he ſteered to the ſouth-ſide of *Labrador*, and fell in with the Iſland of *Baccalaos*, which is Newfoundland, and took poſſeſſion both of that iſland and all the coaſt of the north-eaſt part of America, as far as cape Florida; which he alſo, by landing in ſeveral parts of it, claimed in the name of his maſter the King of England. A. D. 1755.

In memory of this diſcovery, and by way of evidence, there was a map or chart of the whole coaſt of North America, drawn by Sebaſtian Cabot himſelf, with his picture and this title, Effigies Seb. Caboti Angli, Filii Jo. Caboti, Venetiani, Militis Aurati, &c. and with the following account of the diſcovery above-mentioned,

" In the year of our Lord 1497, John Cabot, " a Venetian, and his ſon Sebaſtian (with an Eng- " liſh fleet) ſet out from Briſtol, and diſcovered " that land, which no man had before attempted. " This diſcovery was made on the 24th of June " about five o'clock in the morning. This land " he called *Prima Viſta* (or *the firſt* ſeen) becauſe " it was that part, of which they had the firſt " ſight from the ſea. It is now called *Bonaviſta*. " The iſland, which lies out before the land, he " called the Iſland of *St. John*, probably becauſe " it was diſcovered on the feſtival of *St. John* " *Baptiſt*."

This map was hung up in his Majeſty's privy-gallery at Whitehall; and, it is to be feared, the nation

A. D. 1755. nation was deprived of ſuch a valuable teſtimonial of their American title to the whole coaſt of North America, by the fire, which deſtroyed that gallery in the late King William's reign.

Authors [x], who confirm this account, and are more creditable, for having lived nearer the time this diſcovery was made, write that Cabot, having ſailed beyond the cape of *Labrador*, till he had paſſed 58 degrees, and being ſtopt in the month of July with cold and ice, turned again towards the weſt, refreſhed himſelf at *Baccalaos* or Newfoundland, and afterwards ſailed along the coaſt (of the Continent) unto 38 degrees, from whence he ſhaped his courſe to return to England. By which we are authorized to comprehend Hudſon's Bay, with the adjacent countries and the banks of Newfoundland, under the dominion of the Britiſh crown: A territory which extends, along the ſea coaſt, ſeventeen hundred miles, in a direct line. But as Hudſon's Bay has not been concerned in the preſent conteſt, it will ſuffice to confine this ſubject to the territory trading from Cape Charles on the ſouth-eaſt point of Terra Labrador to Cape Florida; including the iſlands and fiſhing banks upon that extenſive coaſt, and by right of diſcovery, as there were no Chriſtian power had any ſettlement thereon, or claim thereto, or even know-

Extent of his diſcoveries.

[x] See Francis Lopez de Gomera, a Spaniard, in his Hiſtory of the Weſt Indies, book II. c. 4.

Peter Martyr. Decad. 3. ch. 6.

Baptiſta Romuſius in the Preface to his 3d vol. of Navigations. And Hackluit's Voyages, vol. III.

ledge

ledge thereof, comprehending all the heathen poſ- A. D. 1755.
ſeſſions and immenſe wilderneſſes, to the utmoſt extent of that Continent weſtward, as far as it is bounded by the South-ſea.

In this light it is certain the powers of Europe, to whom Henry VII. of England notified the poſſeſſion he had taken of the premiſes, by his captains the Cabots, father and ſon, underſtood this diſcovery to exclude their commiſſions and navigators from this coaſt and theſe iſlands and banks: for we read of no attempt of that ſort within theſe limits, till a luſt of dominion, a rivalſhip in trade and navigation, and a natural antipathy and envy, which the French took up againſt our nation, prompted them to ſet a-foot new commiſſions for paring the territories and diſtricts of other Chriſtian nations in the new world. They ſucceeded moſt in the Weſt Indies, where they got poſſeſſion of thoſe iſlands, from whence they draw ſo great national reſources by trade and navigation. Nor did they fail, in a courſe of years, to explore the coaſt of North America. But with that ſecrecy, as to make a ſtrong lodgment in the moſt obſcure part thereof, before it was probable to interrupt their operations, and to drive them off. Thus favoured by the indolence and neglect of the Engliſh, who did not pay that due regard to the improvement of their North American regions, they ſtole up the bay and river of St. Lawrence, and fortified themſelves at Quebec, by which influence they obtained a great extent of land, by them called Canada, and have maintained

First attempt of the French.

A. D. 1755. tained that uſurpation by force, till conquered in the preſent war.

The death of Henry VII. and the ſchemes carried on by his ſon and ſucceſſor Henry VIII. to enſlave his ſubjects, to ſatisfy his luſt, and to rob the religious foundations, by introducing a religion of his own invention; (for he was no otherwiſe a Proteſtant, than as he aboliſhed the Pope's ſupremacy in England, ſtill retaining the worſt of doctrines, and the ſpirit of perſecution againſt all diſſenters from his ſix ſanguinary articles) interrupted the laudable and profitable adventures, ſet on foot with ſo much ſucceſs, for diſcoveries and the ſettlement of unknown countries, inhabited only by heathens.

Neglect of our diſcoveries.

The iſland of Newfoundland.

Newfoundland being the firſt land mentioned in Cabot's diſcovery, we begin with its deſcription. It is an iſland of a triangular form, about 930 miles in circumference, ſeparated on the north, from Terra de Labrador by the ſtreight of Belliſle, which runs north-eaſt, and is about 23 miles over in its narroweſt part. On the weſt it has the gulph of St. Lawrence, and on the ſouth and eaſt the weſtern or great Atlantic ocean. Cape Race or Raz is the moſt ſoutherly point of the iſland, and lies in 46° 45″ north lat. the moſt northern point is in lat. 51. 30. ſo that the greateſt length of the iſland from north to ſouth is 280 miles. And as Cape Raye is its moſt weſterly point, in north lat. 47. 35. the diſtance between it and Cape Race is about 240 miles.

This

This iſland abounds with ſpacious and excellent bays and harbours; and is otherwiſe well ſupplied with freſh ſprings and waters. The produce of the land, though it might be made, by induſtry, to turn to ſome account, is not the conſideration of the adventurers, whoſe principal, and indeed only care is to enrich themſelves by the cod-fiſh trade upon its coaſt; which fiſh is ſo plentiful in this ſea, as to be ſufficient to ſupply the whole world; including what is taken on the banks, which are vaſt mountains concealed under water, as if nature had deſigned them for inexhauſtible magazines of cod-fiſh. Beſides, from the livers of theſe fiſh the adventurers draw off great quantities of train oil, of which they make a conſiderable advantage. And as this navigation brings up the beſt and great numbers of ſeamen, and there is a great demand in France, Spain, Portugal and Italy for Newfoundland fiſh, an excluſive right to this trade and navigation, which we are intitled to by priority of diſcovery, is of the greateſt conſequence to England; as it ſerves, at the ſame time, to enrich and ſtrengthen ourſelves, and deprives other nations of the like means to ſupply themſelves with fiſh, and to man their navies. A. D. 1755.

The Continent, under this diſcovery, has by ſeveral grants, from time to time, been divided into a number of provinces and diſtricts, of which Nova Scotia is the moſt eaſtern ſettlement. The Continent.

Nova

A. D. 1754. Nova Scotia or Acadia.

Nova Scotia or Acadia, as to its antient boundaries has already [y] been deſcribed in the demand made by the Britiſh commiſſaries upon the French King, for the faithful performance of that part of the treaty of Utrecht, which cedes Nova Scotia or Acadia, according to its antient boundaries to his Britannic Majeſty.

When firſt ſettled by the Engliſh.

This province was firſt ſettled by the Engliſh, before the year 1602, which the French hiſtorians allow to be two years, before their navigators ſkulked up the gulph of St. Lawrence, and made a lodgment on the northern borders of this country. In 1620 the crown granted all that part of Acadia, as far as the 48th degree of north lat. to the council of Plymouth or New England: and in the next year the council of New England reſigned to the crown all parts of their grant to the north of the river St. Croix, when it was then granted with the reſt of Acadia to Sir William Alexander, Secretary of State for Scotland, and by him, or his charter, named Nova Scotia, inſtead of Acadia. In 1623 all Acadia or Nova Scotia was given in marriage with King Charles the Firſt's daughter to the French King. Sir David Kirk took it from the French in 1627; but it was again ceded to France by the treaty of St. Germain. In 1654 Cromwel reduced it. But King Charles II. in 1662, without any regard to the remonſtrances of New England and his parliament, againſt admitting the French ſo near to our colonies, delivered it up again; and confirmed its poſſeſſion to

Ceded to the French.

Undergoes ſeveral revolutions.

[y] See before, p. 50.

France

France by the treaty of Breda in 1667. The New Englandmen labouring under great disadvantages from a French neighbour in that maritime situation, laid hold of the first opportunity of a war to force it again out of the hands of the French, and took it from them in 1690 with 700 men only. But their hopes were once more disappointed; for the treaty of Reswick gave it back to France. However, the time at last came to fix this possession in its original right: For Nova Scotia or Acadia being reduced in 1710 by united forces from Old and New England, it was, as already largely [z] explained, confirmed to the crown of Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, "with its antient boundaries, as also the city of "Port Royal, as fully as ever France possessed "them by treaty or other means." A. D. 1755. Ceded to Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht.

The importance of this settlement to the French was very considerable. In the first place, it opened for them a way to the great western ocean from Canada, and secured a communication between Old France and that back colony, without the delay and hazard of the navigation through the river St. Lawrence: Again, it put them in possession of the banks on that coast, with whose produce they might easily rival, if not beat England out of the cod fishery. Its importance to the French.

An author, well acquainted with this subject, remarks, That could France have carried her point in her claim upon Acadia or Nova Scotia, Remarks thereon.

[z] See before, p. 49, 50, and 84, &c.

with

A. D. 1755. with the contiguous iſlands and Cape Breton, ſuch an acquiſition would have made our natural enemies more terrible, than ever, to our colonies: becauſe it might ſecure to them a ſuperiority in the fiſhery for ever, and the whole fur-trade of the northern continent: it would provide them with materials for building ſhips of the greateſt force, and with excellent ports and harbours, from whence they might embark and launch into the ocean; inſtead of the tedious and hazardous navigation down the river St. Lawrence. So that in proportion as France ſhould be deprived of theſe advantages, Great Britain, by retaining the poſſeſſion of Acadia or Nova Scotia, maintains her ſuperiority in the fiſhery and in thoſe ſeas, and preſerves her colonies from the encroachments and threats of their enemies, or rivals in trade. France was ſo ſenſible of the ruin of all her fine plans, for the extent and improvement of her Canadian colony; and for the deſtruction of the Britiſh power, intereſt and trade on the Continent of North America; ſhould ſhe not be able by negociation or force to maintain her perfidious claim to Acadia, that we have ſeen all her policy, riches and ſtrength employed, in this war, to get it once more into her actual poſſeſſion.

New England firſt ſettled, and compoſed of four Provinces.

New England, which was begun to be inhabited in the year 1606, by patent from King James I. is now compoſed of the provinces of New Hampſhire, Maſſachuſet's Bay, Rhode Iſland and Connecticut; which have, in courſe of time, confederated for their common ſupport againſt

againſt the ſeveral attempts made by the French on their back ſettlements: For, ſo early as the year 1611, the French made encroachments upon the New England patent, and endeavoured to ſecure their uſurpation by ſeveral forts at mount Manſel, St. Croix, and Port Royal; and were making diſpoſitions for further invaſions, when Sir Samuel Aſgall drove them off, diſmantled their fortifications, and carried away both their artillery and ſtores [a]. A. D. 1755. Encroachments by the French.

At preſent, and for many years, New England abounds with trading towns, of which Boſton, the metropolis of the province of Maſſachuſet's Bay, is the firſt city of all North America. It contains ten churches, and about 30,000 inhabitants, is built on a peninſula at the bottom of a capacious harbour, defended from the violence of the ocean by ſeveral iſlands and rocks, that appear above water; and from an enemy by a regular fortreſs at the narrow entrance of the river. The chief branch of trade in this city ſeems to be in fiſh, which employs a vaſt number of people; but the inhabitants alſo drive a briſk trade with the Weſt Indies for lumber and proviſions; and with England in maſts, yards, pitch, tar, turpentine and ſtaves, and ſome peltry. Beſides, by taking molaſſoes in return for lumber on the ſugar iſlands, the people of Boſton have ingroſſed the Indian trade on that Continent for ſpirituous liquors, and ſupply the Britiſh colonies in North The town of Boſton.

[a] See Harris, Part I. p. 851. 1ſt Edition.

A D. 1755. America, the Newfoundland fiſhery, and the greateſt part of the commerce on the coaſt of Guinea, with a kind of rum diſtilled from that barter. But nothing does the induſtry of the New Englandmen more honour, than the number of ſhips built in their ports. By which they draw great ſums from other countries, and have become carriers for moſt of the other colonies. They have manufactures of hats, linnen and woollen; and on all occaſions, when called out for war, have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in courage; and therefore the French have always been endeavouring to creep down upon them, and to circumſcribe both their trade and power; which has been particularly manifeſted by building Fort Cohaſſer and Fort Frederic or Crown Point, a conſiderable way within their acknowledged frontier. Theſe confederate provinces contain about 350,000 inhabitants, including a ſmall number of blacks and Indians.

New York ſettled by Swedes and Dutch.

New York is the next colony to the ſouth. It was firſt ſettled by the Swedes, and by the name of New Sweden; and afterwards the name of New Netherland was impoſed by the Dutch, who got footing on the Delaware river by the help of Henry Hudſon, an Engliſh commander of a ſhip, fitted out by the Dutch Eaſt India company to find a nearer paſſage to China. Who, failing in his diſcovery by the north weſt, ſteered for the coaſt of Florida, puſhed into the river, and made a lodgment at the place, where New York now ſtands, in the year 1609. Which, in a few

a few years, throve ſo well, under the influence and aid of the United Provinces in Europe, that the Swedes were obliged to ſubmit to their juriſdiction. But as ſoon as our national ſtrength and ſpirit revived after the reſtoration, the Engliſh aſſerted their right; and the Dutch not able to reſiſt the force ſent to reduce them, or to drive them off, ſubmitted to the King of England on promiſe of being protected in their perſons and properties, in the year 1664. King Charles II. had granted this territory to his brother the Duke of York by letters patent, before the expedition failed; and therefore it was immediately named New York in compliment to his Royal Highneſs the Proprietor. A. D. 1755. Driven out by the Engliſh.

This province is about 50 miles in breadth, within which compaſs lies Long Iſland, on the ſouth of Connecticut. But it extends on both ſides of the river Hudſon, northerly, about 200 miles, till it meets with the Iroquois or Indians of the Five Nations. Long Iſland.

Hudſon River is navigable almoſt 200 miles. At its mouth is the iſland Manahatton, 14 miles long and five broad, which forms an excellent harbour, and contains the capital city, alſo named New York. In which are upwards of 8000 inhabitants, who drive a good trade in corn, flour and other ſpecies of proviſions to the Weſt Indies. It is neatly built, and has four churches. At the diſtance of 150 miles ſtands the town of Albany, upon the ſame river; which, though not large nor populous, is a place of great trade Hudſon's River. Town of New York. Town of Albany.

A. D. 1755. with the Indians, who come here to barter their goods for powder and ſhot, fire arms and cutlery ware, coarſe woollen cloths and linnen, &c. And this is the place where all tranſactions and treaties are negociated between the Engliſh and Iroquois Indians. Iroquois; once the moſt powerful of all the heathens on that Continent, but ſo enervated by the uſe of ſpirituous liquors chiefly, that their whole confederate nation is not able to bring above 1500 men into the field, though augmented by the Tuſcororas, an Indian tribe, which was driven from the confines of Carolina, and joined in their confederacy.

It is computed that the province of New York, including Long Iſland, contains 80,000 inhabitants. It ſhould ſeem, from the ſituation of Crown Point, between lakes Champlain and Sacrament, which ſtands at leaſt thirty miles within the river Iroquois, that the French muſt have gained over thoſe Indians to their intereſt, ſo, at leaſt, as to ſtand neuter upon any breach between them and the Engliſh; which is confirmed by their anſwer to General Shirley's invitation to accompany him to Niagara; and that they were fortifying a road, that in a little time might put them in poſſeſſion of Hudſon's river; which could be eaſily performed from Quebec, by the river Richelieu and the lake Champlain and George; and, conſequently, gain them a ſettlement in the heart of our colonies, and a ſafe and eaſy communication with the weſtern ocean. The Mohok Indians inhabit the country advanced from Albany.

New

New Jerſey lies in a ſoutherly direction from New York, and is that piece of land, which is incloſed between the boundaries of New York and the river Dalaware, on the weſt, about 150 miles in length, and 50 miles broad, containing about 50,000 ſouls. It is ſo advantageouſly ſituated between New York and Penſylvania, that its back ſettlements have little to fear from the hoſtile Indians: and this ſmall tract of land excels in grain and in all kinds of proviſions and fruits, particularly in peaches and melons. Its foreſts, which are large, abound with oak, aſh, beech, cedar, cheſtnut, cypreſs, wallnut-tree, pine, ſaſſafras and hickery. Both this country and New York produce good hemp and flax. All which commodities the inhabitants ſend to the markets of New York and Penſylvania, though there is a very commodious harbour, capable of receiving ſhips of great burden, at Perth-Amboy, its capital, which is very thinly inhabited; though the province is ſuppoſed to contain about 60,000 ſouls. A. D. 1755. New Jerſey.

Penſylvania ſtretches ſoutherly from New York and New Jerſey, 250 miles in length, and 200 in breadth, having no communication with the ſea, except by the mouth of the Delaware; containing above 250,000 inhabitants, who carry on a large commerce with Europe and the Weſt Indies: and the importance of this colony to its mother country, may be gathered from the value of the imports from England, which in the year 1757 amounted to 268,426l. 6s. 6d. ſterling. Philadelphia, its capital, is an extraordinary large, Penſylvania.

A. D. 1755. The town of Philadelphia.

rich and flouriſhing city, built on a tongue of land, at the conflux of the Dalaware and Schulkel, two navigable rivers, in the form of a regular oblong; with broad, ſpacious and uniform ſtreets, croſs each other at right angles, leaving proper ſpaces for public edifices. The houſes are alſo neatly built of brick, and there are commodious docks for building of ſhips. But one great misfortune attends this opulent and numerous people, whoſe religious principles of Quakeriſm, being too pacific, have encouraged the ſubtle French to hover more about their borders than ſome other of their neighbours. They even erected a fort on their property, at Lake Erie, and another at ſome diſtance to the ſouthward of the River Au Beuf, beſides other encroachments, unmoleſted.

Maryland.

Maryland, in length about 140 miles, and almoſt of the ſame breadth, ſpreads along the Bay of Cheſapeak, bounded on the north by Penſylvania, on the eaſt by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the ſouth by the river Potowmack. Its number of white inhabitants do not exceed 40,000: But their negro ſlaves are upwards of 60,000, by whoſe labour they cultivate and manufacture 40,000 hogſheads of tobacco, which is the ſtaple commodity of their province. Their capital is called Annapolis, beautifully ſituated on the river Patuxent.

Virginia.

Virginia, which is now properly ſo called, and diſtinguiſhed as a province on this continent, is the next ſettlement to the ſouthward, bounded on the north, by the river Potowmack; on the eaſt,

by

by the bay of Cheſapeak; on the ſouth, by Carolina; and without any limits to the weſtward; though the plantations have not yet extended beyond the Allegany mountains; making in length about 240 miles, and in breadth not more than 200 miles. The white people in this province are computed to be 70,000, and the blacks many more; employed chiefly as in Maryland, and raiſing much the ſame quantity of tobacco, which is the ſtaple commodity of this province; though Great Britain is ſupplied from hence with a conſiderable quantity of flax, hemp, iron, ſtaves, wallnut-tree and Cedar-planks; and a good trade is carried on with the Weſt Indies in lumber, pitch, tar, corn and proviſions. A. D. 1755.

This province abounds with vaſt foreſts of timber, and produces plenty of corn, and every ſort of fruit in great abundance and perfection.

The Bay of Cheſapeak runs from ſouth to north 300 miles into the country, covered from the weſtern ocean by the eaſt ſide of Maryland, and a ſmall part of Virginia on the ſame Peninſula, and receiving many rivers on both ſides; as James river, York river, Rappahannock, and Potowmack. Cheſapeak Bay.

As to its towns. James Town, its antient capital, is dwindled into a village; and the preſent ſeat of government, named Williamſburg, is neither large nor populous.

The Carolinas, bounded on the north by Virginia, form a ſhore on the weſtern ocean of 400 miles and upwards; extending in breadth near The Carolinas.

A. D. 1755. 300 to the lands inhabited by the Cutabaws,[b] Creeks,[c] Cherokees,[d] and Chickeſaws.[e]

They are divided into two provinces, the north and the ſouth. North Carolina is moſt populous, and carries on a very conſiderable trade in tar, pitch, turpentine, ſtaves, ſhingles, lumber, corn, peas, pork, beef, tobacco, deer-ſkins, indigo, wheat, rice, bees-wax, tallow, bacon, hogs-lard, timber, &c. Its chief town is ſmall and called Edenton. But the capital of South Carolina, called Charles town, is commodiouſly ſituated at the conflux of two navigable rivers, with a commodious harbour; contains about 800 houſes well built, and is well fortified. The trade of this province is much in the ſame things, as in North Carolina; excepting its ſtaple commodities of rice and indigo, which here are cultivated with good ſucceſs.

Georgia. Georgia, the moſt ſouthern of all our ſettlements on this coaſt, extends about 60 miles along the ſea ſhore, and runs almoſt 300 miles from thence to the Apalachian mountains, widening in the inland parts to above 150 miles in breadth:

[b] They live in the middle of our plantations, about 200 miles from Charles Town.

[c] Inhabit a beautiful country, beginning at about 500 miles from Charles Town, and running weſtward within 100 miles of the Miſſiſippi; and are accounted a brave and wiſe people.

[d] Diſtant 500 miles from Charles Town, and 200 miles from the neareſt Engliſh ſettlement.

[e] Live about 600 miles weſt of Charles Town, and are a brave, friendly and faithful people.

But thinly inhabited. It is bounded on the ſouth, by the river Attamaha, not far from the late Spaniſh fort of St. Auguſtine. The inhabitants raiſe large quantities of rice and indigo; and have made ſome progreſs in the culture of ſilk. Its capital is named Savannah, commodiouſly ſituated on a river of the ſame name, about 10 miles from the ſea. It has another town named Auguſta, about 200 miles higher up that river, navigable for large boats; at which town the Georgians carry on a profitable trade for ſkins, with the Creeks, Chickeſaws, and the Cherokees, who are at preſent the moſt reſpectable tribes of Indians, both for number and ſtrength. A. D. 1755. The towns of Savannah and Auguſta.

Let us now reſume the thread of our hiſtory. The hoſtilities commenced in the North American ſeas, as well as on that Continent, gave ſuch a turn to the ſpirit of the nation, which received the news with the greateſt joy, as obliged the government to proceed; it being too late to retreat. And, as the war was expected to be confined to the ſea, and to operations in North America, depending upon a ſuperiority on the ocean, they pretended to ſtrike ſuch a ſtroke, as to deprive the French at once of the means to man their fleets. But this amounted to no more than an order for our ſhips of war to make repriſals upon the French, by taking all their ſhips, wherever they ſhould be met; and to diſpatch Sir Edward Hawke, with 18 men of war,[f] to wait for the French fleet, un- The meaſures taken by the Britiſh court. Repriſals made.

[f] On the 21ſt of July.

der

A. D. 1755. der the command of M. de Guay, who had put into Cadiz; and was expected ſhortly to return to Breſt. Sir Edward's orders were, to cruize off Cape Fineſterre till the French fleet came in ſight: than which no ſtation could have been appointed ſo favourable to the French. It was ordered upon the mere preſumption, that the French fleet muſt ſail in that tract and in no other, leaving the whole Bay of Biſcay, and the Atlantic Ocean, as far as the Engliſh channel, open, for the courſe of M. du Guay's fleet, as well as for the return of the ſhips from North America, which du Guay had been ſent out to convoy ſafe into port. Accordingly M. du Guay ſoon got intelligence of Admiral Hawke's ſtrength and ſtation, and the purpoſes for which he had orders to lie there: And like a ſkilful ſeaman, the French Admiral ſeized the opportunity of the Engliſh ſquadrons confinement, ſo far diſtant from Breſt; and, departing from Cadiz, ſteered directly weſt from Spain into the Atlantic Ocean, and, at a great diſtance from the coaſt changing his courſe, he ſtood directly for the Lands End of England; whereby he avoided Admiral Hawke's fleet, cruiſing off Cape Fineſterre, arrived ſafe in the Britiſh channel, fell in behind it with his ſquadron, and got ſafe into the harbour of Breſt [s] on the 3d of Sept.

Admiral Hawke's cruiſe.

Upon advice of du Guay's ſafe return, Adm. Hawke was called home; where he arrived on the 29th of September. The miniſtry in order

[s] See the Obſervation concerning this meaſure, on p. 132.

to

to ſtop the clamour of the people, who were greatly exaſperated at their imprudent conduct on this occaſion, pretended to ſtrike ſome extraordinary blow by another fleet of 22 ſhips of the line and ſix frigates. But, it is evident, this was only intended for a temporary expedient to cover themſelves from national reſentment: for, this ſquadron, committed to the command of Admiral Byng, ſailed on October the 14th, and returned on the 22d of November, from a weſtern cruiſe, which was all the ſervice he was directed to perform. Commodore Frankland was ſent to the Weſt Indies with four men of war, under the like inſtructions. By this commiſſion for repriſals, the French trade was diſtreſſed, and their navy deprived of a great body of ſeamen. For before the end of the year, our cruiſers brought 300 merchant ſhips, many of which were very rich, from St. Domingo and Martinico; and 8000 ſailors, into our ports. By which the French government were diſtreſſed for men, and the merchants and manufacturers were ruined.

A.D. 1755.

Admiral Byng's cruiſe.

French trade diſtreſſed.

But this violent proceeding, without a formal declaration of war, on the part of Great Britain was loudly impeached of injuſtice, and breach of faith by the French miniſtry, and not greatly approved of by many thinking people at home.

Remarks on the meaſures of the Britiſh miniſtry.

A pamphlet ſoon appeared with remarks on this meaſure; the author of which ſaid, "Whilſt the French are palpably obnoxious to the charge of having been originally the incendiaries of the war; whilſt the Engliſh have, on the other

A. D. 1755. hand, the juſteſt of cauſes to maintain againſt the open invaſions of their rights and properties, it ſeems the fate of this nation, never to *imitate* the French, but in thoſe points, which redound to the reproach of their taſte, and of their honour.

The French, it is true, ſet us an example of committing hoſtilities without a previous declaration of war. But was ſuch an example to be followed? Or can the matter we blame, be given as a reaſon, and a ſanction for our own proceeding? If they violated the ſacred law of nations, in their unformal attack upon a fort, in an obſcure, remote ſpot of America, the old fair Engliſh way was, to have inſtantly declared war, and to have repelled their perfidy in a manner more ſuitable to the dignity of the nation.

To urge, that it was apprehended Spain would have joined with France, had Great Britain declared war firſt, is a weak ſuppoſition. For an open act of hoſtility is a more effectual declaration of war, than mere words in form. And we had that advantage of the French. Nothing was more eaſy than to prove it.

The failure then of this eſſential form, has furniſhed the French with that handle for declaming againſt us, of which they have taken ſuch advantage.

The hoſtilities begun and committed by them in a corner of North America, though to the full, as real breaches of the peace, as any we have ſince retaliated upon them, were not of that glaring and univerſally ſtriking nature, as the predatory

tory war carried on by us upon the ſea, which was ſpread with their merchantmen, ſecure, as they had reaſon to apprehend, upon the faith of a peace; of which this rupture had, as to them, received no ſanction of a declaration of war; and ſurely ſuch a meaſure could not, humanly ſpeaking, fail of bringing it on: So that, to treat them only as proviſional captures, is as falſe, with reſpect to politics, as it is with reſpect to the law of nations. Indeed, nothing could have been contrived more effectually to give ſuch a good cauſe, as ours, the air and face of a bad one. A. D. 1755.

This was then playing the game agreeable to the deſires of the French. They could not but feel the damage; but though the merchantile intereſt was very dear to them, it was conſidered as ſubordinate to their general ſyſtem: Therefore, in this caſe, they bore the injury with national fortitude, and ſecretly ſolaceing themſelves in this reflection, That by ſuch an act of precipitation in politics, the Engliſh were doing themſelves greater, and even irreparable damage in the opinion of the public, and had given them a fair opportunity to vindicate their own breach of faith in the repairs of Dunkirk, which they had, ever ſince the treaty of Utrecht, made a capital object of their councils.

Affairs of EaſtIndies.

Advices from the Eaſt Indies, this year, complained of a want of ſtrength, in the Engliſh, to maintain their former advantages over the French and their allies: and that a negociation, ſet on foot between Mr. Saunders, the Engliſh govern-

A negociation ſet on foot with Monſ. Dupleix.

A. D. 1755. governor, and M. Dupleix, had miſcarried; the commiſſaries on our part having detected a forgery in the commiſſions, under which Dupleix pretended to act from the Great Mogul, appointing him Governor General, from the river Kriſtna to the ſea.[h]

His forgery diſcovered.

Hoſtilities renewed. The congreſs broke up, and hoſtilities continued, as uſual, in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly. The Engliſh were in poſſeſſion of the town, and the enemy well encamped upon the iſland before it, with a large body of cavalry, and the river every where fordable.

This ſituation of the enemy was of great diſadvantage to parties ſent out for proviſions and ſtores, which could not be avoided. In the month of February 1754, they cut off a party of two captains, ſix officers, 180 men rank and file, four pieces of cannon, 800 Sepoys, and about 7000 pounds of money, with a large convoy of proviſions, by a party of 120 French infantry, about the ſame number of deſerters, a French troop of about 80, 6000 Sepoys, a large body of Maiſſore cavalry, and the Marattas, making in all about 10,000, with ſeven pieces of cannon: And it was with great courage and conduct, that another convoy eſcaped the like fate, on the 12th of May following. In which ſkirmiſh we loſt

[h] They diſcovered that it was a falſe ſeal fix'd to the Saned or grant, called the Mogul's; and another had no date. Every grant from the Mogul is authenticated not only with a ſmall ſeal, on which is engraven the name of the Mogul, but alſo with that of his Viſiers.

about

about 200 Sepoys, 59 private men, killed and wounded, and ſix officers wounded. In this hazardous ſituation, our Indian war continued the whole ſummer, till it was happily concluded by an unforeſeen negociation. A. D. 1755.

The French Eaſt India company, having great reaſon to be diſguſted with M. Dupleix's conduct, which ſerved to enrich himſelf, and to extend his own power, ſo far, as to make them jealous of his deſign to raiſe himſelf to the dignity of an independent Eaſtern Prince, and to eſtabliſh his government at their expence, and perhaps upon their ruin in thoſe parts; and dreading the conſequences of a war with the Engliſh, on that trading coaſt, in caſe of a rupture between Great Britain and France, which they were not able to ſupport; endeavoured to get clear of Dupleix, and to eſtabliſh a good harmony with the Engliſh Eaſt India company at the ſame time: Having alſo intelligence, that the Britiſh miniſtry had already[i] diſpatched Rear Admiral Watſon, and Rear Admiral Pocock, with a ſquadron[k] of capital ſhips, and Colonel Adlercroon's regiment, to ſupport the Britiſh intereſt beyond the Line; they immediately diſpatched M. Godeheu, with a commiſſion of Com- Reſolutions of the French Eaſt India company. Admirals Watſon and Pocock ſail for E. Indies.

[i] In March 1754.

[k] Conſiſting of the Kent 70 guns, Captain Speke, with Rear Admiral Watſon on board: the Cumberland, 66 guns, Captain Harriſon, with Rear Admiral Pocock on board; the Tyger, 60 guns, Captain Latham; the Saliſbury, 50 guns, Captain Knowles; the Bridgwater, 20 guns, Captain Martin; and the King's Fiſher ſloop, 14 guns, Captain Smith.

miſſary

A. D. 1755. Dupleix superceded.

miſſary General and Governor General of all their ſettlements, and 1500 Europeans, and with inſtructions to ſupercede M. Dupleix in his government, and to do his endeavours to ſtrike up a proviſional treaty of armſtice and pacification with the governor of Fort St. George, and with the other Engliſh ſettlements on that coaſt.

M. Godeheu's pacific conduct.

M. Godeheu executed his commiſſion with dexterity and honour. He, on his arrival, found the Engliſh ſquadron upon the coaſt. A truce, if poſſible to be gained, admitted of no delay; and in order to conciliate a good opinion of his pacific intentions, he, immediately upon his landing, ſent back the troops which M. Dupleix had ſtopped[l] in their paſſage from Madraſs to Fort St. George, and detained priſoners ever ſince at Pondicherry; and at the ſame time ſignified his inclination to purſue pacific meaſures, and propoſed a ſuſpenſion of arms between the two European grand commercial companies.

Such a ſudden change in the French was highly acceptable to the Engliſh. The governor and council by their diſpatch and promiſe concurred with M. Godeheu in this work, and it was ſoon after[m] agreed to ſuſpend all hoſtilities: and on the 26th of December 1754, articles of a proviſional treaty, and articles and ſtipulations of a truce, were ſigned by Thomas Saunders, Eſq; Preſident for the honourable Eaſt India company on the coaſt of Coromondel and Orixa, of Fort St.

A ceſſation of hoſtilities.

A proviſional treaty between the two companies.

[l] See before, p. 77.

[m] On the 11th of Oct. 1754.

George,

George, on the part of the Engliſh united Eaſt India company; and by the Sieur Charles Robert Godeheu, Commiſſary for his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; Commander General of all the ſettlements of the French company on both ſides the Cape of Good Hope, and at China; Preſident of all the councils there eſtabliſhed, and Director General of the India company of France. A. D. 1755.

By the proviſional treaty it was agreed in the firſt article, That the two companies, Engliſh and French, ſhould renounce for ever all Mooriſh government and dignity, and never interfere in any difference that may ariſe between the princes of the country.—In which article the conduct of M. Dupleix is particularly pointed at and condemned, whoſe ambition had put him upon every device of arms, of intrigue and forgery, to robe himſelf with the pageantry of an eaſtern monarch; to force himſelf into the Mooriſh government, and to pillage the Nabobs, &c. of their treaſure; ever fomenting difference between the Princes of the country, that he might by ſome means come in for a part of the ſpoil.

The 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th articles, relate to the ſettlements of both nations and their diſtricts. By the 8th article, it was agreed, "That "theſe conditions accepted on both ſides, altho' "they are not to be a law for a definitive treaty "in Europe, ſhould nevertheleſs produce a truce "between the two nations and their allies, until "news be received in India of the anſwers made "in Europe concerning this agreement."——By

A. D. 1755. the 9th article, "That neither nation ſhould be "allowed to procure, during the truce, any new "grant or ceſſion, or to build forts for the defence "of new eſtabliſhments; but only to rebuild and "repair the fortifications now ſubſiſting in the "eſtabliſhments they poſſeſſed at that time, in order "to prevent their entire ruin."——By the tenth, "That until the arrival of anſwers from Europe "to theſe articles, which were to be diſpatched "by the firſt ſhips, to be ſubmitted to the deciſion "of the two companies, under the pleaſure and "approbation of the two crowns; the two na- "tions ſhould not proceed to any ceſſion, retro- "ceſſion, or evacuation of what they now poſ- "ſeſs, every thing being to remain on the foot- "ing of *uti poſſidetis*."—And laſtly, "That in "regard to indemnification, the two nations may "expect for the expences of the war; This arti- "cle ſhould be amicably adjuſted in the definitive "treaty."

A truce concluded.

The articles and ſtipulations of a truce, concluded on the ſame day, and between the ſame parties to promote the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquility in this part of India, were as follow:

Art. I. To take place on the 11th of January 1755, the day of the expiration of the ſuſpenſion of arms, proclaimed on the 11th of October 1754: all hoſtilities ſhall ceaſe between the Engliſh and French.

Art. II. During this truce, which ſhall be in force until we are informed in India of the anſwers made in Europe concerning the ſaid proviſional

ſional treaty; the troops of the two nations, French and Engliſh, ſhall not act againſt each other, either as principals or auxiliaries. A. D. 1755.

Art. III. The two nations, Engliſh and French, engage to oblige their allies to obſerve all that is ſtipulated for the accompliſhment of a truce by virtue of the treaty, and whoever ſhall dare to infringe it ſhall be reputed a common enemy, and ſhall be reduced to good order by force of arms.

Art. IV. If either of the two nations, French or Engliſh, or either auxiliary troops or allies, ſhall commit any act of hoſtility, poſſeſs themſelves of any place, or any one ſhall cauſe any damage to be done to another during the ſaid truce, both oblige themſelves to make reparation, proportionable to the damage and to the entire reſtitution of whatever ſhall be taken.

Art. V. If the allies, or other troops in pay of either nation, ſhall be guilty of any act of hoſtility, or commit any pillages in the territories whereof either nation is now in poſſeſſion, it ſhall be lawful for both nations to repulſe their inſults by force, by which the injured nation ſhall not be deemed to have infringed the preſent agreement.

Art. VI. If the allies or auxiliaries, troops of either nation ſhall take up arms and inſult the countries of which the nation, they are allied to, is now in poſſeſſion: in this caſe, the two nations ſhall aſſiſt each other againſt this enemy, who ſhall thereby become the common enemy of both.

Art. VII. The troops of the two nations ſhall be employed, during this truce, in the care of

A. D. 1755. their preſent eſtabliſhments and poſſeſſions; they may be tranſported freely, and without any difficulty, from one place to another, at the pleaſure of the Governor, Generals, Commanders, &c. of each nation; and all perſons actually under the protection of either flag, may likewiſe go and come at pleaſure, without being moleſted either in their effects or perſons.

Art. VIII. Trade ſhall be free throughout the Carnatick, and in all the countries to the northward of the Coromandel coaſt, for the two contracting nations: they may fetch merchandizes from all the places in the dependance of each other, and tranſport them freely, without any reſtraint, through the reſpective jageers and territories.

Art. IX. All common enemies, or the particular enemies of either nation, who ſhall come to attack the Engliſh and French in their preſent poſſeſſions, and trouble the tranquillity which is to reign in India, ſhall be repulſed by the united force of the two nations, French and Engliſh.

Art. X. As ſoon as the truce is proclaimed, the mutual exchange of priſoners ſhall be ſet about, man for man, and means ſhall be reſolved on for the eaſe of thoſe, which ſhall not be exchanged.

Art. XI. Commiſſaries ſhall be appointed on both ſides, to examine into the infringements committed by each party, or their auxiliary troops or allies, and ſettle the reſtitution to be made of all the places taken, during the truce, againſt the tenor of the ſuſpenſion of arms; as likewiſe of all that may have been taken from them by the ſaid

auxiliary troops, in merchandizes, effects, money, &c. and further to settle in a fixed method, for a guide, during the whole time of the truce, all the names, and the extent of every country, paragana [n], and village, under the power and in the possession of the two nations, English and French. A. D. 1755.

Art. XII. It is agreed, that whenever, in the course of the truce, any complaint shall be made by either of the said nations of an infringement of the *fourth* article, the said commissaries on each side appointed, shall certify and examine the fact, that justice may be done accordingly to the injured nation, either by restitution or reparation, according to the nature of the injury received.

Done at Fort St. George, Dec. 31, 1754.

Dated at Pondicherry,
Dec. 26, 1754.

Remarks on these treaties.

These treaties (though manifestly most favourable to the French, as they left them at liberty to recover from the unnatural state, into whch Dupleix had thrown the company's affairs, by his ambition, avarice, and tyranny; had opened a free trade and communication for their undertakings by sea, and left so many essential points to be settled by commissaries, with a people that are known never to determine in such cases, but by the single argument of their own convenience and interest) promised the English considerable relief from the burthen and hazard of war; and they were rendered more satisfactory by the de-

[n] District.

A. D. 1755. parture of M. Dupliex; who was ordered and ſent to France by the firſt ſhips; and by the friendly conduct of M. De Sauſſay, commander of the French at Seringham, who, being ſollicited by Nauderauze, the Maiſſorean General, with an offer of three lack of rupees, to march off and leave him at liberty to ſurprize Trichinopoly, in poſſeſſion of the Engliſh, rejected the bribe with diſdain.

The truce broke by the French. But, the Sieur Godeheu being returned for Europe, M. de Leyrit, his ſucceſſor, and M. Buſſy, who was left at liberty, in the late treaty, to enlarge the valuable and extenſive poſſeſſions which the French held in the north, ſoon convinced the Engliſh that the tranquillity was not founded upon ſuch a ſolid baſis, as expected; and that while one ſide of the country had laid down their arms, there was no ſecurity for our extenſive concerns and intereſts in other parts. For, expreſly contrary to the ninth article of the proviſional treaty it appeared very early in the year 1755, that the French were endeavouring to acquire the dominion of all the provinces of the Deckan °. Buſſy demanded of Salabatzing, the poſſeſſion of the fort of Golconda; and Leyrit took the part of the Polygar of the Velloure, the ſtrongeſt fort in the province, againſt his Sovereign the Nabob Mahomed Allee Cawn; threatning, by letter to the Governor of Madraſs, and by marching 300 French, and as many Sepoys, from Pondicherry,

° See the account of the war in India, by Richard Owen Cambridge, Eſq; p. 132.

to support the rebel, and to oppose the English employed by the Nabob to collect his revenues from the tributary Princes, that held under him [p]; our fleet having then sailed upon an expedition to reduce the piratical state of Angria, on the Malabar coast, which had for many years infested the trade of Bombay, and greatly endangered the navigation of, not only the English, but of the Dutch, &c. from Europe. A. D. 1755.

After this survey of the transactions beyond the seas, let us return to the state of affairs at home. Where, at the end of September, the admiralty list of the royal navy exhibited a most formidable aspect for our enemies to meditate upon. It consisted then of Affairs of Europe.

British navy.

1	ship carrying	110 guns	1100 men
5	ships carrying	100 ——	1000 men, each
13	—— ——	90 ——	700
8	—— ——	80 ——	600
5	—— ——	74 ——	500
29	—— ——	70 ——	480
39	—— ——	60 ——	400
3	—— ——	54 ——	350
28	—— ——	50 ——	300
4	—— ——	44 ——	250
35	—— ——	40 ——	250
42	—— ——	20 ——	140
31	carrying from 18 to	10 ——	100
213	Besides a great many bomb ketches, fire —— ships and tenders.		

[p] Ibid. p. 117.

A. D. 1755. Such a navy was ſufficient to oppoſe the united maritime force of all Europe; whilſt that of the French, even at the end of this year, and including the ſhips upon the ſtocks, amounted to no more than

French navy.

6	ſhips carrying	80 guns
21	——	74 ——
1	——	72 ——
4	——	70 ——
31	——	64 ——
2	——	60 ——
6	——	50 ——
32	frigates	
113		

French remonſtrance againſt Admiral Boſcawen's proceedings.

The French court, as ſoon as they heard of Admiral Boſcawen's taking their two men of war, dreſſed up a freſh remonſtrance againſt Great Britain to the court of Spain; and repreſented this action, before a declaration of war, to be a proceeding, that threatened the very diſſolution of all faith amongſt nations; with a view to draw the Spaniards, at once, into their quarrel. To which Sir Benjamin Keene the Britiſh miniſter to his moſt Catholic Majeſty confronted a ſtrong memorial, importing, "That it was well known, "the French fleet ſent to America, carried troops, "ammunition, and every neceſſary for defending "countries, which the French had unjuſtly uſurped "in North America, and of which the Engliſh "claimed the property. That the rules of ſelf-

Anſwered by Sir Benjamin Keene.

"defence

" defence authorize every nation to render fruit- A. D. 1755.
" leſs any attempt that may tend to its prejudice.
" That this right had been made uſe of only in
" taking the two French ſhips of war, and that
" the diſtinction of place might be interpreted in
" favour of the Engliſh, ſeeing the two ſhips
" were taken on the coaſt of the countries where
" the conteſt aroſe." Such was the diſpoſition or policy of the Spaniſh court at this time, that they ſeemed ſatisfied with Sir Benjamin Keene's anſwer to the French complaint; though the French miniſter replied with obſerving, That the hoſtilities of the Engliſh had begun in the European ſeas, from whence they had taken and carried a vaſt number of French ſhips [p] into their ports. Reply of the French.

But what is more extraordinary, the French miniſtry ſtill maintained an appearance of moderation, and a deſire to accommodate matters with Great Britain without coming to blows. It is certain, they were afraid of our ſuperiority at ſea, ſhould it be let looſe upon them; and they were diſappointed of their American ſcheme, to ſecure their poſſeſſion by a ſuperiority of European troops, &c. before we ſhould be ready to oppoſe them. Therefore any device to curb, or to keep us inactive, was the beſt game they could play. So that, after we had carried the national reſentment to the lengths above related, taking every ſhip our cruiſers could meet with, and detaining both their cargoes and crews, the French miniſtry, as ſoon as they heard one of their men of war had taken at ſea, and brought the Blandford man of Their pacific pretences continued.

[p] About 195 at this time.

war,

A. D. 1755. war, belonging to his Britannic Majeſty into Nants, with Mr. Littleton, appointed Governor of Carolina, on board; they ordered the Governor to be ſet at liberty, and ſhortly after releaſed both the ſhip and crew. Whatever might be the motive for this reſtitution, whether to throw upon us the breach of faith and the commencement of the war, or to provoke us to more moderate meaſures, it had no effect. Our preparations for ſea ſervice were accelerated with incredible activity and expedition. And the French in earneſt began to make the beſt of their caſe, in order to deprive us of the benefit of a naval war. Their preparations for a land war went on with extraordinary diligence: They made ſure of the Empreſs Queen, our old ally, and marched great numbers of their troops on the coaſt of the Britiſh Channel, to terrify us with an invaſion; a ſcheme that had often delivered them from the power of the Britiſh arms, when they were not able to cope with us in open battle.

Blandford man of war releaſed and ſent home.

Threaten us with an invaſion.

The King's return from Germany.

In the midſt of this hurry his Majeſty returned from his Electorate, which he left on the 8th of September, and he arrived at his palace at Kenſington on the 15th of the ſame month.

The firſt thing his Majeſty did was to finiſh the treaty with Ruſſia, above-mentioned [q], which was ratified on the thirtieth of the ſame month. But when this and the treaty with Heſſe Caſſel came before the parliament, they were canvaſſed

Debates about the treaties with Ruſſia and Heſſe Caſſel.

[q] See page 135.

with

with a good deal of diſlike: and previous to that, the King of Pruſſia taking great diſguſt at the ſeventh article in his Britannic Majeſty's treaty with Ruſſia, which he looked upon as a menace levelled againſt himſelf, declared by his miniſters in all the courts of Europe, "That he would oppoſe, with his utmoſt force, the entrance of any foreign troops into the Empire, under any pretence whatſoever." A. D. 1755.

King of Pruſſia's declaration on that occaſion.

This ſpirited declaration by the King of Pruſſia, at a time France had erected and filled ſeveral great magazines in Weſtphalia, by permiſſion of the Elector of Cologne, and had already marched large bodies of troops towards the frontiers of the Empire, drew overtures from that court immediately. The Duke de Nivernoiſe was ſent to Berlin, and propoſed a new alliance with his Pruſſian Majeſty, in order to perſuade his Majeſty to retract his declaration: and the French Ambaſſador's reception was ſuch as made England dubious of the King's reſolution to abide by what he had declared. In this ambiguity his Britannic Majeſty dreading the fate of his Electoral dominions, in caſe Pruſſia might be gained over by France, whoſe forces on the Lower Rhine were provided with magazines, all the way to Hanover, applied alſo to the court of Pruſſia, with ſuch advantageous propoſals, as made him entirely relinquiſh all thoughts of further negociation with the Grand Monarch: Though our treaty with his Pruſſian Majeſty did not take effect till ſome months after.

Its effect on France.

On Great Britain.

His

A. D. 1755.

His Britannic Majeſty at the ſame time demanded the auxiliaries, which he had a right unto by treaties, from the Empreſs Queen. But, with an unprecedented ingratitude that heireſs of the houſe of Auſtria, for whoſe ſupport againſt France in particular, Great Britain had ſpent and run our nation in debt more millions than her hereditary dominions are worth, not only abſolutely refuſed to perform her engagements, under the pretence that an American war was not a caſe of our alliance with her: But afterwards, when required by England alſo, to defend her barrier towns in the Low Countries, obtained for her family by Britiſh blood and treaſure, on that expreſs condition, ſhe excuſed herſelf from the ſervice, under a pretence of her fears from the King of Pruſſia.

Queen of Hungary refuſes to aid Great Britain according to treaty.

National diſcontent with the miniſtry.

The nation began to be greatly alarmed at the meaſures of the court. The miniſtry, notwithſtanding the attention given, all this year, to our marine, and the lengths they had run, in making repriſals, and in commencing hoſtilities in North America, were ſo perplexed and diſpirited with the news of Braddock's defeat, that they ſeemed wavering in their councils, and more inclined to an accommodation, than to proceed in their demands of ſatisfaction, and to maintain their national rights, by way of arms. And his Majeſty's taking ſuch a powerful army of Ruſſians and Heſſians into Britiſh pay, without conſent of parliament, and, as it was ſuggeſted, having drawn upon the Treaſury for a part of the money (which had

had been particularly intended by the vote of credit in the laſt ſeſſions of parliament for the ſea ſervice, and to maintain our poſſeſſions in North America) to make good his agreement with the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel; this created a jealouſy in the people, that it was intended to enter into ſuch continental meaſures, as would neceſſarily deprive Great Britain of the means to diſtreſs the enemy by ſea, and to do herſelf juſtice in America. A. D. 1755.

The ſpirit of the nation at this juncture, will beſt appear from the political obſervations publiſhed by the patriots. It was obſerved, That the nation had been long under the direction of ſtate empericks; whoſe only merit had been to ſkin our wounds and palliate our diſtempers. That it was now time to ſearch the wound to the bottom, and to apply wholeſome and regular medicaments to the almoſt corrupted body: That the cure, though perhaps painful, muſt be ſpeedily undergone: becauſe a delay would certainly bring on more dreadful ſymptoms, and infallibly end in political death. That the nation had been long deluded by the magic ſound of words, and ſome of the principal men had been drove from the throne by odious diſtinctions and falſe imputations; whereby the rancour and animoſity of parties had been kept up, and the Sovereign deprived of the aſſiſtance of ſome of the ableſt of his ſubjects, moſt firmly attached to his perſon and family: That we were loaded with a moſt heavy debt, and alarmed by imminent dangers from within; and juſt upon the brink of a war with Remarks on the ſpirit of the nation.

A. D. 1755. with a great, and our moſt powerful enemy; the event of which might determine our being, as a free and independent nation. Therefore, that nothing leſs than a vigorous exertion of our natural rights, and unanimous concurrence, with the divine aſſiſtance, in the defence of our liberties, King and country, could prevent us from ſinking under the weight of ſuch multiplying and growing evils.

Does not the voice of the people, ſaid they, who pay the taxes, cry loudly at preſent for a war, to reſtrain the ambitious views of our perfidious neighbours, the French? So that let thoſe, now concerned for the nation, ſteer clear of the blunders, miſtakes and malpractices, which deprived Great Britain of the advantages expected in the laſt war; and make the true intereſt of their country, the ſole object of their operations, and they need not doubt of giving ſatisfaction to the nation.

The intereſt of this nation is ſo very plain and obvious, that honeſty can never miſtake it: we want no extraordinary talents to feel our own ſtrength, or to know our own good. The ſea is our element to fight upon, ſhips are our caſtles: and our marine is an over-match for all Europe. We may in ſuch a war humble the Grand Monarch, and reduce him to ſubmit to equitable terms of peace. It is as natural for Britain to truſt in her fleets, as a bull in his horns, or a lion in his paws. But on the Continent France muſt

beggar

beggar us and diſpoſe us to accept of the conditions ſhe may pleaſe to grant. A. D. 1755.

As for ſubſidiary forces; it was aſked, What had the Britiſh Empire got by the vaſt ſums of money paid in ſubſidies to the Dutch, Saxons, Bavarians, Heſſians, Hanoverians, Danes, Ruſſians, Pruſſians, Hungarians, to the King of Sardinia, the Duke of Wolfenbuttle, and to God knows who beſides? All of whom had taken Britiſh pay, within ſixty years paſt, without enabling us to humble one enemy, or to ſecure a firm, laſting and equitable peace: or to ſtrike ſuch terror into our enemies, that they durſt not invade our property, plot againſt our liberty, or to interrupt our trade, and without recovering the balance of Europe, or putting our allies out of the power of the common enemy. What then is Britain to expect from numerous and ſtill more expenſive ſubſidiary treaties? but a national debt, which, if not timely prevented, would in the end, reduce us to beggary and contempt. Every one knows that our land forces, whether mercenaries or ſubſidiaries, have no influence upon the councils of our enemies. It is our naval force they are afraid of. It is the number of our ſquadrons of ſhips of war, when they are well manned and appointed, under brave, experienced and honeſt commanders, and not a ſtanding army at home, nor a ſubſidiary army abroad, that gives us a due influence at foreign courts. Such was the language and ſentiments of the nation at this time.

The

A. D. 1755. Addreſs of the city of London.

The parliament being ſummoned to meet on the 13th of November, the city of London addreſſed his Majeſty, not with the flattery of a miniſterial faction, to deceive and poiſon the ear of the Sovereign; to ſmother the complaints and prayers of the people, to palliate the national diſtreſſes, and to ſkreen our enemies from juſt revenge; but with language and ſentiment, that flowed from hearts replete with truth and liberty, and intended to rouſe the Britiſh lion from a ſtate of dangerous ſecurity, by making a tender of their lives and fortunes, to enable his Majeſty to begin and carry on a juſt and neceſſary war againſt an enemy, that is not to be bound by treaties; nor to be ſatisfied with any thing leſs, than our ruin: but who may at any time be humbled by a proper exertion of that naval force, with which Providence has bleſſed and diſtinguiſhed this nation, and enabled it, above all others, to defend itſelf. This was followed by addreſſes of the ſame import from the whole nation.

His Majeſty met his parliament on the 13th of November, and opened the ſeſſions with the following ſpeech.

His Majeſty's ſpeech at opening the parliament.

My Lords and Gentlemen! The preſent critical conjuncture of affairs, and my conſtant inclination to have the advice and aſſiſtance of my parliament on all important occaſions, have made me deſirous to meet you here as early as poſſible. Since your laſt ſeſſion I have taken ſuch meaſures as might be moſt conducive to the protection of our poſſeſſions in America, and to the regaining

ſuch

ſuch parts thereof, as had been encroached upon, and invaded, in violation of the peace, and contrary to the faith of moſt ſolemn treaties.—For this purpoſe, the maritime power of this kingdom has been got ready with the utmoſt application and expedition, and been principally employed. Some land forces have been ſent from hence to North America; and all proper encouragement has been given to the ſeveral colonies there, to exert themſelves in their own defence, and in the maintenance of the rights and poſſeſſions of Great Britain. A. D. 1755.

With a ſincere deſire to preſerve my people from the calamities of war, as well as to prevent, in the midſt of theſe troubles, a general war from being lighted up in Europe, I have been always ready to accept reaſonable and honorable terms of accomodation; but not ſuch have hitherto been propoſed on the part of France. I have alſo confined my views and operations to hinder France from making new encroachments, or ſupporting thoſe already made; to exert our right to a ſatisfaction for hoſtilities commenced in a time of profound peace; and to diſappoint ſuch deſigns, as, from various appearances and preparations, there is reaſon to think have been formed againſt my kingdoms and dominions.—By theſe methods I have purſued the plan, which I formerly pointed out to you, and for which I had the ſatisfaction to receive the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of your vigorous ſupport.—What other power can object to proceedings ſo abſolutely neceſſary to our own de-

A. D. 1755. fence and ſecurity? My good brother, the King of Spain, ſees with concern theſe differences; and the part which he generouſly takes in the common welfare of Europe, makes him earneſtly wiſh the preſervation of the public tranquillity. He has alſo given aſſurances, that he will continue in the ſame pacific ſentiments.—In purſuing theſe great ends, I make no doubt of the vigorous and chearful ſupport of my parliament: and that while I am engaged in this juſt and national cauſe, the affectionate aſſurances, which they gave me the laſt ſeſſions will be effectually made good. In conſequence thereof, I have greatly increaſed my naval armaments, augmented my land forces in ſuch a manner, as might be the leaſt burdenſome; and have concluded a treaty with the Empreſs of Ruſſia, and another with the Landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, which ſhall be laid before you. His Majeſty concluded with obſerving that the ſervices would require large ſupplies: declaring that he aſked no more than ſhould be requiſite for the effectual carrying on of thoſe meaſures, which would be neceſſary to ſupport what has been begun, according to their inclination, for the ſecurity of his kingdoms and dominions, and for the purpoſes already mentioned, of an extraordinary expence made this year by him, in purſuance of the power given him by parliament; and promiſing that whatever ſhould be granted, ſhould be applied with the ſtricteſt oeconomy to thoſe uſes only, for which it ſhall be given.

This

This ſpeech met with uncommon oppoſition in both houſes of parliament, which appeared in the formation of the addreſs from each houſe. The miniſterial party amongſt the Lords had inſerted in their addreſs, 'That they looked upon themſelves as obliged by the ſtrongeſt ties of duty, gratitude, and honour, to ſtand by and ſupport his Majeſty in all ſuch wiſe and neceſſary meaſures and engagements, as his Majeſty might have taken in vindication of the rights of his crown, or to defeat any attempts, which might be made by France, in reſentment for ſuch meaſures; and to aſſiſt his Majeſty in diſappointing or repelling all ſuch enterprizes, as might be formed, not only againſt his kingdoms, but alſo againſt any other of his dominions, *though not belonging to the crown of Great Britain*, in caſe they ſhould be attacked on account of the part, which his Majeſty had taken for maintaining the eſſential intereſts of his kingdoms.' The other Lords in the oppoſition [r], headed by Lord Temple, would not agree to this inſertion; becauſe, in the firſt part of it, the wiſdom of the houſe was proſtituted, by engaging to approve of the treaties with Ruſſia and Heſſe Caſſel, which they had not ſeen, and which they apprehended could be of no uſe to Great Britain: and, in the ſecond part, they would be guilty of the greateſt indiſcretion, by conſenting to meaſures, which manifeſtly engaged this nation in a continental connection for the defence of

A. D. 1755.

Debates upon the addreſs to this ſpeech.

In the Houſe of Lords.

[r] Amongſt whom, it is ſaid, were Lord Hallifax, Lord Talbot, and Earl Pomfret.

A. D. 1755. Hanover, that could not be ſupported by Great Britain, and would be ſo far from being of advantage to us at ſea, or in America, that, it was to be feared, might, in the end, diſable the nation from defending itſelf in other parts of the world.—But the court party, upon putting the queſtion, carried their addreſs with this inſertion, by a great majority of voices againſt the weight of argument.

His Majeſty's anſwer to the addreſs of the Lords.

His Majeſty received this addreſs with the following moſt gracious anſwer:—'My Lords! I give you my thanks for this dutiful and affectionate addreſs. I ſee with the greateſt ſatisfaction the zeal you expreſs for my perſon and government, and for the true intereſt of your country; which I am determined to adhere to. The aſſurance, which you give me for the defence of my territories abroad, are a ſtrong proof of your affection for me, and regard for my honour. Nothing ſhall divert me from purſuing thoſe meaſures, which will effectually maintain the poſſeſſions and rights of my kingdoms, and procure reaſonable and honourable terms of accommodation.'

Debates on the addreſs in the Houſe of Commons.

The addreſs in the Houſe of Commons was dreſſed up with the ſame zeal, gratitude and warm aſſurances to ſupport his Majeſty and his foreign dominions; and with their approbation of the treaties he had made; but not yet laid before that houſe; and was carried, upon a diviſion, by a great majority, though ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by ſeveral gentlemen in high poſts under the government; amongſt whom Henry Bilſon Legge, Eſq; the

the Chancellor and Under-Treaſurer of his Majeſty's Exchequer, and William Pitt, Eſq; Pay-Maſter of his Majeſty's forces, are ſaid to have diſtinguiſhed themſelves, on the part of their country. A. D. 1755.

His Majeſty, when he received the addreſs of the Houſe of Commons, gave the following anſwer. "Gentlemen! I thank you for this dutiful and loyal addreſs. You may be aſſured, although I wiſh for nothing more than a ſafe and honourable accommodation, I am determined to protect and maintain the valuable and undoubted rights and poſſeſſions of my crown. Your aſſurances, that you will aſſiſt me in the defence of my foreign dominions, if they ſhould be attacked, on account of the meaſures I am purſuing for the true intereſt of theſe kingdoms, are ſuch proofs of your affection to me, and of your regard to my honour, as give me the greateſt ſatisfaction." His Majeſty's anſwer to their addreſs.

How triumphant ſoever the court enjoyed this advantage by a majority in parliament, the country conceived a very mean opinion of the miniſtry, eſpecially of Henry Fox, Eſq; who, three days before the ſeſſion was opened, had ſucceeded Sir Thomas Robinſon, in the office of one of his Majeſty's principal Secretary's of State, and was empowered by his Majeſty to manage his intereſt in parliament. The nation's attention was immediately fixed upon this new miniſter, and made him reſponſible for the addreſſes above-mentioned, and for an intention to involve his country in a continental war, to the prejudice of our national intereſt. Which diſcontent was heightened very National diſguſt. Mr. Fox Secretary of State.

A. D. 1755. soon after by a draught from Ruſſia, for a part of the ſubſidy agreed for in the late treaty with the Czarina; and not yet provided for by parliament: and therefore it was refuſed by part of the miniſtry.

The miniſter took uncommon pains, even from one member's houſe to another, to divide the country party, and even to condemn in private converſation the meaſures he was purſuing in parliament, and to pledge his honour for the uprightneſs of his intenſions, and his averſion to continental connections. But, when no art was powerful enough to conceal the falacy of his heart, he was reſolved to try what might be done by removing the patriots from all ſhare and poſts in the government. Accordingly Henry Bilſon Legge, Eſq; and William Pitt, Eſq; were diſmiſſed from their employments, for diſtinguiſhing themſelves on the part of their country, in the late parliamentary debate; and Sir George Lyttleton was made Chancellor of the Exchequer [s]. But, neither did

[s] There was a new commiſſion for the Treaſury, conſiſting of the Duke of Newcaſtle, the Earl of Darlington, Sir George Lyttleton, Thomas Hay and Robert Nugent, Eſq; But ſuch was the ficklenes of the times, that on the 16th of November the Earl of Darlington and Mr. Hay were removed from the Treaſury, and appointed Pay-Maſters-General in the room of Mr. Pitt. Earl Gower was ſworn of the Privy-Council and made Keeper of the Privy-Seal; the Duke of Marlborough made Maſter-General of the Ordnance. Lord Anſon, Sir Willam Rowley, William Ponſonby, Thomas Villiers, Edward Boſcawen, Richard Edgecumbe, Eſq; and Lord Bateman, were conſtituted Lords of the Admiralty.

This

did this violent ſcheme anſwer his expectations. A. D. 1755. Neither places, penſions, nor power were the objects of a patriotic heart. The great men, diſplaced for their virtue, perſevered in their endeavours to prevent the fatal conſequences of a war, on the continent, prejudicial to our national intereſt. So that, when the treaties of Ruſſia and Heſſe came before parliament, they did not receive the ſanction of thoſe houſes, without very warm debates; and ſeem to have received the approbation of the houſe of commons, only to preſerve his Majeſty's honour, and to defend thoſe countries, which might be attacked merely on account of our quarrel with France. Patriotiſm revived.

Without doors the nation rang with theſe or the like expreſſions.—The quarrel with France, at preſent, is not for any of thoſe ruinous motives, which have kindled ſo many bloody wars, in ſupport of foreign ſtates; nor for dominion, nor extent of territory; but for extent and protection of trade: It is whether the trading genius of Great Britain or France ſhall prevail. It is whether Great Britain or France ſhall rule the main. Their argument.

France has taken meaſures to ruin our trade and navigation. They have uſurped upon thoſe territories, by which our naval power and our trade are ſupported. What therefore have we to do? But to prepare in time for a vigorous, and, perhaps, a long war; to keep our fleets out con-

This was called the miniſtry, with Mr. Fox at the head; but few of them were conſulted in the adminiſtration of the moſt important affairs.

A. D. 1755. ſtantly; to ſupply our people abundantly with proviſions, ſtores, and money; a great deal of which muſt be wanted to carry on a war in America: and therefore, it is to be hoped, that we ſhall not wantonly and unprofitably ſquander it away in Germany. It is not meet we ſhould take the childrens bread and caſt it to the dogs. What, then, in the name of common ſenſe, can be the meaning of hireing troops in Germany, or Ruſſia? To pretend that they are for our aſſiſtance, is an impoſition upon the common underſtanding of mankind.

How evaded. In order to quiet theſe clamours, the march of a large body of French troops down to their coaſts, furniſhed the miniſterial agents, with an artificial argument, to terrify the people into a better opinion of the ſubſidiary treaties. They ventured to ſay, that theſe ſubſidiary troops were not only intended originally, but would ſoon be found neceſſary, and imported, for the defence of our iſland, againſt a French invaſion, to be carried into execution by flat-bottomed boats, and ſuch ridiculous, incredible veſſels. But, arguments, that work only on our fears, and don't conciliate a confidence and affection, ſeldom prevail in ſettling the mind.

Supplies raiſed by parliament. Yet, while the nation was agitated by the terrors of an invaſion, and by the apprehenſions of a war in the hands of a miniſtry, obnoxious for their flattery about the throne, and for their attachment to continental meaſures, the houſe of commons agreed to the ſupplies for the enſuing year, and

and provided for the deficiences of the proviſion for the former year. The houſe voted[t] 50,000 ſeamen, including 9138 marines, and 34,263 ſoldiers. In January following they voted ten new regiments of foot, and 11 troops of light dragoons, beſides the former. They likewiſe voted 298,534 l. 17 s. 10 d. ½ for the maintenance of forces already in our American colonies; and 79,915 l. 6 s. 0 d. for ſix regiments of foot from Ireland, to ſerve in North America and the Eaſt Indies. 15,000 l. gratuity to New England for faithful ſervices, and 5000 l. to Sir William Johnſon in particular. 20,000 l. to the King of Pruſſia; 121,447 l. 2 s. 6d. for Hanoverian forces. A. D. 1755.

The warlike preparations in South France began about this time to attract the attention of all Europe. And it was with ſome degree of confidence repreſented to be intended againſt Minorca. But this information was totally diſregarded by our miniſtry, which affected to interpret all the motions of the French in every part of their kingdom, to be deſtined either againſt the Britiſh iſles, or America, or againſt Hanover. By inculcating and perſuading the firſt report amongſt the well-meaning people, they prepared them to acquieſce to the meaſures of the court; and by the ſecond they endeavoured to reconcile the diſlike the

[t] On the 24th of November 1755. About this time the Eſperance man of war ſailing from Rochfort to Breſt, to be completely manned was taken, with 300 men on board, and 79 guns, by the Orford, Captain Stevens, after three hours engagement, and brought into Plymouth.

Engliſh

A. D. 1755. Engliſh had to the ſubſidiary forces to cover his Majeſty's electoral dominions.

Miniſterial conduct. The miniſter drove on Jehu-like by his majority in the houſe; and, to give the better proof of his principles, he carried ſuch affairs, as under another miniſtry would have given him a real cauſe to inveigh againſt their arbitrary proceedings. For, in the act for the more ſpeedy manning of his Majeſty's navy, he had this clauſe added, That the commiſſioners impowered under this act "might order, wherever and whenever they "pleaſed, a general ſearch to be made for ſuch "perſons (*there deſcribed*) in order to their being "brought before them to be examined: that the "pariſh and town-officers might, *without any "ſuch order*, ſearch for and ſecure ſuch perſons, "in order to convey them before the ſaid com-"miſſioners to be examined: and that when ſuch "perſon or perſons were judged by the recruiting "officer to be fit for his Majeſty's ſervice, he or "they ſhould be deemed a liſted ſoldier, and "committed to a place of ſafety or to a public "priſon." By a new clauſe added to the act for extending the maritime laws to America, a recruiting officer was impowered to enliſt and detain an indented ſervant, though his maſter ſhould reclaim him, upon paying ſo much as two juſtices of the peace ſhould allow. Both which clauſes in the hands of a wicked and enterprizing adminiſtration might have been made ſuch uſe of, as would have undermined the bill of rights, and been inconſiſtent with that ſecurity, which is pro-

A dangerous clauſe added to the navy bill.

vided by our happy conſtitution for the liberty of the ſubject. A. D. 1755.

But this was not all: the very miniſter, who pleaded the ſupport of Hanover and our German allies for taking German and Ruſſian troops into Britiſh pay, made the terrors of an invaſion, induſtriouſly propagated for miniſterial purpoſes, the prop of that diſgraceful, and dangerous meaſure of calling over Hanoverian and Heſſian troops to defend England from the attempts of the French: by which Hanover and Heſſe were left expoſed to the danger of the French army, as had been ſuggeſted both from the throne and in the debates for the ſubſidiary treaties: and England, with a powerful army of her own children, was put under the protection of foreign troops. Mr. Fox, by a meſſage from his Majeſty, got both the houſes to approve of his requiſition and bringing over a body of Heſſian troops [u], and then to addreſs his Majeſty to bring a body of Hanoverians [w] over alſo, into this kingdom. And accordingly theſe foreign troops, notwithſtanding all the pretended fears of ſome people for Hanover, &c. were landed in England [x], within the courſe of one Foreign troops brought into England.

[u] The parliament granted for the charge of 6544 foot, with the general officers and train of artillery from Feb. 23, 1756, to Dec. 24 following, together with the ſubſidy purſuant to treaty, 163,357 l. 9 s. 9 d.

[w] The parliament granted for the charge of 8605 foot with the general officers, train of artillery and hoſpital, from May 11, 1756, to December 24 following, 121,447 l. 2 s. 6 d.

[x] 8000 Heſſian foot and 900 horſe, landed at Southampton, on the 15th of May. 10,000 Hanoverians landed the 21ſt of May at Chatham.

month,

A. D. 1755. month. Such expedition, and so little need of foreign troops to guard our coasts, created great jealousies; and made the people of England more afraid of their military friends, than the hostilities of an open enemy; dreading, from the specimen of those acts, which struck at the root of the subjects liberty, that these forces might be called in to enable the ministry to proceed to more violent measures. But under so good and gracious a King, as then reigned, his subjects had reason to hope for better things, and these despotic acts served only to bring such an odious administration to a sudden end.

Creates great uneasiness.

Several passages both in his Majesty's speech, and his answers to the addresses of his parliament, seemed to leave the French some hopes of success by way of negociation; if not to settle affairs amicably, yet to amuse the British court, till they might be perfectly prepared to execute their important schemes. We are indulged in this supposition by that extraordinary correspondence carried on between the two crowns, during the recess of parliament, at Christmas; which produced the following letter, from M. Rouille minister and secretary of state for foreign affairs, to Mr. Fox, secretary of state to the King of England; dated Versailles, 21st of December.

Pacific measures pretended by the French court.

SIR,

M. Rouille's letter to M. Fox.

BY command of the King my master, I have the honour to send your excellency the following memorial, &c.

"The

A. D. 1755.

"The King is able to demonſtrate to the whole univerſe, by authentic proofs, that it is not owing to his Majeſty that the differences relating to America, have not been amicably accommodated.—The King, being moſt ſincerely deſirous to maintain the public peace, and a good underſtanding with his Britannic Majeſty, carried on the negociation relative to that ſubject, with the moſt unreſerved confidence and good faith. The aſſurance of the King of Great Britain's diſpoſition to peace, which his Britannic Majeſty and his miniſtry were conſtantly repeating both by word of mouth and in writing, were ſo formal and preciſe, that the King could not, without reproaching himſelf, entertain the leaſt ſuſpicion of the ſincerity of the court of London's intentions. It is ſcarce poſſible to conceive how theſe aſſurances can be reconciled with the orders for hoſtilities, given in November 1754, to General Braddock, and in April 1755, to Admiral Boſcawen.——The attack and capture, in July laſt, of two of the King's ſhips in the open ſea, and without a declaration of war, was a public inſult to his Majeſty's flag; and his Majeſty would have immediately manifeſted his juſt reſentment of ſuch an irregular and violent proceeding, if he could have imagined that Admiral Boſcawen acted by the orders of his court. For the ſame reaſon the King ſuſpended, at firſt, his judgment of the piracies, that have been committed for ſeveral months by the Engliſh men of war, on the navigation and commerce of his Majeſty's ſubjects, in contempt of the law

of

A. D. 1755. of nations, the faith of treaties, the uſages eſtabliſhed among civilized nations, and the regard they reciprocally owe to one another. The ſentiments of his Britannic Majeſty gave the King room to expect, that at his return to London, he would diſavow the conduct of his admiralty and naval officers, and give his Majeſty a ſatisfaction proportionate to the injury and the damage.—But ſeeing that the King of England, inſtead of puniſhing the robberies committed by the Engliſh navy, on the contrary encourages them, by demanding from his ſubjects freſh ſupplies againſt France; his Majeſty would fall ſhort in what he owes to his own glory, the dignity of his crown, and the defence of his people, if he deferred any longer the demanding of a ſingle reparation for the outrage done to the French flag, and the damage done to the King's ſubjects.

His Majeſty, therefore, thinks proper to apply directly to his Britannic Majeſty, and demand from him immediate and full reſtitution for the French ſhips, as well men of war, as merchantmen, which, contrary to all law, and all decorum, have been taken by the Engliſh navy; and of all the officers, ſoldiers, mariners, guns, ſtores, merchandize, and in general of every thing belonging to theſe veſſels.

The King will always chuſe to owe to the King of England's equity, rather than to any thing elſe, that ſatisfaction, which he hath a right to demand: and all the powers in Europe will undoubtedly ſee in this ſtep, which he hath determined

mined to take, a new and ſtriking proof of that invariable love of peace, which directs all his counſels and reſolutions.—If his Britannic Majeſty orders reſtitution of the veſſels in queſtion, the King will be diſpoſed to enter into a negociation for that further ſatisfaction, which is legally due to him, and will continue deſirous, as he hath always been, to have the diſcuſſions relating to America, determined by an equitable and ſolid accommodation. But if, contrary to all hopes, the King of England ſhall refuſe what the King demands, his Majeſty will regard this denial of juſtice, as the moſt authentic declaration of war, and as a formed deſign in the court of London, to diſturb the peace of Europe." A. D. 1755.

Mr. Fox ſent to M. ROUILLE the following anſwer[y], dated at Whitehall, January 13, 1756, by his Majeſty's command.

SIR,

I Received on the 3d inſtant, the letter dated the 21ſt paſt, with which your excellency honoured me, together with the memorial ſubjoined to it. I immediately laid them before the King my maſter; and by his command I have the honour to inform your excellency, that his Majeſty continues deſirous of preſerving the public tranquillity: but though the King will readily conſent to an equi- Mr. Fox's anſwer.

[y] In French, ill becoming the firſt miniſter of ſtate in the Britiſh court.

and

A. D. 1756. table and ſolid accommodation, his Majeſty cannot grant the demand that is made of immediate and full reſtitution of all the French veſſels, and whatever belongs to them, as the preliminary condition of any negociation; his Majeſty having taken no ſtep, but what the hoſtilities begun by France, in a time of profound peace, (of which he hath the moſt authentic proofs) and what his Majeſty owes to his own honour, to the defence of the rights and poſſeſſions of his crown, and the ſecurity of his kingdoms, rendered juſt and indiſpenſible. I have the honour to be, &c.

Remarks on this correſpondence.

The incongruity of this correſpondence between two nations ſo far engaged in hoſtilities, as Great Britain and France were at this time, would not permit his Britannic Majeſty to anſwer M. Rouille's letter otherwiſe, than by his ſecretary of ſtate, and required ſome method to take off the diſagreeable apprehenſions, which it began to diffuſe amongſt the people, already diſſatisfied with the pacific conduct of the miniſtry, and to expoſe to the ſeveral courts of Europe, the falſhood of the imputations and facts therein contained. Therefore the miniſtry cauſed remarks to be made on the principal articles of its contents; which were publiſhed and diſperſed at all the courts of Europe.

The Britiſh miniſtry's remarks on M. Rouille's memorial.

In the firſt place, it is therein remarked, That whatever may have been, or are now, the ſentiments of the moſt Chriſtian King, with regard to the differences concerning North America, it is unlucky,

unlucky, that the conduct of the court of Verſailles, towards Great Britain, ſhould correſpond ſo ill to the diſpoſition, which M. Rouille's memorial aſcribes to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and to the profeſſions of good faith and unreſerved confidence, with which, it was pretended, the negociation was, on their part, carried on [b]. And if it be from the courſe of this negociation, "that the authentic proofs, are to be drawn, by which the moſt "Chriſtian King is able to demonſtrate to the "whole world, that it is not owing to him, that "the differences in queſtion have not been amicably accommodated," it may not be improper to touch upon ſome parts thereof, and ſhew that every fact bears witneſs to his Britannic Majeſty's moderation. A. D. 1756.

For, in the month of January 1753, the French Ambaſſador returned to London, and made great proteſtations [c] of his court's ſincere deſire, finally and ſpeedily to adjuſt all diſputes between the two crowns concerning America: and notwithſtanding the extraordinary preparations, which were known to be making at that time in the ports of France, her ambaſſador propoſed, "That before the ground "and circumſtances of the quarrel ſhould be enquired into, poſitive orders ſhould be immediately ſent to our reſpective governors, forbidding them to undertake any new enterprize, or "proceed to any act of hoſtility; and enjoining

[b] See the proofs produced by the commiſſaries, on p. 49, &c. and p. 84, &c.

[c] See page 121.

A. D. 1756. "them, on the contrary, to put things, without "delay, with regard to the lands on the Ohio, "on the ſame footing that they were, or ought to "have been, before the late war, and that the "reſpective claims ſhould amicably be referred to "the commiſſioners at Paris, that the two courts "might terminate the differences by a ſpeedy "accommodation."

The court of London immediately declared its readineſs to conſent to the propoſed ceſſation of hoſtilities, and that all the points in diſpute might be diſcuſſed and terminated by the miniſters of the two crowns: but on this ſpecial condition, That all the poſſeſſions in America ſhould previouſly be put on the foot of the treaty of Utrecht, confirmed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle. Wherefore, the King of Great Britain propoſed, "That "the poſſeſſion of the lands on the Ohio, ſhould "be reſtored to the footing it was on, at the con-"cluſion of the treaty of Utrecht, and agreeable "to the ſtipulations of the ſaid treaty, which "was renewed by that of Aix-la-Chapelle; and "more over that the other poſſeſſions in North "America ſhould be reſtored to the ſame con-"dition, in which they actually were at the "ſigning of the ſaid treaty of Utrecht, and agree-"ble to the ceſſions and ſtipulations therein ex-"preſſed; and then the method of informing "the reſpective governors, and forbidding them "to undertake any new enterprize or act of hoſti-"lity, might be treated of; and the claims of "both parties reſerved to be ſpeedily and finally "adjuſted in an amicable manner between the

"two

"two courts." That is to ſay, the French ſhould repair the injury done by open force, before the parties ſhould enter into treaty about the claim of right; after which the poſſeſſions of both parties might be ſettled on the foot of a definitive agreement. A. D. 1756.

To this equitable expedient to divert the horrors of an open war, the French ambaſſador was ſo far from agreeing, that he ſeriouſly delivered a kind of reply, which at bottom was only a repetition of his firſt propoſal. However, to ſoften the affair, he produced, at the ſame time, full powers from his court to treat, conceived in very ſpecious and polite terms: though the effects were as little correſpondent thereto, as before. France, likewiſe, ſoon after delivered a draught of a preliminary convention, which was nothing more than the firſt propoſal enlarged. This, added to what was doing on the coaſt of France, was too plain to deceive any. Therefore, England would by no means agree to a convention, which ſhould leave France in poſſeſſion of all ſhe had acquired by her violences and uſurpations; the preciſe grievance Great Britain complained of: and, after the expiration of which, we ſhould have been juſt where we were, when that convention was ſigned.

A draught of a counter-convention was afterwards delivered to the ambaſſador, containing an offer of the moſt moderate terms, being confined to thoſe points only, which were his Majeſty's indiſpenſible right, and eſſential to the ſecurity of his colonies.—To this France did not vouchſafe

A. D. 1756. to make any anſwer, and her ambaſſador was authoriſed only to hear what was ſaid to him about the affair, but to make no propoſals. In fine, after a long ſeries of evaſions, in which the ceſſation of hoſtilities was continually recurred to, the ambaſſador inſtead of receiving inſtructions to enter into a negociation upon the counter-convention abovementioned, was ordered to demand, as a previous condition, that England ſhould deſiſt from three points, which made a principal part of the ſubject in diſpute, viz.

I. The ſouth part of the river St. Lawrence, and the lakes, that diſcharge themſelves into that river.

II. The twenty leagues of country demanded along the bay of Fundi: and,

III. The lands between the Ohio and Oubecho.

The diſcuſſions, with which this extraordinary piece was followed, and during which France ſhuffled, at every turn, concluded with a memorial preſented by the French ambaſſador, in which was treated the affairs of the iſlands, as well as that of North America. This alſo was anſwered by a very ample piece, that refuted the memorial article by article, and fully juſtified the terms of the counter-convention. But the French ambaſſador's ſudden departure, about this time, prevented any reply.

Secondly, it is remarked, that notwithſtanding the meaſures taken to defend our rights and property in North America, both by ſea and land, and the captures, which were made in July laſt, purſu-

purſuant thereunto, his Britannic Majeſty's aſſurances, of his pacific diſpoſition, given to France, were as honeſt and ſincere, as they were formal and preciſe: and he muſt have condemned himſelf, had he carried them ſo far, as to endanger the poſſeſſions of his crown, and the ſafety of his people, to purchaſe the friendſhip of France. A. D. 1756.

It is to no purpoſe that France gives the epithet of *hoſtile* to the orders and inſtructions given to General Braddock and Admiral Boſcawen. She would be glad to draw a veil over the hoſtilities committed by France in America, from the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle to the date of thoſe orders. For almoſt from the very inſtant of ſigning that treaty [d], and even at the opening of the commiſſion [e], which in conſequence of it was eſtabliſhed at Paris, for the affairs of America; France diſtruſted before hand her right; and, ſetting up for the judge, as well as the party, in her own diſpute, cauſed the province of Nova Scotia to be invaded, and, after a ſeries of open hoſtilities againſt the inhabitants, the King's ſubjects erected three forts in the heart of that province; and, if ſhe had not been prevented, was prepared and ready to deſtroy the new ſettlement at Hallifax. The like hoſtilities were committed, at the ſame time, againſt his Majeſty's lands and ſubjects on the Ohio and the Indian lakes; where, France, without any ſhadow of right, forbid the Engliſh to trade, ſeized them by force, and ſent them

[d] See p. 22, 25, 41.

[e] See p. 28, 33, 43, 45, 49.

A. D. 1756. priſoners[f] to France; invaded the territories of Virginia, attacked a fort, which covers its frontier, and to ſecure their uſurpations, erected, with an armed force, a chain of forts on the lands they had invaded.

If his Majeſty could have thought, that the governors of Canada acted by orders of their court, he would have been intitled to repell theſe hoſtilities with that vigour, which the caſe required. He contented himſelf with complaining to the court of France! but with ſo little effect, that the French miniſtry, not ſatisfied with not anſwering, gave on this occaſion a very ſingular inſtance of their honeſty: for in ſpite of theſe complaints made by the Earl of Albemarle, (in conſequence of an order from his Majeſty) particularly by an expreſs memorial delivered in May 1752[g], France had afterwards the modeſty to alledge, that England had never complained of theſe proceedings, and conſequently had nothing to find fault with.

At laſt the King's patience being worn out by the continuance of theſe violences, he found himſelf obliged to provide for the ſecurity and defence of his ſubjects. Yet, notwithſtanding the juſt reaſons he had for proceeding to extremities, he added, to his many years forbearance, a ſignal proof of his moderation in the ſmallneſs of the ſuccours he ſent to America, which conſiſted only of two battalions of 500 men each, eſcorted by

[f] See p. 45, [g] See this memorial at large on p. 45, &c.

two

two frigates: and in the orders given to the commanding officer, which were to diſlodge the invaders of the King's territories, there is nothing in theſe facts irreconcileable with the aſſurances given of his Majeſty's diſpoſition towards peace. It is the invaſion made by France, and the violences that attended it, which are *hoſtile:* and it never can be unlawful to repel an aggreſſor.. A. D. 1756.

Therefore to make out the pretended inſult offered to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's flag, France is obliged to invert the order of things. She affects to take the conſequence and effect for the cauſe; and alledges, as the principal affair, what was only acceſſary, and proceeded from it; taking occaſion from the ſmall ſuccours General Braddock carried to America, to make the ſending of thoſe ſuccours, the riſe of the troubles in that part of the world. France equips a fleet of a very alarming force, and the King, in conſequence thereof, is obliged to make proportionable armaments. France ſends that fleet to North America, (with three times the number of troops carried to the ſame continent by General Braddock) in order for her commanders to ſupport the acts of violence already committed, and to add new ones.

Now the ſame law, the ſame principle of defence, which authoriſes the reſiſtance of an invader, equally authoriſes the preventing of the part attacked, from being over-powered by ſo formidable a reinforcement: it was therefore very natural to expect, that the King would provide for the

A. D. 1756. protection and safety of his subjects, by hindering the landing of so powerful an armament in North America, and endeavour to preserve his American settlements from total ruin.

The same motive of self-defence hath forced the King to seize the French ships and sailors, in order to deprive the court of France of the means of making a descent; with which their ministers in all the courts of Europe have threatned England. A menace, which is the most significative to England, as it hath been accompanied or preceded by the precipitate recall of the ministers of France at London and Hanover; by the march and cantonment of large bodies of troops on the coasts of Flanders and the channel; and they publicly avowed the re-establishment of the port of Dunkirk [h].

For the rest: it is hard to imagine why the French should conceive the King ought to disavow

[h] In August 1755, the Risbank, a very strong battery, on the right hand side going into the harbour, was restored to its original strength, or better fortified, though expresly contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of Utrecht and Aix la-Chapelle. It was built entirely new in form of a half moon, mounting 22 cannon, facing the mouth of the harbour, with embrasures for several more; and many men were still employed on that part of the fortification. On the other side of the harbour, they were erecting a large rampart for a battery of 50 or 60 cannon, facing the sea: 2000 men were then employed to finish it with all expedition, and was to be called the Bavarian Battery. They were also repairing the sluices, in order to form a back water for cleaning and deepening the harbour.

the

the conduct of his officers, who acted by his orders; or why they ſhould wonder at his Majeſty's demanding the neceſſary ſupplies from his ſubjects to enable him to fruſtrate the ambitious and unjuſtifiable views of France. A. D. 1756.

How can that court pretend to be ſurpriſed at the acts of violence it complains of, after the court of Great Britain had, during the whole courſe of the negociation, conſtantly rejected the propoſals made by France for a ſuſpenſion of arms, unleſs it were preceeded by a reſtitution of the poſſeſſions taken by open force from England? A condition, to which the court of Verſailles would never agree. This was informing that court very plainly, what method the King propoſed to take, in order to obtain his juſt right.

For theſe juſt and valid reaſons the King rejected the peremptory demand contained in the memorial ſigned by M. Rouille: and to avoid taking notice of the terms made uſe of in it, which ſhock common decency, his Majeſty cauſed a ſhort and negative anſwer to be made to it, in the form of a letter, written by Mr. Fox, his ſecretary of ſtate: and he is the more determined not to admit what France demands, as a preliminary condition, prior to any negociation, as it appears from this very memorial, that after granting it, he would be as far as ever from obtaining an equitable and ſolid accommodation with reſpect to the injuries he has ſuffered for ſeveral years. And it does not appear how his Majeſty's reſolution to defend his American dominions, and hinder France

from

A. D. 1756. from inſulting his kingdoms, can be conſtrued in France to be a denial of juſtice, and a formed deſign in the King of Great Britain to diſturb the peace of Europe.

Britiſh ſubjects ordered to depart from France.

However, in conſequence of that memorial and Mr. Fox's anſwer, the French King's orders were publiſhed, at Dunkirk, for all Britiſh ſubjects to leave his dominions, before the 1ſt of March, except ſuch as might obtain his permiſſion to remain. Another edict was publiſhed at the ſame time, inviting his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's ſubjects to fit out privateers, promiſing a premium of forty livres for every gun, and as much for every man, they might take on board the enemy's ſhips; with a further promiſe, that in caſe peace ſhould be concluded ſoon, the King would purchaſe his ſaid privateers at their prime coſt.

Privateers ordered and encouraged by France.

Britiſh ſhips ſeized in port.

Purſuant to the above orders, the Engliſh veſſels in the ſeveral ports of France were ſeized, and their crews ſent to priſon.

Whatever might be the real motive for this correſpondence, it outwardly appeared, on the part of Britain, to be countenanced by the apprehenſions the miniſtry had all along entertained, and affected to entertain, of an invaſion; and, on the part of the French to prolong our neglect of armaments for the Mediterranean; where now they had determined to ſtrike that great blow, ſo long threatened againſt Great Britain. For, though our Agents, Conſuls and Ambaſſadors at Paris, Carthagena, Turin, &c. perpetually repreſented in the ſtrongeſt terms the naval and military preparations

Remarks on the ſeveral pieces of intelligence concerning an invaſion.

parations at Toulon; though Mr. Banks at Carthagena had informed the miniſtry, on the 27th of Auguſt, that theſe preparations were expreſly making againſt *Minorca:* the French, by their emiſſaries in Holland, &c. and by their movements on the coaſt of the Britiſh channel, and ſometimes by counter orders at Toulon, endeavoured to draw off their attention from the main object. The French knowing the foible of their neighbours, to be terrified with every motion, they ſhould make on the coaſt of the Channel, played off their old political engine of an invaſion ſo effectually, that they dampt the Britiſh fire, which a few months before had threatened deſtruction to the navigation of France; and made the miniſtry ſo cool, that they ſeemed unconcerned, what became of the important tenures of their maſter's crown in the Mediterranean. A. D. 1756.

It is true that there was a report [i] of the Pretender's being at Paris: but the ſame advice remarked, that it wanted confirmation: that an embarkation was intended for Scotland: that the Breſt ſquadron was ordered to continue in the road: that the French miniſtry were extreme buſy in repairing the fortifications of Dunkirk, and that there were ſixteen battalions in and about that town, beſides ſeven companies of marines. But there could be nothing ſo terrible in all theſe appearances, as to engage the whole attention of the Britiſh miniſtry, and our chief ſtrength at ſea, Dunkirk repaired.

[i] 16th of September, 1755.

to

A. D. 1756.

No ſigns of an invaſion.

to wait upon their motions. For, other letters on the 30th of the ſame month informed, That though all the grenadiers in the Flemiſh garriſons had orders to be ready to march, and the troops at Dunkirk were ſtill encamped, the infantry, which are the only troops for an expedition againſt this iſland, had begun their march into winter quarters, and the cavalry were gone to Britany, French-Comte and Burgundy. A natural diſpoſition for covering their own coaſts againſt a deſcent from Britain; but very improper to be interpreted a diſpoſition for invading an iſland, whoſe bulwarks are the ocean, and whoſe cities and towns are without walls and fortifications. Had the French ever intended to invade us, they would have kept their infantry, and not their cavalry upon the coaſt.

Armaments at Toulon, and their deſtination.

The advices in the courſe of the month of October, confirm the armament's deſtination from Toulon againſt Minorca or Gibraltar. And from thoſe advices it appears, with great perſpicuity, that the French obſerved an exact uniformity of conduct in their ports of the Mediterranean; ſometimes in a hurry; at other times ſhewing by way of feint, a ſlackneſs in their armaments, or a diſtant intention; but never loſing ſight of their real object, and making as much diſpatch, as the nature of their expedition and the ſeaſon of the year would permit. In which they diſcovered great policy and oeconomy; confounding our intelligence, and expending no more of the public money than was neceſſary, till the time of action

ſhould

A. D. 1756.

ſhould diſcover their real deſign; while in the northern provinces they induſtriouſly kept up the report and appearance of an embarkation. But how could people be ſo infatuated with ſuch an improbability, weighing all circumſtances? Beſides the moſt penetrating intelligence received on the 20th of October, by Lord Holderneſs, ought to have rectified all ſuch vague [k] ſuppoſitions, founded on no better authority than hearſay, "No court, ſaid that correſpondent, was "ever in a more cruel ſituation than that of "France, they have been led into a war by the "repeated aſſurances given them by the Duke "de Mirepoix, That however angry the Engliſh "nation was, the King and his miniſtry would "not enter into a war. As this was credited by

[k] Is it not amazing, that a perſon in the capacity of Admiral Smith, than whom nobody could be ſuppoſed to underſtand the requiſites for embarkation and convoying troops, deſtined for a deſcent upon an iſland better, ſhould hearken to, and tranſmit to the admiralty, his own apprehenſions of the truth of, a report, which ſome French emiſſary had impoſed upon him, That the deſcent was to be made with 100,000 troops: which would require more veſſels to bring them over, than all their nation could then furniſh; and a better ſtationed and equipped navy to convoy them, than the few ſhips of war at Breſt and Rochfort, whoſe courſe down the channel to Calais and Dunkirk, muſt be expoſed to the Britiſh fleets at Plymouth, Portſmouth, and at the mouth of the Thames. How Admiral Smith could be ſo credulous on this occaſion is beyond comprehenſion: for, about a month after, he aſſures the Lords of the Admiralty, That there was no movement in the French ports of Dunkirk, &c. that indicated an embarkation.

A. D. 1756. "the French council in general, they took their "measures, in conſequence, and were never more "ſurprized than when the news came of our "taking the two French ſhips in America."

No fear of an invaſion.

That the French King and his miniſtry were greatly enraged there is not the leaſt doubt. Neither ſhall it be denied that an invaſion of Ireland and Scotland was propoſed. But upon examination, ſo many difficulties aroſe that it was laid aſide. However it was reſolved to ſtrike ſome ſtroke of great conſequence, to indemnify the French merchants for the loſs of their ſhips: not by a new embarkation for America, where their force was already greatly ſuperior to ours, and which could not be undertaken with bad ſhips, and ſcarcity of artillery, men and proviſions; nor by invading Britain or Ireland; becauſe they had neither tranſports for ſuch an undertaking, nor were making other diſpoſitions in the northern provinces of their country, that could induce us to give credit to ſuch a report; but by ſome action in the Mediterranean againſt ſome place left unguarded.

Invaſion propagated by the miniſtry.

In the courſe of the next month, the alarm of an invaſion increaſed, and was rung in every body's ears by the miniſterial agents and emiſſaries, who in this particular joined heartily in the deluſive pretences of the enemy. It appears by the intelligence received at the proper offices, that this terror of an invaſion was founded upon no better authority yet, than trite accounts of the Iriſh brigade being quartered on the French coaſt;

Without ſufficient grounds.

of a few merchantmen detained or laid up in Dunkirk and Calais; of ſeven frigates lying under ſailing orders in Breſt Road, for the protection of their mercantile navigation, and a gaſconade to invade England with a fleet not in their power to ſend to ſea, and at the ſame time to attack Hanover. Whereas the moſt punctual and intelligible correſpondents declared, That there did not appear the leaſt diſpoſition, nor was there any talk of an embarkation. For, though different plans had been propoſed, they had all been rejected: becauſe, in the firſt place, it was impoſſible for them to collect a ſufficient number of tranſports in one or two harbours, as would be neceſſary: and becauſe the Breſt fleet, was it in a condition to put to ſea, could not pretend to convoy them; for ſhould that fleet meet the Engliſh, either in going or returning, it would be riſking the whole trade of their country, and expoſing both their fleet and forces to ruin. A. D. 1756.

Still our miniſtry kept the greateſt part of their naval force inactive, to watch the event of uncertain, contradictory, and improbable, reports, and paid no regard to the real armaments making at Toulon; except we may admit an order for General Stuart to repair to his command in Minorca, given this month, to be an indication of their firſt glance towards the defence of the important fortreſs of Mahon: but even this was done with ſo little grace, that the General could not procure a paſſage to his command till he ſailed with Admiral Byng. Naval force kept inactive. General Stuart ordered to Minorca.

As

A. D. 1756.

State of the armaments at Toulon, in the winter.

As the winter advanced, the diligence in the port of Toulon ſlackened; and this furniſhed various conjectures, as if the French were inclined to pacific meaſures, and to lay the intended expedition aſide in the Mediterranean. But yet it plainly appears, in the midſt of that uncertainty, that the Toulon ſquadron, of twelve ſhips of the line, were in ſuch forwardneſs as required no greater expedition at that ſeaſon, and might be eaſily put to ſea, early in the ſpring: that, in the mean time, all diligence was uſed to recruit the land forces in Provence, and in the neighbouring provinces: that contracts were made for tranſports, and that a ſtrict watch was kept to ſecure a ſufficient number of ſailors againſt the time of action[1]. Nay, our admiralty received letters from Marſeilles, dated the 24th of December 1755, which expreſly ſaid, That five frigates were ready to put to ſea, and that twelve ſhips of the line were under orders to be equipped with all expedition, and would be ready to ſail in *three weeks*, under the command of M. de la Galiſſionere, all the officers being appointed: which is generally the laſt ſtep in the equipment of a French ſquadron.

Its deſtination how to be collected.

Thus every particular, but the poſitive deſtination of the Toulon ſquadron was known; and the intention to attack Gibraltar or Mahon was eaſily collected from their victualling, for a ſhort time, the number of troops to be embarked, and

[1] See Mr. Banks's Letter of the 7th of December 1755, and ſeveral other correſpondents.

the

the variety of ſmall veſſels taken up for tranſports, which were not fit to paſs into the ocean. A. D. 1756.

However our miniſtry continued to give credit to, and to fix their whole attention upon the advices of the tranſactions in the north of France: from whence Lord Holderneſs produced letters, dated from the 5th to the 15th of December, that mentioned great augmentations made to the militia of Normandy and Picardy, which already conſiſted of twenty-two battalions each, and that nothing was talked of but a declaration of war, and a reſolution to fix the Pretender on the throne of England, in the March following: that 70 or 80,000 land forces were expected to arrive, and to be cantoned in the towns and villages near Dunkirk, to favour a ſquadron to be commanded by M. Bart, to ſcour the north ſeas. Neglected by the miniſtry. Vain pretences of an invaſion.

Whence was a ſquadron to be expected ſufficient to face the Britiſh navy? It could not be from Toulon, for obvious reaſons. It could not be from Breſt, nor from Rochfort; becauſe advices of the firſt of December, to that ſame noble Lord, expreſly declared, that the ſquadron in thoſe ports, under M. Conflans went on very ſlowly; that the ſquadron under M. Perrier conſiſted only of five ſhips of the line, and four frigates, when completely equipped; that there was but one ſhip fitting at Dunkirk; and that there was no other maritime diſpoſition in that, or in its neighbouring ports.

It muſt be confeſſed that ſome advices, of the ninth of this month, related a deſign in France, to fit out every ſhip, that could be made capable

A. D. 1756. to keep the ſeas, and to divide the whole into two fleets, one at Toulon, the other at Breſt; to fall with force on the Britiſh ſquadrons diſperſed in ſmall numbers; and in the mean time to make a powerful invaſion with 50,000 men. But, next day, this formidable gaſconade was knocked on the head by freſh aſſurances, That France had no other views than to gain time: that there were no diſpoſitions on the coaſt of the Britiſh channel for an embarkation: that eight frigates had ſailed from Breſt, but were employed only as convoys to merchantmen: and that there was nothing to be apprehended of immediate danger or trouble from the French on that coaſt.

Remarks on all the intelligence.

Sum up the whole intelligence, which brings us to the concluſion of the year 1755, you will not be able to find any ground for the miniſterial pannic continually dreaming of, and alarming the people with the dread of an invaſion. How then ought we to account for that paſſage in his Majeſty's ſpeech, where he informs his parliament, "That from various appearances and preparations "there was reaſon to think, there have been formed "deſigns againſt his kingdoms and dominions;" except, as a noble Peer, many years at the head of the law, has taught us, We conſider ſuch ſpeeches as the language of the miniſtry, rather than the ſentiments of their royal maſter: and then it may create a ſuſpicion, that this alarming invaſion was a pure miniſterial bubble, grafted upon the political conduct of the enemy, in order to raiſe a prodigious ſum of money out of the fears of the people.

A. D. 1756.

The invasion of Minorca ascertained.

On the 4th of February 1756, Mr. Fox received advice, dated the 17th of January, from Mr. Birtles, Conſul at Genoa, a port greatly connected with Toulon, That the Dukes of Richelieu and Mirepoix were nominated to command in Provence, and that it was whiſpered, they intended to make a deſcent from Toulon, with a body of troops [m], to ſurprize the iſland of Minorca. The Lords of the admiralty, on the 20th, received an account of the ſtate of the French marine as follows,

State of the French marine.

At Breſt	2 ſhips of	80 guns
	1 —— of	74
	2 —— of	70
	3 —— of	64
	3 —— of	50
	1 —— of	34
	8 —— of	30
	4 —— of	24
	In all	24
At Rochfort	2 ſhips of	74 guns
	1 —— of	70
	3 —— of	64
	7 —— of	30
	In all	13

[m] Sixty battalions under the command of the Duke of Richelieu. As the ſame gentleman wrote on the 26th of January.

A. D. 1756.

At Toulon	1 ſhip	of 80 guns
	3 ——	of 74
	7 ——	of 64
	1 ——	of 60
	4 ——	of 30
	2 ——	of 24
	In all	18
At Havre	2 ſhips	of 32 2
	Total	57

Minorca ſtill neglected.

The ſtate of Minorca did not yet ſeem to be rightly conſidered and attended to by the Britiſh court, who ſuffered themſelves to be deluded, or were willingly engaged in the deception of a French invaſion, which after Chriſtmas revived with ſtronger ſymptoms of a determinate reſolution. It was currently reported from the Hague, that the troops [n] were to be tranſported in [o] flat-bottomed boats; that M. de Belliſle was to command the expedition, who was already with the Prince de Soubiſe making their circuit along the French coaſt: that 80,000 men were marching to Dunkirk, and that M. Perrier's ſquadron was falling down into Breſt Road. But Mr. Joſeph Cockburn, of the Hunter cutter, having ventured

Reports of the invaſion refuted.

[n] One hundred and forty battalions, ſaid Lord Briſtol in his Letter from Turin.

[o] Seven or eight hundred ſaid M. Villettes at Bern.

into Breſt water in his row boat, could ſee no more than nine men of war of 50 guns, and under, and ſix ſail of large merchantmen. Conſequently all this talk was calculated by the enemy only to alarm and diſtreſs us. For at this very juncture the Breſt ſquadron above-mentioned ſailed with a convoy of troops for Canada [p], and not upon that ſilly ineffectual errand to cover a fleet of flat-bottomed boats in defiance of the Britiſh navy. A. D. 1756.

The month of February increaſed the light into the deſtination of the Toulon armament. Poſitive advice was received [q], that preparations were making to embark 25,000 men, with a train of artillery, deſigned againſt Minorca: that the ſhips were hove down, and that they would be ready to put to ſea the middle of March [r]. The ſame advice was confirmed very ſtrongly from the Hague [s]. And Sir Benjamin Keene, the Engliſh miniſter at Madrid, who having given General Blakeney, the commanding officer at Mahon, notice of the French armament, and his apprehenſions concerning its deſtination, writes to Mr. Fox [t] in theſe pathetic terms: "The uneaſineſs, I feel, "comes from the approach of an intended attack

Certain advice of an intended invaſion of Minorca.

From Sir Benjamin Keene, &c.

[p] See Letter in Lord Holderneſſe's office, dated January 31, 1756.

[q] On the 26th of February, by the Admiralty from Marſeilles.

[r] Ibid. and Conſul Birtles, from Genoa.

[s] So early as the 14th of February.

[t] On the 24th of February.

A. D. 1756. "on his Majeſty's dominions in the Mediterra-
"nean.—I mean the iſland of MINORCA in par-
"ticular; being forced to this idea by repeated
"accounts of numbers of troops aſſembled at
"Marſeilles, and on the coaſts of the Mediter-
"ranean, to be eaſily tranſported in ſmall veſſels,
"under the convoy of twelve capital ſhips ready
"to ſail from Toulon." Captain Harvey, of the Phœnix, then at Mahon, gave notice [u] of the ſame to the Admiralty, and to Lieutenant-General Fowke, commanding at Gibraltar, That the Toulon expedition was certainly intended againſt Minorca; that there had been a council of war called at Mahon, and reſolutions taken to prepare for defence; but adds, in his letter to General Fowke, We can do nothing if you do not ſend us ſome beef ſpeedily; and that the garriſon was then in great diſtreſs. This intelligence was followed by a letter to Mr. Fox, from General Blakeney himſelf, in theſe terms, "I can't be too early in acquainting you, Sir, that by different informations from France and Spain, there is great reaſon to believe the French intend very ſhortly to make an attack upon this iſland.—In conſequence I've called a council of war—and we were unanimouſly of opinion, that conſidering who theſe informations came from, and the reports every where about, which ſeemed to tally with them, this iſland ought, with the greateſt ſpeed, to be put in the beſt ſtate of defence it can:—

From Captain Harvey.

From Gen. Blakeney.

[u] February 7. received March 6th.

and

and I am accordingly applying myſelf to every meaſure, I think, for the ſafety and defence of this place." A. D. 1756.

Yet nothing ſeemed to awaken the attention of the miniſtry for Minorca. The nearer the danger of that iſland approached, the more determined the French endeavoured to make us believe they intended to invade Britain, thereby to keep our navy in a ſtate of inactivity, till the blow was ſtruck in the Mediterranean. Belliſle's plan was magnified, which was to aſſemble 100,000 men between Cherburg and Dunkirk, in order to give an equal uneaſineſs to the ſouth and weſt parts of England, and to oblige us to ſeperate our forces: to bring twelve ſhips of the line and as many frigates from Breſt, to facilitate an embarkation of 600 ſail of tranſports, each to carry 100 men, to be pilated by ſmugglers of Kent, Suſſex and Hampſhire, to three different attacks; two of which to be only feints, the real one to be commanded by the Marſhal in perſon. All which it was alledged was feaſible in a freſh ſouth-eaſterly wind, a dark night, a fog, or a ſtark calm: becauſe in any of theſe caſes, the Engliſh fleet could not come to prevent their paſſage.

Neglected by the miniſtry.

Terrified by chimerical invaſion.

It was further ſaid, That there were already collected 140 veſſels of different burdens at Dunkirk; a great convoy of proviſions and ammunition ſent to Calais, Dunkirk, &c. from Douay and other places: that there were 600 flat-bottomed boats in the ports of Britany and Normandy for the ſame ſervice; that the Pretender had

A. D. 1756. been at Verſailles ſome time, and was to embark with the M. Belliſle: that the train of artillery was prodigious, and the preparations both for defence and offence were immenſe: that they were determined to execute Belliſle's plan, though they were ſure to loſe all their veſſels employed, and riſk their whole kingdom: but that they hoped, by their number of boats, and ſuperiority of fire from the heavy cannon, they were to carry, they might form a ſafe paſſage, notwithſtanding they ſhould meet with the Engliſh fleets; and that, in caſe they could land their whole force, they would march directly to London; and ſecure Portſmouth, with the battering train and the ſhips from Breſt and Toulon.

Refuted. Yet if we attend to the following intelligence, it will be found that all theſe preparations and gaſconades, were no other than feints on the part of France: it will appear that there was not near the like certainty of a reſolution to make a deſcent on Great Britain, as there was on Minorca.

The bugbear of the ſquadrons fitting out at Breſt was known on the firſt of February to amount to no more than a ſquadron under M. Perrier, to ſail to St. Domingo; another under M. Beaufremont, to guard the coaſts, and a third under M. Conflans, to protect the French colonies. So that nothing was to be feared from the naval power of France in the Channel. The very mention of 100,000 men for the ſervice of a maritime expedition was enough to deprive it of credit; and the ſame correſpondents, who tranſmitted that intel-

intelligence, ſhewed that they did not believe it to be ſerious. 'It is believed, ſaid one, that their motion to the ſea coaſt is nothing but an affected parade of marches and counter-marches.' Or, as another of the ſame date, 'An army to ſkreen their own coaſts from a deſcent, and to intimidate England.' A. D. 1756.

On the ſixth of February it was aſſured, from undoubted correſpondents, that neither armament, nor embarkation was then ordered: that the troops, ordered from the interior parts of France to the ſea coaſts, had received counter-orders: that every thing for the preſent ſeemed quiet at Calais: that neither troops nor veſſels of any ſort were collecting at Havre: that all reports of ſuch armaments, as above-mentioned, on that coaſt, were falſe, and that there were no more than fourteen or ſixteen ſail of ſhipping in that port, including two frigates on the ſtocks, ready to be launched, and two others of 30 and 40 guns, ſent from Breſt, a few days before, to be refitted [w].

His Majeſty's meſſage to the parliament concerning an invaſion.

It is, therefore, very extraordinary that his Majeſty was adviſed to ſend a meſſage to the Houſe of Lords, on the 23d of this month, ſignifying, That he had received repeated advices from different places and perſons, that a deſign had been formed by the French court, to make an hoſtile invaſion upon Great Britain or Ireland, and that the great preparations of land forces,

[w] Captain Whitwell's Letter to the Admiralty, on the 24th of February.

ſhips,

A. D. 1756. ſhips, artillery, and warlike ſtores, were then notoriouſly making in the ports of France, oppoſite to the Britiſh coaſts, left little room to doubt of the reality of ſuch a deſign: that he had not only augmented his forces by ſea and land, to put his kingdoms into a poſture of defence; but that he had ordered tranſports to bring over hither a body of Heſſian troops, in order further to ſtrengthen himſelf; without taking the leaſt notice of the advices of the intelligence concerning the hoſtile preparations for invading Minorca; which had been repeated uniformly, continually, and with greater certainty than any of the advices about the imaginary invaſion of Great Britain or Ireland; and without mentioning any meaſures taken, or intended, by his miniſtry, for its defence.

Takes no notice of the intelligence concerning Minorca.

The time of action drawing nigh, and no preparations of a fleet, nor of an army by the Engliſh, except an order [x] for all the abſent officers from Minorca, but General Huſke, to oppoſe the grand enterprize undertaken at Toulon; the Duke of Richelieu, on the road, to take the command of the embarkation, declared openly, at Lyons, that its deſtination was againſt Minorca, and to beſiege Mahon.

Officers ordered to Minorca.

Duke of Richelieu declares his ſervice againſt Minorca.

This intelligence was immediately tranſmitted from Bern, by M. Villettes, who had all along diſcouraged the thoughts of ſuch an expedition; but now adds, That the armaments, then carrying on in the neighbouring provinces of Spain

[x] Dated 3d of February 1756, in the war office.

with

with great activity, gave him room to think that the two courts would join their force againſt Minorca and Gibraltar. He particularly obſerved, That Galiſſionere was arrived to take upon him the command of the fleet: that ſeven ſhips of the line and five frigates were in the road [y]: that they were ſhipping 6000 bombs and 30,000 weight of biſcuit [z]: that twelve ſhips of the line and five frigates would be ready to ſail by the beginning of April: that four gallies, four xebecks and ſeven or eight other veſſels, fit for ſuch a ſervice, were ordered to attend the fleet, and to carry the ammunition and proviſions, &c. viz. 2500 oxen, 6000 rations of hay, 6000 faſcines, 1000 barrels of gunpowder, 12 cannon 36 pounders, 24 of 24 pounders, 8 of 12 pounders, 8 mortars of 12 inches, 6 of 8 inches, beſides petards, fuſees, &c. that cloth had been bought at Marſeilles for 350 tents: that they ſtript the ſea and land, and the iſlands, of their artillery and ammunition, to arm the fleet at Toulon; and that all theſe ſteps, and more, left no doubt, but that an attack would be made on Mahon; and that the whole embarkation of twenty-three battalions of foot and one of artillery would be in readineſs to ſail on the fifth of April. All which was literally true, and confirmed from all quarters. A. D. 1756.

The readineſs and appointments for the Toulon expedition.

In this ſituation what did the Britiſh miniſtry do? They had evidence, from moſt unexceptionable authorities, that there was a real armament at Remarks on the conduct of the Britiſh miniſtry.

[y] On the firſt of March. [z] On the eighth of March.

Toulon

A. D. 1756. Toulon of twelve men of war of the line, five frigates, &c. ready to convoy a powerful army, openly acknowledged by the enemy to be deſigned againſt Minorca: and they could not be ignorant of the diſtreſs Mahon was in for officers, for men, for proviſions, and almoſt every neceſſary to defend ſuch a fortreſs againſt ſo powerful, ſkilful and enraged an enemy; and, conſequently, of the danger of its falling a prey to ſuch a powerful attack, for want of a ſuperior fleet, to cover the iſland from ſuch an attempt. Yet this could work no further upon the miniſtry than to procure an order on the 8th of March for ten ſhips of the line to hold themſelves in readineſs for the Mediterranean. Which ſquadron, on the 11th, was put under the command of Admiral Byng, a good diſciplinarian, but never proved by any ſevere ſervice, where he had the chief command; with an order for him to take on board the Earl of Effingham, General Stuart, and other officers, to the number of forty-two, and ſome private men, ordered to their reſpective poſts and corps at Minorca and Gibraltar. Theſe ſhips were,

A ſquadron ordered under Adm. Byng, for Minorca.

The	Ramillies	of 90 guns
	Culloden	— 74
	Buckingham	— 70
	Captain	— 70
	Revenge	— 70
	Trident	— 64
	Intrepid	— 64
	Lancaſter	— 66
	Kingſton	— 60
	Defiance	— 60

But

But the equipping of theſe ten ſhips was attended with ſuch directions, that their departure was delayed till the 6th of April, for want of men [a]; Mr. Byng being directed to haſten the fitting out of the Stirling Caſtle, and to complete her compliment of men in preference to any other ſhip; and reſtrained from meddling with the men on board the Naſſau, Torbay, Eſſex, Prince Frederick and Greyhound, which the Secretary of the Admiralty ſaid, were wanted on the *moſt preſſing ſervice*, viz. to try to intercept four frigates and a convoy of 40 merchantmen, drove into Havre by the Windſor; a ſervice no ways ſo preſſing, as the relief of Minorca. A. D. 1756. How delayed.

What adds to the negligence of the Britiſh miniſtry, in regard to his Majeſty's dominions in the Mediterranean, is, that no advices, ever ſo well atteſted and confirmed, could prevail with them, in the courſe of years ſince the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, to ſend into thoſe ſeas, for the protection of Minorca, and the lucrative trade carried on by our merchants through the Streights, more than

[a] Admiral Byng writes to Mr. Clevland, Secretary to the Admiralty, April 1ſt, ready for ſailing in every reſpect, except want of men: will take 336 men, now the regiments are all on board, to complete them. My own ſhip wants 222, 183 of them being lent to the Ludlow Caſtle. The Trident had 78 lent to the Hampton Court and Tilbury, which ſhips we are likely to meet with. April 3d, Intrepid, Ludlow Caſtle and Cambridge came but yeſterday to Spithead—ordered men immediately.—Hope to ſettle to-day, to be able to ſet ſail to St. Helen's. April 4th, wind weſt, diſappointed to find the Intrepid ſhort of complement 150 men.

three

A. D. 1756.

three ſhips of 60, one of 50, three of 44, and a ſloop, to cruiſe on that extenſive ſtation.

State of the navy, and how employed.

Our navy, at home, within this period, (from the 1ſt of Auguſt 1755, to the 30th of April 1756[b],) when the French carried on their armaments both by ſea and land, in their ſouth and north provinces, was employed only to reinforce Admiral Hawke, cruiſing off Cape Finiſterre; to form a ſquadron of obſervation in the Downs, under Vice Admiral Smith; another ſquadron, as noted above, to cruiſe to the weſtward of Uſhant, under Admiral Byng: and in another ſquadron of 13 ſhips of the line, and one frigate, ordered on the 9th of January 1756, under the command of Vice Admiral Oſborne, to convoy a grand fleet of merchantmen, and to cruiſe to the weſtward[c]. So that the whole maritime ſtrength of the nation, which in the open ſeas would be a match for all the ſhips of war in Europe, was detained from its neceſſary ſervice, by the policy of France and the fears of our own miniſtry.

Continental affairs in Europe.

Here let us leave Admiral Byng upon his voyage to Minorca, and enquire into the negociations carrying on between Great Britain and the

[b] According to the admiralty account of the ſtate and condition of the fleet, in the ſeveral ports of Great Britain in January 1756, there were 21 ſhips of the line, and 24 frigates, ready to put to ſea; and 32 ſhips of the line, and five frigates fitting, which were very forward: and there was actually muſtered on board thoſe ſhips 20,541 ſeamen, and borne upon the books 24,853.

N. B. Excluſive of what were at ſea.

[c] He returned on the 16th of February.

Powers

Powers on the Continent, in the beginning of this year. We have already cited the correſpondence between the ſecretaries of the two crowns of Great Britain and France. Which put an end to any further overtures from that inſidious enemy. A. D. 1756.

Upon this, the face of affairs began to bear an hoſtile aſpect, threatening not only this nation, but the King of Pruſſia with the moſt powerful efforts of arms, from France and her intereſt upon the continent of Europe; the conduct of the court of Vienna having convinced his Majeſty, before he left Hanover, that there was a ſecret intrigue between that court and Verſailles. Hoſtile appearance in Germany.

As his Britannic Majeſty was anxious for the ſafety of his electoral dominions, and they were ſpecifically threatened by France, it was natural for him to provide, the beſt way in his power, to defeat the intentions of his enemies, and to cover his German dominions from ſurprize and invaſion. Hanover threatened by France.

On the other ſide, his Pruſſian Majeſty, without ally, and fully informed of the ſecret practices and deſtructive intentions of the Czarina, and the Empreſs Queen, and their allies on the continent, againſt him; and far from being pleaſed with the French conduct in caſe of an open rupture between him and thoſe powers: theſe motives had, in the latter end of the year 1755, brought about a negociation for a treaty between England and Pruſſia, to keep all foreign troops from entering the empire of Germany, as a meaſure neceſſary for the ſafety of their reſpective dominions; which Motives for the treaty with Pruſſia.

treaty

A. D. 1756. treaty was concluded and ſigned, on the 16th of January 1756, and contained in ſubſtance,

The Pruſſian treaty. I. That Great Britain with her allies, and Pruſſia, ſhall mutually aſſiſt each other, in endeavouring to keep all foreign troops from entering the Empire.

II. That Great Britain ſhall pay 20,000 l. as an indemnification for the captures of that merchandize, which was taken on board Pruſſian bottoms, and ſold during the laſt war; and in return, that Pruſſia ſhall pay the Sileſia loan.

Remarks thereon. Whoever compares this treaty, with that made a few months before with Ruſſia, though they are quite oppoſite to each other, will find that they are not contradictory, but very conſiſtent: for, whatever they may appear in terms; it is manifeſt, that they are both formed to anſwer one intention, on the part of his Britannic Majeſty. The King of Pruſſia's martial ſpirit; his diſguſt for a long time with the houſe of Hanover; his general attachment to the intereſt of France, which might diſpoſe him to become a proper inſtrument to execute the projects of the French miniſtry, already provided for, againſt the electorate of Hanover, and its dependencies; put the King of Great Britain, Elector of Hanover, upon meaſures to defeat any attempt to his prejudice by the aid of Pruſſia. Which could not be done ſo effectually by any other means, than engaging a power ſufficient to deter him, and to keep him quiet, with an army hovering over, and ready to break in upon his regal dominions, the moment his Pruſſian Majeſty

dared

dared to join France in the execution of the invaſion of Hanover. This was certainly a good reaſon for the Ruſſian treaty; and would not only have anſwer'd the end propoſed by his Britannic Majeſty, but completed the ruin of his Pruſſian Majeſty, under the ſpecious appearance of maintaining the liberties of the Empire, which was then reſolved by the confederacy againſt Pruſſia, though not come to the knowledge of his late Majeſty. But when his Majeſty diſcovered an inclination in the King of Pruſſia to ſhake off his French connections, and to become ſincerely an ally to Great Britain, and was from thence thoroughly perſuaded, that his Electoral dominions had nothing to fear from his arms, it made the treaty with Ruſſia uſeleſs; the power, whoſe motions the Ruſſian army was hired to watch, having become a friend. The only dread, that now appeared, was an invaſion by the French; whoſe entrance into the Empire was become the ſole object of thoſe councils, which were held for the protection of Hanover. The beſt means to preſerve Hanover, was to ſeek for, and gain an alliance capable of reſiſting any foreign power, ſuch as the French, from entering the Empire. This could not be done by the Ruſſian troops, which were cantoned in Lithuania and other diſtant ſtations: but might be effectually undertaken with the aid of the King of Pruſſia. Therefore as the ſafety of Hanover was the chief object of theſe two treaties; and that ſafety could be more effectually maintained by making the enemy, of A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. whom we were jealous, a friend and ally, and to join in keeping the French from entering the Empire, it was a wiſe and good meaſure.

The Pruſſian treaty the ſeeds of a German war.

This treaty was ſoon perceived to contain the ſeeds of a German war: for, ſhould the French perſiſt in their reſolution to invade Hanover, Heſſe, Hanover and Pruſſia would be obliged to oppoſe them.

His Britannic Majeſty demands an aid of 6000 Dutch.

In Holland, the miniſters of Great Britain and France, uſed their utmoſt endeavours to ſecure an intereſt with the States, for their reſpective maſters. The Honourable Colonel York, his Britannic Majeſty's ambaſſador at the Hague, delivered a memorial on the 13th of February, importing, "That although his maſter had convinced all Europe of his deſire to maintain "the general peace, that had lately ſubſiſted; "yet he found himſelf threatened with a war be- "ing kindled in his own dominions. That France "was at that time making immenſe preparations "of all kinds, particularly on the northern coaſt, "which were evidently deſigned againſt Great "Britain; and which the French miniſters at the "ſeveral courts of Europe had confirmed by their "declarations: that it was the intereſt of their "High Mightineſſes to defend Great Britain, "and the proteſtant ſucceſſion in his Majeſty's "illuſtrious houſe: that his Majeſty was not "frightened by thoſe threatning appearances; but "was determined to take every precaution to pre- "vent their effect: and that the love he bore to "his people, his attention to their ſafety, and to

"the preſervation of their liberty and religion, A. D. 1756.
"and his deſire to protect all his coaſts from the
"ravages of the enemy, were motives, which
"obliged him to demand the 6000 men, to be
"ſent over to his aſſiſtance, which the Republic
"was bound to do by treaty; and that the neceſ-
"ſary ſhipping for their embarkation would be
"got ready immediately."

The French ambaſſador at the Hague oppoſes that requiſition.

But the French ambaſſador preſented a memorial, in which he inſiſted that Great Britain was the aggreſſor; and threatened the States with the high diſpleaſure of his royal maſter, in caſe they complied with the requiſition of 6000 men made by England; putting them in mind of their expence and loſſes in the laſt war: and ſeconded his menaces with ſhewing them, that there were 40,000 French troops in Flanders ready to invade their provinces. This threatning and the weight of the French penſioners in the councils of the United Provinces, who are well paid, furniſhed the Dutch with excuſes for refuſing, or, at leaſt, for procraſtinating their anſwer to this fœderal demand; till the court of Great Britain, rather than be obliged to reſent ſuch a breach of treaty in a national way, delivered them out of the embarraſſment, by ordering Mr. York to acquaint the Princeſs Regent, That his Majeſty would not inſiſt upon his demand.

Remarks on the conduct of the Dutch.

We muſt not quit the Dutch on this occaſion, without ſome remarks on a conduct, which ſhews that there can be no dependance on their covenanted faith, nor any expectations of grateful returns

A. D. 1756. for the innumerable favours they have received from England.—The dread of the French arms, and their inability to defend themſelves againſt ſo powerful an invader was their plea, to make void their engagement by treaty. But, if we ſearch the hearts of theſe politicians, it will be found, that, if France had not been ſo kind as to furniſh them with this excuſe, they were determined to find ſome other means to evade our demand. Could the Dutch, that in the year 1745 picked out 6000 men, who, they knew, were under a capitulation not to fight the French, and ſent them, at our great expence, to defend this iſland againſt that very foe, landed in North Britain, be expected to act with ſincerity and fidelity on any other like occaſion? Their dependance is entirely upon trade: and as their expectations to increaſe their trade were to be attained only by an exact neutrality, it was reſolved, from the moment a war between Great Britain and France was certain, to ſacrifice faith, gratitude, and every public virtue to procure a neutrality: and that they would have acted no otherwiſe is evident from the reſolutions, previous to Mr. York's declaration to the Princeſs Regent, delivered to the States of Holland, by the towns of Amſterdam, Dort, Haerlem, Gouda, Rotterdam and Enckhuyſen, which flatly declared that England was uncontrovertibly the aggreſſor in Europe, by ſeizing a conſiderable number of French veſſels; that the threatened invaſion of Great Britain did not affect the Republic's guarantee of the proteſtant ſucceſſion,

ſion, inaſmuch as it was only intended to obtain reparation for the injury ſuſtained by the ſubjects of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty; finally, that the ſuccours demanded could not be of any advantage to the King of England; as it appeared by the declaration of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, that their granting theſe ſuccours would immediately lay them under a neceſſity of demanding, in their turn, aſſiſtance from Great Britain. A. D. 1756.

Such ſentiments deſtroy all thoughts of any fœderal aid from the Dutch, however ſtrictly bound by treaty and gratitude. If in caſes of ſuch emergency our neareſt allies can deny their aſſiſtance upon the bear excuſe of convenience to their own intereſt; it is time for Great Britain to withdraw its dependance from all foreign connections, and inſtead of relying on the forces provided by treaties, to place its ſtrength in a regular and well-diſciplined militia, which we ſhall find wiſely and honeſtly eſtabliſhed under the next adminiſtration; and, if kept up under due regulation, will always relieve us from the neceſſity of calling in a foreign mercenary army to defend us from invaſions.

The Empreſs Queen had ſet the Dutch an example of the ſame kind of diſregard to treaties and of ingratitude, as obſerved before. But not content with departing ſo much from the intereſt of that ally, which had ſo often, and to its own great detriment, ſaved her houſe from ruin; ſhe, on the 1ſt of May, ſigned a treaty with France, our natural enemy, and then in arms, and threatning us with deſtruction. By which extraordinary Auſtria joins with France.

A. D. 1756. revolution in the intereſts of Europe, its whole political ſyſtem aſſumed a new face; and we find it neceſſary to ſhew the cauſes which produced it.

New ſyſtem of politics in Europe.

Its cauſes.

The reigning King of Pruſſia having, in the courſe of the laſt war, taken advantage of the weakneſs, to which the houſe of Auſtria was then reduced, made good the claims of his family to the moſt conſiderable part of the dutchy of Sileſia, by force of arms; and, by the treaty of Dreſden, obliged the Queen of Hungary to cede and guarantee to him his conqueſts in Sileſia; a fine country, extending 200 miles in length, along the courſe of the large and navigable river Oder: a country of the moſt exquiſite fertility and beſt cultivation, abounding with men, abounding with valuable manufactures, and yielding a clear yearly revenue of 800,000 l. ſterling. The peace was ſcarcely ſigned, before this Auſtrian heireſs ſet on foot practices to recover, what ſhe had ceded in December 1745. For on May the 22d 1746, ſhe entered into a league with the court of Peterſburg, one of whoſe ſecret articles provides, That in caſe his Pruſſian Majeſty ſhould attack her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen, or the Empreſs of Ruſſia, or even the Republic of Poland, that this attack ſhould be conſidered as a breach of the treaty of Dreſden: that the right of the Empreſs Queen to Sileſia, ceded by that treaty, ſhould revive; and that the contracting powers ſhould mutually furniſh an army of 60,000 men to reinveſt the Empreſs Queen with that dutchy. The King of Poland was invited to accede to that treaty: and he

Sileſia ceded to the King of Pruſſia, and its importance.

Queen of Hungary's practices to recover it.

Her treaty with Ruſſia.

King of Poland.

he did ſo far accede to it, as to ſhew he perfectly agreed in his ſentiments, and was willing to co-operate with the two Empreſſes. But, his ſituation in the jaws of a formidable enemy, ſhould any thing perſpire too ſoon, and the experience of paſt misfortunes, had rendered him ſo wary, that he declined ſigning the treaty, with the conſent of the parties concerned; who agreed with his requeſt, that he ſhould have a ſhare of the ſpoil, on the footing of a treaty (the 18th of May 1745,) for the eventual partition of the King of Pruſſia's dominions. So that though the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, was excepted, he was, to all intents and purpoſes, a party to the treaty of Peterſburg. A. D. 1756.

From this time every deviſe was practiſed to embroil the King of Pruſſia with the northern powers; and eſpecially to render him odious to the Czarina in perſon. This being fully effected, magazines and armies were prepared in Bohemia and Moravia; and the King of Poland, under the pretence of a military amuſement, raiſed an army of 16,000 men, to ſecure the important and ſtrong poſt of Pirna. The Empreſs Queen went ſo far, as to try her intereſt with Great Britain, whether ſhe might depend upon any ſupport from thence in caſe of need, depending much upon the differences, which had ſome time ſubſiſted between his Britannic Majeſty and the King of Pruſſia. But they that were moſt ready to help her and her family in diſtreſs, could not be brought to do any thing for her ambition and revenge. This re- Intrigues and preparations for war againſt the King of Pruſſia.

A. D. 1756. buff in England threw her into that humour, which made her refuſe her aid, when demanded, by virtue of treaty, by Great Britain: and the Britiſh alliance with Pruſſia ſoon after furniſhed her with a reaſon for throwing herſelf into the arms of France [d].

Why the Queen of Hungary deſerted Great Britain.

Her practices diſcovered by the King of Pruſſia.

Thoſe treaties could not be carried on without the knowledge of his Pruſſian Majeſty, who jealous of the Queen of Hungary's ſincerity at the time of her ceding Sileſia, watched all their motions, and ſpared no coſt to gain perfect intelligence of their moſt hidden deſigns. Therefore, when he ſaw that the Empreſs Queen was reſolved to avail herſelf of her alliances and her armaments, by means of the troubles between England and France, his Majeſty ordered his miniſter at Vienna, to demand a clear explication and proper aſſurances concerning the preparations then making within her dominions: and being anſwered very dryly, That ſhe was only taking meaſures for her own ſecurity, and that of her allies and friends; the King believing himſelf no longer obliged to preſerve any terms with one, that was preparing for his ruin; ſenſible of the advantage it would be to keep a ruinous war out of his own territories, and well prepared for action, he entered Saxony with a powerful army. Where we ſhall leave him, till we have taken a further view of our own affairs.

Why the King of Pruſſia had recourſe to arms.

[d] Some think that this was done in revenge for our making a ſeparate peace at Aix-la-Chapelle, and making Auſtria the victim. See p. 2.

The

A. D. 1756.

Admiral Byng's inſtructions.

The ſquadron under the command of Admiral Byng being fitting out, the lords of the admiralty [e] ſent him theſe inſtructions for his conduct. "Whereas the King's pleaſure has been ſignified to us by Mr. Fox, one of his Majeſty's principal ſecretaries of ſtate, that upon conſideration of the ſeveral advices, which have been received relating to the ſuppoſed intention of the French to attack the iſland of Minorca, a ſquadron of ten ſhips of the line do forthwith ſail for the Mediterranean, under your command: and whereas we have appointed the ſhips named in the margin [f] for this ſervice, you are hereby required and directed immediately to put to ſea with ſuch of them as are ready, (leaving orders for the reſt to follow you, as ſoon as poſſible) and proceed with the utmoſt expedition to Gibraltar.

Upon your arrival there, you are to enquire, whether any French ſquadron is come through the ſtraits; and if there is, to inform yourſelf, as well as poſſible, of their number and force; and if any of them were tranſports. And, as it is probable they may be deſtined for North America, and as his Majeſty's ſhips named in the margin [g], are either at, or going to Halifax, and are to cruiſe off Louiſbourgh, and the mouth of the

[e] March 30, 1756, ſigned Anſon, Villiers, Rowley, Boſcawen, Bateman, Edgecumbe and J. Cleland. *N. B.* The Admiral did not receive them till April the 1ſt, at 10 in the morning.

[f] See before, p. 252.

[g] Grafton, Sterling Caſtle, Fougueux, 4th, Nottingham, Lichfield, Centurion, Norwich, 6th, Succeſs, Vulture ſloop.

Gulph

A. D. 1756. Gulph of St. Lawrence, you are immediately to take the ſoldiers out of ſo many ſhips of your ſquadron as, together with the ſhips at, and going to Halifax, will make a force ſuperior to the ſaid French ſquadron, (replacing them with landmen or ordinary ſeamen from your other ſhips) and then detach them, under the command of Rear Admiral Weſt, directing him to make the beſt of his way off Louiſbourgh; and taking the afore-mentioned ſhips, which he may expect to find there, under his command, to cruiſe off the ſaid place, and the entrance of the Gulph of St. Lawrence; and uſe his utmoſt endeavours to intercept and ſeize the aforeſaid French ſhips, or any other ſhips belonging to the French that may be bound to, or returning from, that part of North America.

If upon your arrival at Gibraltar, you ſhall not gain intelligence of a French ſquadron having paſſed the Straits; you are then to go on, without a moment's loſs of time, to Minorca: Or, if, in conſequence of ſuch intelligence, you ſhall detach Rear Admiral Weſt, as before directed, you are to uſe equal expedition in repairing thither, with the ſhips, which ſhall remain with you; and if you find any attack made upon that iſland by the French, you are to uſe all poſſible means in your power for its relief. If you find no ſuch attack made; you are to proceed off Toulon, and ſtation your ſquadron in the beſt manner you ſhall be able, for preventing any ſhips getting out of that port; or for intercepting and ſeizing any, that may get out; and you are to exert the utmoſt

vigilance

vigilance therein, and in protecting Minorca and Gibraltar, from any hoſtile attempt. A. D. 1756.

You are alſo to be vigilant for protecting the trade of his Majeſty's ſubjects from being moleſted, either by the French, or by cruiſers from Morocco, or any other of the Barbary States; and for that purpoſe to appoint proper convoys and cruiſers.

You are likewiſe to be as attentive, as poſſible, to the intercepting and ſeizing, as well ſhips of war and privateers, as merchant ſhips, belonging to the French, wherever they may be met with, within the limits of your command. But in purſuance of the King's order in council, you are not to ſuffer any of the ſhips of your ſquadron to take any French veſſels out of any port belonging to the Ottoman Empire, upon any pretence; nor to moleſt, detain or impriſon, the perſons of any of the ſubjects of the Ottoman Empire; and alſo not to ſeize and detain any French ſhip or veſſel whatſoever, which they ſhall meet with in the Levant Seas, bound from one port to another in thoſe ſeas, or to, or from any ports of Egypt, having any effects of Turks on board.

Upon your arrival in the Mediterranean, you are to take under your command his Majeſty's ſhips and veſſels named in the margin[h], which are at preſent there.

If any French ſhips of war ſhould ſail from Toulon, and eſcape your ſquadron, and proceed out of the Mediterranean; you are forthwith to

[h] Princeſs Louiſa, Portland, Deptford, Cheſterfield, Dolphin, Phœnix, Experiment, Fortune ſloop.

ſend,

A. D. 1756. ſend, or repair yourſelf to England, with a proportionable part of the ſhips under your command: obſerving that you are never to keep more ſhips in the Mediterranean, than ſhall be neceſſary for executing the ſervices recommended to you.

To enable you the better to perform the abovementioned ſervices, you are to take care to keep the ſhips and veſſels under your command in conſtant good condition, and to have them cleaned as often as ſhall be requiſite for that purpoſe."

More inſtructions. By further inſtructions[i] it was ordered, that, (whereas the King had been pleaſed to direct that the royal regiment of Fuzileers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie, ſhould ſerve on board his Majeſty's ſhips in the Mediterranean, and that the ſaid regiment ſhould be landed in Minorca, in caſe the governor, or commander in chief of that iſland, ſhall think it neceſſary for its defence; and the governor of Gibraltar having orders, in caſe a further reinforcement ſhall be neceſſary at Minorca, to make a detachment equal to a battalion, from his garriſon; which detachment, the admiral, or commander in chief of his Majeſty's ſhips in the Mediterranean, is to convoy to Minorca, on board the men of war, or ſuch tranſport veſſels, as he ſhall be able to provide for that purpoſe;) he ſhould pay due obedience to his Majeſty's aforeſaid directions, by landing Lord Robert Bertie's regiment, in caſe the ſaid iſland of Minorca ſhould be

[i] Dated the 31ſt of March 1756, ſigned by Anſon, Villiers, Rowley and J. Cleland.

attacked,

attacked, and, upon conſultation with the governor, the ſame ſhould appear to be neceſſary; and not to confine himſelf to the landing that regiment only, but alſo to aſſiſt with as many gunners and men from his ſquadron, as might be ſerviceable, and the ſhips could poſſibly ſpare; and that he likewiſe ſhould pay due regard to his Majeſty's aforeſaid pleaſure, in relation to tranſporting a battalion from Gibraltar to Minorca. A. D. 1756.

Before we proceed with the expedition, it will be proper to ſpend a little attention upon theſe inſtructions, of whoſe breach, the Honourable Mr. Byng is accuſed. There is but one article in the ſet of inſtructions, ſo far as they regard the operations of the enemy, that can be accounted poſitive: which is the order that requires him to put to ſea as ſoon as poſſible, &c. For, though it is admitted in the introductory clauſe, That ſeveral advices had been received concerning the ſuppoſed intentions of the French to attack the iſland of Minorca; the next ſuppoſes, that their real deſign was, to ſlip through the Straits of Gibraltar, and direct their courſe to North America; and makes a ſuitable proviſion for ſeparating the ſquadron, and ſending off ſuch a part of it, under Rear Admiral Weſt, together with ſuch a proportionable number of the ſoldiers on board, as, added to the ſhips, he was ſuppoſed to find there, would render him ſuperior to the enemy: and all the other articles hanging in like manner upon events, were accordingly to be obſerved, or not, as circumſtances agreed, or otherwiſe. And as the Admiral's Remarks on inſtructions.

A. D. 1756. Admiral's inſtructions were, in general, founded on a perſuaſion, that the French armament at Toulon was deſtined to North America; ſo it was declared with the utmoſt confidence, by thoſe, who ought to have known better, that, for want of ſeamen, ſix or eight ſhips of the line at moſt, was the greateſt number the enemy could poſſibly put to ſea from that port.

Hence it is manifeſt, That, as there was no want of early intelligence of the nature and deſtination of the armament at Toulon, the miniſtry gave no credit to it: that inſtructions unpreciſe in their nature, being founded on miſtakes and uncertainties, accompanied with orders, yet more unpreciſe and embarraſſing, could not but be productive of perplexities and difficulties in every queſtion, they gave riſe to; conſequently of ſnares and dangers in every reſolution taken upon them: and that from the very different aſpect of things on the admiral's arrival at Gibraltar, from that, which they had been made to wear in England, a difference of conduct became abſolutely neceſſary: and thenceforward, he was either to proceed diſcretionally, or not proceed at all.—Inſtead of ſix or eight ſhips of the line, he had been informed were the moſt the enemy could ſend to ſea on the 13th of April, juſt a week after Admiral Byng ſailed from St. Helens; he now found their Toulon ſquadron to conſiſt of 12 ſhips, from 64 to 84 guns; four frigates, from 24 to 46; beſides ſloops, five bomb veſſels, &c. which had already

already got poſſeſſion of all Minorca, except Fort St. Philip. A. D. 1756.

This difference in the real ſtate, as well as in the aſpect of things, will, in ſome meaſure, account for part of that conduct, for which Admiral Byng was ſo ſeverely treated afterwards.

Admiral Byng ſails for Gibraltar.

However, thus armed and inſtructed, the Admiral ſailed for Gibraltar in his way to Minorca, on the 6th day of April: but was kept at ſea by calms and contrary winds, till the 2d day of May, on which he arrived at Gibraltar, where he received an information of the enemy's operations and ſtrength on the iſland of Minorca, and on that coaſt, very different from what he had been made to expect: and, without delay[k], iſſued his orders accordingly, on the very day of his arrival, for all the ſhips of his ſquadron to complete their proviſions and water with the utmoſt expedition. On the 3d the Admiral went a ſhore to communicate to the governor of Gibraltar his orders, relative to a battalion, to be detached from the garriſon, and to be embarked on board the ſquadron for the relief of Fort St. Philip.

Arrives at Gibraltar.

His conduct there.

General Fowke's conduct.

But General Fowke the governor of Gibraltar, having alſo received inſtructions or orders upon this head from the war office, in three ſeveral let-

[k] The firſt reſolution of the court martial unanimouſly declares, "It does not appear that any unneceſſary delay was made by Admiral Byng, in the proceedings of the ſquadron under his command, from the time of their ſailing from St. Helens, on the 6th of April, till the time of their arrival off Minorca, on the 19th of May."

ters,

A. D. 1756.

ters, which either did not appear ſo intelligible to him, as to warrant a precipitate compliance with the admiral's demand; or, perhaps, new matter had ariſen, which had not been ſo much as ſuppoſed at the time of penning them, and ſuch as was productive of difficulties hardly to be ſurmounted, he thought it his duty, in the firſt place to take the opinion of the Engineers beſt acquainted with the works of Fort St. Philip, (the principal of whom had been in ſervice there, and enjoyed his preſent poſt, on the merit of bringing home a model of that fortreſs) concerning the poſſibility of relieving the ſame. Who, the ſame day, ſigned an opinion, That all circumſtances conſidered, it would be extremely dangerous, if not impracticable, to throw ſuccours into it.

Conſults Engineers.

Their opinion.

Next day, the 4th of May, this opinion was ſubmitted to a council of war, compoſed of the governor and all the field officers of the garriſon, aſſembled to take into conſideration the ſeveral orders above-mentioned. Thoſe to Admiral Byng, have been recited at length. General Fowke produced Lord Barrington's letters to him, who in his firſt letter, dated March 21, 1756, writes, "That the King has ordered the royal regiment of Fuzileers to embark immediately for Gibraltar, and that upon their arrival, he is to make a detachment from the four regiments then in garriſon, to Minorca:" which implies, That if the detachment was to go, the regiment was to ſtay. But leaſt this ſhould not be clear enough, the next paragraph adds, "That together with the recruits for the corps

Calls a council of war.

corps in his garriſon, the ſaid regiment was to be diſembarked and quartered in the garriſon under his command: upon which ſaid diſembarkation, he, the ſaid General, in obedience to his Majeſty's further pleaſure, was to cauſe a detachment, equal to a battalion on the preſent Britiſh eſtabliſhment, to embark for Minorca." The next letter, without the leaſt reference to, or appeal of, any part of the former, repeats the order for cauſing a battalion to embark on board his Majeſty's fleet for the relief of the iſland of Minorca, in caſe there ſhould be any likelihood of its being attacked." And the third letter, dated April 1, only directs him, "to receive ſuch women and children belonging to the royal regiment of Fuzileers, as Admiral Byng ſhould think fit to land there." A. D. 1756.

As it was impoſſible to form any abſolute judgment upon theſe inconſiſtencies; they had recourſe to the Admiralty inſtructions delivered to Admiral Byng, dated March 31, for an explanation of their intention. Wherein it is not only ſignified, That the King had been pleaſed to direct, that the royal regiment of Fuzileers ſhould ſerve on board his Majeſty's ſhips in the Mediterranean, and alſo be landed at Minorca, in caſe the ſaid iſland was attacked, and upon a conſultation with General Blakeney, it ſhould be found neceſſary: but moreover that the governor of Gibraltar had orders (only thoſe above-mentioned) to make a detachment, equal to a battalion, from his garriſon, in caſe of a like neceſſity for a further reinforcement:

A. D. 1756. ment: and this detachment, together with the ſaid regiment, the Admiral was required to land in Minorca, under the reſtrictions before ſpecified; together with what other aſſiſtance of gunners and men his ſhips could poſſibly ſpare.

Their reſolutions. But after mature deliberation upon theſe letters and inſtructions, and upon the written opinion of the engineers, and the ſituation of his Majeſty's garriſons and forces in the Mediterranean, the council came to this reſolution, That the ſending ſuch a detachment, equal to a battalion, would evidently weaken the garriſon of Gibraltar, and be no ways effectual for the relief of Minorca: aſſigning for the grounds and reaſons of this reſolution, the impracticability of introducing any ſuccours into the place; the inſufficiency of the number propoſed, if thrown in, for the defence and preſervation of the iſland in its preſent condition, which they apprehended to be the meaning of the letters and orders before them; and the imprudence of weakening the garriſon of Gibraltar, unneceſſarily riſking the loſs of an additional number of his Majeſtys troops, without any reaſonable proſpect or hope of their being any aſſiſtance to Minorca: concluding with the following reaſon:—"Becauſe "the Toulon ſquadron, by the beſt accounts the "council have received, is at leaſt equal in force, "if not ſuperior to that under Admiral Byng: "and ſhould the Britiſh fleet be any way weaken-"ed by any engagement, or any other accident, "the garriſon of Gibraltar would be expoſed to "imminent danger; and as the garriſon ſtands

" at preſent, it is not more than ſufficient to the " common duty of the garriſon." A. D. 1756.

Though theſe conſiderations prevailed with the council not to come into any meaſures, which would have expoſed Gibraltar, without preſerving Fort St. Philip; they nevertheleſs diſcovered a laudable diſpoſition to do whatever could be prudently done for the good of the ſervice, which was to furniſh one captain, ſix ſubalterns, nine ſerjeants, eleven corporals, five drums and 235 private men, to ſupply the deficiency of thoſe ſoldiers, miners and ſeamen, put aſhore at Fort St. Philip by Captain Edgecumbe, and without which reinforcement his ſhips[1] could not be of any ſervice in an engagement. A ſupply granted.

Let us now revert to the conduct of Admiral Byng on this occaſion. Having now, for the firſt time, one poſitive fact to reaſon upon, namely, That Fort St. Philip was actually beſieged, by a great force completely furniſhed with all manner of neceſſaries for ſuch an undertaking, and that the ſiege was covered by a ſquadron abundantly ſtronger and better appointed, than had been conceived by thoſe, who dictated his inſtructions: His firſt concern was to conſider in what manner he might conduct himſelf for the better fulfilling his orders.—The American *if*, on which his inſtructions ſeemed to lay the greateſt ſtreſs of probability, with reſpect to the deſign of the French armament at Toulon, was now out of the Admiral Byng prepares to ſail for Minorca.

[1] The Deptford, Princeſs Louiſa, and the Fortune ſloop.

A. D. 1756. queſtion. And the *if*, referring to the French fleet's being ſtill inactive in their port, and in that caſe, directing him to ſtation his ſquadron in the beſt manner to prevent their getting out, was alſo made void: ſo that his preſent duty was confined to *uſe all poſſible means in his power*, for the relief of the place; at the ſame time to take proper care to protect Gibraltar from any hoſtile attempt; to protect the trade of his Majeſty's ſubjects in the Mediterranean, and to annoy the enemy within the limits of his command; except, &c. therefore Admiral Byng, having received on board the 267 men from Gibraltar garriſon, on the 6th, and being joined by the Experiment, the Portland and the Dolphin, and having done all in his power to ſupply the wants of his ſquadron, though not fully ſupplied with water, a deficiency entirely owing to the inſufficiency of the ſprings; he ſet ſail on the 8th of May at eight in the morning, the wind eaſterly. But it continuing variable, and often interrupted by calms, this ſquadron could not reach the height of Palma, the capital of Majorca, till the 16th, where the Phœnix had been ſhut up, almoſt three weeks by two French men of war, that cruiſed off that port, and retired immediately on ſight of the Britiſh ſquadron in the Offing. The Experiment was ſent in with a letter from the Admiral to the Engliſh conſul for intelligence, which returned with the Phœnix, Capt. Harvey, who in the courſe of this war has acquired great honour to his country by his naval conduct and perſonal courage; by whom he received advice,

Arrives off Majorca.

advice, that the Toulon fleet, under the command of M. de la Galiſſionere, conſiſting of 10 ſhips of the line, five frigates, and 180 tranſports, with 11000 land forces, had ſailed from that port on the 12th of April; and landed in Minorca, at Ciudadella on the 18th of the ſame month. The French fleet conſiſted of, A. D. 1756. Gets intelligence of the French fleet, &c.

Line of battle ſhips.

Le Foudroyant	84 guns.
La Couronne --	74
Le Guerrier —	74
Le Redoutable	74
Le Temeraire --	74
L'Hippothame	64
Le Fier ——	64
Le Triton —	64
Le Lion ——	64
Le Contant —	64
Le Sage ——	64
L'Orphée —	64

Frigates.

La Juno	46 guns.
La Roſe	30
Gracieuſe	30
La Topaze	24
La Nymph	24

The Admiral before he ſailed for Minorca, diſpatched a letter by expreſs to the lords of the admiralty; in which, though it might contain no-

A. D. 1756.

thing but truth, his zeal for the ſervice, and chagrin at the many diſappointments and delays he had met with, prompted him to expoſtulate too freely with thoſe, he knew, could have diſpatched him with more advantage and credit. He begins with a kind of accuſation againſt their dilatory orders for fitting out his ſquadron: "If, ſaid he, I had been ſo happy, as to have arrived at Mahon, before the French had landed, I flatter myſelf, I ſhould have been able to prevent their getting a footing on that iſland. He complained that there were no magazines in Gibraltar for ſupplying his ſquadron with neceſſaries; whoſe neceſſities had not been fully ſupplied at the time he was obliged to ſail from England, and had been greatly multiplied in a long and tedious voyage. In particular, he obſerved, that the careening wharfs, pits and ſtorehouſes were entirely decayed, ſo that he ſhould find the greateſt difficulty in cleaning the ſhips that were foul: and this was the caſe, not only of thoſe that here joined him from a cruiſe in the Mediterranean, under Commodore Edgecumbe; but even of ſome of thoſe carried out from Portſmouth. He then very impoliticly gave his opinion, that, if it ſhould be found practicable, it would be very impolitic to throw any men into St. Philip's caſtle; which could not, he ſaid, be ſaved without a land force ſufficient to raiſe the ſiege: and therefore, that a ſmall reinforcement would only add ſo many men to the number, which muſt fall into the hands of the enemy. He further ſaid, That it was the joint opinion of

Admiral Byng's firſt letter from Gibraltar to the lords of the Admiralty.

ſuch

uch engineers and artillerymen in Gibraltar, who had been at Minorca, that it would be impoſſible to throw any number of men into St. Philip's, if the French had erected batteries on the two ſhores near the entrance of the harbour, ſo as to bar all paſſage up to the ſally-port of the fortreſs; and concluded, that his own ſentiments were agreeable to their opinion." A. D. 1756.

This letter conſiſts of two parts: the former is a poſitive impeachment of the miniſtry, for their not ſending a fleet to the aſſiſtance of Minorca ſooner, and better provided; and for neglecting, and ſuffering the magazines and wharfs at Gibraltar, the only place for the King's ſhips to careen at, and to be ſupplied with neceſſaries, when Mahon was inveſted, run to decay and ruin.—The latter part does as good as tell them, that they had ſent him upon an impracticable ſervice, and that if it miſcarried, as in all probability it was like to do, it muſt be laid to their charge, who had not ſent a land force to raiſe the ſiege, as well as a fleet, that was inferior to the enemy's. Remarks thereon.

The gentlemen in the adminiſtration not being uſed to be rallied by their officers, and foreſeeing that Minorca muſt fall a prey to the French force upon it, and that its loſs would be attended with a general clamour againſt themſelves, ſhould they not be able to fix the blame elſewhere; it ſeems moſt probable, that from this moment, they united to throw the miſcarriage, if it ſhould ſo happen, upon Byng alone: for which purpoſe

A. D. 1756. they could collect matter enough from this letter, where he doubts of the ſucceſs of his expedition. Which they interpreted, and had it propagated, to be a certain ſign that Mr. Byng would not endeavour to relieve Fort St. Philip: and this was ſo well improved from Byng's future conduct, that they effectually transferred the blame of the loſs of Minorca from themſelves to the perſon, who had taken upon him, ſo unſeaſonably, to hint a diſapprobation of their conduct. This ſerved to amuſe the people, and made a ſacrifice of Byng; yet, the moſt ſenſible and impartial part of the nation ſaw through the artifice, and could not acquit the miniſtry of miſconduct, delays and neglect, though they could not entirely approve of the conduct of Admiral Byng, on the day of battle; for which he ſuffered death; yet his crime was no more, than *not having done all that was in his power to do* in the time of action; a crime, if deſerving of death, that involved many more, even every one, through whoſe delay, impediment, or neglect, that expedition was put off to the 6th of April, and was ſo badly fitted out.

Arrives on the coaſt of Minorca. It appears by the journals of this voyage, that the wind continued eaſterly until the 18th, at nine at night, when a fine breeze ſprung up northerly, and the ſquadron ſailed large all night, and found itſelf on the coaſt of Minorca at break of day, on the 19th. The Admiral, about five in the morning, diſpatched Captain Harvey, in the Phœnix, with the Cheſterfield and Dolphin a-head of his fleet,

to

to reconnoitre, as close as possible, the harbour's mouth, at Mahon, and the situation both of the enemy and their batteries; as also to observe whether it were practicable, and where, to throw any succours into the castle; to look out for the French squadron, and to pick up, if possible, any of their small craft, for intelligence, with proper signals for all these purposes. A. D. 1756.

Captain Harvey was also charged with the following letter to General Blakeney.

Ramillies, off Minorca, May 19.

SIR,

I Send you this by Captain Harvey, of his Majesty's ship Phœnix, who has my orders to convey it to you, if possible, together with the inclosed packet, which he received at Leghorn. —I am extremely concerned to find that Captain Edgecumbe was obliged to retire to Gibraltar, with the ships under his command, and that the French are landed, and St. Philip's Castle is invested; as I flatter myself, had I fortunately been more timely in the Mediterranean, that I should have been able to have prevented the enemy's getting a footing on the island of Minorca. His letter designed for General Blakeney.

I am to acquaint you, that General Stuart, Lord Effingham and Colonel Cornwallis, with about 30 officers, and some recruits belonging to the different regiments now in garrison with you, are on board the ships of the squadron; and shall be glad to know by the return of the officer, what place you will think proper to have them landed at.

The

A. D. 1756. The royal regiment of Engliſh fuziliers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie, is likewiſe on board the ſquadron, deſtined, agreeable to my orders, to ſerve on board the fleet in the Mediterranean, unleſs it ſhould be thought neceſſary, upon conſultation with you, to land the regiment for the defence of Minorca: But, I muſt alſo inform you, ſhould the fuziliers be landed, as they are part of the ſhips compliments, the marines having been ordered by the Lords Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, on board of other ſhips at Portſmouth, to make room for them, that it will diſable the ſquadron from acting againſt that of the enemy, which I am informed is cruiſing off the iſland: however, I ſhall gladly embrace every opportunity of promoting his Majeſty's ſervice in the moſt effectual manner, and ſhall aſſiſt you to diſtreſs the enemy, and defeat their deſigns, to the utmoſt of my power.

Pleaſe to favour me with information, how I can be moſt effectual of ſervice to you, and the garriſon; and believe me to be, &c.

Captain Harvey had orders to deliver this letter, if poſſible, to the General; and as with a view to ſome ſuch ſervice as this, a private ſignal had been agreed upon between him and Captain Scroope, of the Dolphin, who was in the caſtle, and had kept his boat, in order to come off, upon occaſion, it was expected that the letter would have been ſafely delivered.

The

The frigates above diſpatched got round the Laire of Mahon, a ſmall iſland, about half an hour before nine o'clock, and, though they met with light airs of wind, and ſometimes a ſtark calm, they continued to make the beſt of their way for the harbour's mouth. A. D. 1756.

About half an hour paſt nine the whole ſquadron got round the Laire alſo, with a freſh gale; but ſoon fell in with light airs and calms, at about three miles from St. Philip's Caſtle.

In the mean time Captain Harvey, ſtanding on for the harbour's mouth, made his private ſignals, but without the deſired ſucceſs. No return was made: no boat was ſeen to come off: and the enemy's ſquadron appearing at the ſame time in the ſouth-eaſt quarter, the Admiral thought it adviſeable to call in the Phœnix, and the other frigates; bore away for the enemy, and made the general ſignal to chaſe. What prevented its delivery. Enemy's fleet appears.

Both ſquadrons made ſail to each other, and about two in the afternoon the Admiral made the ſignal for the line of battle a-head, which for want of ſufficient wind, could not be form'd ſo properly, as otherwiſe it might have been. His next care was to furniſh ſuch of his ſhips, as were ſickly and ill-manned (which was the caſe of ſeveral) with ſeamen from the frigates [m]. He or- Byng prepares for battle.

[m] Thirty out of the Phœnix into the Revenge; and twenty into the Deptford. Forty out of the Experiment into the Captain, and twenty into the Lancaſter: and out of the Dolphin twenty into the Intrepid, twenty to the Defiance, and ſeventeen to the Portland.

dered

A. D. 1756. dered the Phœnix, which had long before been reported unfit for ſervice, and was furniſhed with proper materials for ſuch a purpoſe, to be converted into a fire-ſhip. He alſo diſpoſed his ſquadron in line of battle, as you'll find it in the note at the bottom [n], according to the order he had made on the 3d of May, while he laid in the Bay of Gibraltar.

The enemy advances. About ſix in the evening the enemy advanced in order, with twelve large ſhips and five frigates;

Tacks. but in an hour's time, at two leagues diſtance, they tacked, as it did ſeem, to gain the weather-gage; an advantage, which Mr. Byng would have committed a great error to loſe, and therefore this obliged him to tack alſo, and to ſecure the land-wind in the morning; being then about five leagues from Cape Mola, having ſtood towards the enemy [o], from the time of their firſt diſco-

[n] The line of battle,—The Kingſton to lead with the ſtar-board and the Defiance with the lar-board tacks on board.

Frigates	Rates	Ships	Commanders	Number of Guns	Number of Men	Diviſion
	4	Kingſton	Capt. Perry	60	400	
	4	Deptford	Amhurſt	50	280	
Cheſterfield	3	Culloden	Ward	74	600	
Phœnix to repeat ſignals	2	Ramillies	Hon. J. Byng, Eſq; Capt. Gardiner	90	780	Admiral of the Blue.
Fortune ſloop	3	Trident	Durell	64	500	
	4	Prſs Louiſa	Noel	60	400	
	3	Revenge	Cornwall	64	480	
Experiment	3	Intrepid	Young	64	480	
Dolphin to repeat ſignals	3	Captain	Catford	64	480	
	3	Buckingham	Temple Weſt, Eſq; Capt. Everitt	68	535	Rear-Admiral of the Red.
	3	Lancaſter	Hon. G. Edgecumbe	66	520	
	4	Portland	Capt. Baird	50	300	
	4	Defiance	Andrews	60	400	

[o] See the third and fourth Reſolutions of the court-martial.

very

very, with calms and little wind; which conduct was afterwards approved of by the court-martial [p]. A. D. 1756.

The enemy on ſhore, having got ſight of our fleet, were not negligent in contributing all in their power to encourage and ſtrengthen their fleet for engagement; and for this purpoſe they diſpatched 600 ſoldiers in two tartans to reinforce Galiſſionere, in the night. The two tartans, appearing cloſe to the rear of the Engliſh fleet, were chaſed, and one of them, with two Captains, two Lieutenants, and about 100 ſoldiers, rank and file, fell into the hands of one of our frigates, that gave them chaſe: the other eſcaped. Is reinforced from the iſland. Loſe a tartan wth ſoldiers.

The 20th, in the morning, proving hazy, the enemy's ſquadron was not to be ſeen at day-break; But ſoon after the taking of this tartan, it came in ſight, to the ſouth-eaſt; and Admiral Byng, about two o'clock, threw out a ſignal to bear away two points from the wind, and engage [q]. Thus, from the time of firſt ſeeing the French fleet in the morning of the 19th of May, till our fleet weathered the French about noon the 20th, the Admiral took proper meaſures to gain and keep Byng's ſignal to engage.

[p] Fifth reſolution of the court-martial.

[q] See twelfth and thirteenth reſolutions, where it is ſaid, That ſoon after the fleet was upon the lar-board-tack the Admiral made ſignals for leading two points to ſtar-board, which brought the wind upon or abaft the beam, and the ſhips continued that courſe nearly a-head of each other, till the Admiral made the ſignal for battle, about twenty minutes after two o'clock.

the

A. D. 1756.

the wind of the enemy, and to form and close the line of battle [r].

Admiral West's conduct in the engagement.

But Rear-Admiral West perceiving it impossible, at so great a distance as they were then from the enemy, to comply with both orders, bore away with his division seven points from the wind, and closing down upon the enemy, attacked them with such vigour, that the ships, which opposed him were presently driven out of the line [s]. This seems to have been the critical moment, that decided the fate of Minorca, and furnished matter for Byng's ruin. For, the other division not bearing down, and the enemy's centre keeping their station, Rear-Admiral West durst not pursue his advantage, least his communication with the rest of his fleet should be entirely cut off.

Errors of Admiral Byng.

What Admiral Byng was particularly blamed for, was his order for the Deptford to quit the line, before the engagement, and for all his division to fall a-back in the beginning of the action, when the Intrepid's fore-topmast was shot away [t]. For his order to the Deptford the Admiral said, it was to make the English fleet exactly equal to the enemy's, which consisted of twelve ships of the line and five frigates: as for the other point,

[r] See the eighth resolution of the court-martial.

[s] The five headmost ships of the enemy went away to leeward, out of gun-shot. Ibid. resolution fifteenth.

[t] A little before three o'clock. Ibid. resolution sixteenth.

though

though it ſhewed a good deal of care of his Majeſty's ſhips, to prevent their running foul or damaging one another, it was ill-timed, and gave the cenſorious world too much ground to queſtion his courage, and to caſt the whole blame of the miſcarriage of this day upon him alone; and an opportunity for Galiſſionere to retreat with his fleet, and repair his damage; and as his ſhips were clean, they were ſoon out of reach of our ſhips, which gave them chaſe, being very foul and unfit for the purſuit of a nimble enemy. A. D. 1756.

In this action it appeared, by the reſolutions of the court-martial, That the van-diviſion bore down properly for the ſhips oppoſed to them in the enemy's line, and diſabled five of them: that the Intrepid, the ſternmoſt ſhip of our van-diviſion, after an engagement of about a quarter of an hour, loſt her fore-topmaſt a little before three o'clock: that the Revenge, the headmoſt ſhip of the rear-diviſion bore down, after the ſhips of the van bore down, for the ſhip oppoſed to her in the enemy's line, and that ſhe brought up upon the weather-quarter of the Intrepid, upon the Intrepid's fore-topmaſt going away; and that ſhe quickly afterwards, upon the Intrepid's ſetting her fore-ſail, bore down under the Intrepid's lee-quarter and brought up there: and that upon the ſignal being made for battle, and the van putting before the wind, the Admiral in the Ramillies edged away ſome points; and the Trident and Princeſs

The court-martial's reſolutions concerning this action.

A. D. 1756. Princeſs Louiſa thereby coming to windward of him, the Admiral thereupon hauled up his fore-ſail, backed his mizentop-ſail, and endeavoured to back his maintop-ſail, to allow of their getting into their ſtations, and continued in that ſituation for five, ſix or ſeven minutes. Upon which that court gave it as their opinion, That the Admiral, after the ſignal was made for battle, ſeparated the rear from the van-diviſion, and retarded the rear-diviſion of the Britiſh fleet from cloſing with and engaging the enemy, by his ſhortning ſail, by hauling up his fore-ſail, backing his mizentop-ſail, and backing or attempting to back his maintop-ſail, in order that the Trident and Princeſs Louiſa might get a-head again of the Ramillies: And further, that inſtead of ſhortning ſail the Admiral ought to have made the Trident and Princeſs Louiſa's ſignals to make more ſail; and that he ought alſo to have ſet ſo much ſail himſelf, as would have enabled the Culloden, the worſt ſailing ſhip in his diviſion, to have kept her ſtation, with all her plain-ſail ſet, in order to have got down, with as much expedition as poſſible, to the enemy, and thereby have properly ſupported the van-diviſion [u].

Galiſſionere's conduct cenſured.

Having loſt ſight, and all hopes of ſeeing the French again under M. Galiſſionere, whoſe behaviour on this occaſion ſeems more unpardonable than Admiral Byng's; his ſhips being clean, bet-

[u] See fifteenth to twentieth reſolution of the court-martial.

ter

ter manned, carrying a greater weight of metal [w], and encouraged by a place of retreat, in caſe of a defeat; the want of which was certainly a grand conſideration with an Admiral, who had no other relief in caſe of a misfortune, than to return to Gibraltar, where there were neither ſtores, conveniencies, nor yet proviſions to ſupply the wants of ſuch a ſquadron, if diſabled from keeping the ſea; Admiral Byng brought to about eight o'clock at night, to join the Intrepid, diſabled and left to

A. D. 1756.

Admiral Byng's conduct after the engagement.

[w] The Hon. Admiral Byng's ſquadron, when he engaged M. De la Galiſſionere's off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names	Guns	Wt of metal on the low dec.	mid dec.	upp dec.	men.
		lb.	lb.	lb.	
Ramillies	90	32	18	12	780
Culloden	74	32		18	600
Buckingham	68	32		18	535
Lancaſter	66	32		18	520
Trident	64	24		12	500
Intrepid	64	32		18	480
Captain	64	24		12	480
Revenge	64	24		12	480
Kingſton	60	24		9	400
Defiance	60	24		12	400
Prſs Louiſa	56	24		12	400
Portland	48	24		12	300
	778				5875
Frigates					
Deptford	48				280
Cheſterfield	40				250
Phœnix	22				160
Dolphin	22				160
Experiment	22				160
Total	932				6885

M. De la Galiſſionere's ſquadron, when he landed the troops at Minorca 18 April, and at the engagement with Admiral Byng's ſquadron off Cape Mola, 20 May, 1756.

Ships Names.	Guns	wt. of mt. on the low dec.	upp dec.	Number of Sea-men.	Sol-diers.	Total men on board each ſhip.
		lb.	lb.			
Foudroyant	84	52	24	700	250	950
La Couronne	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Guerrier	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Temeraire	74	42	24	650	150	800
Le Redoutable	74	42	24	650	100	600
l'Hipopothame	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Fier	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Triton	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Lion	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Content	64	36	24	500	100	600
Le Sage	64	36	24	500	100	600
L'Orphée	64	36	24	500	100	600
	828			6800	1550	8350
Frigates						
La Juno	46			300		300
La Roze	30			250		250
Gracieuſe	30			250		250
La Topez	24			520		250
La Nymphe	24			200		200
Total	982			8050	1550	9600

A. D. 1756. the care of the Chesterfield, and to refit his ships, as fast as possible, and continued so all night. But next morning the enemy was quite gone, and Mahon was north-north-west about ten or eleven leagues. He then sent cruizers in quest of the Intrepid and Chesterfield, which had parted from the rest of the squadron in the night; and joined him next day; and having, from a state and condition of the squadron, brought him in by the proper officers, found that the Captain, the Intrepid and the Defiance, (which latter had lost her Captain) were very much damaged in their masts, the Admiral thought it proper, on the 24th, to call a council of war on board the Ramillies, before he went again to look for the enemy.

A council of war. This council, besides the proper naval officers [x], who by right are consulted upon such occasions, consisted also of several land officers, by the Admirals particular request. For he desired General Stuart, Lord Effingham, Lord Robert Bertie and Colonel Cornwallis to attend, that he might collect their opinions, upon the present situation, and concerning the future operations of the fleet under his command. And the questions debated, and the resolutions in this council were, as follow:

Questions debated. I. Whether an attack upon the French fleet gives any prospect of relieving Minorca. *Ans.* It would not.

II. Whether, if there was no French fleet cruising off Minorca, the English fleet could raise the siege. *Ans.* It could not.

[x] The Admirals and Captains of all the ships.

III. Whe-

III. Whether Gibraltar would not be in danger by any accident that may befal this fleet? *Anſ.* It would be in danger. A. D. 1756.

IV. Whether an attack with our fleet, in the preſent ſtate of it, upon that of the French, will not endanger the ſafety of Gibraltar, and expoſe the trade of the Mediterranean to great hazard. *Anſ.* That it would.

V. Whether it is not moſt for his Majeſty's ſervice that the fleet ſhould immediately proceed for Gibraltar. *Anſ.* That it ſhould proceed for Gibraltar.

At this council, ſays the Admiral, in his letter to Mr. Cleland, Secretary to the Admiralty, dated on board the Ramillies off Minorca, May the 25th, 1756, not the leaſt contention or doubt aroſe. In the ſame letter he informed the Lords of the Admiralty, that he was making the beſt of his way to Gibraltar.

In this action the killed and wounded on our ſide were, Loſs in this action.

On board the Buckingham, wounded 7	killed 3	
Captain —— 30	—— 6	
Lancaſter —— 14	—— 1	
Intrepid —— 39	—— 9	
PrinceſsLouiſa —— 13	—— 3	
Defiance —— 45	—— 14	
Portland —— 20	—— 6	
Total 168	42	

A. D. 1756.

The only perſon of diſtinction amongſt the ſlain was Captain Andrews of the Defiance, whoſe ſhip the Admiral gave to Captain Harvey.

The killed and wounded on the ſide of the French were, on board the

	wounded	killed
Foudroyant	10	2
Le Redoutable	3	
La Couronne	3	
Le Tameraire	15	
Le Guerrier	43	
Le Lion	7	2
Le Sage	8	
L'Orphée	9	10
Le Content	19	5
Le Triton	14	5
L'Hipopothame	10	2
Le Fier	4	
Total	145	26

Minorca being thus given up by our fleet upon the coaſt, let us turn our attention to what was doing upon the iſland.

The French invade Minorca.

The Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, who commanded in chief by land, on this expedition, and Count Galiſſionere, who commanded the fleet, attended by the principal officers of the army, had entered the city of Ciudadella without oppoſition. The Engliſh garriſon, not able to diſpute the diſembarkation of the troops, retired: and the magiſtracy received the French officers with great ceremony

remony at their entrance;—the Marſhal telling them, That he was not come to attack them: but that he was ſent thither for no other reaſon than to obtain ſatisfaction for the inſults and injuries done the King his maſter by the Engliſh. He promiſed them his protection, and aſſured them that he would take particular care of the behaviour of his troops, ſo that they ſhould commit no ſort of violence, and pay for what they ſhould buy. But he added: "beware of carrying on any correſpondence with the enemy; for, "if you do, you ſhall be treated with the utmoſt "ſeverity." A. D. 1756. Duke de Richelieu's ſpeech.

This was upon the 18th of April; and on the 19th the Marſhal took poſſeſſion of a ſmall fort, abandoned alſo by the Engliſh, which ſerved to cover Fornelles, a ſmall port, ſituate on the eaſt ſide of the iſland, at the point of a bay near a cape of the ſame name.

On the 20th, the Marquis du Meſnil and the Marquis de Monteynard, two Lieutenant-Generals, were detached from the army with twenty-four companies of grenadiers and a royal brigade, to encamp at Mercadel, from whence they were to advance towards Mahon, in order to block up that port on the eaſtern ſide of the bay, whilſt the main body of the army inveſted Fort St. Philip, and the French fleet under Galiſſionere blocked up the entrance of the bay of Port Mahon, with orders to give Admiral Byng's ſquadron battle, in caſe it ſhould attempt to relieve the fort. March forward to Mahon. Supported by a fleet.

A. D. 1756.

Condition of Fort St. Philip.

We have already ſeen that many of the principal officers were abſent from Fort St. Philip: for, though they had been ſent on board Admiral Byng's fleet, they were not landed. The garriſon alſo was thought to be too weak for a long and vigorous defence of a fortreſs ſurrounded with ſuch numerous works, againſt an army, ſo eaſily ſupplied and recruited from the ſouth of France: for which reaſon a reinforcement had been ordered from Gibraltar, but without its proper effect. For, the ſiege was begun ſome weeks before our fleet appeared upon the coaſt; and it returned to Gibraltar, with the troops on board, deſigned to reinforce the garriſon of Fort St. Philip.

Governor Blakeney cenſured.


Yet Governor Blakeney has been greatly blamed for his conduct. It has been ſaid, that he neglected his poſt, by ſhutting himſelf up in his own houſe during the whole ſiege, regardleſs of the command entruſted to his care: that he ought to have broke up the roads from Cuidadella and Fornelles, and pulled down the houſes in St. Philips's town: that he ought alſo to have compelled the natives to go into the caſtle to eaſe the ſoldiers, by doing the labour of the garriſon: and that the fortreſs was not, in the whole, properly defended; and at laſt, given up without neceſſity [y].

This is the ſubſtance of the charge; which, after the Governor's return to England, was an-

[y] See a letter to the Right Hon. Lord B——y, being an enquiry into his defence of Minorca.

ſwered





LORD BLAKENEY.

swered [z] minutely by a principal officer, with the concurrence of the other officers under his command during the siege. In which answer the public are informed, That, as there was not one Colonel to take the chief command, in case of an accident; nor an officer between him and a Lieutenant-Colonel; and that there were forty-one Captains and Subaltern-officers belonging to the four regiments in garrison, absent, the Governor thought it most adviseable, and best for the service, to appoint one fixt place or station for him to receive intelligence from the officers commanded to go the rounds, or from any others, as circumstances and the exigencies of the service might require; laying it down as a maxim, That it should always be known, during a siege, where to find the Commander in Chief; and that the Governor of a fortification, who, out of vain curiosity, when the immediate service does not require his presence, goes to view the out-works, or hazards his life, when there is no need of his attendance, is guilty of great imprudence. He kept two Lieutenant-Colonels, and the Aid-de-Camp to one of them constantly going the rounds: for which they were excused all other duty; that they might have no excuse for remissness in this. Besides, the Fort-Major and Fort-Adjutant attended the Governor as often as they could be spared: the Captains, at every post, had orders

A. D. 1756.

Defended in his conduct.

[z] See a full answer to an infamous libel, &c. Printed for W. Reeve, 1757.

A. D. 1756. to inform the Governor, by a Subaltern-officer, or a ſerjeant, immediately, of every proceeding or accident that might happen under their reſpective commands: A report was made every morning to him, by the Field-officer of the day, of the particular incidents within the twenty-four hours of duty: with an account of the ſhot and ſhells fired during that time, deſcribing their particular directions: and his own Aid-de-Camp was always ready to carry his orders when and where-ever required.

The circumference of the works being about a mile, wholly inveſted by ſea and land, and the approaches carried on every where, it might have been a fatal conſequence, had the Governor, through a vain curioſity or imprudent bravery, gone to view one part of the fortifications, while another remote part of it had been attacked; or had he thereby loſt his life. Therefore, it was thought moſt prudent, under theſe circumſtances, to fix upon the caſtle for his ſtation to receive intelligence, and to give his directions and orders. Not that the caſtle could be ſuppoſed exempt from danger: on the contrary, the Governor was here much expoſed to the fire of the enemy's cannon and mortars; who in a particular manner were obſerved to level their ſhot and ſhells at the body of the caſtle and the Governor's houſe: But, it was from the top thereof, as from the centre of the fortreſs, he could beſt and almoſt inſtantaneouſly view all the works and poſts under his command,

and

and the operations, batteries, movements and approaches of the beſiegers. A. D. 1756.

During the whole ſiege of ſeventy days, the Governor never went into a bed nor undreſſed himſelf. Every one had acceſs to him at all hours, night and day: and in the day-time he exerciſed the ſerjeants and ſoldiers himſelf, on the public parade, in the manner of defence upon any attack of the fortifications, or ſubterraneans; until it became dangerous for the men, from the enemy's ſhot and ſhells; and after that he continued their exerciſe in his own apartments, when time would permit. Thereby diſcharging the duty of a good Governor, with an attention and application ſeldom to be met with in a man of eighty-two years of age.

When a place on the Continent is threatened with a ſiege; the advance of armies, and the neceſſary preparations to carry the deſign into execution cannot be ſecreted: they ſoon grow notorious, and furniſh the Governor with time to break up roads, and to remove all buildings that may either obſtruct the execution of his own batteries, or favour the approaches of the enemy. But in this caſe all the intelligence, that could be obtained by the Governor, ſhut up in an iſland, was, that great preparations were making in the ſouth of France, which ſometimes were ſaid to be intended againſt Gibraltar, or Minorca, and ſometimes againſt Corſica, or againſt our plantations in North America, or to join the Breſt ſquadron in the invaſion of Great Britain or Ireland.

In

A. D. 1756. In which uncertainty, having no advice, nor orders for his conduct from England, he would have acted very improperly to brake up roads and to remove buildings before the enemy's motions ſhould put their intentions out of all doubt to be levelled againſt his government; and then Governor Blakeney did all that was in the power of one in his circumſtances, to do. For, as ſoon as it was certain [a] that the French were making good their landing at Ciudadella, the Governor, with the advice of the chief engineer, pulled down the engineer's own houſe, which was a fine modern building, and four windmills; theſe being the only erections, ſuppoſed to be of ſervice to the enemy, during a ſiege; there being ſuch an eſplanade between the village and the fortifications, that the houſes in St. Philip's town could do no harm to the beſieged, but, on the contrary, they did great miſchief to the French, when beat about their ears by the cannon-balls and ſhells from the caſtle. As to the roads; the difficulty both in regard to time, and to the nature of the ground, might be admitted in excuſe. The French landed on the 17th, and meeting with no oppoſition from a land force [b], that was obliged to ſhut themſelves up

[a] General Blakeney had no certainty of this intended invaſion of Minorca, till two days before they landed, which advice he received by a packet-boat diſpatched on purpoſe. From which time he made the beſt preparations he could for the defence of the caſtle.

[b]. There was a ſmall redoubt, with one company, at Forneles, and a poſt with five companies at Ciudadella, which the

up in the fort, they took poſſeſſion of Mahon on the 19th of the ſame month. Which was a ſpace of time too ſhort for removing the buildings of St. Philips town, had it been neceſſary; or to break up the roads effectually, had they been ever ſo eaſy to dig up. But, the ſurface of the whole iſland of Minorca is ſuch a hard rock, that the French could not ſink entrenchments for about a mile round the fort, with the labour of their whole army: How then was it poſſible for Governor Blakeney to break up the roads for thirty miles with his ſmall number of men in three days, and when they had other work and duty upon their hands, which could not be left undone. Yet, even under theſe difficulties, the Governor gave a ſample of his attention to this part of duty. He did order [c] the bridges to be broken down, and the roads to be broken up: and they were actually ſpoiled, as much as the ſhortneſs of the time, and the few men, that could be ſpared, were able to execute his orders. In which, or any other labour or ſervice, the Governor could depend upon no aſſiſtance from the iſlanders. The Spaniards, upon this occaſion, refuſed to join in any act againſt the French. The more ſenſible part of them would frequently acknowledge, that their condition was greatly bettered, ſince the Engliſh had poſſeſſion of the iſland; and that their govern-

A. D. 1756.

the Governor recalled, as he did all his advanced parties, as ſoon as the enemy began to diſembark.

[c] Major Cunningham was charged with this part of the ſervice.

ment

A. D. 1756. ment was mild and good: but ſuch was the influence of the prieſts, over the lower claſs eſpecially, by repreſenting the Engliſh to be enemies to their religion, and in a ſtate of damnation, or devils upon earth; that it got the better of all other conſiderations, and kept up their averſion to us, even to the laſt. For, though the Governor iſſued out a proclamation, with a promiſe of pay and other encouragements, to as many as would voluntarily enter the fort, only thirteen gentlemen gave in their names; only three of them entered the caſtle with the Governor; and one of them deſerted afterwards. And of twenty-five bakers and artificers, whom the Governor hired, at a high price, to ſerve in the caſtle, and gratified with a prieſt at the public expence, for their ſpiritual duties; ſuch was the diſaffection, that five or ſix of them deſerted over the palliſadoes; neither could the reſt have been reſtrained without a proper guard always to watch them.

All that the Governor could do was actually performed with great diligence and circumſpection. He deſtroyed all the wine in the cellars of St. Philip's town, to prevent any miſcarriage in his own men by drunkenneſs; and he carried the butts into the caſtle to ſerve for gabions and traverſes. He drove all the cattle he could meet with into the fort, for the benefit of the garriſon, and made ſuch a proviſion of wine, that there was no want of theſe neceſſaries at the time of their capitulation. He, not in a condition to give the invaders battle, walled up his ports; he aſſigned every

every party their poſts; placed centinels; and ordered every other precaution becoming the beſt commander in his circumſtances. A. D. 1756.

At this time Commodore Edgecumbe laid at anchor cloſe under the walls of St. Philip's Caſtle, with ſeveral rich merchant ſhips; which muſt have all followed the fate of the fortreſs, had the French fleet, as it might, have blocked them up in the harbour of Mahon. But, they were permitted to eſcape; upon a ſuppoſition, that their crews would be too conſiderable a reinforcement to the garriſon, whoſe weakneſs the French Marſhal was perfectly acquainted with. However, when Edgcumbe ſailed with his ſquadron, he left behind him all his marines, a detachment from Gibraltar, the whole crew of the Porcupine ſloop, and the greater part of the Dolphin's, as a reinforcement to the fort, under the immediate direction and command of Captain Scroop of the Dolphin, who voluntarily offered himſelf for that ſervice, and ſignalized himſelf for his conduct and bravery during the ſiege.

As ſoon as this little ſquadron had ſailed for Gibraltar, the Governor ſunk a ſloop in the channel leading to the harbour. But the French fleet never attempted to approach the fort.

On the 22d of April Governor Blakeney ſent a letter by a drum to Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, demanding the reaſons for ſuch a hoſtile invaſion of that iſland; to which he received for anſwer, That he was come with intention to reduce the iſland under the dominion of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty,

A. D. 1756. Majeſty, by way of retaliation for the conduct of the King of England, who had ſeized and detained ſhips belonging to the King of France and his ſubjects.

It was conjectured by the French Commander in Chief, that he ſhould have very little trouble in the reduction of a fortreſs, which, to all appearance, was not provided with ſufficient ſtrength to hold out a regular ſiege: and therefore he himſelf did not come ſo well provided with engineers, as the ſervice afterwards did require; and, as if the bare ſight of his army had been enough to ſtrike terror into the handful of men immured by their Governor in Fort St. Philip, he erected his batteries at Cape Mola, at ſuch a diſtance, on the other ſide of the harbour, that they could do no execution, and at the ſame time were moſt expoſed to the fire of the caſtle; which was ſo well ſerved, and ſo continual on this quarter, that it ſoon convinced the enemy of the vanity of their ſanguine hopes of an eaſy conqueſt, and of the neceſſity of changing their plan of attack, and to make their approaches on the ſide of St. Philip's town. Where, on the 12th of May, and near the ſite, from whence the Governor had removed the wind-mills, they, about nine at night, opened two bomb batteries, with great fury. The fire was inceſſantly kept up on both ſides, from mortars and cannon; and the French raiſed new batteries continually, where they diſcovered the leaſt advantage againſt the fortreſs,

In

In this precarious ſituation Governor Blakeney took the direction of the whole defence upon himſelf. His order in writing was, "That no "officer, of what rank ſoever he might be, ſhould "direct a meaſure of any conſequence to be taken, "without being firſt communicated to him for "his approbation." Which was punctually obſerved. A. D. 1756.

As the works were extenſive, the beſiegers much too numerous to be oppoſed by open force, and the garriſon not half the number requiſite for the defence of the fort, the Governor could make no ſallies; and was confined to ſuch operations, as would annoy the enemy from his batteries, and to ſave his people for the defence of the place, in the laſt extremity. Thus he made as much uſe as he could of the ſubterraneans to ſhelter his men: he ordered the guards to parade in them, and to march to and from the ſeveral poſts aſſigned them, under their covers by the communications: and that part of the garriſon, not upon duty, was ordered to continue always under thoſe covers. By which prudent diſpoſition the garriſon was ſaved, and the poſts conſtantly ſupplied; and it was in a great meaſure owing to the obedience both of officers and men under this wiſe diſpoſition, that five thouſand of the enemy were cut off, with a ſmall loſs on our ſide.

Having ſeen that all diſpoſitions were made for defence, that providence could ſuggeſt, or the nature of the place could admit of;—let us add,

A. D. 1756. That the Governor, upwards of a year before the ſiege, had ordered a ſurvey to be taken of the ordnance and of the ſtores; found forty cannon and upwards defective, and had them replaced by the Board of Ordnance. He alſo had the ſhot and ſhells carefully ſurveyed and gaged; and finding the fuzees in ſtore unſerviceable by length of time, he ordered an equal number of empty ones to be drove; and by ordering a number of ſoldiers to be diſciplined in the management of the artillery, many of them became expert gunners, and did good ſervice in the defence of the place. —All which were proper attentions of a good Governor.—In the time of the ſiege councils of war were frequent, and the engineers always attended. The batteries of cannon and mortars were well ſerved, and did great execution: but he had no miners, except ſix or ſeven coal-heavers, or ſuch like men, picked out amongſt the regiments.

On the 19th day of the month the brave garriſon exulted with joy at the ſight of Admiral Byng's ſquadron; and Mr. Boyd, Commiſſary of ſtores, ventured in an open boat with ſix oars, down a creek called St. Steven's Cove, on the weſt ſide of the caſtle, through a ſhower of muſket and cannon-balls, from the enemy's poſt on the other ſide, to join the Britiſh ſquadron, and to inform the Admiral of the condition of the garriſon. This boat actually reached the open ſea, but was obliged to put back by the ſame way he came out, not being able to reach the fleet, which

was

was too far diſtant, and then ſtretching to the ſouthward, and alſo chaſed by two light veſſels from the enemy. But no tongue can expreſs the ſurprize they met with next day, when the French fleet returned to their ſtation, off Cape Mola; no Engliſh ſquadron was to be ſeen, and a general diſcharge or feu-de-joye, in the French camp, confirmed the report of a deſerter, that Admiral Byng's fleet had been worſted, and obliged to retire by the French ſquadron under M. de la Galiſſionere. A. D. 1756.

How far Galiſſionere could pride himſelf, or the French were intitled to the claim, of a victory over the Engliſh fleet, by the action on the 20th of May, is beyond all conception: for, it is notorious, that Galiſſionere ran away from Admiral Byng. The misfortune on our ſide was the permitting the French fleet to retreat, without a general engagement, and to flee without being purſued, and to reſume their ſtation to block up Mahon by ſea, without being moleſted. All which circumſtances, duly conſidered, anſwered the purpoſes of the greateſt victory to the enemy: becauſe the ſea was ſhut to the beſieged, and open for every neceſſary purpoſe to the beſiegers.

Theſe were, no doubt, ſevere trials: but the garriſon, in no wiſe degenerated from their courage: though they found themſelves abandoned by the Engliſh fleet, they reſolved to exert their utmoſt in their own defence, and for the glory of their country; not without hopes, that the fleet might be reinforced, and return with ſufficient

7

A. D. 1756. ſtrength to their relief. With ſuch ſpirits they ſuſtained and returned the enemy's fire without ceaſing, always ready to maintain the poſt of honour, and to ſeek for a ſtation where they could do moſt execution. Neither did their vigour abate, but rather increaſed with their labour and danger; when their embraſſures and parapets were demoliſhed, and they ſtood expoſed to every ball and ſhell from the enemy, encompaſſing them on every ſide; who at laſt were augmented, by reinforcements, to twenty thouſand men, and were inceſſantly carrying on their approaches with ſixty-two battering cannon, twenty-one mortars, and four howitzers, beſides ſmall arms.

There was no reſiſting ſuch a formidable army, without further aid. And a well appointed fleet was the only effectual means to ſnatch the prey out of the enemy's hands: which, as it was in our power to ſend, might be expected in a very ſhort time: And the French Marſhal having intelligence, that the court of Great Britain had diſpatched a ſtrong addition of one eighty gun ſhip, three of ſixty-four and one of fifty guns to join the ſquadron under Admiral Byng: as he could not but foreſee his own diſgrace in the conſequences of a defeat of his fleet, which would infallibly lock his army up in an iſland where he could not find ſupport of any kind, and oblige him to ſurrender priſoners of war: and the prolongation of the ſiege being ſo far beyond the time, his court was taught to expect a ſurrender of Fort St. Philip's; that his enemies about the King had

made uſe of it to leſſen his abilities in their royal maſter's eſteem, and were upon the point of getting him recalled: therefore M. Duke de Richelieu puſhed matters with the utmoſt vigour; and having made a practicable breach in one of the ravelins, and conſiderably damaged the other outworks on the 27th day of June, it was reſolved to try the effects of a general aſſault, in that very night. A. D. 1756.

The garriſon was reduced to two thouſand five hundred men at the time the general attack was made: on the contrary, the enemy's army, which had been continually reinforced by a regiment of artillery and ſupplies of troops, ammunition, &c. was ſtronger than at the beginning of the ſiege. State of the garriſon at the general attack.

On the evening of the 26th the Duke de Richlieu called a council of war, at which were preſent all the general officers, to whom he imparted the whole project, and received their approbation. He then proceeded to ſettle their reſpective charges for the execution of the plan; and took his own poſt in the centre of the attacks on the left, with orders for the Count de Maillebois, the Marquis de Miſnil, and the Prince of Wirtemburg to attend him, to give the neceſſary directions for the ſupport and ſucceſs of the attacks. It was likewiſe agreed, That the ſignal, for the beginning of the attack, ſhould be given by firing a cannon and four bombs, from the battery near the ſignal houſe. The plan for the attack.

Things being thus diſpoſed, the artillery continued to batter the forts till the 27th at ten o'clock in the evening, when they all on a ſudden ceaſed The ſignal.

A. D. 1756. ceaſed firing. Immediately the ſignal of a cannon ſhot and four bombs thrown into the caſtle, was given, according to orders; and M. de Monty marched againſt Strugen and Argyle, and Meſſrs. de Briqueville and de Sades, advanced ſucceſſively againſt Kane and the Queen's redoubt. The men of wars boats, with troops and ſcaling ladders, went up St. Stephen's Cove, at the ſame time, and attempted to carry Charles's Fort, but were bravely repulſed.

The ſtorm. The beſiegers behaved like heroes, diſputing the ground inch by inch; but after much execution, by the fire on both ſides, the Strugen or Anſtruther Redoubt was taken by aſſault, and the Argyle and Queen's Redoubt by eſcalade.—The Argyle was blown up: and three mines were ſprung under the Queen's redoubt, the glacis of the Anſtruther and Kane's Lunette, with ſuch execution, that they blew three companies of French grenadiers into the air. But the loſs on this occaſion to the garriſon was much more fatal. For, Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffries, of Lord Effingham's regiment, the ſecond in command, and, indeed the principal acting man in the fort, was taken priſoner, between the Strugen and Argyle, as he was hurrying with a hundred men to their relief. When he found the French in poſſeſſion of the redoubt, he endeavoured to retreat: but was ſurrounded and obliged to ſurrender, with fifteen of his men. Here alſo Major Cunningham, who was in his company, though he had the good fortune to preſerve his liberty, was ſo diſabled by a wound through

through his right hand with a bayonet, and by having his arm ſhattered with a muſket ball, that he was no longer able to continue on duty. A. D. 1756.

Theſe three redoubts being taken, and the enemy in poſſeſſion of the cannon and mortars found in them, made a lodgment inſtantly in that part, which was the principal attack, and carried on the other attacks with vigour. At the ſame time, the Prince de Beauveau, to whoſe charge was committed the attack againſt the weſtern and Caroline lunettes, got poſſeſſion of the covert way; but, as Kane's lunette was not taken, he was obliged to retreat, having nailed up twelve pieces of cannon, cut down the palliſadoes, deſtroyed the gun carriages, and maintained this as long as he could, in order to favour the principal attack. A lodgement made.

The impracticability of maintaining a fortreſs of ſuch an extent, by ſuch a thin garriſon, againſt all theſe firings, and the combination of all theſe various attacks, ſo animated the French Commander, that he made ſure of ſucceſs on the left; and by break of day, his men being totally maſters of the Queen's redoubt and the forts Strugen and Argyle, they poſted 400 in the former and 200 in the latter: M. Richelieu and his noble attendants, above-mentioned, continuing all the time, as had been concerted, in the center of the attacks on the left.

The brave Governor and garriſon defended themſelves with all the intrepidity that is natural to Engliſhmen in time of danger. But none diſtinguiſhed themſelves more than thoſe in the Bravery of the beſieged.

A. D. 1756.

weſtern and Caroline Lunettes, where each officer and ſoldier, emulous of glory, maintained their ground with exalted courage and exerted bravery, under the greateſt fatigue, againſt a vaſt ſuperior number of the enemy.

A parley, and its bad effects.

At day break on the 28th, the beſiegers, famous for ſtratagem, to accompliſh what they can't perfect by force, beat a parley, and obtained a ceſſation of arms under colour of burying their dead, which indeed laid in heaps about the places of action. But the principal view of the enemy was, to ſnatch an opportunity to ſecure the lodgments they had made, by introducing into them a conſiderable number of troops, through a ſubterranean paſſage, which had been opened by a ſhell, and not diſcovered by the beſieged, till the day cleared up; and then it was too late to diſpute its poſſeſſion with the enemy.

When this was diſcovered, and it was known that, by this paſſage under the Kane, the enemy might proceed to all the other communications of the ſubterraneans communicating with all the out works, which the garriſon was not in a condition, for numbers, to defend; the governor, during the

A council of war in the caſtle.

ceſſation of arms, held a council of war; who having duly conſidered the circumſtances of the garriſon, and of the meaſures propereſt to be taken, the majority declared for a capitulation. Then the governor conſulted the officers of artillery: who all declared, that the works were in a

Bad ſtate of the garriſon.

ſhattered, ruinous condition, and irreparable in the preſent ſtate of the garriſon. He alſo ſent for all

the

the captains not upon duty; who all agreed, that the garriſon was not in a condition to ſuſtain another general attack: that the body of the caſtle was greatly ſhattered: the embraſſures were beat down: that the palliſadoes were in many places broken to pieces; that the garriſon was worn out with inceſſant duty and watchings; and that the enemy, being in poſſeſſion of the ſubterraneans, which communicate themſelves under all the caſtle, the governor muſt be obliged to defend theſe alſo, ſhould he ſtand another ſtorm, or leave the body of the place expoſed to the enemy, without reſiſtance: for which there was not a ſufficient force under his command. A. D. 1756.

Theſe conſiderations and the want of intelligence, after the diſappearance of the Engliſh ſquadron under Admiral Byng, prevailed on the governor to propoſe terms of capitulation, in order to preſerve the remains of his brave garriſon, and the lives of a conſiderable number of his Majeſty's ſubjects, that were in the fort; and which, without diſtinction, might have been thrown away in caſe of a general ſtorm: and it was happy for them that he did capitulate; for the enemy, the very next day after the capitulation, landed 4000 men more with ammunition at Ciudadella. Surrenders by capitulation.

Yet this meaſure has not eſcaped cenſure: there was an oppoſition even in the council of war. For, ſome officers argued that, as the garriſon was very little [d] diminiſhed, was ſtill in high ſpirits, Objections.

[d] The loſs of the Engliſh amounted to no more than three officers killed, five wounded, and 71 private men killed, and

A. D. 1756.

rits, and in want of nothing: that, as there was no breach made by the enemy in the body of the caſtle, nor a ſingle cannon erected to batter in breach: that, as the loſs of an outwork was never deemed a ſufficient reaſon for ſurrendering a fortreſs of ſuch a ſtrength and importance: that, as the counterſcarp was ſo well ſecured by its rocky foundation, as not to be taken, otherwiſe than by aſſault, which would coſt the enemy more men, than in their laſt attempt: that, as the counterſcarp muſt be taken before the enemy could attack the ditch, or batter in breach, and they muſt have recourſe to galleries, before they could paſs the foſſe, which was furniſhed with mines and counter-mines: and that, as they might hope for relief from the Engliſh fleet when properly reinforced, they could not ſee the neceſſity of capitulating; eſpecially, as they held it to be the duty of a governor to defend his caſtle to the laſt extremity, without paying any regard to conſequences.

The capitulation [e] did great honour to Governor Blakeney; Marſhal Richlieu declaring, in his anſwer

326 wounded (25 of which died of their wounds) 10 died of diſeaſes, and 17 were miſſing.

[e] *Articles of capitulation propoſed by Lieutenant General Blakeney, for his Britannic Majeſty's garriſon of the caſtle of St. Philips's, in the iſland of Minorca.*

Article I.

THAT all acts of hoſtility ſhall ceaſe, until the articles of capitulation are agreed upon and ſigned.

Richlieu] I.

Granted.

II.

swer to the second article, that he had been induced by the brave defence made by the governor and garrison, A. D. 1756.

II.

That all the honours of war shall be granted the garrison on their surrender, such as, to march out with their firelocks on their shoulders, drums beating, colours flying, 24 charges for each man, match lighted, four pieces of cannon, and two mortars, with 20 charges for each piece, a covered waggon for the governor, and four others for the garrison, which shall not be searched on any pretence.

Richlieu] II.

The noble and vigorous defence which the English have made, having deserved all the marks of esteem and veneration, that every military person ought to shew to such actions; and Marshal Richlieu being desirous also to shew General Blakeney the regard due to the brave defence he has made, grants to the garrison all the honours of war that they can enjoy, under the circumstance of their going out for an embarkation, to wit, firelocks on their shoulders, drums beating, colours flying, 20 cartouches each man, and also lighted match; he consents likewise, that Lieutenant General Blakeney, and his garrison, shall carry away all the effects that shall belong to them, and that can be put into trunks. It would be useless to them to have covered waggons; there are none in the island, therefore they are refused.

III.

That all the garrison, including all the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, as well civil as military, shall have all their baggage, and effects secured, with liberty of removing and disposing of them, as they shall think proper.

Richlieu] III.

Granted, except to the natives of the island, upon condition that all the lawful debts of the garrison to the Minorquins, who are to be considered as French subjects, shall be paid.

IV.

That the garrison, including the officers, artificers, soldiers, and other subjects of his Britannic Majesty, with their families,

A. D. 1756. garriſon, to grant them ſuch generous terms, which intitled them to march out with all the honours

lies, who ſhall be willing to leave the iſland, ſhall be provided with proper veſſels, and conducted to Gibraltar by the ſhorteſt and moſt direct navigation: that they ſhall be landed immediately upon their arrival, at the expence of the crown of France, and that they ſhall be ſupplied with proviſions, out of thoſe that may yet be remaining in the place, at the time of its ſurrender, as long as they ſhall remain in the iſland, and during their voyage at ſea, and that in the ſame proportion that they receive at preſent. But if a greater quantity ſhould be wanted, that they ſhould be furniſhed with it at the expence of the crown of France.

Richlieu] IV.

Tranſport veſſels ſhall be furniſhed from among thoſe which are in the pay of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and proper for the military and civil garriſon of Fort St. Philip, and their families. Theſe veſſels ſhall carry them by the ſafeſt navigation to Gibraltar, with the ſhorteſt delay poſſible, and ſhall land them immediately, upon condition, that after their being landed, theſe ſhips ſhall be provided with ſufficient paſſports, that they may not be moleſted on their return to the port of France they ſhall be bound for: and hoſtages ſhall be given for the ſafety of the tranſport veſſels and their crews, who ſhall embark in the firſt neutral ſhip that ſhall come to fetch them, after the ſaid veſſels ſhall be returned in the port of France.

The garriſon ſhall alſo be ſupplied with proviſions as well during their ſtay in the iſland, as for twelve days voyage, which ſhall be taken from thoſe that ſhall be found in the Fort St. Philip, and diſtributed on the footing, that they have been uſually furniſhed to the Engliſh garriſon; and if more be wanted, it ſhall be furniſhed, paying for it as it ſhall be agreed by commiſſaries on both ſides.

V.

That proper quarter ſhall be provided for the garriſon, with an hoſpital fit for the ſick and wounded, whilſt the tranſports

are

honours of war, and to be conveyed by ſea to Gibraltar. And his Majeſty, our late ſovereign, who A. D. 1756.

are getting ready, which ſhall not exceed a month, to be reckoned from the day of ſigning this capitulation; and with regard to thoſe, who ſhall not be in a condition to be tranſported, they ſhall ſtay, and care ſhall be taken of them, 'till they are in a condition to be ſent to Gibraltar by another opportunity.

Richlieu] V.

The veſſels being ready for the tranſporting the garriſon, the providing quarters, as demanded, becomes unneceſſary; they ſhall go out of the place with the leaſt delay, in order to proceed to Gibraltar; and with regard to thoſe, who cannot be embarked immediately, they ſhall be permitted to remain in the iſland, and all the aſſiſtance they ſhall want, ſhall be given them for their going to Gibraltar, when they ſhall be in a condition to be embarked; a ſtate of them ſhall be drawn up, and the neceſſary paſſports ſhall be left, for a ſhip to go and return; and an hoſpital ſhall alſo be furniſhed for the ſick and wounded, as ſhall be ſettled by the reſpective commiſſaries.

VI.

That the governor ſhall not be accountable for all the houſes that ſhall have been deſtroyed and burnt during the ſiege.

Richlieu] VI.

Granted for the houſes deſtroyed or burnt during the ſiege; but ſeveral effects, and titles of the admiralty court, which have been carried into the fort, ſhall be reſtored, as well as the papers of the town houſe, which have been carried away by the receiver; and the papers and titles relating to the ladings of the French merchant-ſhips, which have been alſo retained.

VII.

When the garriſon ſhall come out of the place, no body ſhall be permitted to debauch the ſoldiers, to make them deſert from their regiments; and their officers ſhall have acceſs to them at all times.

Richlieu]

A. D. 1756. who could not be ſuppoſed to be ignorant of any part of the attack and defence of Fort St. Philip, not

Richlieu] VII.

No ſoldier ſhall be excited to deſert, and the officers ſhall have an entire authority over them to the moment of their embarkation.

VIII.

An exact diſcipline ſhall be obſerved on each ſide.

Richlieu] VIII.

Granted.

IX.

That ſuch of the inhabitants of the iſland, as have joined the Engliſh for the defence of the place, ſhall have leave to remain, and to enjoy their goods and effects in the iſland without being moleſted.

Richlieu] IX.

General Blakeney, and Marſhal Richlieu, cannot fix or extend the authority of the Kings their maſters, over their ſubjects; it would be ſetting bounds to it, to oblige them to receive in their dominions, thoſe whom they ſhould not think proper to have ſettled there.

X.

That all priſoners of war ſhall be reſtored on each ſide.

Richlieu] X.

All the priſoners that have been made during the ſiege ſhall be reſtored on each ſide, ſo that when the French return thoſe they have, the piquets, which were taken going to join the French fleet, the day Admiral Byng appeared before Mahon, ſhall be reſtored.

XI.

That Mr. Cunningham the engineer, who acted as a volunteer during the ſiege, ſhall have a paſſport, and leave to go wherever his affairs require.

Richlieu] XI.

Granted.

XII.

not only approved of General Blakeney's conduct; but, upon his arrival in England, ennobled [c] him; and diſtinguiſhed him with other particular marks of his regard and favour. A. D. 1756.

This brave commander, General William Blakeney, was a native of Ireland, and born at mount Blakeney, in the county of Limerick, A. D. 1672,

XII.

Upon the foregoing conditions, his excellency the lieutenant general governor conſents, after the hoſtages ſhall have been exchanged for the faithful execution of the above articles, to deliver up the place to his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, with all the magazines, ammunition, cannons, and mortars, except thoſe mentioned in the ſecond article, and to point out to the engineers all the mines, and ſubterraneous works. Done at the caſtle of St. Philip, the 28th of June 1756.

Richlieu] XII.

As ſoon as the foregoing articles ſhall have been ſigned, the French ſhall be put in poſſeſſion of one of the gates of St. Philip's caſtle, as well as of the Forts Malborough and St. Charles, upon the hoſtages being ſent on both ſides, for the faithful execution of the foregoing articles.

The ſtoccado that is in the port ſhall be removed, and the going in and the coming out ſhall be left open, at the diſpoſition of the French, until the whole garriſon has marched out, in the mean time, the commiſſaries on both ſides ſhall be employed, thoſe on the part of his excellency General Blakeney, in making an eſtimate of the effects in the military magazines, and others: and thoſe on the part of his excellency the Duke of Richlieu, in receiving them; and to deliver to the Engliſh ſuch part thereof, as has been agreed upon. Plans ſhall alſo be delivered of the galleries, mines, and other ſubterraneous works. Done at St. Philip, the 29th of June, 1756.

[c] By the title of Lord Blakeney, of mount Blakeney in the kingdom of Ireland.

the

A. D. 1756. the ancient ſeat of his family. He entered into the land ſervice in the beginning of Queen Ann's war, and was made an enſign by Lord Cutts at the ſiege of Venlo. But he was long overlooked and neglected, till he found a friend in the late Duke of Richmond, by whoſe intereſt he was promoted to a regiment. He ſerved againſt the Spaniards at Carthagena, and recommended himſelf to his late Majeſty by his courage and conduct in the defence of Sterling caſtle, againſt the rebels and their French auxiliaries in 1745. Yet his great merit and unblemiſhed character could procure nothing better for him in the decline of life, when old age bore hard upon him, than a command on the iſland of Minorca, where he was obliged to reſide ſeveral years as lieutenant governor.

The caſtle, &c. ſurrendered. The articles of capitulation being ſigned, and the hoſtages given, M. de Richlieu entered Fort St. Philip, on the 29th of June at noon: where he found 240 cannon fit for ſervice; beſides 40 ruined or nailed up during the attack, 70 mortars, 700,000 lwt. of gunpowder, 12,000 cannon balls and 15,000 bombs. The garriſon conſiſted of 2963 men, about 2300 of whom were military, (the reſt labourers, &c.) commanded by three lieutenants colonels only, 23 captains, and a very few ſubalterns. In the defence of this fort there were expended, 27,018 ſhells of different ſizes, 1032 hand granades, 32,706 round ſhot, 332 double headed ſhot, 959 grape ſhot, 353,639 pounds

Ammunition expended during the ſiege.

13

13 ounces of gunpowder, 73 carcaſſes of 12 inches, 41 of 10 inches, and 86 fire balls. A. D. 1756.

Admiral Byng's return to Gibraltar.

Admiral Byng, agreeable to the laſt reſolution of the council of war, which was held on board the Ramillies, on the 24th of May, gave orders for the ſhips under his command to ſtand to the weſtward; and they accordingly did ſo, in the afternoon of the ſame day. But, what by contrary winds, and what by the detention occaſioned by the care neceſſary to be given to the crippled ſhips, the Intrepid being ſometimes forced to be taken in tow, the ſquadron did not arrive at Gibraltar till the 19th of June; where the Admiral found Commodore Broderick, who had arrived four days before, with five ſhips of the line [f], to reinforce his ſquadron.

Reinforced.

Remarks on this reinforcement.

By the date [g] of Commodore Broderick's inſtructions or orders, it is evident, that this reinforcement was ordered, before it was poſſible for the miniſtry to have received any advice from Admiral Byng himſelf, or any authentic intelligence relating to his ſquadron: and by the letter ſent by the Admiralty, and delivered by Captain Broderick, to Admiral Byng, at Gibraltar, which you have at the bottom of this page [h], it is alſo evident,

[f] The Prince George of 80 guns, Hampton Court, Ipſwich, and Naſſau of 64, and the Iſis, of 50 guns.

[g] May the 17th.

[h] Admiralty office, May 21, 1756.

SIR,

MY lords commiſſioners of the admiralty having received certain intelligence, that the French are fitting out more ſhips at Toulon, they have thought proper to reinforce the ſquadron

A. D. 1756. evident, that the neceſſity of reinforcing the Admiral was known ſoon after his ſailing from England; and therefore that, had thoſe very five ſhips been originally added to, inſtead of following, his ſquadron, too late, it would have given Admiral Byng ſuch a ſuperiority in the Mediterranean, that the French admiral would not have dared to wait for him.

Admiral Byng prepares to ſeek the enemy.

Thus reinforced, Admiral Byng reſolved to return in queſt of the enemy, and once more to give them battle; with this reſolution, he gave immediate orders to remove the ſick men in his ſquadron, amounting to near 1000, into the hoſpital; for all the captains to refit their ſhips for ſea with all poſſible expedition, to complete their ſhips with water, to aſſiſt the maſter-ſhipwright and ſtore-keeper, with as many hands as poſſible, from every ſhip, to carry on the ſervice of the fleet; and for the agent-victualler to furniſh all the ſhips with wine and proviſions.

All thoſe, with ſeveral other duties and ſervices, were forwarded with the utmoſt diligence; and the Admiral reſolved to put to ſea, and to attempt the relief of Fort St. Philip, which according to

ſquadron under your command with the ſhips named in the margin, by whom this is ſent to you.

Theſe ſhips carry out a regiment of ſoldiers, and will probably take more on board at Gibraltar, if they can be ſpared.

I am, Sir,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

J. CLEVLAND.

To the Hon. Adm. Byng, Mediterranean.

the

the intelligence he had received, continued ſtill to hold out. A. D. 1756.

Admiral Byng alſo diſpatched a letter to the admiralty, containing the particulars of the late action, and of the reſolutions of the council of war concerning his preſent motions. But the contents were not made public, for ſeveral days after its arrival, and then garbled in ſuch a manner, as to throw the odium of the miſcarriage upon him, and to ſuppreſs thoſe paſſages, which tended to his own juſtification, or reflected upon the conduct of the miniſtry; eſpecially in the department of the admiralty. For which partiality they were much blamed by the friends of the admiral, and cenſured by the generality of the people. Becauſe it expoſed the commander in chief entirely to the reſentment of the public, without a poſſibility of exculpating himſelf; and ſuggeſted ſtrong ſuſpicions againſt the integrity of thoſe, who durſt not truſt the people with a ſight of theſe paſſages in the admiral's letter, that regarded their own conduct, in the affair of Minorca. But this will beſt appear from the entire letter, as it was afterwards publiſhed by the admiral in his own vindication, as follows:

Ramilies, off Minorca, May 25, 1756.

SIR,

I Have the pleaſure to deſire you will acquaint their lordſhips, that having ſailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahon the 19th, having been joined by his Majeſty's ſhip Phœnix, off Majorca, Admiral Byng's letter of the 25th May, 1756.

A. D. 1756. Majorca, two days before, "by whom I had confirmed the intelligence I received at Gibraltar, "of the ſtrength of the French fleet, and of "their being off Mahon. His Majeſty's colours "were ſtill flying at the caſtle of St. Philip, and "I could perceive ſeveral bomb batteries playing "upon it from different parts; French colours we "ſaw flying on the weſt part of St. Philip's. I "diſpatched the Phœnix, Cheſterfield and Dolphin a-head, to reconnoitre the harbour's mouth, "and Captain Harvey, to endeavour to land a "letter for General Blakeney, to let him know "the fleet was here to his aſſiſtance, though every "one was of opinion, we could be of no uſe to "him, as by all accounts no place was ſecured for "covering a landing, could we have ſpared any "people. The Phœnix was alſo to make the "private ſignal between Captain Harvey and "Captain Scrope, as this latter would undoubtedly "come off, if it were practicable, having kept "the Dolphin's barge with him; but, the enemy's "fleet appearing to the ſouth-eaſt, and the wind "at the ſame time coming ſtrong off the land, "obliged me to call thoſe ſhips in, before they "could get quite ſo near the entrance of the harbour, as to make ſure what batteries or guns "might be placed to prevent our having any "communication with the caſtle." Falling little wind, it was five before I could form my line, or diſtinguiſh any of the enemy's motions, and not at all to judge of their force more than by their numbers, which were ſeventeen, and thirteen appeared

peared large. They at firſt ſtood towards us in a regular line, and tacked about ſeven, which I judged was to endeavour to gain the wind of us in the night; ſo that being late, I tacked, in order to keep the weather-gage of them, as well as to make ſure of the land-wind, in the morning, being very hazy and not above five leagues off Cape Mola. We tacked off towards the enemy at eleven; and at day light had no ſight of them. But two tartans with the French private ſignal being cloſe in the rear of our fleet, I ſent the Princeſs Louiſa to chaſe one, and made the ſignal for the rear admiral, who was neareſt the other, to ſend ſhips to chaſe her; the Princeſs Louiſa, Defiance, and Captain, became at a great diſtance; but the Defiance took her's, which had two captains, two lieutenants, and 102 private ſoldiers, who were ſent out the day before with 600 men on board tartans to reinforce the French fleet, on our then appearing off the place. The Phœnix, on Captain Harvey's offer, prepared to ſerve as a fire ſhip, but without damaging her as a frigate, till the ſignal was made to prime, when ſhe was then to ſcuttle her decks, every thing elſe being prepared, as the time and place allowed of. The enemy now began to appear from the maſt head; I called in the cruiſers, and when they had joined me, I tacked towards the enemy, and formed the line a-head. I found the French were preparing theirs to leeward, having unſucceſsfully endeavoured to weather me: they were 12 large ſhips of the line, and five frigates. As

A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. ſoon as I judged the rear of our fleet to be the length of their van, we tacked all together, and immediately made the ſignal for the ſhips that led, to lead large, and for the Deptford to quit the line, that ours might become equal in number with theirs. At two I made the ſignal to engage, as I found it was the ſureſt method of ordering every ſhip to cloſe down on the one that fell to their lot. And here I muſt expreſs my great ſatisfaction at the very gallant manner in which the rear admiral ſet the van the example, by inſtantly bearing down on the ſhips he was to engage with his ſecond, and who occaſioned one of the French ſhips to begin the engagement, which they did, by raking ours as they went down; I bore down on the ſhip that lay oppoſite me, and began to engage him, after having received the fire for ſome time in going down. The Intrepid "unfortunately" (in the very beginning) had his fore-top-maſt ſhot away, and as that hung on his fore-ſail and backed it, he had no command of his ſhip, his fore tack and all his braces being cut at the ſame time, ſo that he drove on the next ſhip to him, and obliged that, and the ſhips a head of me to throw all aback; this obliged me to do ſo alſo for ſome minutes, to avoid their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our adverſary out of the line, who put before the wind, and had ſeveral ſhot fired at him from his own admiral. This not only cauſed the enemy's center to be unattacked, but left the rear admiral's diviſion rather uncovered for ſome little time. I ſent and

called

called to the ſhips a-head of me to make ſail on, and go down on the enemy, and ordered the Cheſterfield to lay by the Intrepid, and the Deptford to ſupply the Intrepid's place. I found the enemy edged away conſtantly, and as they went three feet to our one, they would never permit our cloſing with them, but took the advantage of deſtroying our rigging; for though I cloſed the rear admiral faſt, I found I could not again cloſe the enemy, whoſe van was fairly drove from their line; but their admiral was joining them by bearing away. By this time 'twas paſt ſix, and the enemy's van and ours were at two great a diſtance to engage; I perceived ſome of their ſhips ſtretching to the northward, and I imagined they were going to form a new line; I made the ſignal for the headmoſt ſhips to tack, and thoſe that led before with larboard tacks, to lead with the ſtarboard, that I might by the firſt keep (if poſſible) the wind of the enemy, and by the ſecond, be between the rear admiral's diviſion and the enemy, as his had ſuffered moſt, as alſo to cover the Intrepid, which I perceived to be in a very bad condition, and whoſe loſs would very greatly give the balance againſt us, if they had attacked us next morning, as I expected. I brought to about eight that night to join the Intrepid, and to refit our ſhips as faſt as poſſible, and continued ſo all night. The next morning we ſaw nothing of the enemy, though we were ſtill lying to; Mahon was N. N. W. about ten or eleven leagues. I ſent cruiſers out to look for the Intrepid and Cheſter-

A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. field, who joined me the next day; and having, from a ſtate and condition of the ſquadron brought me in, found that the Captain, Intrepid and Defiance (which latter has loſt her captain) were much damaged in their maſts, "ſo that they were "endangered of not being able to ſecure their "maſts properly at ſea; and alſo that the ſquadron "in general were very ſickly, many killed and "wounded, and no where to put a third of their "number, if I made an hoſpital even of the 40 "gun ſhip, which was not eaſy at ſea;" I thought it proper in this ſituation, to call a council of war before I went again to look for the enemy. I deſired the attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their opinions upon the preſent ſituation "of Minorca and Gi-"braltar, and make ſure of protecting the latter, "ſince it was found impracticable to either ſuc-"cour or relieve the former with the force we "had; for though we may juſtly claim the victo-"ry, yet we are much inferior to the weight of "their ſhips, though the numbers are equal; and "they have the advantage of ſending to Minorca "their wounded, and getting reinforcements of "ſeamen from their tranſports, and ſoldiers from "their camp; all which, undoubtedly has been "done in this time that we have been laying to re-"fit, and often in ſight of Minorca; and their "ſhips have more than once appeared in a line "from our maſt-heads. I ſend their lordſhips "the reſolution of the council of war," in which there

there was not the leaſt contention or doubt aroſe. A.D. 1756.
" I hope indeed we ſhall find ſtores to refit us at
" Gibraltar, and if I have any reinforcement,
" will not loſe a moment's time to ſeek the enemy
" again, and once more give them battle, though
" they have a great advantage in being clean
" ſhips, that go three feet to our one, and there-
" fore have the choice how they will engage us,
" or if they will at all, and will never let us cloſe
" them, as their ſole view is the diſabling our
" ſhips, in which they have but too well ſucceeded,
" though we obliged them to bear up." I do not ſend their lordſhips the particulars of our loſſes and damages by this, as it would take me much time, and that I am willing none ſhould be loſt in letting them know an event of ſuch conſequence.
" I cannot help urging their lordſhips for a rein-
" forcement, if none are yet ſailed, on their know-
" ledge of the enemy's ſtrength in theſe ſeas, and
" which, by very good intelligence, will in a few
" days be ſtrengthened by four more large ſhips
" from Toulon, almoſt ready to ſail, if not now
" ſailed to join theſe." I diſpatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene, by way of Barcelona, and am making the beſt of my way to " cover" Gibraltar; from which place I propoſe ſending their lordſhips a more particular account. I am, Sir,

Your moſt humble ſervant,

JOHN BYNG.

To the Hon. John Clevland, Eſq;

A. D. 1756.

When this entire letter was publiſhed by Mr. Byng's friends, it was accompanied with ſome remarks very diſadvantageous to the miniſtry; wherein it is obſerved, That the firſt mutilation concealed an alluſion made to his former letter from Gibraltar, which it was apparently the intereſt of the miniſtry to keep in darkneſs. It ſeems likewiſe intended by this omiſſion, to inſinuate that Byng never came within ſight of Minorca, and that he was caught *unexpectedly* by the French. The words *could we have ſpared any people* would have diſcovered the weakneſs of the armament; and the opinion of the officers that the *landing place was covered*, would have ſhewn the folly of thoſe, who contrived the expedition, and ſent out a weak fleet, when they might have made it ſtronger by adding the ſhips of which the crews were uſeleſsly devouring their proviſions at Spithead; and amuſed the nation with an attempt to relieve Minorca, while they ſent no land forces, or none proportioned to the purpoſe, and ſent them out at a time, when they could not be landed.

Remarks on the mutilated paſſages, marked with ".

The next omiſſion was likewiſe equally unfair, and equally malignant, and appears deſigned partly to caſt reproach on the admiral, and partly to hide the faults of the miniſtry. To conceal the fitneſs of Byng's retreat, they ſuppreſs the damage done to the ſhips; to conceal their own negligence, they omit the mention of the wounded, and the want of an hoſpital ſhip for their reception.

This

This is the firſt time that a fleet was fitted for ſuch an enterprize, without ſtore-ſhips, fire-ſhips, hoſpital-ſhips, or tenders; and why this fleet was thus imperfectly furniſhed, what reaſon can be given, if the relief of Minorca was intended. A. D. 1756.

The intent of this omiſſion being principally to fix upon Byng the reproach of returning without neceſſity, it may now be enquired, whether it was proper to have hazarded a ſecond engagement? No man was ever expected to fight without hope of victory, or without proſpect of advantage, proportionate to the danger of defeat. Hope of victory he could have none; the French fleet was at firſt ſuperior, and was far more ſuperior after the battle; proſpect of advantage was now at an end, for he could not now relieve St. Philip; though Galiſſionere had delivered up his ſhips without a ſhot, it was already inveſted by an adequate force, and though the ſiege might have been prolonged it could not have been raiſed.

It is much harder to diſcover why Galiſſionere ſuffered our ſhattered ſhips to eſcape.

The next mutilation ſuppreſſes the account of the enemies ſuperiority. The French had an army from which the fleet was ſupplied with freſh men: Byng had more than 1000 ſick, without an hoſpital ſhip for their reception.

The next paſſage omitted deſcribes another advantage enjoyed by the French, that their ſhips were *clean*, to which it might have been added to the honour of our miniſters, that *their ſhips were better*. A clamour was raiſed by the aſſertion, that they

A. D. 1756. they ſailed *three feet to one:* a ſeaman's phraſe, never deſigned to be underſtood literally, nor ever interpreted literally before; by which nothing is implied but that they ſailed faſter, and had great advantage by ſuperior celerity.

He *hoped* to find ſtores *to refit him at* Gibraltar; where, in effect, from the ſtate, in which he had left it, and which was carefully concealed from the public, he had *little hopes* of finding them: yet this delay, which the miniſters knew to be unavoidable, was imputed to him, as a new crime.

The next paragraph omitted, is the "urging "the admiralty to a ſpeedy reinforcement, if "none was already ſent;" a requeſt which he had before made; at the ſame time "acquaint- "ing them with the increaſing ſtrength of the "enemy at Toulon, by four large ſhips;" which circumſtance, though it tends not to juſtify the admiral's behaviour, gives a favourable idea of his zeal for ſucceſs, and a contemptible one of thoſe, who, preſiding at the head of affairs, had been totally ignorant of what was preparing at Toulon, and negligent at beſt of what happened to Minorca.

The laſt paragraph has but one word omitted, which, inſtead of "making the beſt of my "way to Gibraltar, is to *cover* Gibraltar;" a very material alteration; the going to cover a place, being very different from going to a place; the one ſignifying an act of prudence, and of a ſoldier; the other, in ſuch inſtances, of flight, and of a fugitive. Was not this word premeditately

tately left out, to prevent the aſking what danger Gibraltar was in, and to what part of the letter this referred? A. D. 1756.

But, the court of London had received advice of the action of the 20th of May by the way of France, with ſome hints very diſadvantageous to the character of Admiral Byng, and greatly improved afterwards to his deſtruction: though it muſt not be forgotten, that the French Admiral Galiſſionere, was as highly cenſured by his court, for his conduct on the ſame day; and was ſuperſeded, recalled, and put under arreſt; and, if he was not diſgraced with the ignominy of a public execution, he diſappear'd ſoon after, not without ſuſpicion of a violent death, upon the road to Paris.

Upon theſe advices, every inſtrument of the miniſtry was employed to degrade the unfortunate admiral, to repreſent him to be the *ſole* cauſe of the national diſgrace in the Mediterranean, and to prepare them to caſt the *whole* blame of the loſs of Minorca upon him, ſhould it be forced to ſurrender to the French. The whole blame caſt upon Admiral Byng.

The importance of Minorca, which had been ſo much ſlighted by the Britiſh miniſtry, was now rung in every ear. It was now repreſented to be the moſt happy for us in its ſituation: to be capable of vaſt improvements; to have the two beſt ports in the Mediterranean ſea; which might make that iſland a magazine of Britiſh commodities, and the center of a moſt extenſive commerce. This iſland, ſaid they, who took no effectual meaſures for its defence, before it was too late, ſo Importance of Minorca.

juſtly

A. D. 1756. juſtly the object of our hopes; the trophy of our victories; which drew to Great Britain, the reſpect of Spain; the confidence of Italy; and the ſubmiſſion of the pyratical ſtates of Barbary; is not only loſt, but loſt in ſuch a manner, as ſhould give every Briton a manly, rational and patriot concern.

Before we quit this iſland it may be agreeable to the reader to give a deſcription of it, for which we are chiefly obliged to John Armſtrong, Eſq; engineer in ordinary to his Majeſty. This gentleman informs us, that the iſland of Minorca lies in the Mediterranean ſea, about 60 leagues S. of the coaſt of Catalonia, and is one of thoſe iſlands that conſtituted the ancient kingdom of Majorca; cut and indented with a prodigious variety of creeks and inlets on the north ſide, occaſioned by frequent and violent northerly winds. It is upwards of 33 miles long, and varies in breadth from eight to twelve miles, and in ſome parts more: computed to contain 236 ſquare miles, and 151,040 ſquare acres. It is 62 miles in circumference, and divided into four terminos or diſtricts; the termino of Mahon, of Alajor, the united termino of Mercadal and Fererias, and the termino of Ciudadella: which together contain about 28,000 inhabitants.

Deſcription of Minorca.

Its ſituation.

Extent.

Diviſion.

Inhabitants.

Mahon is the ſeat of government, in the neighbourhood of St. Philip's caſtle, the only fortreſs of any conſideration in the iſland. This city is built on an elevated ſituation, and the aſſent from the harbour is ſteep and difficult. It was formerly

Mahon.


A New and Accurate MAP of the Island of MINORCA, with the Town and Harbour of MAHON, & S.t Philip's Castle, & FORTIFICATIONS 1763
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TERMINO
CIUDADELA
FERERIAS
MERCADAL
ALEYOR
MAHON
Punta des Curbais
C de Somerider
Son Salamo
Conolla
Sonfe
Bini Atrama
Torre de Ram
Se Mudaina
Ciudadela Creek
Elupes
Ses Angoxas
Rafel den Morra
S.t Andria
Torre Trancade
Son Olivas
Son Olivart
Son Jouit Son Joan
Sona Purets
Son Marquet
C de Touch
Son Tora
Platges de Son Saura
Cala Toqueta
Cala Macarela
S.t Caldana
Cala Tribulo
Riv de Son Bau
Son Carabasa
Se Mola
Son More de Bax
Granada
Fererias
Saleria
Cavalaria
S.ta Agata
Cala Caldere
Cala Larabo
Arenal de Bini Mella
C de Toro
Buferias
Arenal de Tirant
Port Furnels
Signal house
C de Cavalaria
C de Pantine
Se Boval
Ola de Setra
Ne de Genovasa
Punta de Pons
Cala Pons
Port de Addaya
Cala Morena
es Pou den Caldas
Les Fontales
C de Tauritx
Bella Muada
Lucalx
Els Orts
Mercadal
Moli
Mount Toro
Serra
Capi Fort
C de Mosena vivas
Se Uparda
Bini Marvoc
Mongofra
Catarina
I de Colom
Se Buffera
Se Galara
Bini Atau
Bini Eunes
Son Bau
Son Blanc
Aleyor
S.t Paume
Palafanque
Bini Araga
Se Masquida
Lluc Asaldent
Et Gendaret
Cutama Vell
Rafel Colom
S.t Antonio
C Negra
Cala
Torraubut Nau
Monple
Calen Port
Mahon
S.ta Grana
Bini Atap
C de la Mola
Signal house
Calas Covas
Bini Calaf
Loc Noude Bini Fadat
Sangefam
Bini Parrel
Bini Becca Vell
S.t Philips
Governor of the Castle's house
es Caudellas
Cala Bini Barax
Torre de Bini Sefui
Atalaya Grosa
Signal house
Cala de Alcafa
Cala de Rafelet
Marlborough Redoubt
S.t Stephens Cove
Mahon Harb.r
Cala Bini Sefui
Cala Bini Bini
Cala Bini Acola
I de Laire
References to the PLAN
a S.t Philips Castle
b Royal Counterguard
c S.t Georges D.o
d Hanover D.o
e Welsh D.o
* Wilhelmina Ravelin
f Charlotta D.o
g Prince Fredericks D.o
h New Lunette
i West D.o
k South West D.o
l South Lunette
m Carolina Redoubt
n Queens D.o
o Corn Magazine
p Powder D.o
q Grand Store House
r Timber Sheds
s The Nunnery
t Victualing Office for S.t Navy
u Carmelite Convents
w Carriage Sheds
British Statute Miles 69 to a Degree
HARBOUR
THE
TOWN OF MAHON
Mast Houses
Naval Hospital
Bloody I
Quarrantine I
Low Land
Pond
Philipet Cove
Signal House
Golgotha
Safrony
Product House
English Cove
Old Road
New Road
The
S.ta Gratia
S.t Philip's Town
F.t Philipet
Entrance of the Harb.r
F.t Charles
S.t Stephens Cove
Governor of the Castles House
Marlborough Redoubt
Scale of one Mile.
Mile

ſurrounded with a wall, but at preſent the buildings have extended themſelves into large and elegant ſuburbs, beyond thoſe limits. The buildings are univerſally of free ſtone, either covered with tiles, or flat-roofed and terraced. The ſtreets are not paved, the native rock appearing almoſt every where: and they are generally very narrow. At the foot of the hill, on which Mahon ſtands, is a fine wharf of great extent in length, and proportionably broad. The whole weſtern end thereof, was ſet apart for magazines of naval ſtores, and other uſes of his Majeſty's ſhips. The water at the key is deep enough for any ſhip to come as near, as it has occaſion. The eaſtern part of the dock is ſet a part for the merchant's ſervice. A. D. 1756.

A little out of the town, in the way to St. Philip's, ſtands a ſmall convent of Carmelite friars: and about a mile below the town is Engliſh Cove, the general watering place for the navy: where there is a plentiful ſupply of ſweet water. The harbour at this place, is near a mile over; which is almoſt its greateſt breadth: half a mile lower, and about a mile ſhort of St. Philip's, lies Bloody Iſland, whoſe area contains about 12 acres, making almoſt an equal diviſion of the harbour, leaving the greateſt breadth and deepeſt water next Mahon. On this iſland ſtands a capacious hoſpital belonging to the navy, with convenient apartments for the proper officers. Bloody Iſland.

Almoſt oppoſite to this iſland, on the Mahon ſide, lies the Oyſter Cove. This cave or cove is ſcooped Oyſter Cove.

A. D. 1756. ſcooped out of the rock, with a north-eaſt aſpect, and takes its name from an oyſter-fiſhery, managed by Spaniſh divers, who venture ten or twelve fathoms, with a hammer to break oyſters from the bottom of the rock.

Quarentine Iſland. From hence, on the left hand, in the way to St. Philip's, by water, is the Quarentine Iſland; which is leſs than Bloody Iſland, and nearer to Cape Mola ſhore. Here all veſſels from Barbary and the Levant, when thoſe parts are viſited by the plague, are obliged to perform quarantine.

St. Philip's Caſtle. St. Philip's Caſtle next preſents itſelf at the entrance of Mahon Harbour; and is ſituate on a neck of land between Mahon Harbour and St. Stephen's Cove. Its numerous works extend themſelves to the ſhore on both ſides. The body of the place conſiſts of four baſtions and as many curtains, ſurrounded with a deep ditch, hewn out of the ſolid rock, which furniſhed free-ſtone for the walls. The area is ſurrounded with the Governor's houſe, a chapel, guard-room, barracks, &c. and in the center there is a pump to ſupply the troops with rain-water from a ciſtern; and the whole ſquare is paved.

Over the flat-roof of the arched buildings is a ſpacious rampart, affording an extenſive proſpect, and the baſtions are mounted with guns. The communication from the lower area to the top of the rampart is by a pair of ſtairs, made likewiſe of ſtone, and ſo wide, broad and eaſy of aſcent, that mules and aſſes can carry burdens up to any apart-

apartment, and great guns can be drawn up them, when wanted. A. D. 1756.

The whole body of the place is undermined; and very ſerviceable ſubterraneous works are contrived in the rock, and communicate with one another, where neceſſary.

Before the entrance of the Caſtle is a horn-work, with other out-works to this and the reſt of the front; which works are better conceived by the eye from the plan, than any words would be able to deſcribe them.

There is a great number of large guns mounted towards the entrance of the harbour, beſides thoſe that point to the land, which would require the ſervice of a vaſt many artillery-men on occaſion; as indeed the various works demand a very conſiderable garriſon to diſpute them with an enemy.

The capacious galleries, that are cut out of the rock, and extend themſelves throughout all the works, are of the utmoſt advantage: for here the people are ſecured from the ſplinters of ſtone, which in time of action would tare them to pieces, as well thoſe off duty, as thoſe obliged to expoſe themſelves. Theſe ſubterraneans afford quarters and ſhelter to the garriſon, impenetrable to ſhot and ſhells, and not to be come at, but by cutting a way to them through the living rock; againſt which a number of countermines are provided, at proper diſtances, and in ſuch places as are moſt expoſed by their ſituation.

In the main ditch is a ſmall powder magazine: there is a much larger under the Covert-way of the

A. D. 1756. the place: where alſo there are ſtore-houſes ſufficient for every occaſion, with an hoſpital near St. Stephen's Cove. Beſides the ciſtern, which is liable to many accidents, there are ſeveral wells within the works: and a quantity of every ſpecies of proviſions is conſtantly kept up, to ſupport the whole ſoldiery of the garriſon, in caſe of a ſiege.

On the point of land, eaſt of the Caſtle, ſtands Charles Fort, of little uſe. The grand battery lies down at the water-edge, and has a high ſtone wall to cover the gunners, who play their ordnance through a long range of embraſſures. This is the common burial-place of the garriſon.

The Queen's Redoubt is the moſt advanced of all the works towards the country, on the ſide where it ſtands: Between it and the harbour are two other works. On the other ſide of St. Stephen's Cove ſtands the Marlborough.

The Araval, or Suburb of St. Philip's, conſiſts of quarters for officers, of barracks for ſoldiers, a church, and, at one time, of ſo many houſes inhabitted by Spaniards, that the glacis of the fortreſs almoſt reached thoſe buildings; which being foreſeen to be favourable to an enemy, in caſe of a ſiege, the houſes were cleared away to ſuch a diſtance as to leave a ſufficient eſplanade between the village and fortifications.

St. Stephen's Cove. St. Stephen's Cove is a ſmall inlet of the ſea, eaſily admitting boats with fiſh and proviſions, when the circumſtances of a ſiege ſhall render it diffi-

difficult to approach the garriſon by way of the harbour. A. D. 1756.

The Laire of Mahon, otherwiſe Coney-Iſland, is ſeparated from the main land by a ſound about two miles over, and very dangerous to ſhips of burden, on account of its ſhoals and foul ground. Here are a multitude of rabbits, and no inconſiderable quantity of ſalt. Laire of Mahon.

There is a good key at St. Philip's for ſhips; and on the other ſide of the harbour, a little lower down, on the narroweſt place, ſtands Fort St. Philipet, in which is a ſmall magazine of powder, and a guard, with a battery of guns, on a level with the ſurface of the water, for the defence of the harbour. Fort Philipet.

Cape Mola is a high land, ſevered almoſt from the iſland by Philipet Cove and a ſmall bay on the north ſide, and is univerſally eſteemed capable of being rendered an almoſt impregnable fortreſs, at a moderate expence. On the elevated top of this cape is the ſignal-houſe, to give the garriſon due warning of ſhips and veſſels approaching from the ſea. A buſh hung out denotes a ſmall veſſel, a ball a ſhip, two or three balls two or three ſhips, and a flag a fleet: theſe ſignals are hoiſted on the quarter the ſhips are diſcovered. Cape Mola.

Purſuing the great road to Ciudadella, made by Governor Kane, and called after his name, we meet with the ſhire town of Alajor, and the next in goodneſs to Mahon and Ciudadella. This town ſtands high and airy, and is tolerably well Alajor.

A. D. 1756. built, with a handſome Gothic free-ſtone church on an eminence. The buildings are of ſtone alſo; and the ſtreets very narrow and not paved. Here are alſo quarters for a regiment of ſoldiers; but the garriſon uſually conſiſts of no more than nine companies, the other being ſent to the caſtle of Fornelles. There is only one convent in this town, which is of Franciſcan friars.

Mercadal. Mercadal, the next ſhire-town, is ſituated on a hill about the center of the iſland, is a very poor place, and meanly built. A little to the eaſt of which is Mount Tor or Toro, the higheſt ground in the iſland: on whoſe eminence ſtands a convent of Auguſtine friars, in a moſt agreeable ſituation.

Mount Toro.

Fornelles. About ſix miles north of this mount is the caſtle of Fornelles, built on the weſtern ſide of the entrance of a large harbour of the ſame name. This fort is ſquare, faced with hewn ſtone, and conſiſts of four baſtions, and as many curtains, a very little ditch, and no out-works before it. The ſquare within is filled with houſes for the troops, and for laying up proviſions and ammunition; which are all ſtrongly vaulted and covered with ramparts. The ſignal-houſe is ſituated at Athalia, upon a high land on the oppoſite ſide of the harbour. But the duty of this fort is done by one company only, detached from Alajor. The port is large and ſpacious; but the ſhoals and foul ground make it very hazardous for ſhips of burden.

Mount

A. D. 1756.

Mount Agatha, ſo called from the chapel ſituate on its ſummit, dedicated to St. Agatha, ſtands about four miles north-weſt of Mercadal, is a very high barren rock: on the top of which the Moors fortified themſelves, and held out againſt a numerous army, long after the Chriſtians had driven their countrymen from the lower parts of the iſland. The ruins of which works are ſtill to be ſeen; and within their limits there ſtill continue two remarkable rain-water ciſterns entire, containing together 2173 tons, or 547,596 wine gallons, which, at the allowance of one gallon a day would furniſh 1500 men with water for one year.

Mount Agatha.

Ciudadella is the next place worthy of our attention. It was the antient capital of Minorca, till the ſeat of government was removed by the Engliſh to Mahon. By this means it has declined in its trade and wealth. This town is ſurrounded by a wall, bold and of great height, built by the Moors upwards of ſix hundred years ago, next the Baranco. The reſt is more modern, and conſiſts of a rampart, with a great many baſtions and curtains, all of ſquared free-ſtone. Though the rampart is narrow at the curtains, the baſtions are roomy enough; and the parapets are all of ſtone. A good ditch has been laid out, and cut to a conſiderable depth in the ſolid rock, in ſome places, with the parapet of a covered-way before it; but it is little more than marked in other places. Theſe works, ſays Mr. Armſtrong, have been ſlighted ever ſince Minorca has been in

Ciudadella.

A. D. 1756. our hands, and the garriſon, upon an alarm, is to make the beſt of its way to St. Philip's Caſtle, (as was the caſe in 1756) driving before it all the cattle, that are to be eaſily found; and ſpoiling the roads, the better to obſtruct the enemy on his march [1]. This antient town is built at the head of a little harbour, where coaſting veſſels find ſhelter in a ſufficient depth of water, cloſe to the very walls of the town. The garriſon, which conſiſts of a regiment of ſoldiers, find the beſt quarters in the iſland here. The chief buildings are the exchange, an antient ſtructure, raiſed on Gothic arches of a conſiderable height: The Governor's houſe, a large irregular fabric, built in the gorge of a baſtion. Divine ſervice is performed for the garriſon in the great hall of this houſe. Here is the cathedral of the whole iſland. It ſtands near the center of the town, is the largeſt church in the iſland, and a noble Gothic building. Here is alſo another neat church at a little diſtance. Near Mahon-gate ſtands a convent of Auſtin friars, a large edifice, with a handſome church within it. Fronting the great parade there is a Franciſcan convent of friars. This building is large, but irregular. The nuns of St. Clara have alſo a convent in this town. Near the entrance of the harbour, which is about a mile from the town, ſtands another chapel, dedicated to St. Nicholas, the Popiſh patron of ſeafaring people; adjacent to which are the ruins of

[1] See page 300.

a ſmall

a ſmall caſtle, intended formerly, but very unfit, to defend the entrance of the harbour. And a little without Mahon-gate is a convent of the order of St. Antonio; it is a ſmall houſe, but well endowed. The ſignal on the light-houſe for this fortreſs ſtands about two miles north-weſt, and is called Torre del Ram: from whence, if a fleet, in time of war, approaches, the country is alarmed by a great ſmoak in day-time, and by a great fire in the night. A. D. 1756.

As for the court of France; their King's mandate to the Archbiſhop of Paris to ſing *Te deum* upon the conqueſt of Minorca, and his rewards beſtowed upon the officers concerned in the reduction of Fort St. Philip, give a full idea of their ſentiments and rejoicing on that occaſion. In the mandate the French King tells the Archbiſhop, That after having waited too long in vain for the ſatisfaction he had promiſed himſelf from the King of England's equity, as a reparation for the outrages committed by his navy upon the French ſhips, to the great ſcandal of all Europe; he found himſelf obliged to have recourſe to arms, in order to avenge the honour of his crown, and to protect the commerce of his dominions. "It "is, ſaid he, from ſuch juſt motives, that in the "month of April laſt I ſent a body of troops into "the iſland of Minorca, under the command of "my Couſin, the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu, "with a ſquadron commanded by the Marquis "de la Galiſſionere, Lieutenant-General of my "naval armies, to drive the Engliſh from a port, Rejoicings in France. King's mandate to the Archbiſhop of Paris.

A. D. 1756. "which they had ſeized upon through the ſpirit "of general domination, which they want to ex- "tend over the two worlds. After a dangerous "and toilſome ſiege, during which the Engliſh "ſquadron, that came up to relieve Minorca, "was repulſed by mine; and Marſhal Richelieu, "in conſequence of a diſpoſition, as boldly con- "trived, as it was to be rapid in its execution, "at laſt gave French valour its full ſwing; and "whilſt the enemy truſted to the ſtrength of their "ramparts, my troops carried the out-works of "Mahon by aſſault, in the night between the 27th "and 28th of laſt month: terror did the reſt: "the garriſon was forced to capitulate, and retire "to Gibraltar; abandoning about 200 pieces of "cannon and 80 mortars. The ſucceſs of ſo "important an enterprize, wherein my troops "were to ſurmount all the obſtacles, which art, "aſſiſted by nature, can contrive for the defence "of a place, muſt be attributed to nothing, but "the favour, which the Lord of Hoſts is pleaſed "to grant to the juſtice of my cauſe: and there- "fore, to render him a public homage of my "thankfulneſs, and to beſeech him to continue "unto me his divine protection, I write you this "letter, to acquaint you, that it is my intention, "that you cauſe *Te deum* to be ſung in the me- "tropolitan church of my good city of Paris, "&c." And the vanity of the French nation was fed ſo highly with this unprecedented and unac- countable ſucceſs over the Engliſh, their antient conquerors, and the preſent obſtacle to thoſe vaſt

ſchemes

A. D. 1756.

ſchemes of univerſal monarchy, for many years carried on by Gallic councils; that the people immediately conceived, either that the Britiſh courage was degenerated into cowardice, or that the Britiſh miniſtry had drank ſo deeply of the fountain of corruption, as to become indifferent, and inſenſible of their national intereſt.

Reſolutions of the privy council.

However, to efface ſuch diſagreeable imputations, the firſt accounts of this diſaſter, brought the Britiſh miniſtry to a reſolution to ſuperſede, and to put under arreſt the two Admirals, Byng and Weſt, charged with miſconduct on the day of action, and General Fowke, Governor of Gibraltar, for not obeying his orders, which were to embark 700 men on board of the fleet ſent to relieve Minorca. For which purpoſe the Antelope of 50 guns, was ordered to ſail immediately for Gibraltar, with Admiral Hawke, Admiral Saunders, ſeveral navy captains; alſo the Earl of Panmure and the Lord Tyrawley. The two Admirals had orders to ſuperſede, to put under arreſt, and to ſend home Admirals Byng and Weſt: and Lord Tyrawley had the like orders in regard to General Fowke. The Antelope ſailed from Portſmouth on the 16th of June, and arrived at Gibraltar on the third of July, when Admiral Byng was preparing, and was very near to ſail for the relief of Port Mahon. Admiral Hawke obeyed his orders, and ſent the ſtate priſoners to England on the 9th, in the ſame man of war that brought him to Gibraltar.

Admiral Hawke, &c. ſent to Gibraltar.

To ſuperſede and arreſt Byng, &c.

A. D. 1756.

On this occaſion the Secretary of the Admiralty wrote this letter to Admiral Byng, to acquaint him with his Majeſty's pleaſure.

Letter to ſuperſede Admiral Byng.

" SIR,

" HIS Majeſty having received an account " that the ſquadron under your command, " and that of the French under the command of " Monſieur Galiſſionere, came to action off the " harbour of Mahon, the 20th of laſt month, " and that the French (though inferior to you in " force) kept before the harbour, and obliged you " to retreat; I am commanded by my Lords " Commiſſioners of the Admiralty, to ſend you " herewith an extract of Monſieur Galiſſionere's " letter to his court, giving an account of the " action, and to acquaint you, that his Majeſty " is ſo much diſſatisfied with your conduct, that " he has ordered their Lordſhips to recal your- " ſelf and Mr. Weſt, and to ſend out Sir Edward " Hawke, and Rear-Admiral Saunders, to com- " mand the ſquadron.

" I am extremely ſorry to be obliged to inform " you of ſuch a diſagreeable event, being with " great regard,

SIR,

" Your moſt obedient humble Servant,

Admiralty-Office, June 8, 1756.

J. CLEVLAND.

To

To this he returned a letter, which neither betrayed conſciouſneſs of guilt, dread of reſentment, nor confuſion of mind. A. D. 1756.

Gibraltar-Bay, July 4, 1756.

"SIR,

Admiral Byng's anſwer.

"BY Sir Edward Hawke I have received their "Lordſhips orders, and your letter of the "8th of June, which I have immediately com- "plied with, and have only to expreſs my ſur- "prize at being ſo ignominiouſly diſmiſſed from "my employment, in the ſight of the fleet I had "commanded, in ſight of the garriſon, and in "ſight of Spain, at ſuch a time, in ſuch a man- "ner, and after ſuch conduct, as I hope ſhall "ſhortly appear to the whole world. 'Tis not "now for me to expoſtulate; I flatter myſelf "that Mr. Weſt and I ſhall make evident the in- "jury done to our characters, which I know of "nothing in the power of any being whatever "that can atone for; ſo high an opinion I have "of that, which was ever unſullied before, and "which I hope to make appear, has been moſt "injuriouſly and wrongfully attacked now, on "the grounds of a falſe gaſconade of an open "enemy [k] to our King and country, and which would

[k] Galiſſionere's letter, dated the 22d of May, in which he writes: The 19th in the morning we deſcried the Engliſh ſquadron from the top-maſts-head, and the two ſquadrons drew pretty near each other that day, but never were within gun-ſhot; which was not our fault, as the Engliſh were to wind-

A. D. 1756. "would have evidently appeared, had the poſ-
"ſible time been allowed for my own expreſs's
"arrival, in which there was nothing falſe, no-
"thing vaunting, nothing ſhameful, nor any
"thing, which could have prevented our receiving
"his Majeſty's royal approbation, for having,
"with a much inferior force, fought, met, at-
"tacked, and beat the enemy: of this, it is
"needleſs for me to ſay more at preſent, than
"that I am ſorry to find Mr. Weſt, with the
"Captains, Lieutenants, and officers of the ſhips,
"we had our flags on board of, are to be ſufferers
"for what I alone, as Commander in Chief, am
"anſwerable: But it is ſo much of a piece with

windward of us. The 20th the French admiral worked about ſo as to gain the wind; but juſt as he had got into a favourable poſition for it, the wind ſhifted in ſuch a manner as ſtill left this advantage to the Engliſh ſquadron. At half an hour paſt two in the afternoon, the two ſquadrons were in line of battle, and began the engagement. The Engliſh conſiſted of eighteen ſail, of which thirteen were of the line; and ours of twelve ſhips of the line and four frigates. The action laſted above three hours and a half, but was not general all the time. The Engliſh ſhips that ſuffered moſt from our broadſides got to the windward again out of gun-ſhot; they all along preſerved this advantage, that they might keep clear of us as they pleaſed. After having made their greateſt efforts on our rear-diviſion, which they found ſo cloſe, and from which they were ſo furiouſly canonaded, that they could not break in upon it, they reſolved to ſheer off, and did not appear again all the next day, being the 21ſt. In general, none of their ſhips long ſtood the fire of ours. The ſhips of our ſquadron ſuffered but little; they were repaired in the night, and ready to fight the next morning.

"the


A New & Accurate Map of the Seat of the late War on the Coast of CHOROMANDEL, in the East Indies. 1763.
BAY
BENGAL
PART OF MASHUR
PART OF MADUREY
PART OF TANJAOR
MARAWA
TRANGANBURI or TRANGABARD.
PONDICHERY F
NEGAPATNAM H
Scales.
Eng: Marine Leag: 20 to a Degree
English Miles 69 ½ to a Degree.
EXPLANATION.
City or considerable place
Indian Temple or Pagoda
Residence of a Navob or Mogol Governor
Residence of a Pilliagar or Indian Prince
Choultry, Inns or Lodging Places
Kotta, Koltey or Kotta a fortifyed place
Patnam a Town in General
D Danes
E English
F French
H Dutch
P Portuguese
78
79
80 Long: East from London
81
14
13
12
11
10

" the whole unheard of treatment I have met " with, that neither they, the fleet, or myſelf " can be more aſtoniſhed at that particular, than " at the whole. A. D. 1756.

J. BYNG.

The Captains and others, who were ſuperſeded and ordered home, on this account, were, Rear-Admiral Weſt, Captain Gardiner of the Ramillies, the Admiral Byng's ſix Lieutenants, Gunner and Purſer, and his Maſter and Surgeon; and Captain Gough of the Experiment, and Captain Baſſett of the Fortune-ſloop, who had been appointed by him to thoſe commands, occaſioned by the death of Captain Andrews and Captain Noel. Priſoners ſent to England.

Here we will leave Admiral Byng and his fellow-priſoners to meet their deſtiny; and defer the narrative of the effects, this miſcarriage in the Mediterranean produced at home, till we ſhall have drawn a conciſe repreſentation of the operations and tranſactions performed by our arms in diſtant parts of the world.

In the Eaſt Indies we left the Britiſh fleet at Bombay, preparing for an expedition againſt Angria, the ſcourge of thoſe ſeas; whoſe territories, from a neſt of pyrates, was become a ſort of empire, and ſubſiſted much in the ſame manner, on that coaſt, as the ſtates of Barbary, which ſprang from a like original, make themſelves formidable in Europe. Affairs of the Eaſt Indies. Expedition againſt Angria.

The

A. D. 1756.

His origin.

The origin of this Eaſtern pyratical government, was laid by one Conogee Angria: who having been advanced by Saha Raja, from the ſtation of a private Maratta to the poſt of General and Admiral in his wars with, or rather rebellion againſt the Mogul, about one hundred years ago, and rewarded for his ſervice with the government of Severndroog, he ſoon threw off the yoke, and ſeized upon ſeveral of his Prince's veſſels, which he had commanded, and with which he turned an arch pyrate. His firſt care was to fortify himſelf on that iſland, and to ruin the Marattas fleet, that they might have no way to attack him. However the Marattas built three forts upon the main, within leſs than point-blank ſhot of his little territory, which was not above a mile in circumference, but a rock of ſtone by nature and well fortified by art. This did not anſwer their expectations to reduce Angria to obedience, or to reſtrain him from encroaching upon their dominions, and interrupting the trade and navigation of that coaſt. For, having the ſea open, and much ſuperior to his country men in maritime affairs and in bravery, he left them to purſue a fruitleſs attempt againſt his fortifications, and

His territories.

ſurprized ſeveral of their ſea-ports, and carried his conqueſts from Tamana to Rajapore, containing ſixty leagues of ſea coaſt, including ſeveral commodious harbours; and a diſtrict of inland country from 20 to 30 miles backward; which he ſecured by forts properly diſpoſed on ſuch eminences, as commanded the narrow paſſes and defiles. But what

what made all his forts more formidable, they were receptacles for fugitives, renegadoes and vagrants of all nations. A. D. 1756.

The Marattas despairing of success by their arms, proposed to his successors terms of accommodation, for Angria to keep possession of his acquisitions, on condition that he should acknowledge the sovereignty of the Raja, and pay him an annual tribute. To which Angria, then upon the throne of this pyratical state, agreed. Becomes tributary to the Marattas.

Angria's armaments having now no employ against his countrymen, he bent all his force towards the sea, and fitted out a fleet, that made several considerable captures both from the English, French and Dutch. Amongst them were the Darby, an English East-Indiaman, richly laden from Europe, with one hundred and fifty men; and the Jupiter, a French ship of 40 guns, with 400 slaves on board. The Prince of Geriah, as Angria was then called, grew so insolent at last that he dared to attack Commodore Lisle, in the Vigilant of 64 guns, the Ruby of 50 guns, and several other ships in company, as the Commodore was departing from the Malabar coast. He stood a siege by seven armed ships and two bomb vessels, sent by the Dutch from Batavia, with a number of land forces, and obliged them to retire without success; and then brooking no kind of subjection, and presuming on his own strength, he threw off his allegiance to the Raja of the Marattas; and by way of contempt ordered the ears and noses of the messengers sent by Turns his armed vessels against the English, &c. Holds out a siege. Rebels against the Marattas.

his

A. D. 1756. his Sovereign to reclaim him to his obedience, to be cut off. Such a provocation inſpired the Marattas with a ſpirit of vengeance, and drove them to a reſolution to ſollicit the government of Bombay for aſſiſtance, to attack him with their marine force, while he ſhould preſs him cloſe by land. Which ended in a treaty ſigned by the Nanna or Chief of the Marattas, and by the Governor of Bombay, on the part of the company. But before the confederates were ready for action, which was more than a year, occaſioned by the backwardneſs or dilatory proceedings of the Marattas, Angria was ſo elevated with his ſucceſs againſt three Dutch ſhips, one of fifty guns, one of thirty-ſix, and one of eighteen guns, the two former of which he burnt, and took the laſt; that he had the vanity to declare his expectations to be ſoon ſuperior to any force, that could be brought againſt him in the Indian ſeas; and accordingly continued to augment his marine with ſeveral veſſels, and one that was to carry 40 guns.

League between the Engliſh and Marattas againſt him.

His ſucceſs againſt the Dutch.

Expedition againſt him from Bombay.

This ſhewed the neceſſity of more activity on the part of the confederates, to humble this common enemy, already too formidable on the Malabar coaſt: Accordingly, the Marattas being ready, the Protector of 40 guns, the Swallow of 16 guns, and the Viper and Triumph bomb-veſſels ſailed on the 22d of March from Bombay, under the command of Commodore James, then Commander in Chief of the company's maritime force in India. This ſmall ſquadron fell in, next day, with ſeven ſail of Angria's grabs, and eleven

gallivats, off Rajapore, and chaced them to the southward. On the second day, still continuing the chace, Commodore James was joined off Choule by seven Maratta grabs and sixty gallivats. But, as soon as this fleet got the length of Comoro Bay, the Marattas, under pretence of performing some religious acts, not practicable on board of ship, according to their superstition, went ashore, where they dallied away thirty hours. In the mean time Angria's squadron got into the harbour of Severndroog. But upon the approach of Commodore James, who with much difficulty brought up his dilatory allies, the enemy slip their cables and put to sea, the gallivats towing their larger vessels; and, as there was but little wind, that gave them considerable advantage over the English ships of war. So that, though the Commodore gave them chase it was all in vain. For the enemy threw out every thing to lighten their vessels with amazing industry and dexterity, and not only spread their yards with all the sail they had, but they tried to catch every breath of air by fastning their garments, quilts, and even their turbants extended on the flag-staves. By this manœuvre they gained their point; whilst our allies, the Marattas, whose ships are light, and built floaty for sailing large and in light gales, kept all astern. Which obliged Commodore James to give over the chace, and to return to Severndroog; a fortress on an island within musket-shot of the main land, with no more than two fathom and a half in the Firth; strongly, but not regularly fortified; the greatest part

A. D. 1756.

The escape of his fleet.

Severndroog.

A. D. 1756. part of the works being cut out of the ſolid rock, and the reſt built with ſtones ten or twelve feet ſquare; and mounts fifty-four guns on the baſtions. On the main land there are three forts, one, the largeſt, is called Fort Goa, built in the ſame manner, with large ſquare ſtone, and mounts 40 guns. The other two, built with ſtones of an irregular ſhape, mount about 20 guns each.

Beſieged. The Commodore began to cannonade and bombard the Iſland Fort on the 2d of April 1755. but not being able to penetrate the walls, which were fifty feet high and eighteen thick, on the ſide where he made his firſt attack, he moved his ſtation ſo, as to reach Fort Goa with his lower deck guns, while he plied Severndroog with his upper tier. By this prudent diſpoſition and a vigorous fire, the north-eaſt baſtion of Severndroog and part of the parapet, were laid in ruins, about noon; when a ſhell ſet fire to the houſes, and the Engliſh from the round-tops, with an inceſſant fire, prevented the garriſon's extinguiſhing it: and the wind being northerly ſpread the flames all through the fort, blew up one magazine, and cauſed a general conflagration. A multitude of men, women and children, ran out and endeavoured to eſcape, on the other ſide of the iſland, in boats; but they were taken up by the Swallow ſloop, ſtationed to the ſouthward to prevent the throwing in of ſuccours on that ſide. This enabled the Commodore to turn all his fire thenceforward upon Fort Goa: which was ſerved with ſuch a ſevere cannonade, that the enemy was ſoon obliged

to

to hang out a flag of truce; But the Governor, A. D. 1756.
without waiting the event of a capitulation in his neceſſitous circumſtances, croſſed over with ſome choſen Sepoys to Severndroog, where he ſeemed determined to maintain his ground, till he ſhould receive ſuccours from Dabul, truſting in the natural ſtrength of the place, notwithſtanding the ruin it had ſuſtained in its walls and magazines by the bombardment. This being evident from all his anſwers to the ſummons and meſſages ſent him, the Commodore increaſed his fire, both from the ſhips and from the three forts on the main, now in his poſſeſſion: under which firing a number of ſeamen were landed, with a determination to carry their point, who ran up reſolutely to the gates of the fortreſs, and with axes opened to themſelves an entrance through the ſally port without much loſs. Stormed.

This conqueſt was followed by the ſurrender [1] of Bancote, now called Fort Victoria, the moſt northern port of any conſequence under the dominion of Angria, which ſubmitted upon the Commodore's ſummons. The harbour is commodious for a trade in ſalt and other goods, which are ſent thither from Bombay in great quantities; and was therefore preferred in the choice of the Engliſh in the diſtribution of the conqueſts with the Marattas; who conſented that our Eaſt-India company ſhould quietly poſſeſs this fort and port for the future. The Commodore delivered [m] up Surrender of Bancote.

[1] On the 8th of April. [m] On April 11th.

A. D. 1756. the other fortreſſes, he had reduced, to them; and on the 15th he was recalled, as he was anchored before, and was preparing to attack Dabul; the ſeaſon for action at ſea being too far advanced. However, the Governor and Council of Bombay conceived ſuch an high opinion of Commodore James's conduct and courage, and were ſo animated by the ſucceſs under his command, that they prepared to follow the blow, in due time, againſt their troubleſome and dangerous neighbour, whoſe deſtruction was reſolved upon.

Admiral Watſon arrives at Bombay. In this ſituation ſtood affairs between the Engliſh and their allies, and Angria, in November, when Rear-Admiral Watſon arrived with his ſquadron at Bombay. While theſe ſhips were cleaning and repairing, Commodore James was diſpatched in the Protector, with the Revenge and Bombay frigates, to reconnoitre Geriah, the capital of Angria's dominions, and to ſound the depths of water at the entrance of the harbour: and upon his return and report, on the laſt day of December the Admiral ordered the Bridgwater and Kingfiſher's ſloop, and ſome of the Company's armed ſhips, to proceed to the port of Geriah, and to cruiſe off it. Theſe were joined on the 27th of January 1756, by Commodore James in the Protector and Guardian frigate: and on the 11th of February, by the Admiral and his whole ſquadron.

Sails againſt Angria.

Angria diſpirited flies to the Marattas Such a formidable fleet, ſo far beyond the apprehenſions of Angria, ſtruck him with ſuch terror, that he abandoned his fort and threw himſelf entirely

entirely upon the mercy of the Marattas, with whom he ſaw it was neceſſary for him to purchaſe a peace at any rate. And they, without regard to their treaty with the Engliſh, preferred the advantages, that they hoped to reap from his riches, to every other conſideration; and agreed to receive him under their protection, on condition, that they might be immediately put in poſſeſſion of the fort of Geriah, in which he had hoarded up all his riches. To which Angria ſubmitted, and even ſigned an order for that purpoſe to his brother, whom he had left in command. Yet this clandeſtine treaty was not carried on ſo ſecretly, but the Admiral got information of it: and, in order to defeat their union, he next day, in the morning, ſent a ſummons to the fort, and, receiving no anſwer, in the afternoon he marched, and ſtood in to the harbour in two diviſions, the Bridgwater leading his Majeſty's ſhips the Tyger, Kent, Cumberland and Saliſbury, and the company's ſhip, Protector of 40 guns: the other diviſion was made up of the company's ſhips, the Revenge, Bombay grab and Guardian frigate; the Drake, Warren, Triumph and Viper bomb-ketches, led by the King's-fiſher. When this fleet had taken its ſtation there began ſuch a fire, as preſently ſilenced both the grabs and batteries. About four in the afternoon the Reſtoration, an armed ſhip, taken by Angria ſome time before, from the Eaſt India company, was ſet on fire by a ſhell, which communicating to his whole fleet, they very ſoon ſhared the ſame fate.

A. D. 1756.

His fort beſieged.

A. D. 1756. In the night, having no enemy to diſturb them by ſea, the Admiral ordered Colonel Clive to land with all the troops, to prevent the Marattas entrance [n] into the fort: and next morning the Admiral ſent a meſſage to the Commander in Chief, declaring, that he would give no quarter, in caſe he would not ſurrender, and admit the Engliſh troops into the fort, in an hour's time. Which not being complied with, the attack was renewed with ſuch vigour, about four in the afternoon, that the garriſon, in leſs than half an hour, hung out a flag of truce. However, the Commandant neither hauled down his colours; nor admitted the Engliſh troops. This obliged the Admiral to repeat the attack, which was carried on with ſo terrible a fire, that the garriſon cried out for mercy, and let in our troops; being ſubdued only by the terror of ſo unuſual a fire; it being impoſſible for the heavieſt metal to make a breach in the walls of that fortreſs, whoſe height and thickneſs were extraordinary; either hewn out of the ſolid rock, or built of ſtones ten feet in length laid endways.

Surrenders.

Loſs of the Engliſh. The ſtrength of theſe walls, within which the enemy was ſafe, after they were driven from the ramparts, accounts for the ſmallneſs of the num-

[n] This was proved to be their deſign, by an offer they made to the Captains Buchanan and Forbes of 50,000 rupees, if they would ſuffer them to paſs their guard: which they rejected with indignation, and diſcloſed it to Colonel Clive; whoſe vigilance the Marattas found it impoſſible to elude.

See Cambridge's account of the war in India, p. 129.

ber,

ber, that were killed: and the inconſiderable loſs of the Engliſh muſt be attributed to their own bravery and ſpirit, which ſoon drove the enemy from their works by the briſkneſs of their fire. A. D. 1756.

But the loſs to the enemy was irrecoverable. There were found in the place 200 cannon, ſix braſs mortars, and a very large quantity of proviſions of all kinds, beſides 120,000l. and upwards, in money and effects. There were eight ketches, one ſhip, a great number of ſmall veſſels called Gallivats, and two large ſhips upon the ſtocks, one of 40 guns; without any poſſibility of recovering that power, by which Angria had for ſo many years reigned a terror to the maritime powers of Europe, frequenting thoſe ſeas, as well as to his neighbouring ſtates. Amongſt the priſoners were the wife, children, and mother of Angria; who received the admiral with a flood of tears, and on their knees, with their faces to the ground. Mr. Watſon comforted them with aſſurances, that he would be to them a friend and a father. Upon hearing of which, the youngeſt ſon ſeized the admiral's hand, and ſobbing, ſaid, "Then you ſhall be my father." Three hundred Europeans, and as many Sepoys were left to guard the fort, and four of the company's veſſels to defend the harbour. Of the enemy.

Our ſucceſs on this coaſt was greatly checkered with our loſſes in other parts of the Eaſt Indies. We left[o] the M. Legrit and M. Buſſy ſeeking a

[o] See page 198.

A. D. 1756. pretence for rekindling the war, on the coaſt of Coromandel.

M. Buſſy's ſcheme to ſeize Golconda. M. Buſſy not getting his ends of Salabatzing, from whom he demanded the poſſeſſion of the fort of Golconda, under pretence of ſecurity for the expences he had been at in his cauſe againſt the rebels; the haughty French man behaved at laſt with ſuch an air of arrogance, that the Mooriſh Prince ordered him immediately to return to Pondicherry, with his handful of Europeans. But Buſſy did not depart from the Mooriſh army without giving ſtrong hints of his intentions to accompliſh that by force, which he was not able to acquire by intrigue and ſolicitation.

Salabatzing applies for aid to the Engliſh. His march for Maſſulipatam, by the way of Hydrabad, the capital of Golconda, alarmed Salabatzing, who immediately wrote to the governor of Madras for an aid of troops to prevent any inſults from this enraged and perfidious Frenchman, who committed ſome diſorders in the countries through which he paſſed with his forces: tho' narrowly watched by a party of Maratta horſe, which hovered about his little army all the way.

Buſſy reinforced. Buſſy had with him 400 Europeans, about as many Seapoys, and he had ordered the governor of Pondicherry to reinforce him with 400 or 500 more Europeans, to be landed at Maſſulipatam, about 15 days march from Hydrabad; where he arrived with a large ſtock of proviſions of all ſorts, which he took by violence from the Bazars in his march.

At

At Hydrabad Buſſy converted a large houſe into a fort; whereon he mounted ſome great guns, and prepared to defend himſelf, and to maintain that ſtation, in caſe of an attack; which he had reaſon to expect from his injured ally, the Viceroy Salabatzing. A. D. 1756. Fortifies himſelf at Hydrabad.

The governor of Madras having nothing to fear from the ſide of Pondicherry, ſo much weakened by the large ſupplies ſent to Mr. Buſſy from thence, agreed to aſſiſt Salabatzing with 400 Europeans, including a train of artillery, and 400 Sepoys; which joined to 50,000 Mooriſh horſe in the Viceroy's pay, were thought ſufficient to defeat the attempts of Buſſy's whole army, that did not exceed 1000 men. But when every thing was ſettled for their rout and ſubſiſtence, the loſs of Calcutta and all the ſubordinate Engliſh ſettlements or factories in the kingdom of Bengal, obliged the governor and council to drop this expedition, and do the utmoſt in their power to re-eſtabliſh thoſe ſettlements. Aid promiſed Salabatzing. How diſappointed.

How far the French may be ſuſpected to have favoured or ſuggeſted that fatal cataſtrophe at Calcutta has not yet tranſpired: but, as it had ſuch an influence upon our affairs at this critical conjuncture, it will be proper to give the following account,

Bengal is the moſt eaſterly province of the Mogul's dominions in India, lies upon the mouth of the Ganges, extending near 400 miles in length, from E. to W. and 300 in breadth, from N. to S. annually overflowed by the river Ganges, which Bengal, its ſituation and extent.

A. D. 1756. makes it one of the richeſt and moſt fruitful provinces in that quarter of the globe.

Bay of Bengal. The Bay of Bengal is the largeſt and deepeſt in the known world; extending from the ſouth part of Coromandel to the river Huguley. In which ſpace it receives the great rivers Ganges, and Guena from the weſt ſide, and the Aracan and Menamkiori or Avat river from the eaſt ſide. But Bengal, as a coaſt, is ſuppoſed to extend only from Cape Palmiras on the N. of the coaſt of Gal-

Ganges river. conda, to the entrance into the Ganges; which riſes in the mountains of Nigracut, part of Great Tartary, receives many other rivers, and after a courſe of 3000 miles falls into the Gulph of Bengal by ſo many mouths, that travellers are not agreed in the number of them. However the common paſſage for European ſhipping is up the river Huguley, one of the moſt weſtern branches.

Importance of Bengal. The richneſs and fertility of the country, and the extenſive and ſafe navigation of this large river, ſhew the importance of the ſettlements, within theſe limits; and have engaged the trading companies of the maritime nations in Europe to eſtabliſh factories upon the banks of the Ganges: which will be better deſcribed by the following ſurvey of the villages, &c. on each ſhore, ſo far, as they ſerve to convey an idea of the intereſt of the Engliſh united Eaſt India Company.

Deſcription of Culculla. The firſt town worthy obſervation on the ſide of the river Huguley is Culculla, a good market for coarſe cloth, and for corn, oil, and other produce of the country. A little higher is the Dutch

Bankſhall,

Bankſhall, or place, where their ſhips ride, when the currents prevent their getting up the river. A. D. 1756.

From Calculla and Juanpardoa two large deep rivers run to the Eaſt; and on the weſt ſide there is another that runs by the back of Huguley iſland to Radnager, famous for manufacturing cotton, cloth and ſilk romaals, or handkerchiefs: and on the ſame river is grown the greateſt quantity of ſugar in Bengal. Radnagor.

Ponjelly, a little market town for corn, ſtands a little higher on the eaſt bank of Huguley river, and exports more rice than any place thereon. About a league above Ponjelly ſtands a pyramid, which ſerves for a landmark or boundary of the Engliſh Eaſt India company's ſettlement of Calcutta, that is about a league higher. Ponjelly.

At Calcutta, when this diſaſter happened, there was a fort, in which ſtood the governor's houſe; and convenient apartments for the factors and writers; magazines for their ammunition, and ſtore houſes for goods and proviſions; garriſoned by two or 300 ſoldiers; who were generally employed in conveying the company's ſhips from Patana, or Patna, loaded with ſalt-petre, piece goods, opium and raw ſilk: for, as the company hold the colony of Calcutta in fee tail of the Mogul immediately, they were under no apprehenſions of being diſpoſſeſſed by an enemy; tho' the Rajas, whoſe governments extend along the Ganges, between Patana and Caſſimbuzzar, had ſometimes interrupted that navigation, and endeavoured by force of arms to exact the payment of certain duties for all merchandize, Calcutta.

A. D. 1756. chandize, that paſſed on the coaſt, by or through their dominions; which extend upwards of 1000 miles.

Trade of Bengal. The trade of Bengal ſupplies rich cargoes for fifty or ſixty ſhips yearly: beſides what is carried in ſmall veſſels to the neighbouring countries: and the article of ſalt-petre only is become of ſo great conſequence to the European powers, that every thing has been attempted by the French and Dutch to deprive the Engliſh of that advantage. For which reaſon it was greatly to be ſuſpected that theſe rivals in trade, that were always ſeeking an opportunity to ruin the Engliſh intereſt in the

The Engliſh attacked by the Nabob of Bengal. Eaſt Indies, had ſpirited up a new Nabob of Bengal to extirpate the Engliſh factories within his dominions, under various ſlight pretences; of being treated with diſreſpect by Governor Drake; of a right to certain duties, which were refuſed by the company, and for giving protection to ſuch perſon or perſons, that had fled to him for ſanctuary.

Whatever might be the real cauſe it does not ſo much concern, neither does it appear, as yet, with any certainty. Intrigue on the part of

Why the French and Dutch; avarice and ambition of the Nabob; and ſome indiſcretions and neglect on the part of the Engliſh, are the moſt reaſonable conjectures.

His army and proceedings. About the end of May 1756, Saradjot Dollah, the new Nabob, immediately upon his eſtabliſhment, took the field, with an army of 30,000 horſe, 30,000 foot, and between three and 400 elephants.

He

He detached about 600 men to reduce Caſſimbuzzar [p], which fort [q] he ſummoned to ſurrender; aſſuring them that they ſhould have cauſe to repent their reſiſtance: which not being complied with, and expecting a reſolute and powerful oppoſition, the cunning Nabob had recourſe to ſtratagem to facilitate his intentions. He ordered 20,000 men to join the 600, and propoſed a truce for an amicable determination of the ſubject of complaint. By this means he inveigled Mr. Watts, the chief of this factory, to his tent, under promiſe of a ſafe conduct: but Mr. Watts was no ſooner in his power, than he was obliged, by threats, to ſign an acknowledgment of a debt to the Nabob in a large ſum of money. He then inſiſted upon Mr. Watts's ſending for Meſſrs. Collet and Batſon, two of the council; which being complied with alſo, the Nabob detained both Watts and Batſon, and ſent Collet to prevail on A. D. 1756.

[p] Caſſimbuzzar, about 100 miles above Huguley, and 20 leagues weſt from Dacca, are factories both Engliſh and Dutch, of which, by their company's orders, the ſeconds of the council ought to be the chiefs. It is a large town, much frequented by merchants, and ſtands in a very healthy and fruitful iſland of the Ganges, whoſe inhabitants are employed in many valuable manufactories, eſpecially muſlins and ſilks, which are naturally yellowiſh, till the natives whiten them with the aſhes, which they call there, of Adam's fig-tree. Tavernier ſays, that the Dutch export 7000 bales of them from hence annually; and, except what the natives keep for themſelves, the Tartar and Mogul merchants ingroſs the reſt, which is about 15,000 bales.

[q] Was ſmall, regularly built, mounted 60 cannon, and had about 300 men in garriſon.

the

A. D. 1756. the factory to surrender, threatening death to his two prisoners, whom he treated with the utmost indignity, and hurried them away to Moxoudavat, or Muxedabad; and destruction to them all, if they would force him to take it, by assault.

Cassimbuzzar surrenders. This was opposed warmly by several of the gentlemen in the company's service: but the majority of the people prevailed; and accordingly on the 4th of June, the factory of Cassimbuzzar was surrendered to the Nabob of Bengal: which was so far from delivering the English out of their distress; that it encouraged the haughty eastern Prince to proceed with all his force against our principal settlement at Calcutta. The Moors having thus got possession of the fort at Cassimbuzzar without exchanging a single shot, seized upon every thing; ill treated the people; left them scarce a shirt to their backs, and, a few days after, sent them also to Moxoudavat, the capital of Bengal, to be confined in different prisons and dungeons.

Calcutta besieged. The Nabob dispatched near 60,000 troops, 300 elephants, and 500 cannon to reduce Calcutta, charging the commander in chief with a letter for Governor Drake; in which he offered to accommodate matters with the English on condition, that he would pay the arrears of his duty on trade, for 15 years past; to defray the expence of his army, till it should return to Moxoudavat, as well as what it had cost him already, and to deliver up some Mooriſh nobles, which had taken shelter from his tyrannies, with all their effects, in that factory.

To

To which Mr. Drake made no reply; but on that letter's being repeated twice, thrice and four times, he tore it to-pieces and trampled upon it. This ſo exaſperated the Nabob, that he came in perſon with the reſidue of his army, and arrived by long marches on the 17th, before Calcutta, having driven the advanced guards from the paſſes into the fort. The Moors were permitted to commit the greateſt exceſſes in the town, which they plundered for 24 hours, and ſtript not only the houſes, but the inhabitants, without diſtinction of age or ſex, and left them naked. A. D. 1756.

The enemy then threw up a ſmall breaſt work oppoſite to the fort, and mounted two twelve pounders upon it; which fired twice or thrice in an hour; and ſo badly ſerved, that it was impoſſible for them to make a breach: however, long before any real attack had been made, Mr. Drake, who declared himſelf a quaker, reſigned the fighting-poſt to his ſecond, and under the favour of a thick ſmoak, occaſioned by the ſtore-houſes and magazines ſet on fire by the Moors, conveyed all the treaſure he could collect from the merchants, &c. and the company's books, and carried all the ladies, and the counſellors, with him on board the ſhips, which laid off in the Ganges; leaving Mr. Holwell behind, who ſaid he would ſtay and defend the place to the laſt extremity; though the party that fled on board had carried 100 ſoldiers from the garriſon with them. The governor flies to the ſhips.

Mr. Holwell thus left with only a few gentlemen and ſome military officers, called a council of war: The fort how defended.

A. D. 1756. war: after which, to appeaſe the grumbling of the ſoldiers, left in the fort, he divided three cheſts of treaſure amongſt them; made them large promiſes for their fidelity and courage; ſecured the keys of the gates himſelf; and next morning ſtood to the defence of the place gallantly.

The attack was made very briſk; the Moors having got poſſeſſion of the counſellors houſes, which were built cloſe and round the fort, galled the Engliſh much, and drove them from the baſtions: but they were ſeveral times diſlodged by the fire from the fort; which killed upwards of 12,000 Moors, with the loſs of only five or ſix Engliſh, the firſt day: but on the third day, moſt of the Engliſh ſoldiers being either killed or wounded, and Mr. Holwell ſeeing himſelf deſerted by almoſt every body, attempted to make an honourable and ſafe retreat on board the ſhips. For this purpoſe, he is ſaid to have hung out a flag of truce, and to have demanded a capitulation, to amuſe the enemy, till he could carry his retreat into execution. But the ſhips were now fell ſeveral miles below the fort, without leaving a boat to aſſiſt the beſieged in their eſcape; which defeated all expectations of ſafety, that way; and, it is very probable the ſame circumſtance giving the Nabob reaſon to think the fort would ſurrender at diſcretion, when thus deſerted, without hopes of ſuccours and relief, he would attend to no terms of capitulation.

The

The ſoldiers diſpairing of ſucceſs, and quite diſabled with their continual ſervice, in the evening of the 19th, knocked off the lock of the Little Gate and let in the Moors; who killed ſeveral that firſt preſented themſelves; ſtripped all naked, and loading them with irons, crammed 146 into a dungeon, called the black hole, of about 18 foot ſquare, with only two windows to the weſtward, at eight in the evening; out of whom next day, there were no more than twenty three left alive[r], at ſix in the morning; the reſt being ſmothered by the exceſſive heat: and their releaſe was owing more to the avarice of the Nabob, than to any bowels of compaſſion. For, being informed that there was a conſiderable treaſure ſecreted in the fort, entruſted to the confidence of Mr. Holwell, the barbarous tyrant was moved to order him and his companions out of the black hole. Yet this was not the end of Mr. Holwell's miſery. He, not privy to any ſuch treaſure, as the Nabob queſtioned him about, and three of his companions, were loaded with irons, and conveyed three miles, in a putrid fever, to the Indian camp, and there expoſed to a heavy rain all night; next day brought back to Calcutta, under the intenſe heat of the ſun, and embarked in an open boat, for Moxoudavat, not only without help for people in their diſtreſs; but treated in a

A. D. 1756.

How delivered up.

Miſeries of Mr. Holwell, &c.

[r] Occaſioned by a profuſe ſweat on every individual, attended with an inſatiable thirſt; and at laſt by the intolerable ſteam that aroſe from the dead bodies, as well as the living, as pungent and volatile as ſpirits of hartſhorn.

manner,

A. D. 1756. manner, that would ſhock a merciful reader. Arrived at the city of their deſtination; they were lodged in a ſtable, led captives in chains through the ſtreets, and treated as the worſt of criminals; till releaſed by the pity and interceſſion of the Nabob's grandmother. Mr. Watts and his companion in ſlavery received the ſame grace. But having received advice, that the Engliſh ſhips were making ſome motions to recover their ſettlement and to revenge themſelves, he ordered that all the inhabitants of Calcutta ſhould withdraw and quit the country within three days, under pain of having their noſes and ears cut off: ſent pioneers to raze the town to the ground; and wrote to the governor of Madras, that no Engliſh ſubject ſhould thence forward ſettle within his territory of Bengal.

This was the caſe, that ſo immediately required all the aid of the government of Madras to prevent the Engliſh being driven out, and extirpated for ever from the moſt lucrative trade in ſalt-petre and the other produce, and the manufactures of thoſe countries watered by the Ganges; and to give this ſervice the preference to any other.

Aid ſent to Bengal. Accordingly it was reſolved to drop the agreement with Salabatzing[s], and to diſpatch 600 Europeans, and 1000 Sepoys, under the command of Captain Clive, againſt the Nabob or Suba of Bengal, in order to reſtore the company's factories and commerce.

[s] See before, p. 359.

In

In consequence of this resolution, Salabatzing was under necessity to hearken to the French terms of accommodation, and to receive them into his service: and Bussy, reinforced by 500 Europeans, under Mr. Law, began the new year (1756) with the conquest of Ingeram, Baudermalanka and Vizagapatam, factories belonging to the English. This having been foreseen, the greatest part of the company's effects were shipped off, from the two former places, immediately upon the first alarm of hostilities. And as the latter was in no condition to withstand 600 Europeans, 6000 Sepoys, 4000 Pikemen, and 30 pieces of cannon, which M. Bussy brought against it, whose garrison consisted of no more than 140 Europeans, and 420 Sepoys and Topasses, it surrendered by capitulation; in which it was agreed, "To deliver up the "place, the fortifications, the artillery, marine "and military stores, arms, ship-stores, &c. to "the company of France; as also all that should "be found in the different magazines belonging "to the English company; that the chief, the "council, and all those employed in the English "company's service, the officers and all others, "both civil and military, to be prisoners of war, "on their parole: that all the soldiers, sailors and "other Europeans should be prisoners, as long as "the war should continue between the King of "France and the King of England, or till they "should be exchanged." Besides the capture of this place gave the French the entire possession of the coast from Ganjam to Messulapatam.

A. D. 1756.

The bad effects of his agreement with the French.

Capitulation of Vizagapatam.

A. D. 1756.

Revolt and uſurpation of Mauphus Cawn.

Affairs did not ſucceed much better in the ſouthern provinces of the Indies. The governor of St. George reſolved to ſend 1000 Sepoys and the Coffree company from Trichinopoly, under the command of Mahomed Iſouf Cawn, to reduce the rebel Polygars, who, by the inſtigation of the French, had united againſt the Nabob's brother Mauphus Cawn; had obtained ſeveral advantages over his troops, and had blocked up a large party in a ſtrong fort, between Madura and Tinevelly. But the day before theſe troops began their march, advice came that Mauphus Cawn, had not only obtained a complete victory over the rebels, killed the general and 2000 colleries, and taken 300 horſe, and all their baggage, guns, and ſome elephants, in a battle fought within ſeven miles of Tinevelly; but that he had uſurped and ſeized upon his brother's country; having firſt under falſe and frivolous pretences, prevailed with our Sepoys to quit the fortreſs of Madura.

Affairs of North America.

In North America the loſſes and diſappointments of the expeditions, for the defence of the Ohio, the territories yet uncultivated, and the ſettlements made by the Britiſh ſubjects on the back of our provinces, on the ſouth of the bay of St. Lawrence, expoſed our colonies to the inroads and barbarities of the French and their Indian confederates, during the winter; and were chiefly aſcribed to the appointment of improper commanders on that continent. For, it muſt be confeſſed, that there was a great overſight in the miniſtry; firſt, to chuſe a man for that ſervice, who was totally

totally unacquainted with the country, to which he was ſent, and with the ſervice, which he was to perform: and one, whoſe raſh and precipitant temper made him unqualified for a ſervice, whoſe ſucceſs depended upon the moſt cool, wary and circumſpect attention and foreſight: and then to ſend him without a companion, equal to the poſt, and to ſucceed him in the chief command, in caſe of death, or other fatal accident. By the firſt fault, we have ſeen that Braddock's expedition was rendered unſucceſsful[t], and the territory on the back of Virginia and Penſylvania was particularly left expoſed to the ravages of a cruel enemy: and by the ſecond miſtake, the chief command, upon the death of General Braddock, devolved on General Shirley, a man, who had been worn out in the practice of the law, as a barriſter; who was naturally diffident, ſlow, and inert; who had never ſeen battle, or ſiege, and who had, nevertheleſs, been made commander in chief of the King's armies in North America, with the appointments and pay of the great Duke of Marlborough. This points out the erroneous conduct of the miniſtry; but in no wiſe intended, as a ſlur on the character of Mr. Shirley, who obtained the government of Boſton by his merit; was reckoned an able politician; underſtood the intereſt of his country well; had the honour of his Majeſty and the welfare of his country very much at heart; was employed in the commiſſion to ſettle the limits between

A. D. 1756.

General Shirley's character.

[t] See page 145, &c.

A. D. 1756. England and France in North America, &c. in which great truſt he acquitted himſelf with honour; and from his thorough knowledge of his Britannic Majeſty's title to that continent, he ſeems to have been entruſted with the affairs thereof.

The miſeries, to which the back ſettlements were expoſed, by ſeveral miſcarriages of the expeditions carried on laſt ſummer, againſt Fort du Queſne, Niaguara and Crown Point, and the fatal conſequences, which were foreſeen would follow a want of a ſuperior force, to oppoſe and repel the French, and to drive them off from the Britiſh territories; and that diſunion and diſagreement, which ſtill continued amongſt the provinces, about raiſing neceſſary ſupplies of men and money, for the common ſafety, greatly alarmed thoſe, who were neareſt the ſeat of danger, and produced ſeveral ſpirited remonſtrances to their rulers, and inſtructions to their repreſentatives, ſetting forth, That when they ſaw the views of an ambitious potent Prince, extended in defiance and in open violation of the moſt ſolemn treaties with the native Indians, and the crown of Great Britain; and his ſubjects ſeizing lands undoubtedly within his Majeſty's grants, fortifying themſelves thereon, aſſiſted by all the native forces of Canada, and large numbers of veteran ſoldiers from France, opening thereby a ſhort and eaſy paſſage to our own back ſettlements: that, when they reflected, that theſe intruders are the avowed enemies of our trade, liberty, property, laws and religion, the utter extirpation of which, can only ſatisfy them: when

Remonſtrances of the provinces moſt expoſed to danger.

when they conſidered that this appears to be the grand leading ſtroke in all their ambitious views, and the only way to bring about an arbitrary and tyrannical empire, and introduce a bloody and perſecuting religion, throughout all the continent of North America: to ſucceed in which they obſerved them to act in one uniform manner, guided by one ready council, all directed to one fixed and unalterable point; their ſtrength conſiſting in union, and their proſpect of ſucceſs founded on the preſent unhappy disjointed ſtate of our colonies; which appears ſo evident to our Indian allies, that ſelf-preſervation has induced many of their warriors to go over to the French, believing either that our circumſtances are deſperate, or that we are an eaſy, effeminate and daſtardly people, and conſequently not to be relied on, being doubtful that the Engliſh would not make any proviſion againſt the impending dangers. They could not forbear being alarmed at a ſituation ſo ſhocking to every true ſubject of Great Britain: and that it was with the utmoſt concern they had ſeen thoſe evils, from ſmall beginnings, riſe by degrees to the moſt threatning dangers; and that they could not help attributing their monſtrous growth to the private views, inaction, irreſolution, and diſunion of the ſeveral legiſlative powers of Britiſh America: So that, an invaſion, which the natural ſtrength of the colonies united, and an eaſy expence, might have once repelled, is now become matter of ſerious concern and importance to their mother country, and calls for a A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. provincial aſſiſtance in arms and money; and muſt coſt immenſe ſums to thoſe colonies, which a friendly union and care might have ſaved.

Had no effect upon the quakers in the aſſembly of Penſylvania.

Solemn and well grounded as theſe remonſtrances were, the ſpirit of oppoſition ſtill continued, eſpecially in the aſſembly of Penſylvania; in which the leading men, amongſt the quakers, did all in their power to obſtruct the paſſing any bill for raiſing money, and for eſtabliſhing a militia; and ſome of them went ſo far as to vindicate the enemy, and to adviſe forbearance, as the beſt means to ſecure their liberty and property. To confirm this deluſion, which had ſeized upon the majority of the repreſentatives, many preachers, or ſpeakers, both men and women, ran about with more than common aſſiduity, declaiming againſt all preparations for war, and declaring, "That whatever evil might come upon our provinces, it was of their own ſeeking: that the French were ſettled on their own lands, and that the defeat of the King's troops was a judgment for diſturbing the enemy in their peaceable habitations: that their colony was under the immediate protection of heaven; and that it was in vain to endeavour to drive the French out of their forts; and particularly, that it was unneceſſary for the Penſylvanians to take up arms." This doctrine had ſuch effect, that the unhappy Penſylvanians deſpiſed all military arts and military officers, and were deaf to all meaſures towards maintaining the common ſafety; till the French themſelves, by puſhing on their encroachments upon this province,

after the defeat of Braddock, ſo as to threaten their very capital with deſolation; and the inconteſtable proofs, that daily arrived from the back ſettlements, of the barbarities exerciſed by the enemy upon men, women and children, gave the aſſembly a more natural turn to acknowledge the neceſſity of preparing for the defence of their province. A. D. 1756.

On the 3d of November, the aſſembly ſitting, the governor informed them, by a meſſage, that he had received intelligence of the encampment of 1500 French and Indians[u] on the Suſquehanah, within 80 miles of Philadelphia; that they had gained the Delawares and Shawaneſe to their intereſt[w]: that he could have put the province into a poſture of defence to prevent the miſchiefs, already committed by this party, had his hands been properly ſtrenghtened; but that he had neither money, nor arms, nor ammunition at his diſpoſal; that their was no militia, and that it was not poſſible for him to form the backſettlers into ſuch regular bodies, as the preſent exigence required; and he earneſtly entreated them to grant proper

Several meſſages from the governor concerning the impending danger.

[u] A body of 1400 Indians and 100 French, who marched from the Ohio, with an intention to divide into ſeparate parties, when they came near to the frontiers; viz. 40 to go againſt Shamakin, 40 againſt Juniata, and 40 againſt Harris's Ferry; and thus to ſpread themſelves in ſmall parties quite over the province of Penſylvania, taking up their winter quarters at Lancaſter.

[w] Theſe two tribes of Indians declared that they had received a hatchet from the French, and were determined to uſe it againſt the Engliſh, as long as any of us were alive.

A. D. 1756. ſupplies of money, and to prepare a bill to eſtabliſh a militia, excepting ſuch as are conſcientiouſly ſcrupulous of bearing arms, it being impoſſible without ſuch law to prevent confuſion and diſorder, and to anſwer the purpoſes of government, whatever money might be raiſed.

The aſſembly admitted that the back-ſettlers had been greatly alarmed, and that great cruelties had been committed by the Delawares and Shawaneſe: but inſtead of proceeding immediately to enable the governor to repreſs and avenge theſe incurſions by the bill deſired, they requeſted him to inform them, whether he knew of any diſguſt or injury the Delawares and Shawaneſe had received, or by what means their affections had been alienated from the province; and put other queries of like tendency to avoid coming to an explicit anſwer to the governor's meſſage.

Juſt as this anſwer was diſpatched, the aſſembly received another meſſage, acquainting them with the utter deſtruction of the ſettlers at the Great Cove. Which had no effect towards facilitating reſolutions for the common ſafety. On the 10th of November, the governor acquainted the aſſembly, that the Indians had publicly demanded the aſſiſtance of the province, and had declared, that unleſs they ſhould be immediately ſupported, they muſt in their own defence take part with the French, whom they were not able to reſiſt alone: and further, that he was determined, with the advice of his council, to ſet out in perſon to ſuccour the back-ſettlers by his preſence, and to put them

them into the beſt order he could, diſpairing now of doing any thing in conſort with the aſſembly. This menace did not produce its deſired effect: eight days more were trifled away in fruitleſs and diſagreeable meſſages about the ſupplies. On the 18th the governor acquainted the aſſembly, by meſſage, that the Indians had deſtroyed and driven away the inhabitants of Tulpehocken; and obſerved, that the means they had under conſideration for raiſing money were too dilatory; that, as no money could be iſſued thereby, in leſs than ſix weeks, in which time a great part of the province might be laid waſte, he urged them for an immediate ſupply, and a law to regulate a militia, and to ſubmit them to diſcipline. This brought on farther delay. But next day, November the 19th, many hundreds of the back-ſettlers arrived at Philadelphia, and in a body demanded that relief, to which they were intitled by the laws of God and nature, and under the protection of government. Theſe unhappy and deſerted people applied themſelves firſt to the governor, who pitied their diſtreſs; told them that he had done all in his power to gain from the aſſembly the relief they ſollicited, and ſhewed them the order for 5000 l. from the proprietaries, to be laid out as a free gift in defence of the province. Upon which they hurried to the Stadt-houſe with a waggon loaded with the dead bodies of their friends, who had been ſcalped about 60 miles off, by the Indians; threw them down at the door of the aſſembly houſe; curſing the quakers principles, and bid

A. D. 1756.

The back ſettlers come to Philadelphia.

Demand relief and protection.

Bring down their murdered friends.

A. D. 1756. bid the committee of aſſembly behold the fruits of their obſtinacy, and confeſs that their pretended ſanctity would not ſave the province without the uſe of means; at the ſame time threatning, that if they ſhould come down on the like errand again, and find nothing done for their protection, the conſequences ſhould be fatal [x]. And this was declared with ſuch marks of grief and miſery in their faces, who had loſt their wives, their children, and the labour of their whole lives, that they, either moved by the diſtreſs, or over-awed by the threats of the injured people, immediately dropped all their diſputes; paſſed the money-bill for 60,000l. on the ſame terms offered to them in Auguſt laſt; and alſo paſſed a militia-bill, by

Attended with threats.

[x] The quakers, leaſt the aſſembly ſhould waver in their oppoſition, ſolemnly conjured them, in a public addreſs, not to grant any money for purpoſes inconſiſtent with the PEACEABLE TESTIMONY they profeſſed, as it would deſtroy the *religious liberties* and the fundamental part of their conſtitution; for which their forefathers left their country, and ſettled that, then a wilderneſs; declaring alſo, that if a tax ſhould be granted to raiſe money for any *unpeaceable purpoſes*, many would be under a neceſſity of *ſuffering*, rather than conſent thereto, by the payment of it.——The other inhabitants of the province addreſſed them in the ſtrongeſt terms, to come into contrary meaſures. "We hope, ſaid they, that we ſhall always be able to preſerve that reſpect for you, which is due to the faithful repreſentatives of *freemen*; but on the preſent occaſion you will forgive us, if we aſſume characters higher than that of *humble ſuiters*, PRAYING for the defence of our *lives* and *properties*, as a matter of GRACE: you will permit us to make a poſitive and abſolute DEMAND of it, as a matter of perfect and unalienable RIGHT by the laws of God and man.

which

which thoſe, who bear arms, might be formed into regular bodies, ſubject to diſcipline, and rendred more able to ſerve their country, and more terrible to their enemies. Which being the firſt militia-act ever paſſed in Penſylvania, and containing ſome very remarkable paſſages, in regard to the ſcrupuloſity of thoſe, who refuſe to bear arms for the defence of their country and of their own liberty, property and religion; the reader will find it at the bottom of the page [y]. A. D. 1756.

In

[y] *An Act for the better ordering and regulating ſuch as are willing and deſirous to be united for military purpoſes within the province of Penſylvania, paſſed Nov.* 25, 1755.

WHereas this province was firſt ſettled by (and a majority of the aſſemblies have ever ſince been of) the people called Quakers, who, though they do not, as the world is now circumſtanced, condemn the uſe of arms in others, yet are principled againſt bearing arms themſelves; and to make any law to compel them thereto, againſt their conſciences, would not be only to violate a fundamental in our conſtitution, and be a direct breach of our charter of privileges, but would alſo in effect be to commence perſecution againſt all that part of the inhabitants of the province: and for them by any law to compel others to bear arms, and exempt themſelves, would be inconſiſtent and partial. Yet foraſmuch as by the general toleration and equity of our laws, great numbers of people of other religious denominations are come among us, who are under no ſuch reſtraint, ſome of whom have been diſciplined in the art of war, and conſcientiouſly think it their duty to fight in defence of their country, their wives, their families, and eſtates, and ſuch have an equal right to liberty of conſcience with others. And whereas a great number of petitions from the ſeveral counties of this province, have been preſented to this houſe, ſetting forth, that

A. D. 1756. In Virginia the government, prevailed upon by the miſeries ſuffered by the back-ſettlers, who had been

that the petitioners are very willing to defend themſelves and country, and deſirous of being formed into regular bodies for that purpoſe, inſtructed and diſciplined under proper officers, with ſuitable and legal authority; repreſenting withal, that unleſs meaſures of this kind are taken, ſo as to unite them together, ſubject them to due command, and thereby give them confidence in each other, they cannot aſſemble to oppoſe the enemy, without the utmoſt danger of expoſing themſelves to confuſion and deſtruction.

And whereas the voluntary aſſembling of great bodies of armed men from different parts of the province on any occaſional alarm, whether true or falſe, as of late hath happened, without call or authority from the government, and without due order and direction among themſelves, may be attended with danger to our neighbouring *Indian* friends and allies, as well as the internal peace of the province.

And whereas the Governor hath frequently recommended it to the Aſſembly, that in preparing and paſſing a law for ſuch purpoſes, they ſhould have a due regard to ſcrupulous and tender conſciences, which cannot be done where compulſive means are uſed to force men into military ſervice; Therefore, as we repreſent all the people of the province, and are compoſed of members of different religious perſuaſions, we do not think it reaſonable that any ſhould, through a want of legal powers, be in the leaſt reſtrained from doing what they judge it their duty to do for their own ſecurity and the public good; we, in compliance with the ſaid petitions and recommendations, do offer it to the Governor to be enacted, And be it enacted, by and with the advice and conſent of the repreſentatives of the freemen of the ſaid province in general aſſembly met, and by the authority of the ſame, That from and after the publication of this act, it ſhall and may be lawful for the freemen of this province to form themſelves into companies, as heretofore they have uſed in time of war without

been killed or taken, to the number of 70 perſons, ordered the militia of the counties of Dumfries, Prince A. D. 1756.

without law, and for each company, by majority of votes in the way of ballot, to chuſe its own officers.———

And that as ſoon as the ſaid companies and regiments are formed, and their officers commiſſioned, it ſhall and may be lawful to and for the governor, or commander in chief, by and with the advice and conſent of the colonels, lieutenant-colonels and majors of all the regiments, to form, make, and eſtabliſh articles of war, for the better government of the forces, that ſhall be under their command, and for bringing offenders againſt the ſame to juſtice; and to erect and conſtitute courts-martial, with power to hear, try, and determine any crimes or offences by ſuch articles of war, and inflict penalties by ſentence or judgment of the ſame on thoſe, who ſhall be ſubject thereto, in any place within this province.———

Provided always, that the articles ſo to be made and eſtabliſhed, ſhall contain nothing repugnant, but be as near as poſſible conformable to the military laws of *Great Britain*, and to the articles of war made and eſtabliſhed by his Majeſty in purſuance of the laſt act of parliament for puniſhing mutiny and deſertion, the different circumſtances of this province compared with *Great Britain*, and of a voluntary militia of freemen, compared with mercenary ſtanding troops, being duly weighed and maturely conſidered.

Provided alſo, that nothing in this act ſhall be underſtood or conſtrued to give any power or authority to the governor or commander in chief, and the ſaid officers, to make any articles or rules that ſhall in the leaſt affect thoſe of the inhabitants of the province who are conſcientiouſly ſcrupulous of bearing arms, either in their liberties, perſons or eſtates; nor any other perſons of what perſuaſion or denomination ſoever, who have not firſt voluntarily and freely ſigned the ſaid articles after due conſideration as aforeſaid.

Provided alſo, that no youth, under the age of twenty-one years, nor any bought ſervant or indented apprentice, ſhall be admitted to enroll himſelf, or be capable of being enrolled in

A. D. 1756. Prince William and Fairfax to be draughted; and that 160 of them ſhould march out of Wincheſter towards the ſouth branch of the river Potomac, where ſeveral late murders had been committed: and 500 more were draughted about the middle of October, from the regiments at other places, and ordered to rendezvous at Fort Cumberland, to prevent further exceſſes from the French and Indians in thoſe quarters, who had depopulated five or ſix counties, and cut off the correſpondence with Fort Cumberland and Wills's Creek, for a time.

The Moravian ſettlement at Guaden Hutten, or Mohony Creek, about 85 miles from Phila-

in the ſaid companies or regiments, without the conſent of his or their parents or guardians, maſters or miſtreſſes, in writing under their hands firſt had and obtained *.

Provided alſo, that no enliſtment or enrollment of any perſon in any of the companies or regiments to be formed and raiſed as aforeſaid, ſhall protect ſuch perſon in any ſuit or civil action brought againſt him by his creditors or others, except during his being in actual ſervice in field or garriſon; nor from a proſecution for any offence committed againſt the laws of this province.

Provided alſo, that no regiment, company, or party of volunteers, ſhall, by virtue of this act, be compelled or led more than three days march beyond the inhabited parts of the province; nor detained longer than three weeks in any garriſon, without an expreſs engagement for that purpoſe, firſt voluntarily entered into and ſubſcribed by every man ſo to march or remain in garriſon.

This act to continue in force until the 30th of October next, and no longer.

* See how this agrees with the clauſe in the act paſſed in November laſt at Weſtminſter, page 212.

delphia,

delphia, was deſtroyed by the Indians, led on by the French, only two perſons eſcaping alive; who continued burning and deſtroying every thing they met with, and barbarouſly murdered all, without regard to age or ſex. Which had ſuch an effect that the ſettlers at Bethlem and Nazareth, amongſt whom were many Moravians, formed themſelves into bodies, to oppoſe and defend themſelves againſt the enemy, and thereby prevented the like outrages for the future in thoſe parts. A. D. 1756.

Theſe, and an infinite more calamities, were daily reported from the weſtern frontiers of our colonies; where the French were in poſſeſſion of the vaſt country on the Ohio, ſecured for the preſent by Fort du Queſne; and had cut off the Indian nations from our colonies by Crown Point and Fort Cohaſſer, Niaguara and Frontenac, and a multitude of ſmall forts, on the back of New England and New York, that commanded all the paſſes and the lakes; and by Fort Condé, and its commandaries, properly eſtabliſhed behind the Carolina's, to finiſh that chain, intended to girt all the Engliſh colonies from Nova Scotia to Georgia: and the French in Canada employed the whole winter in preparations for the ſiege of Oſwego, and to complete their operations on the Ohio; placing ſtrong garriſons at Crown Point and Ticonderoga; from whence, and other ſtations, they ſent out ſmall parties to diſtreſs the Engliſh out-ſettlements. Strength of the French.

On our part, General Shirley exerted the utmoſt of his ſkill and intereſt to unite the Provinces

A. D. 1756. vinces in vigorous meaſures for the next campaign; and was ſo ſucceſsful, as to effect in ſome meaſure the long-wiſhed for union of the Governors of New England and New York, in the common cauſe of defence againſt the encroachments of the enemy; in particular, to avenge the deſtruction of their back-ſettlements, and to attack Crown Point with 8000 New Englandmen and 1,300 men from New York; and to conciliate many of the Indians to the Britiſh intereſt, who had gone over unto, or had given great ſuſpicion of their intentions to join, the French. But he was recalled before an opportunity ſerved to carry his winter councils into action; being ſuperſeded in his chief command, at Albany, by Colonel Webb, who delivered to him his Majeſty's orders to repair to England without delay, dated the 31ſt of March; his Majeſty having, on the 17th day of February preceding, appointed John, Earl of Loudon, General and Governor in Chief of Virginia; and on the 20th General and Commander in Chief of all his forces in North America.

Affairs in Nova Scotia. In Nova Scotia matters did not favour the enemy at all. General Lawrence purſued his ſucceſs, and was obliged to uſe much ſeverity, to extirpate the French neutrals and Indians, who refuſed to conform to the laws of Great Britain, or to ſwear allegiance to our Sovereign, and had engaged to join the French troops in the ſpring, expected to arrive from Old France, as early as poſſible, on that coaſt, or at Louiſbourg; ſome of which, with ammunition, ſtores, &c. fell into the hands

hands of our cruizers off Cape Breton. General Lawrence did not only purſue thoſe dangerous inhabitants with fire and ſword, laying the country waſte, burning their dwellings, and driving off their ſtock; but he thought it expedient for his Majeſty's ſervice, to tranſport the French neutrals, ſo as entirely to extirpate a people, that only waited an opportunity to join the enemy. A. D. 1756.

This meaſure was very commendable. But the excution of it was not quite ſo prudent. The method taken by the General to ſecure his province from this peſt, was to diſtribute them, in number about ſeven thouſand, among the Britiſh colonies, in that rigorous ſeaſon of winter, almoſt naked, and without money or effects to help themſelves. In which diſtribution too many were tranſported to thoſe colonies, where they might with great eaſe get to the French forts, or might facilitate any enterprize from thoſe forts, on the back of our provinces on the ſouth of the Bay of St. Lawrence. Beſides it was exerciſing a power he had no right unto. For his command reached not beyond the limits of Nova Scotia: and this was loading each government, into which thoſe neutrals were tranſported, with an arbitrary and great expence. French neutrals how diſpoſed of.

This may be exemplified in the caſe of Penſilvania. The quota impoſed upon that province were 415, men, women and children. They landed in a moſt deplorable condition at Philadelphia, to be maintained by the province, or turned looſe to beg their bread: and this city not In Penſilvania.

A. D. 1756. being above two hundred miles diſtant from Fort du Queſne, it was very probable, the men might endeavour to get unto, and join their countrymen at that fort; or to ſtrengthen the parties, which hovered about the frontiers, and were continually laying waſte the back ſettlements.

The government, in order to get clear of the charge, ſuch a company of miſerable wretches would require to maintain them, propoſed to ſell them, with their own conſent: but when this expedient for their ſupport was offered to their conſideration, the tranſports rejected it with indignation, alledging, That they were priſoners, and expected to be maintained, as ſuch; and not forced to labour. They further ſaid, That they had not violated their oath of fidelity, which, by the treaty of Utrecht, they were obliged to take; and that they were ready to renew that oath, but that a new oath of obedience having been preſcribed to them, by which, they apprehended, the neutrals would be obliged to bear arms againſt the French, they could not take it, and thought they could not be compelled to do it. Thus General Lawrence cleared the country of the French neutrals; and the Indians in their intereſt, who had been very troubleſome, being moſt of them Roman catholicks, retired to Canada for protection. Which eſtabliſhed peace and tranquillity throughout the province of Acadia or Nova Scotia, according to its antient limits, as ceded to Great Britain by the treaty of Utrecht; till February 1756, when a party of 300 French and Indians

Indians returned to make inroads about Chiegnecto, and to cut off the Engliſh wood-cutters, as they lived in a ſtate of ſecurity from an enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, having intelligence of this party, marched with 300 provincials in queſt of them, came up with them, killed eight Indians on the ſpot, and wounded a conſiderable number of the enemy; as was conjectured from the vaſt quantity of blood, which the Engliſh ſaw, in the purſuit after thoſe invaders. A. D. 1756. French and Indians re-enter Nova Scotia.

Let us hence return to Europe, and reſume the affairs on the continent. The treaty concluded between his Britannic Majeſty and the King of Pruſſia, furniſhed the court of Vienna with a pretence to form an alliance with the court of Verſailles, in order to facilitate a much further view, which it had been watching an opportunity to effect, againſt the King of Pruſſia. In conſequence of this alliance treaties were drawn up, between thoſe two courts, under the name of treaties of friendſhip and neutrality [z], with a formal Affairs of Europe. Treaty of alliance between France and Auſtria.

[z] By which the contracting parties reciprocally obliged themſelves to the guarantee of all their dominions in Europe: and to furniſh each other with 18,000 foot, and 6000 horſe; or with a proportionable ſum of money, viz. 8000 German florins for 1000 infantry, and 24,000 ditto for 1000 cavalry, in caſe of any attack from any power whatever.

This treaty was preceded by the following convention of neutrality, which was ſigned the ſame day.

The differences between his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty and the King of Great Britain, concerning the limits of their reſpective poſſeſſions in America, ſeeming more and more to

A. D. 1756.

mal invitation to neighbouring powers to accede thereunto; and ſolemn aſſurances that the contracting parties had no other view than to preſerve the general tranquility of Europe, and to prevent the flames of war, already kindled between Great Britain and France, from ſpreading to other countries. But, notwithſtanding theſe pacific declarations, the King of Pruſſia ſoon diſcovered, that the principal end propoſed by the Empreſs Queen, in this alliance, was the recovery of Sileſia; in

Its intention.

threaten the public tranquility, his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, and the Empreſs Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who equally deſired the unalterable duration of the friendſhip and good underſtanding that now happily ſubſiſts between them, have thought it neceſſary to take proper meaſures for that purpoſe.

To this end the Empreſs Queen declares and promiſes, in the moſt ſolemn and binding manner, that ſhe will not, either directly or indirectly, take any part in the above differences, in which ſhe is now no way concerned, but on the contrary ſhe will obſerve an exact and perfect neutrality during the whole time of the war that may be occaſioned by the ſaid differences between England and France.

His moſt Chriſtian Majeſty on his part, far from deſiring to engage any other power in his private quarrel with England, reciprocally declares and promiſes, in the moſt ſolemn and binding manner, that he will, on no pretext or reaſon whatſoever, attack or invade the Low Countries, or any other kingdoms, ſtates or provinces, under the dominion of her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen; as likewiſe neither directly nor indirectly injure her poſſeſſions or rights; which her Majeſty the Empreſs Queen doth in the ſame manner promiſe with reſpect to the kingdoms, ſtates, and provinces, of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. This convention or act of neutrality ſhall be ratified by the Empreſs Queen within the ſpace of ſix months, or ſooner if poſſible.

which

which France, who had aſſiſted him in the conqueſt thereof, a few years before, did now concur with her new ally; it being, at this time, the intereſt of the French court to reduce the power of one, who is no longer to be made their tool in the ruin of Germany. His Pruſſian Majeſty was further confirmed in his opinion concerning the hoſtile intentions of thoſe powers towards him, by the intercourſe of theſe two courts with Peterſburgh. To which firſt Vienna, and then Verſailles ſent a ſpecial miniſter. From thence he concluded that a project was carrying on, by thoſe three courts, againſt him; becauſe his power was obnoxious to them all. And he was ſoon convinced of the truth of theſe conjectures: for, early in the ſpring of this year, he received certain intelligence, that the two imperial courts had agreed upon a plan to unite their forces, and to invade his dominions. In this ſituation, he took every meaſure, that could be ſuggeſted by the utmoſt vigilance and magnanimity; as will ſoon appear in the courſe of this hiſtory. A. D. 1756.

The actual invaſion of Minorca, at laſt, drew on that open and formal declaration of war from Great Britain, which had been provoked, and ought to have been done long before; as we have ſhewn by ſufficient evidences, in the courſe of this hiſtory; wherein almoſt every page exhibits ſome breach of faith, hoſtile intrigue or open hoſtility of the French, from the very ſigning of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and which is confirmed Domeſtic affairs.

A. D. 1756. by his Majeſty's declaration publiſhed on the 18th of May, 1756, in this form and theſe words.

His Majeſty's declaration of war againſt the French King.

GEORGE REX.

Declaration of war againſt the French King.

THE unwarrantable proceedings of the French in the Weſt Indies and North America, ſince the concluſion of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the uſurpations and encroachments made by them upon our territories, and the ſettlements of our ſubjects in thoſe parts, particularly in our province of Nova Scotia, have been ſo notorious, and ſo frequent, that they cannot but be looked upon, as a ſufficient evidence of a formed deſign, and reſolution in that court, to purſue invariably ſuch meaſures as ſhould moſt effectually promote their ambitious views, without any regard to the moſt ſolemn treaties and engagements. We have not been wanting on our part, to make from time to time the moſt ſerious repreſentations, to the French King upon theſe repeated acts of violence, and to endeavour to obtain redreſs and ſatisfaction for the injuries done to our ſubjects, and to prevent the like cauſes of complaint for the future: but though frequent aſſurances have been given, that every thing ſhould be ſettled agreeable to the treaties ſubſiſting between the two crowns, and particularly, that the evacuation of the four neutral iſlands in the Weſt Indies ſhould be effected, (which

was

was expreſly promiſed to our Ambaſſador in France) the execution of theſe aſſurances, and of the treaties, on which they were founded, has been evaded under the moſt frivolous pretences: and the unjuſtifiable practices of the French Governors, and of the officers acting under their authority, were ſtill carried on, till, at length, in the month of April 1754, they broke out into open acts of hoſtility, when in time of profound peace, without any declaration of war; and without any previous notice given, or application made, a body of French forces, under the command of an officer bearing the French King's commiſſion, attacked in a hoſtile manner, and poſſeſſed themſelves of the Enliſh fort on the Ohio in North America. A. D. 1756.

But notwithſtanding this act of hoſtility, which could not but be looked upon as a commencement of war; yet, from our earneſt deſire of peace, and in hopes the court of France would diſavow this violence and injuſtice, we contented ourſelves with ſending ſuch a force to America as was indiſpenſably neceſſary for the immediate defence and protection of our ſubjects, againſt freſh attacks and inſults.

In the mean time great naval armaments were preparing in the ports of France, and a conſiderable body of French troops embarked for North America; and though the French Ambaſſador was ſent back to England with ſpecious profeſſions of a deſire to accommodate theſe differences, yet it appeared, that their real deſign was only to gain

A. D. 1756. time for the paſſage of thoſe troops to America, which they hoped would ſecure the ſuperiority of the French forces in thoſe parts, and enable them to carry their ambitious and oppreſſive projects into execution.

In theſe circumſtances we could not but think it incumbent upon us to endeavour to prevent the ſucceſs of ſo dangerous a deſign, and to oppoſe the landing of the French troops in America; and in conſequence of the juſt and neceſſary meaſures we had taken for that purpoſe, the French Ambaſſador was immediately recalled from our court; the fortifications at Dunkirk, which had been repairing for ſome time, were enlarged; great bodies of troops marched down to the coaſt, and our kingdoms were threatened with an invaſion.

In order to prevent the execution of theſe deſigns and to provide for the ſecurity of our kingdoms, which were thus threatened, we could no longer forbear giving orders for the ſeizing at ſea the ſhips of the French King, and his ſubjects: notwithſtanding which, as we were ſtill unwilling to give up all hopes that an accommodation might be effected, we have contented ourſelves hitherto with detaining the ſaid ſhips, and preſerving them and (as far as was poſſible) their cargoes entire, without proceeding to the confiſcation of them: but it being now evident, by the hoſtile invaſion actually made by the French King, of our iſland of Minorca, that it is the determined reſolution of that court, to hearken to no terms of peace, but to carry on the war, which has been long begun

on

on their part, with the utmoſt violence, we can no longer remain, conſiſtently with what we owe to our own honour, and to the welfare of our ſubjects, within thoſe bounds, which, from a deſire of peace, we had hitherto obſerved. A. D. 1756.

We have therefore thought proper to declare war, and we do hereby declare war, againſt the French King, who hath ſo unjuſtly begun it, relying on the help of Almighty God in our juſt undertaking, and being aſſured of the hearty concurrence and aſſiſtance of our ſubjects in ſupport of ſo good a cauſe; hereby willing and requring our Captain-General of our forces, our Commiſſioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of Great Britain, our Lieutenants of our ſeveral counties, Governors of our forts and garriſons, and all other officers and ſoldiers under them, by ſea and land, to do and execute all acts of hoſtility, in the proſecution of this war, againſt the French King, his vaſſals, and ſubjects, and to oppoſe their attempts; willing and requiring all our ſubjects to take notice of the ſame, whom we henceforth ſtrictly forbid to hold any correſpondence or communication with the ſaid French King, or his ſubjects: and we do hereby command our own ſubjects, and advertiſe all other perſons, of what nation ſoever, not to tranſport or carry any ſoldiers, arms, powder, ammunition, or other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations, or countries of the ſaid French King; declaring, that whatſoever ſhip or veſſel ſhall be met withal, tranſporting or carrying any ſoldiers, arms,

A. D. 1756. arms, powder, ammunition, or any other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the ſaid French King, the ſame, being taken, ſhall be condemned as good and lawful prize.

And whereas there are remaining in our kingdom, divers of the ſubjects of the French King, we do hereby declare our royal intention to be, that all the French ſubjects, who ſhall demean themſelves dutifully towards us, ſhall be ſafe in their perſons and effects.

Remarks on the declaration of war.

Certainly the ſound of war never echoed with more ſatisfaction, than at the preſent conjuncture. It was the general requeſt of the nation; eſpecially of them who were to fight our battles, and of thoſe who, by their fortune and condition in life, were likely to contribute moſt to the expence thereof. For, they reaſoned thus; can a declaration of war, to oppoſe French hoſtilities by open force, and to treat the French King and his ſubjects as our avowed and irreconcileable enemies, be attended with more calamitous circumſtances, than to be continually alarmed with invaſions and other attempts upon the Britiſh dominions and trade? Is it not as expenſive to be driven to the neceſſity of maintaining an army on our coaſts, and a fleet in a capacity to ſail upon the firſt orders, as to ferret the enemy out of their lurking holes, from whence they are continually making new encroachments; and to repel force by force? War is the only remedy againſt injuries in times of

of peace. But there was another ſort of men, who, on this occaſion propagated very induſtriouſly a diſagreeable repreſentation of this meaſure, as if the miniſtry had been forced to adopt it, not by choice, but in order to ſtop the mouths of a people ready to exact an account of the money already expended in the greateſt armaments ever known in Britain, both by ſea and land, and at the ſame time permitting France to invade our territories. And theſe inſinuations gained too much upon the timorous and avaricious. A. D. 1756.

However, national virtue made a ſtrong puſh againſt every effort of the miniſtry to render this juſt and neceſſary war unſucceſsful. The friends of our king and country could not help their doubts of the ſincerity of the court, and their fears for the fatal conſequences of a colluſive war. "Should this war, ſaid they, prove to be a mi-"niſterial colluſion, only a meaſure to facilitate "the raiſing new taxes; or an expedient, after "the people have been fleeced full as much "as they are able to yield at one ſhearing, to "frighten them into an inſidious peace; what "would become of Britain? And to relieve the "nation from theſe apprehenſions, it is incum-"bent upon thoſe in power, not only to conduct "the war with integrity, prudence and vigour; "but to patch up no peace till the juſt cries of "the nation ſhall be ſatisfied for loſſes and da-"mages, and upon ſuch terms, as no free par-"liament can diſapprove.

"A war

A.D. 1756. "A war committed to the management of "ſuch, whoſe integrity does not ſtand in the "beſt light; or whoſe abilities in martial affairs "have been ſuſpected to favour the enemies eſcape, "rather than of that inviolable ſecrecy, with which "the councils of our King and country ought to "be kept, would be far from anſwering the end "of his Majeſty's declaration, or obtaining for "Great Britain and its dominions, ſecurity from "injuries in time of peace. Nothing leſs than "purſuing every meaſure with fidelity and vigour, "and oppoſing, counteracting and diſtreſſing the "enemy in every place and attempt, according "to the ſupplies granted by the people, can quit "the miniſtry from the guilt of puſillanimity, "ignorance, or corruption. Nor can the war "procure for us the deſirable ſecurity of a laſt-"ing and peaceable poſſeſſion of our rights and "property, ſhould it be protracted with other "views than to force the enemy to equitable "terms.

"A peace, worded in a dark, ambiguous man-"ner, can never guard us againſt cavils and diſ-"putes: it would expoſe us to the artifices of "thoſe, who are not in a capacity to decide the "right in the field. It is by thoſe kinds of peace, "Great Britain has ſo often been obliged to re-"turn to arms. Had there been no claims left "undetermined at Aix-la-Chapelle: had the "peace-makers, on the part of Britain, inſiſted "upon the evacuation of Crown-Point, of the "encroachments and fortreſſes on the Ohio, and

"in

" in Nova Scotia or Acadia, there would have A. D. 1756.
" been no pretence left for this French after-
" game. If this was an overſight, now is come
" the time to rectify the miſtakes of former mi-
" niſters, and to reſtore the honour and welfare
" of Britain and her colonies. The ſword is
" drawn: and it is drawn to defend our property,
" and to puniſh the uſurpations, encroachments
" and perfidy of France; and it is the hearty wiſh
" of all good ſubjects, that it may never be
" ſheathed till the enemy ſhall make full ſatis-
" faction, and be diſabled from giving Great
" Britain any further reaſon to lie upon her arms
" in time of peace.

" Can there be too much caution in giving
" peace to a people, who are infamous for their
" breach of faith? for embroiling all nations by
" their intrigues; and noted for riſking the event
" of a war, rather than yield any point by nego-
" ciation. Whoſe quiet conſiſts in the trouble of
" all others; and whoſe advantage always takes
" root in the public calamities of their neigh-
" bours.

" Let us then purſue the war with that vigour
" and fidelity, which have ſo often made the Gallic
" throne to ſhake. Let all factions ſubſide, and
" all parties unite in ſuch meaſures, as will beſt
" coerce that power, which has broke through
" all treaties and promiſes, and under the ſanction
" of peace was carrying on war ſecretly into our
" bowels. May all the ſecret inſtruments (if there
" be any) of that perfidious power be diſcovered
" and

A. D. 1756. " and brought to condign punishment: and may " heaven direct our councils, and inspire us with " a resolution never to accept of any terms of ac- " commodation, which might affect either our re- " ligion, reputation, peace, trade, or naviga- " tion.

" Should these be neglected, it would be dif- " ficult to persuade a Briton that the times are " mended, or that more salutary measures are " pursued, than when they had reason to com- " plain of those traitors to their country so often " mentioned in history, who joined with the " prince in the spoil of the subjects, or kept him " under such restraints, as obliged him to be " content with their misrepresentations of facts, in " order to extort from him unjust orders to justify " or to skreen their wicked counsel. They will " look upon this declaration of war to be only a " scheme to keep the minds of the people under " constant fears and alarms, in a constant hurry " and agitation about their own safety, to pre- " vent their looking into public frauds; and to " reduce them to such a low state, as to render " them incapable of punishing those, who under " the name of peace, attempt to enslave the peo- " ple, impoverished by the excessive burden of a " colluſive war."

Engagement between two English and two

On the 17th of May, 1756, the very day that his Majesty signed this declaration of war, there happened a very warm engagement off Rochfort, between the Colchester of 50 guns, Captain Obrian, with the Lime of 20 guns, and two French men of

of war, the Aquilon of 48 guns, M. de Maurville, with the Fidelle of 36 guns, M. de Litardais: an action that begun at ſix in the evening, and laſted till half an hour paſt eleven between the Lime and Fidelle, and till half an hour paſt twelve between the Colcheſter and Aquilon, when diſtreſs and the darkneſs of the night obliged them to part honourably. A. D. 1756. French men of war off Rochfort.

They engaged ſo cloſe and warmly, that the foreſail of the Lime was ſet on fire by the wads of her adverſary, ſoon after the fight began. Which being extinguiſhed, the Lime returned to the charge, and continued the battle, till the Frenchman ſlacked his fire, and ſhe was obliged to bear away, to ſtop the holes received between wind and water, having three feet and a half of water in the hold; in about twenty minutes returned a ſecond time to the charge: but the Fidelle, though ſhe fired the ſignal of diſtreſs, made ſhift to eſcape; the Lime being in no condition to give chace, all her rigging, main, fore, and mizen ſtays, all her main ſhrouds, being ſhot away, except two on a ſide, and every maſt and yard in the ſhip wounded and rendered unſerviceable [a]. The Colcheſter never quitted her adverſary till ſhe took fire, occaſioned by red-hot bullets fired by the Aquilon, as ſuppoſed; which obliged her to bear away [b].

On

[a] Eighty-ſix ſhot went through the maintop ſail, fifty-four through the main ſail; every ſail looked like a ſieve; and a great number of ſhot went through the hull.

[b] About this time the admiralty received advice of the loſs of the Warwick of 60 guns, Captain Shouldham, taken by the

A. D. 1756. On the 27th of May the parliament, after granting all that the miniſtry aſked, to enable his Majeſty to carry his declaration of war effectually into execution againſt France, was adjourned, by his Majeſty's command, to the 18th of June: upon which occaſion the Speaker, when the money bills were preſented for the royal aſſent, addreſſed his Majeſty in the following remarkable ſpeech.

May it pleaſe your Majeſty,

The Speaker's addreſs to his Majeſty. YOUR faithful commons, juſtly ſenſible of the bleſſings they have enjoyed under your happy reign, in juſt indignation at every attempt to diſturb it, have exerted themſelves to the utmoſt of their abilities, to ſupport your Majeſty in the juſt war, which the ambition and perfidy of France have obliged you to enter into, by giving, for the ſervice of this year, ordinary and extraordinary, ten millions, beſides a vote of credit to anſwer any unforeſeen emergency.

They beg leave moſt humbly to ſay—they hope the ſword you have ſo bravely drawn, and they ſo effectually ſupported, will be entruſted only in brave, capable, and honeſt hands; that ſo the naval, the natural ſtrength of England, will make

the Prudent man of war of 74 guns, who had in company with her a 60 gun ſhip, and a frigate of 36 guns, off Martinico. The Warwick perceiving herſelf over matched, endeavoured to get clear by a running fight; and had actually got clear of the large ſhips, but the frigate got under her ſtern, and raked her ſo terribly that the Prudent came up again, and the Warwick ſtruck; having loſt the captain and a great number of men.

a figure, will do ſervice, as much greater, as it is exalted higher than ever before. A. D. 1756.

They apprehend; the preſent critical juncture convinces, that alliances on the continent, as they are unnatural, ſo they muſt ever be prejudicial to the true intereſt of England; that there is no gratitude to be expected from, no dependance to be had on, ſuch allies: allies, who though ſaved, ſupported, ſubſiſting by the blood and treaſure of this kingdom for more than an age, have taken the opportunity of the firſt proſpect of preſent profit, to break through every tye.

Not diſcouraged by the ingratitude of allies, nor the ambition of enemies, they have with pleaſure beheld the ſword drawn to vindicate your honour, the honour and intereſt of England; convinced, and proud to let all the world ſee, that England is able to fight her own battles, to ſtand by her own natural ſtrength, againſt all her enemies.

Though ever attached to your Majeſty's perſon, ever at eaſe under your juſt government, they cannot forbear taking notice of ſome circumſtances in the preſent ſituation of affairs, which nothing but the confidence in your juſtice, your love to the people devoted to you, could hinder from alarming their moſt ſerious apprehenſions; and to whom ſhould they make their fears known, to whom ſhould they complain, but to their protector, their guardian, and their father?—Subſidies to foreign Princes, when already burdened with a debt ſcarce to be borne, cannot but be

A. D. 1756. ſeverely felt; an army of foreign troops, a thing unprecedented, unheard of, unknown, brought into England, cannot but alarm: but ſtill they depend, ſtill they confide in your Majeſty, and only beg leave moſt humbly to ſay, they hope that their burden may be lightened; their fears removed, as ſoon as poſſible; and in the mean time, that the ſword of theſe foreigners ſhall not be entruſted a moment out of your own hand, to any other perſon whatſoever.

His Majeſty's ſpeech. His Majeſty then cloſed the ſeſſions with a moſt gracious ſpeech, thanking the members of both houſes for their unwearied application to public buſineſs, and for their vigorous and effectual ſupport in maintaining the juſt and national cauſe.—He acquainted them, that as the injuries and hoſtilities, which have been, for ſome time, committed by the French, were now followed by the actual invaſion of Minorca, an iſland guaranteed to Great Britain by all the powers of Europe, and and in particular by the French King; he had therefore found himſelf obliged to declare war in form, and relied on the divine protection, and the vigorous aſſiſtance of his faithful ſubjects.—Then addreſſing the commons, his Majeſty particularly thank'd them for their readineſs and diſpatch in granting the large ſupplies; and gave his royal word that they ſhould be ſtrictly applied to the good purpoſes for which they were granted.——Then ſpeaking to both houſes, he concluded with theſe words: Nothing has given me more inward ſatisfaction,

than

than the confidence which you repoſe in me. It is the moſt acceptable return you could make to me; and you may be aſſured, ſhall be made uſe of only for your good: the preſervation of your religion, liberties, and independency, is, and always ſhall be, my great aim; and I truſt you will not be wanting to yourſelves. A. D. 1756.

In this ſeſſions of parliament a bill for eſtabliſhing a regular and well-diſciplined militia paſſed the houſe of commons; and though it did not meet with the ſame ſucceſs in the houſe of lords, who threw it out at the third reading; it was recommended to the members of both houſes to take the ſenſe of the people on it, in their reſpective neighbourhoods, during the receſs of parliament, that an effectual act might paſs for that purpoſe at their next meeting.

Soon after [b] the French King thought proper alſo to make a formal declaration of war; in which he concealed and evaded all the hoſtilities committed by his governors and commanders in the diſtant parts of the world, and fully ſet forth in this hiſtory, before the year 1754: which take in his own words.

The French King's declaration of war againſt Great Britain.

IT is known to all Europe, that the King of England, in the year 1754, was the aggreſſor in the conteſts concerning the ſettlements in North America; and that in the month of June laſt, the French King's declaration of war againſt Great Britain.

[b] On the 9th of June.

A. D. 1756. Britiſh fleet, in contempt of the laws of nations and the faith of treaties, began to commit the moſt violent hoſtilities againſt the ſhips of his Majeſty, and the navigation and commerce of his ſubjects.

The King, juſtly offended by this perfidious conduct, and the many inſults that were offered to his flag, would not have ſuſpended his reſentment, and with-held what he owes to the dignity of his crown for eight months, if he had not been unwilling to expoſe Europe to the calamities of a new war. It was upon this ſalutary principle, that France behaved with the utmoſt moderation, during the moſt injurious proceedings of England.

While the Britiſh fleet, ſometimes by the baſeſt artifices, and ſometimes by the moſt outrageous violence, were ſeizing the veſſels of France, which were ſailing without ſuſpicion of danger, under the common ſafeguard of public faith, his Majeſty ſent back to England a frigate which had been ſeized by the French fleet, and ſuffered the Britiſh merchantmen to continue trading without interruption in the ports of France.

While the French ſoldiers and ſailors, captives in the Britiſh iſlands at a time of peace, were treated with a ſeverity by which the bounds that the laws of nature and the common principles of humanity have ſet to the rights of war, were exceeded, the Engliſh lived and traded without moleſtation in France, under the protection of that reci-

reciprocal kindneſs and reſpect, which civilized nations owe to each other. A. D. 1756.

While the Britiſh miniſtry, under the appearance of ſincerity, impoſed upon his Majeſty's ambaſſador by falſe proteſtations, they cauſed orders, directly contrary to the deceitful aſſurances they had given of an approaching reconciliation, to be executed in all parts of North America.

While the court of London was exhauſting all the ſubtilties of intrigue, and all the ſubſidies of England, to engage the other powers of Europe to act offenſively againſt France, his Majeſty did not demand even the ſuccours which guarantees, or defenſive treaties, authorized him to require of them, but adviſed only ſuch meaſures as might beſt conduce to their peace and ſecurity.

Such has been the conduct of the two nations; and the ſtriking contraſt of their proceedings cannot but convince all Europe of the jealouſy, ambition, and unreaſonable deſires of the one, and the honour, juſtice, and moderation of the other.

His Majeſty hoped that the King of England, acting upon principles of natural equity and the true intereſt of his honour, would at length have diſavowed the ſcandalous exceſſes, which the officers of his fleet continued to commit; eſpecially as his Majeſty gave him an opportunity of doing it with equal juſtice and decorum, by demanding a ſpeedy and complete reſtitution of all the veſſels of France, which had been taken by Britiſh ſhips; and had offered, upon this preliminary condition, to enter into a negociation concerning other ſatisfactions,

A. D. 1756. which his Majeſty had a right to expect, and readily to concur in an amicable accommodation of the differences concerning America.

The King of England having rejected this propoſition, his Majeſty could not but conſider his refuſal as the moſt authentic declaration of war, as his Majeſty had ſaid he ſhould do in his requiſition.

The Britiſh court therefore might have diſpenſed wlth a formality, which was become needleſs; the manner, in which ſhe had already declared war, was a better reaſon than any that was explicitly aſſigned, why ſhe would not ſubmit, to the judgment of Europe, the pretended grievances, which were alledged againſt France in the written declaration of war, that was publiſhed at London.

The vague imputations, which that writing contains, have not the leaſt foundation in truth, and the very manner, in which they are ſet forth, would have confuted them, if they had not been demonſtrated to be falſe in the memorial, which his Majeſty has cauſed to be remitted to all the courts of Europe, containing an exact ſtate of all the *facts* relative to the preſent war, and the negociations that preceded it, ſupported by inconteſtible evidence.

There is however one fact of great importance, which is not mentioned in that memorial, becauſe it was not poſſible to foreſee that England would carry her indelicacy, in the choice of the means of illuſion, ſo far, as ſhe now appears to have done.

She

She talks much of the military works carrying on at Dunkirk, and of the troops which his Majeſty has cauſed to aſſemble upon the coaſt; and it might fairly be concluded from her declaration of war, that theſe works and theſe troops have alone determined her to ſeize whatever ſhe finds at ſea belonging to his Majeſty, or his ſubjects. A. D. 1756.

It is however univerſally known, that the works at Dunkirk were not begun till after the capture of two of his Majeſty's ſhips, which were attacked in a time of profound peace by an Engliſh ſquadron of 13 men of war. It is equally notorious, that the Engliſh fleet had been making prizes of French veſſels more than ſix months, when the firſt battalions, which his Majeſty ordered to the ſea-coaſt, began their march.

If the King of England ſhould ever reflect on the falſhood of the reports, which have been made to him concerning theſe facts, he will not ſurely forgive thoſe, who have betrayed him into the aſſertion of what is ſo far from being true, that it cannot by any artifice be rendered ſpecious.

That which his Majeſty owes to himſelf and to his ſubjects, has at length obliged him to repel force with force; but being ſtill ſteady to his favourite principles of juſtice and moderation, he has directed his military operations to be carried on only againſt the King of England, his aggreſſor; and all his political negociations have been intended merely to juſtify the confidence, which has been placed in his friendſhip, and the integrity of his intentions, by the other nations of Europe.

A. D. 1756. It is not neceſſary to aſſign more particularly the motives which have induced his Majeſty to ſend a body of his troops into the iſland of Minorca, and which have at length obliged him to declare war againſt the King of England, as the King of England has declared war againſt him both by land and ſea.

His Majeſty thus acting upon principles ſo worthy to determine his reſolutions, doubts not but to find, in the juſtice of his cauſe, in the valour of his troops, and in the love of his ſubjects, ſuch aſſiſtance, as they have always hitherto afforded him: but above all he relies for protection upon the Lord of Hoſts.

This declaration concludes with a ſevere prohibition of all communication, commerce, and intelligence with the ſubjects of Great Britain, upon pain of death.

Remarks thereon. In this declaration the moſt Chriſtian King lays aſide that politeneſs, for which his court take great pains to adopt in all their tranſactions, and that veracity, on which the French monarch endeavours to avail himſelf in all negociations and communications. He, forgetful of that decorum, which is due to ſovereign Princes, like a man raving with deſpair, charges his Britannic Majeſty with piracy, perfidy, inhumanity, and deceit, even againſt the conviction of his own conſcience; which told him that the very acts, falſely imputed, in the declaration, to the King of Great Britain, were practiſed continually by himſelf and his miniſters: as has

has been proved at large by the facts ſo often produced in the courſe of this hiſtory, and ſummed up in the declaration of war, made by his Britannic Majeſty. Beſides this farago of abuſe and ſcurrillity, there is nothing more than an accuſation of our making reprizals, and oppoſing an open force to the French hoſtilities, without the ceremony of an open declaration of war: which, though it is not juſtified ſtrictly in point of formality, or uſage between nations at peace with each other; yet it can never make that Prince the aggreſſor, who is obliged through neceſſity to defend himſelf and his dominions, againſt one, that in time of peace invades and deſtroys his property, and ſeizes, impriſons, and murders his ſubjects; as the French had done, with impunity, for ſeveral years in America. A. D. 1756.

As the ſucceſs of this war ſeems to depend chiefly on a naval force, it will be proper to give the following liſt of the royal navy of Great Britain, at the time it was declared.

Liſt of the royal navy of Great Britain, 1756.

FIRST RATES.
900 *Men*, 100 *Guns*.

ROyal Ann
Britannia
Royal George
Royal Sovereign
Royal William
Saint George
Namur
Prince
Ramillies
Princeſs Royal
Union

SECOND RATES.
750 *Men*, 90 *Guns*.

Blenheim
Duke

THIRD RATES.
600 *Men*, 80 *Guns*.

Barfleur
Boyne
Princeſs Carolina
Cambridge

A. D. 1756.

Cambridge
Cornwall
Prince George
Marlborough
Neptune
Newark
Norfolk
Ruſſel

600 *Men*, 74 *Guns.*

Culloden
Invincible
Monarque
Terrible
Torbay
Fougueux

600 *Men*, 70 *Guns.*

Bedford
Berwick
Buckingham
Burford
Captain
Chicheſter
Dorſetſhire
Edinburgh
Elizabeth
Eſſex
Prince Frederick
Grafton
Hampton-Court
Kent
Lenox
Monmouth
Naſſau
Northumberland
Royal Oak
Orford
Princeſſa
Revenge
Stirling-Caſtle
Suffolk
Somerſet
Vanguard
Yarmouth
Swiftſure
Magnanime

600 *Men*, 66 *Guns.*

Princeſs Amelia
Cumberland
Devonſhire
Lancaſter

600 *Men*, 64 *Guns.*

Ipſwich
Intrepide
Trident

FOURTH RATES.

400 *Men*, 60 *Guns.*

Saint Alban's
Anſon
Auguſta
Canterbury
Defiance
Dragon
Dreadnought
Dunkirk
Eagle
Exeter
Greenwich
Jerſey
Kingſton
Lion
Medway
Princeſs Louiſa
Princeſs Mary
Prince of Orange
Montague

A. D. 1756

Montague
Nottingham
Pembroke
Plymouth
Rupert
Rippon
Strafford
Sunderland
Superbe
Tilbury
Tyger
Vigilant
Windſor
Weymouth
Worceſter
York

300 *Men*, 50 *Guns*.

Advice
Aſſiſtance
Antelope
Briſtol
Centurion
Chatham
Colcheſter
Cheſter
Deptford
Falkland
Falmouth
Glouceſter
Guernſey
Hampſhire
Harwich
Iſis
Litchfield
Leopard
Newcaſtle
Nonſuch
Norwich
Oxford
Portland
Preſton
Panther
Ruby
Rocheſter
Saliſbury
Severn
Sutherland
Taviſtock
Wincheſter

FIFTH RATES.

250 *Men*, 44 *Guns*.

Adventure
America
Angleſea
Ambuſcade
Cheſterfield
Crown
Diamond
Dover
Eltham
Prince Edward
Expedition
Enterprize
Goſport
Glory
Prince Henry
Humber
Haſtings
Hector
Jaſon
Kinſale
Launceſton
Ludlow-Caſtle
Lark
Liverpool

Looe

A. D. 1756.

Looe
Lynn
Mary Galley
Pearl
Penzance
Pool
Rainbow
Roebuck
Romney
Saphire
South Sea Caſtle
Thetis
Torrington
Woolwich

SIXTH RATES.

130 *Men*, 20 *and* 24 *Guns*.

Amazon
Alderney
Aldborough
Arundel
Bellona
Biddiford
Boſton
Bridgewater
Blandford
Centaur
Deal Caſtle
Durſley Galley
Dolphin
Experiment
Flamborough
Fowe
Fox
Gibraltar
Greyhound
Garland
Glaſgow
Grand Turk
Hinde
Inverneſs
Kennington
Leoſtoffe
Lively
Lys
Lyme
Margate
Mercury
Mermaid
Nightingale
Phœnix
Portmahon
Queenborough
Renown
Ranger
Roſe
Rye
Sea-Horſe
Shoreham
Squirrel
Seaford
Sheerneſs
Syren
Sphinx
Surprize
Succeſs
Scarborough
Solebay
Tartar
Triton
Unicorn
Winchelſea
Wager
Royal Caroline

BOMBS.

Firedrake
Furnace
Granado

SLOOPS.

SLOOPS.

Albany
Badger
Baltimore
Cruizer
Diſpatch
Falcon
Ferret
Fly
Fortune
Grampus
Happy
Hazard
Hornet
Hound
Jamaica
Kingfiſher
Otter
Peggy
Peregrine
Porcupine
Ranger
Raven
Saltaſh
Savage
Scorpion
Shark
Speedwell
Swallow
Swan
Swift
Trial
Viper
Vulture
Waſp
Weazle
Wolf

A. D. 1756.

YACHTS.

Catherine
Charlotte
Dorſet
Fubbs
Mary
William and Mary
Bolton
Chatham
Drake
Portſmouth
Queenborough.

*** There were alſo a number of fire-ſhips, hoys, tranſports, ſmacks, lighters and hulks.

Letters of mark granted.

Beſides theſe ſhips of war, his Majeſty ordered that a commiſſion ſhould be prepared to empower the lords commiſſioners of the admiralty to grant letters of mark, or commiſſions to privateers for ſeizing ſhips and goods belonging to the French King and his ſubjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories or dominions, and ſuch other ſhips and goods, as are or ſhall be liable to

A. D. 1756. to confiſcation, purſuant to the reſpective treaties between his Majeſty and other Princes, States and Potentates.

Encouragement for Privateers.

There was alſo a proclamation iſſued by his Majeſty for the encouragement of privateers, and for regulating prizes, &c. by which the ſole intereſt in, and property of, every ſhip and cargo, was given to the flag-officers, commanders and other officers, ſeamen, mariners and ſoldiers on board his Majeſty's ſhips, from and after the 17th of May 1756, during the continuance of the war with France: and further allowing to them, and to privateers, the ſum of five pounds for every man alive at the beginning of the engagement, on board of any ſhip taken, ſunk, burnt, or otherwiſe deſtroyed.

Clauſe relating to neutral ſhips.

By the Britiſh declaration of war it is manifeſt that our court was determined to ſeize and condemn as good and lawful prize, any ſhip or veſſel, of what nation ſoever, that ſhould be found tranſporting or carrying either ſoldiers, arms, ammunition, or other contraband goods, to any of the territories, lands, plantations or countries of the French King: accordingly we find that his Majeſty's ſhips of war kept an immediate look out for Dutch ſhips, and brought a number of them into the Downs, in the beginning of June, from off the coaſt and ports of France; and one into Portſmouth; ſome of which were laden with maſts and yards, from Riga for Breſt; of which the Dutch complained as a hardſhip: and the magiſtrates of Rotterdam proceeded ſo far as to lay a tax, equal to four guineas a week, upon every Engliſh ſhip that ſhould

ſhould take in lading at that port; and even in a manner prohibited our ſhips taking goods in there at all. But of this affair more hereafter, when, in the courſe of this work, we ſhall have occaſion to ſhew the iniquitous practices of the Dutch carriers for the French, and to confute their claim of right by treaties, to ſuch a trade and navigation, in a ſtate of ſtrict neutrality. A. D. 1756.

National diſcontent.

Theſe were meaſures perfectly agreeable to the inclinations of the people; yet England never wore a more melancholy aſpect. The loſs of Minorca raiſed a clamour not only againſt Byng, but againſt the miniſtry, in every corner of the nation; ſo much as to addreſs his Majeſty, from every quarter, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to remove the miniſters of ſtate; and to change thoſe meaſures, which had brought ſuch a diſgrace upon Great Britain, and expoſed us to deriſion and ruin.

The voice of the nation, by way of petition to the city of London.

The voice of the nation was collected, as it were, and handed up to the citizens of London; amongſt whom every art was tried, to diſſuade them from that part, which they had always taken, in any public calamity, or danger, to lay the national grievances before the throne, and to ſue for redreſs. "In the time of the moſt alarming "circumſtances, the whole kingdom, ſaid the "common voice of the people, flies to the an-"cient and famous city of London for ſafety: "upon her it caſts her eyes for deliverance: to "her it will impute its deſtruction, if it ſhould "become (which heaven forbid!) a province to "France.

A. D. 1756. "France. The city of London is ſtill able to "ſave three kingdoms; to ſave millions and mil- "lions from French tyranny and popiſh ſuperſti- "tion. O let not the Syren luxury, let not a "mean ſelfiſh ſpirit, the bane of every virtuous "action, lull you into indifference! conſider po- "ſterity, and hand down to them that freedom "and happineſs, which were delivered to you, "for that purpoſe, by your forefathers. Provi- "dence often ſends great evils upon nations to "rouze them from a ſtate of indifference and in- "activity, and thereby to ſave them from utter "deſtruction. If this has no effect, a total diſſo- "lution and ruin muſt follow: this has always "been the caſe under every government. Angels "as well as men are witneſſes, ye honourable ci- "tizens, that ye are now publickly told this im- "portant truth: angels and men will bear wit- "neſs againſt you, if you do not regard it. Long "has it poſſeſſed your minds, that England has "an invincible fleet, that we are entirely ſecure "in theſe wooden walls; but the experience of "late affairs has ſhewn, that without ſome conſi- "derable amendments, you truſt in that, which "may fail you.

"Deceive not yourſelves by thinking (though "he deſerves your higheſt reſentment) that ONE "man ONLY is faulty; but, remember, and let it "ſtrike deep on your minds, that a whole council "of war approved of your fleets flying before the "enemy, inferior in number and ſtrength;—Think "not yourſelves ſafe, becauſe you ſurpaſs in num- "ber of ſhips; for if you are not equal in cou-

"rage,

" rage, ſkill, and conduct, you will ſoon become " inferior in number, or your number will be of " no ſervice. The divine Providence has, per- " haps, permitted the ſhameful diſgrace, which " has befallen us, to awaken you from a falſe ſe- " curity. Hear, O citizens, the divine voice call- " ing to you from your fleet fleeing before the " enemy: a ſight never beheld before! awake, " or you, and we all, are undone." A. D. 1756.

" Our wars of late years having been chiefly " on the continent, and our fleets almoſt excluded " from any ſhare in them; it has been a received " opinion, that we were poſſeſſed of an immen- " ſurable ſuperiority over our dangerous rival " upon the ſea, which nature has beſtowed upon " this iſland for our ſecurity: a bulwark in which " all our ſafety conſiſts. But now the time is " come, that our deſpiſed rival in this element, " defies us upon it; and ſtrives, as much as we " ourſelves have done, to confine the conteſt for " dominion and trade to a ſea-war. Which ſide " has ſhewn ſuperior conduct, ſkill and courage, " the annals of the times will tell. But this is " plainly evident, that unleſs ſome conſiderable " reformation; unleſs ſome new laws and regula- " tions are made; unleſs poſts of command are " made the rewards of merit only; unleſs an " higher ſenſe of honour, love and glory be " lighted up; unleſs an improvement in know- " ledge be made the ſtudy of our navy, we ſhall " in a few years become the ſcorn of our enemies, " and muſt live in perpetual dread of them."

A. D. 1756. "It is, then, your duty, O citizens! as the "metropolis of the kingdom, to have your eyes "open to theſe plain truths: to unite in one body "(calling on the other chief cities, &c. in the king- "dom to do the ſame) and addreſs our ſovereign "to inquire into the cauſes of our miſcarriages: "to exert our naval and natural ſtrength; and to "diſplace and puniſh bad miniſters and officers."

Addreſs to the King by the city of London.

The city of London, accordingly, in common council aſſembled, preſented [c] their humble addreſs to his Majeſty, "humbly begging leave to approach his ſacred perſon, and with hearts full of gratitude for his Majeſty's paternal care of the true intereſt of his people, to expreſs their ſorrow and apprehenſions, from the diſquietudes, which the late loſſes and diſappointments muſt have created in his royal mind." Then they ſignified their fears, "That the loſs of the important fortreſs of St. Philip, and iſland of Minorca, (poſſeſſions of the utmoſt conſequence to the commerce and naval ſtrength of Great Britain) without any attempt, by timely and effectual ſuccours, to prevent or defeat an attack, after ſuch early notice [d] of the enemy's intentions, and when his Majeſty's navy was ſo evidently ſuperior to theirs, would be an indelible reproach on the honour of the Britiſh nation. They expreſſed their apprehenſions for the great danger his Majeſty's poſſeſſions in America were in, by the miſmanagement and delays, which had attended the defence

[c] On the 20th day of Auguſt.

[d] See page 235.

of

of thoſe invaluable colonies, the object of the preſent war, and the principal ſource of the wealth and ſtrength of theſe kingdoms. They begged permiſſion to lament the want of a conſtitutional and well-regulated militia, which they accounted to be the moſt natural and certain defence, under Providence, of his Majeſty's ſacred perſon and government, againſt all invaders whatſoever; becauſe thereby his fleets and armies might be more ſecurely employed abroad, to the annoyance of the enemy; aſſuring him, that they were ready and willing, whenever called upon by his Majeſty, to ſhed the laſt drop of their blood in his ſervice. They ſignified their hopes, that the authors of the late loſſes and diſappointments would be enquired into and puniſhed: that his Majeſty's known intentions of protecting and defending his ſubjects in their rights and poſſeſſions, might be faithfully and vigorouſly carried into execution; and, that the large ſupplies, ſo neceſſarily called for, and ſo chearfully granted, might be religiouſly applied to the defence of theſe kingdoms and colonies; and to their commerce; and to the diſtreſſing of our inveterate and perfidious enemies; as the only ſure means of obtaining a laſting and honourable peace: concluding with the utmoſt ſincerity of heart, to aſſure his Majeſty, that his loyal city of London would, at all times, readily and chearfully contribute to whatever might be neceſſary for the defence of his Majeſty, and his illuſtrious family, and towards the attainment of theſe great and deſirable ends." To which A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. his Majeſty anſwered, That his concern for the loſs of Minorca was great and ſincere: that he would maintain the honour of the nation and the commerce of his ſubjects with the utmoſt care and vigilance: That nothing ſhould be wanting, on his part, towards carrying on the war with vigour, in order to a ſafe and honourable peace, and for recovering and ſecuring the poſſeſſions and rights of his crown: and that he would not fail to do juſtice upon any perſons, who might have been wanting in their duty to him and their country; to enforce obedience and diſcipline in his fleets and armies, and to ſupport the authority and reſpect due to his government.

Inſtructions to the repreſentatives of the city of London.

The citizens did alſo inſtruct their repreſentatives in parliament, "calling upon them moſt earneſtly to exert their utmoſt ability towards procuring a ſtrict and impartial parliamentary enquiry into the cauſes of ſo many late national calamities. An almoſt total neglect of our important fortreſſes in the Mediterranean, of ſuch ineſtimable conſequence to the trade and power of theſe kingdoms; and the permitted abſence of their principal officers, many months after the commencement of hoſtilities; the actual loſs of Minorca, and apparent danger of Gibraltar, are circumſtances that filled them with amazement and concern. But when they reflected on the great preparations for an embarkation of troops and artillery, and the equipment of a powerful fleet publickly known to be carried on at Toulon, whoſe neighbourhood to Minorca was ſufficiently alarming, they could not impute

impute thoſe fatal events to neglect alone; and therefore conjured them to enquire, why a reſpectable fleet was not immediately ſent from hence? and why, at laſt, ſo ſmall a ſquadron was ordered upon this important ſervice, without any frigate, fire-ſhip, hoſpital-ſhip, tranſport, or troops beyond their ordinary compliment? and this at a time when the Britiſh naval force was confeſſedly ſuperior to the enemy's. As the cruelties ſuffered and loſſes ſuſtained by their fellow-ſubjects in North America, had long called for redreſs; whilſt the miſmanagements in the attempts for their ſupport, and the untimely and unequal ſuccours ſent to their relief, have only ſerved to render the Britiſh name contemptible; they therefore required them, to uſe their utmoſt endeavours for detecting all thoſe, who by treachery or miſconduct, have contributed to thoſe great diſtreſſes. They added their preſſing requeſt, that they would uſe their earlieſt endeavours to eſtabliſh a well-regulated and conſtitutional militia, as the moſt honourable defence of the crown, and the moſt conſiſtent with the rights of the people: And this, they ſaid, they were more anxious to recommend to their particular care and attention, as every apprehenſion of danger has furniſhed a reaſon for increaſing the number of regular forces, and for the introduction of foreign mercenaries; the expence of which is inſupportable: truſting that they would purſue this meaſure before they ſhould conſent to the grant of ſupplies; experience having convinced them, that their laudable endeavours afterwards might prove abortive. They hinted at ſome violation

A. D. 1756.

A. D. 1756. tion of the Bill of rights, by a ſuſpenſion or interruption of the ordinary form of juſtice in favour of the foreign troops, then in England; and deſired that they would endeavour to bring to juſtice the adviſers and inſtruments of ſuch an inſult offered to our laws. They intreated them, at all events, to oppoſe the continuance of any foreign troops within the kingdom; a circumſtance, which would ever be conſidered as a reproach to the loyalty, courage and ability of this nation. They expreſſed their hopes, that they would endeavour to limit the number of placemen and penſioners, that had of late ſo remarkably increaſed; and at a proper ſeaſon to reſtore triennial parliaments; as they conceived it to be the only means to obtain a free repreſentative of the people. The immenſe ſums ſo chearfully paid, when almoſt every meaſure reflects national diſgrace, they ſaid, called upon them ſtrictly to enquire into their application; and they expreſſed their dependance upon their wiſdom and integrity to prevent all unnatural connections on the continent, in order to preſerve the independency of theſe kingdoms."

Followed by all parts of the nation.

This example was ſpeedily and ſtrongly copied by the moſt reſpectable parts of the nation; all of them breathing a true patriotic and loyal ſpirit, and ſome of them ſo truly Britiſh, that it would be doing injuſtice both to thoſe patriots and to poſterity, ſhould we paſs them over in ſilence.

Southwark's addreſs.

The borough of Southwark, after aſſurances of loyalty and readineſs to ſupport his Majeſty, &c. begged permiſſion "to expreſs their deep ſorrow

"and

" and amazement at the loſs of Minorca, at a time " when our naval power ſo eminently exceeded " that of our enemies, and the deſtination of " theirs had been ſo long apparent. But, they " added, ſtedfaſt in our allegiance, unalterable in " our loyalty, unanimous in the defence of your " Majeſty's ſacred perſon and government, and " animated with a juſt ſenſe of your Majeſty's " martial virtues, if ſupported by a well-regu- " lated militia, we fear not the vain threats of fo- " reign invaders, and moſt humbly beg leave to " aſſure your Majeſty, with the greateſt ſincerity, " that we will chearfully devote the utmoſt ex- " ertion of our abilities to cruſh all impious at- " tempts, either foreign or domeſtic, to ſubvert " our preſent happy conſtitution; and alſo to " ſupport and invigorate thoſe meaſures, which " your Majeſty's great wiſdom ſhall dictate, in " conducting the ſcenes of this moſt neceſſary " and important war, and for bringing to juſtice " thoſe, however dignified and exalted, who by " their bad counſel, or miſconduct, have occa- " ſioned this our preſent and ignoble diſtreſsful " ſituation." A. D. 1756.

The county-palatine of Cheſter addreſſed his Majeſty in theſe terms.

" We, your Majeſty's moſt dutiful and loyal ſubjects, the High Sheriff, Grand Jury, Gentlemen and Freeholders of the county-palatine of Cheſter, moſt humbly beg leave, at this very extraordinary juncture, to addreſs your ſacred Addreſs of the county of Cheſter.

A. D. 1756. perſon with hearts firmly attached to the preſervation of your Majeſty's government, and the liberties of our country: which we apprehend to be ſo cloſely connected, that they muſt mutually depend on the exiſtence of each other.

Conſcious, therefore, of your Majeſty's wonted juſtice and paternal affection for your people, we dutifully hope, that your Majeſty will kindly, and duly, conſider the preſent unhappy ſituation of theſe once flouriſhing kingdoms.

We are too apprehenſive, from many alarming circumſtances, that the ſupplies, ſo chearfully and liberally given, for the ſupport of your Majeſty's Britiſh dominions, have been fatally miſapplied.

We reflect, with the utmoſt concern and abhorrence, that our fleets and armies have been rendered ineffectual by ignorance, cowardice, or treachery: That our American plantations, by which our trade principally flouriſhes, are ſhamefully torn from us, notwithſtanding the large ſums allowed for their defence: And that Minorca, once glorioufly acquired, and ſince, no leſs valiantly defended; an iſland ſo eſſential to our commerce, and a jewel, ſo conſpicuous in your Majeſty's crown, has been unaccountably abandoned, to the perpetual diſgrace of this nation and your Majeſty's glory, to our perfidious enemy; an enemy we have hitherto never feared, but have often humbled.

Our concern naturally increaſes, when we reflect farther, that the taxes are grievous, the national debt immenſe; that our trade daily leſſens, though

they

they multiply; by which, we fear, we may be too ſoon diſabled from raiſing the neceſſary ſupplies for the ſupport of your Majeſty's and our country's rights. A. D. 1756.

We behold alſo, with the deepeſt ſorrow, foreign troops unavailingly imported, and expenſively maintained within this kingdom, while your Majeſty's faithful ſubjects are unarmed and rejected; who, innately brave, and cordially intereſted, would ſtrenuouſly defend your ſacred Majeſty, and their now endangered country.

Theſe melancholy reflections fill us with fear and amazement; and our allegiance to your Majeſty, and love of our native country, once the arbitreſs of Europe, induce us to unboſom our thoughts to your royal conſideration; not doubting redreſs of our grievances from a King, who loves to be eſteemed the father of his people.

Permit us, therefore, moſt humbly to repreſent to your Majeſty the abſolute neceſſity of having our natural guards, a well-regulated Militia, upon the footing of the Engliſh conſtitution: and we likewiſe moſt humbly hope, from your Majeſty's known juſtice and goodneſs, that you will be pleaſed to direct ſuch a ſpeedy and ſtrict enquiry into the conduct of all thoſe, who, when it was in their power, did not prevent our loſſes; but have conduced, or conſpired, to overwhelm this nation, and your Majeſty's crown, with reproach and diſhonour; that they may receive their due puniſhment, which they ſo juſtly deſerve."

A. D. 1756.

In the inſtructions from the gentry, clergy and freeholders of the county of York, are the following remarkable paſſages. "We moſt earneſtly recommend to you a diligent attendance on parliament, and an active ſcrutiny into all thoſe dire and fatal ſprings of our military diſaſters and perplexed negotiations, which have brought ſuch indignity and burden upon theſe abuſed realms.

Inſtructions of the county of York.

"The extremity long predicted ſeems now to advance with much haſty ſtrides. It is, alas! a truth, which every voice authenticates; and, therefore, your conſtituents conjure that you will be the faithful and honeſt counſellors of royalty, and be no longer amuſed with the futile projects and venal ſpeeches of ſelf-deſigning men, who, in proportion as they promiſe and diſpenſe, only attempt to enſlave, and become the prodigal ſpendthrifts of our patrimonies and acquirements.

"That the welfare of this country may not be totally unhinged, either through our crimes, or the abuſe of ſecondary means, we hope, that you will not only endeavour to introduce a change of men, but of morals and meaſures; that the rank enormities, which deluge this land, may not be laid to the charge and example of its magiſtrates and ſenators: That venality and gaming, the bane of buſineſs and the ruin of integrity, may, in particular, no longer make their proſelytes to ſervile dependence, or preſs

"into

" into their ſervice advocates for foreign and per- A. D.
" nicious ſyſtems. 1756.

" We farther lament, for the ſake of ourſelves,
" and the illuſtrious family on the throne, that
" when, through the fate of human nature, his
" moſt gracious Majeſty ſhall be demanded to
" other glory, that the heir apparent muſt ſuc-
" ceed to ſo diſadvantageous a proſpect: We
" mean, to ſo immenſe a debt, as makes each
" proprietor tremble and each neuter ſad.

" Let it then be your conſtant endeavours, by
" all equitable means, to make this burden light,
" and the yoke eaſy: And, if a continent muſt
" be ſupplied, if our ſpoils muſt be ſhared, let
" America partake, rather than ungrateful Ger-
" many, the ſepulchre of Britiſh intereſt.

" It is with no little concern we find thoſe to
" be the open tenets now, which formerly were,
" with ſome modeſty and addreſs, concealed. But
" we apprehend, and it is hoped you will alſo
" conceive it, that where the intereſt of two
" eſtates, centering in the ſame perſon, inter-
" fere, that the leſſer ſhould give way, and be
" ſubſervient to the greater. This is the manifeſt
" rule of right, the moſt uſual and natural ex-
" pectation.

" This loyal and martial county, the leader in
" a late ſeaſon of danger, the firſt in rank for
" opulence, extent, and natural advantages, pre-
" ſumes farther to adviſe, that you will oppoſe
" (unleſs exigencies change,) all future ſchemes
" of receiving foreign mercenaries into this land;

" and

A. D. 1756. " and that a conſtitutional militia, with our own " troops, may ſupply the occaſions, for which " aliens were imported; and that we may have " no further cauſe to fear and ſay, with Matta- " thias, *God forbid that we ſhould forſake the law* " *and the ordinances.*"

Of Somerſetſhire. The conſtituents of the Knights of the ſhire of the county of Somerſet applied to their repreſentatives with the like zeal, and amongſt other particulars referred them to the perfidy of France, and the miſconduct of the Britiſh miniſtry, ever ſince the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle: " How unhappy, " ſay they, muſt it make every honeſt and gene- " rous Briton, to find, that notwithſtanding the " treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, our trade, rights, " and our moſt invaluable privileges are not ef- " fectually ſecured to us? for no ſooner were we " pleaſing ourſelves with the thoughts of peace " and tranquillity, but we were alarmed with the " augmentation of the naval force of our ene- " mies, and our colonies in America were claimed, " encroached upon, and hoſtilely invaded; and " all this permitted without the leaſt inquiry made, " or reſentment ſhewn, by thoſe who had the " conduct of our public affairs.——*A ſupineneſs* " *unaccountable and unparallelled!*"

Of the city of Briſtol. In the inſtructions from Briſtol, the gentlemen, clergy, merchants, and other principal inhabitants obſerve, that " there is nothing ſo reaſon- " able or ſo juſt, as the deſire, univerſally expreſſed " by the nation, that a clear and full account " may be obtained, of the immenſe ſupplies

" given

" given by their repreſentatives in, and raiſed A. D.
" upon the people, ſince the laſt ſeſſions of par- 1756.
" liament. The motives on which, and the ends
" for which, thoſe vaſt ſums, in our preſent cir-
" cumſtances eſpecially, were ſo readily voted,
" and ſo chearfully paid, were ſufficiently divulged,
" and therefore the manner in which they have
" been applied, ought to be no ſecret. The *Ar-*
" *cana Imperii* are well ſuited to deſpotic go-
" vernments, but are inconſiſtent with, and dan-
" gerous to, the liberties of a free people. Be-
" ſides, it is no way reconcileable to the nature of
" our conſtitution, which is founded on reaſon
" and equity, the liberty of the ſubjects perſons,
" and the ſecurity of their properties.

" We find ſome additional reaſons to ſtrengthen
" the people's claim, which we could wiſh, tho'
" warm friends to it, that they had rather wanted.
" Theſe additional reaſons conſiſt in diſappoint-
" ments and loſſes. In reference to the former,
" we had felt ſomething of them before, and
" experienced them abundantly in the laſt war;
" witneſs our attack on Carthagena, our invaſion
" of Cuba, our deſcent upon Bretagne, and many
" others. However, we muſt allow our preſent
" diſappointment to be of quite a new ſpecies,
" and yet much more galling and provoking than
" all the reſt put together.—For, notwithſtanding
" all our liberal grants, and the ſanguine known
" expectations of thoſe who gave, at leaſt of thoſe
" who paid them,—we have attempted nothing.

" Our loſſes are to the full as wonderful, and

" rather

A. D. 1756. "rather more affecting. In the Weſt Indies our "enemy has a confeſſed ſuperiority, which has "been augmented by the capture of almoſt the "ſingle ſhip of force we had then cruizing in "thoſe ſeas. In North America our colonies "have been ranſacked for many months, by the "moſt barbarous nations, almoſt without de- "fence. We have been deprived of Minorca in "a manner, which does as little honour to the "French as to us. Our navy has been diſgraced "in the Mediterranean. If this, inſtead of a "public, were a private caſe, on ſuch ſuggeſtions "as theſe, a court of equity would, beyond a "queſtion, decree an account."

Of the county of Eſſex.

The county of Eſſex, in their repreſenta- tion of the grievances on this occaſion, obſerve, That "ſtanding armies and foreign troops "have not heretofore been thought the proper "means to repel an invaſion: They are grievouſly "burdenſome to the ſubject, always dangerous to "the conſtitution, and in every reſpect diſagree- "able to the nation, as well as every way inade- "quate to the real ſervice againſt our enemies, "without the aſſiſtance of a greater part of our "fleet, than ought to be confined for that pur- "poſe. Therefore, when a truly loyal, brave, "and generous people, from every quarter, ar- "dently deſire that arms may be put into their "hands for the defence of themſelves, their fa- "milies, their King and their country, againſt "the encroachments and attacks of a perfidious "and dangerous enemy, it was hoped, that they

"would

" would do all in their power to prevent the denial A. D. 1756.
" of ſo natural a right to a free people.

" They the more earneſtly requeſted their aſſiduity " in promoting a conſtitutional militia for theſe " good purpoſes, from a thorough conviction " that it would have as certain a tendency to- " wards the ſecuring the crown to his Majeſty and " his heirs, as the preſerving the liberties and " properties of the ſubjects."

In theſe acts of the people, it is clear that they were ready to ſupport his Majeſty in the juſt and neceſſary war he had been forced into by the obſtinacy, perfidy and hoſtilities of France, after very long and fruitleſs negociations and forbearance: even almoſt to the irreparable injury of our national intereſt: But that they were diſcontented with, and diffident of the miniſtry, and unwilling to truſt the national money, or that the conduct of the war ſhould be committed to them, who had given ſuch umbrage for ſuſpicion of their abilities and neglect in the ſervice of their country: who, they prayed, might be removed out of the adminiſtration: whoſe meaſures they requeſted might be ſcrutinized: and that the foreign forces ſhould be ſent home; a national militia eſtabliſhed, and the authors of our late miſcarriages might be brought to condign puniſhment. Remarks on theſe addreſſes, &c.

His Majeſty, ever attentive to his faithful ſubjects, had already pledged his royal word for a ſtrict application of the ſupplies, granted in the laſt ſeſſion of parliament; and now, he not only promiſed to redreſs their grievances and com-

A. D. 1756. plaints, but commanded an immediate examination into the cauſes of the loſs of Minorca: and, as we ſhall find, proceeded to ſatisfy them in every other part of their petitions.

Admiral Byng arreſted. Admiral Byng and the other ſtate priſoners arrived on the third of July, at Portſmouth. Where the ſaid Admiral was immediately put under arreſt, and eſcorted ſome time after from thence to an appartment in Greenwich-Hoſpital; there to be kept cloſe priſoner to prepare for his trial: which was delayed by the abſence of many evidences, in the Mediterranean, required both in his favour and againſt him.

Admiral Weſt, &c. go to London. Admiral Weſt and Lieutenant-General Fowke were ordered up to London. Where the Admiral was graciouſly received by his Majeſty; but Lieutenant-General Fowke was ordered to take his trial, for diſobeying his Majeſty's orders tranſmitted to him from the ſecretary of war, relating to the embarkation of a battalion of troops to be ſent by Mr. Byng to reinforce Fort St. Philip.

Lieut. Gen. Fowke to be tried.

His court-martial. The court-martial commiſſioned to try Lieutenant-General Fowke, conſiſted [c] of two Generals, eleven Lieutenant-Generals, and three Major-Generals. The Judge-Advocate read the letters,

[c] Gen. Sir Robert Rich, preſident—Gen. Sir J. Ligonier—Lieut. Gen. Hawley—Lieut. Gen. Lord Cadogan—Lieut. Gen. Guiſe—Lieut. Gen. Onſlow—Lieut. Gen. Pulteney—Lieut. Gen. Huſke—Lieut. Gen. Campbell—Lieut. Gen. Lord de la War—Lieut. Gen. Charles Duke of Marlborough—Lieut. Gen. Wolfe—Lieut. Gen. Cholmondeley—Major Gen. Laſcelles—Major Gen. Bocland—Major Gen. Lord George Beauclerk.

which

which you have at the bottom of the page [f], and were said to contain the instructions broken, or A. D. 1756.

[f] *To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief in his Majesty's garrison of Gibraltar.*

SIR, War-Office, March 21, 1756.

I am commanded to acquaint you that it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you receive into your garrison Lord Robert Bertie's regiment, to do duty there; and in case you shall apprehend, that the French threaten to make any attempt upon his Majesty's island of Minorca, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you make a detachment out of the troops in your garrison, equal to a battalion, to be commanded by a lieutenant and major, such lieutenant and major to be the eldest in your garrison, to be put on board the fleet for the relief of Minorca, at the disposition of the admiral,

I am, Sir, your humble Servant,

BARRINGTON.

To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief at Gibraltar.

SIR, War-Office, March 28, 1756.

I am commanded to acquaint you, that it is his Majesty's pleasure, in case you shall apprehend, that the French threaten an attempt upon Minorca, that you make a detachment from the troops in your garrison equal to a battalion, commanded by a lieutenant-colonel and major, for the relief of that place, to be put on board the fleet at the disposition of the admiral; such lieutenant-colonel and major to be the eldest in your garrison. BARRINGTON.

To Lieutenant General Fowke, or, in his absence, to the Commander in Chief in his Majesty's garrison in Gibraltar.

SIR, War-Office, April 1, 1756.

It is his Majesty's pleasure, that you receive into your garrison the women and children belonging to Lord Robert Bertie's regiment.

BARRINGTON.

A. D. 1756. not fulfilled by Lieutenant-General Fowke, as Governor of Gibraltar. To this accuſation the priſoner delivered a written anſwer by way of defence; and he deſired that the Judge-Advocate might read it, and that he might be allowed to aſk ſuch queſtions, as ſhould neceſſarily ariſe from the nature of the caſe.

The defence ſet forth, "that he had received thoſe three letters together, by the ſame hand; and muſt therefore take them together:" that his orders were *confuſed* at leaſt, if not *contradictory*: "that if they were confuſed, then he could not know when he had executed them; and if they were contradictory, they could not be executed at all."

Here the Secretary of War being aſked ſeveral queſtions by the priſoner, he candidly acknowledged, that he apprehended the ſecond letter ſuperſeded the firſt; that he ought to have ſaid in his ſecond letter, *notwithſtanding my former orders*: and that the reaſon for his incorrectneſs was his little experience, having been only about four months in that office.

Then the judge proceeded with the written defence, in which the defendant ſaid, "My orders being confuſed and contradictory, I called a council of war, not to deliberate whether I ſhould obey my orders, or not, but only to take their ſenſe, what was the meaning of them."

Mr. Fowke here, and frequently, urged, that his orders were not abſolute, but diſcretionary; and that the execution of them was left to his

and

and Mr. Byng's diſcretion and judgment; for which he particularly referred to a letter from the Secretary of War to the Commander in Chief at Gibraltar, which throughout ſuppoſes a diſcretionary power in the execution of former orders [g]. A. D. 1756.

He proceed to defended the meaſure itſelf, even if the orders had not been inconſiſtent and contradictory. "The whole number, ſaid he, which I had then in garriſon was but 2,700 men. I had ſpared to Mr. Edgcumbe's ſhips 230, which with 40 of my men, left by him in St. Philip's, made 270: the ordinary duty of the garriſon required, in workmen and guards, eight hundred men, ſo that I had then only 130 men more than three reliefs. If I had made the detachment of a battalion, and put it on board the fleet, I ſhould not then have had much more than two reliefs, and this at a time, when I believed the place was in danger of being attacked, for good reaſons, which I don't think myſelf at liberty to mention."

The Lieutenant-General having explained himſelf in this particular, returned to exculpate him-

[g] For in the Secretary's letter it was ſaid, "if that order has not been complied with, then you are now to make a detachment of 700 men out of your own regiment and Guiſe's, and alſo another detachment out of Poultney's and Panmure's regiments, and ſend them on board the fleet for the relief of Mahon. But if that order has been complied with, then you are to make only one more detachment of 700 men, to be commanded by another lieutenant colonel and major, and to ſend it to Mahon."

A. D. 1756.

ſelf upon the doubtfulneſs of his orders: and adding, that he knew very well that his duty did not allow him to hold a council of war, to deliberate upon the obeying of the orders; and that he had ſummoned that council only to aſſiſt him in the underſtanding of them, the Judge-Advocate reſted the whole proof upon this conceſſion, and obſerving that his own letter, and the minutes of the ſaid council plainly implied, that they had no doubt at all about their meaning, the court found him guilty of the charge, and adjudged that he ſhould be ſuſpended for the ſpace of one year [h]. His Majeſty did not only confirm this ſentence, but diſmiſſed him from his ſervice. To which he was never reſtored; but was, not long after, favoured, as we are informed, with a handſome penſion.

Arts made uſe of to injure Admiral Byng.

In the mean time every thing ſeemed to inflame the public againſt Mr. Byng. His character was artfully delivered over to the populace, to gratify upon it the worſt paſſions, that the worſt artifices and inſtruments could raiſe. There was not a ſpecies of libelling in prints, in verſe, or in proſe, that was not exhauſted to render him odious: the very ghoſt of his honourable father was raiſed, adviſing him to lay violent hands on himſelf—Laſt-dying ſpeeches and confeſſions were prepared in his name—Mock executions were ſpirited up,

[h] When the queſtion was put, to quit or ſuſpend for a year, the voices were equal: but the preſident being, in ſuch caſes, veſted with the caſting vote, he gave it againſt the priſoner.

to make the way eaſy for a real one—Theſe ſanguinary diſcourſes and practices pointed out the priſoner to be the ſtricken-deer, which all the dependents and followers of his proſecutors were to unite in goring out of the herd, and to repreſent him to be the *ſole* cauſe of the diſgrace and loſs ſuſtained by this nation in the Mediterranean. A. D. 1756.

A letter was publiſhed, and ſaid to be dated at Gibraltar 24th of June, in which it was affirmed, Mr. Byng might have ſeveral times ſent letters, and whatever he pleaſed into Minorca, but that he had never attempted it: that private ſignals had been appointed, by which the fleet and garriſon might have underſtood each other; but that the Admiral, when in ſight, did not return one ſignal. That he ſhewed no inclination, in any one inſtance, of coming near the object he had to relieve: that every thing ſhewed, the enemy knew their man; and the plan of his operations: that he had formed his own diviſion with the ſtrongeſt ſhips in the fleet, but would not ſuffer one of them to aſſiſt the wing that was engaged: that he fired ſix barrels of powder, but a great deal of it was in ſignals to hinder others from doing their duty: and he kept at ſo great diſtance from the enemy, that the balls directed againſt the French fell ſhort of their ſhips 500 yards at leaſt. Letters to his prejudice.

Another was dated from the ſame port on the 4th of July, under the deſcription of a ſailor, who delivered himſelf thus: "on the 20th of May, "it was in our power to finiſh the war, and make "ourſelves gentlemen: but the Lord knows if

A. D. 1756. "we ever ſhall have the chance again. We engaged and diſabled the French Admiral, a brave "80 gun ſhip; which fell to our lot in the line; "and we ſhould certainly have made her our "prize, if we had been permitted ſo to do. We "broke our line to run through the French and "pick her up, but were immediately ordered to "keep our ſtation. We ſet her on fire twice on "the quarter; likewiſe drove two ports abaft into "one; beſides carrying away her maintop-ſail "yard, and her top-ſail ſheets fore and aft, and "her ſails alſo; ſo that ſhe could not eſcape at "any rate, if we only had the liberty to have "gone after her. And if ſhe had ſtruck, being "the chief, no doubt but the reſt would have "followed her example; for if ſeven ſail beat off "twelve, what muſt our thirteen have done, if "they had all played their part."

Hanged and burnt in effigy.

There was ſcarce a village in the nation, but dreſſed up a man of ſtraw, and committed him to the gallows and to the flames, under the execrated name of one, that had betrayed his country. London and its environs exhibited many of theſe ſcenes. The populace at Greenwich were permitted to inſult the priſoner in the moſt outrageous manner, by executing him in effigy even before the windows of the quarter, in which he was confined. And, what is moſt unaccountable, a Byng, as the children were taught to call it, with indignation, was, at an extraordinary expence, brought by day-light upon Tower-hill, dreſſed in the regimentals of an Admiral

eſcorted

eſcorted by a file of mercenary wretches hired for that purpoſe, with muſkets on their ſhoulders; and, after parading ſeveral times round that area, with drums beating, under the walls of the Tower of London, he was hanged upon a gallows, there erected, twenty foot high; cut down and burnt in the ſight of 10,000 people, with ſtrong imprecations, to the prejudice of his future defence. A. D. 1756.

It is not collected only from the principal actors at the popular bonfires and incendiary executions, how to form an idea of the ſecret ſprings of ſuch actions, promoted and conducted chiefly by the underſtrappers of great men, and inferior officers under the crown: but from the correſpondence between Admiral Byng and the Admiralty, in which, during his confinement, he could not forbear complaining of being put under an arreſt, after an unprecedented manner, without any reaſon aſſigned, which every criminal has a right to be acquainted with [i]: of being treated with greater ſeverity and ſtricter confinement, than other officers; who, when their conduct was doubted of, were ordered to prepare for their trials, and were indulged with leave to regulate their affairs on ſhore, at large [k]: that his conduct had been placed in England, before his arrival, in an odious light by the induſtry of ſome, as yet inviſible perſons, who were indefatigable in pro- To whom to be aſcribed. His complaints.

[i] See Byng's letter, dated Antelope, Spithead, July 27, 1756.

[k] See ditto, 30th of July 1756.

A. D. 1756. pagating falſhoods to his diſhonour [l]. Being told of the tenderneſs and indulgence ſhewn to him by the Lords of the Admiralty, this unhappy priſoner could not contain himſelf. "What, ſays "he, with aſtoniſhment, can being kept moving "backward and forward, from one place of con- "finement to another, for near three weeks after "my arrival in England, ſo as to make it im- "poſſible for me to prepare any thing relating to "my defence, be called by either of theſe names? "or, can my cloſe confinement at Greenwich, "without ſuffering even my menial ſervants to "remain in the houſe after dark, be called ſo? "And I think I have a right to complain of that "cruel countenance and belief, which ſeems to "be given to a groundleſs report [m] of my having "attempted to make my eſcape, and the rigid

[l] See Byng's letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated Greenwich, September 6, 1756.

[m] This was the ſhameleſs forgery of his attempting to make his eſcape in his ſiſter's cloaths, an invention calculated by ſomebody to countenance more appearance of guilt, and authenticated to the public by an order for additional bolts and bars, additional guards of ſoldiers; and, as if all were not ſufficient, a boatſwain and twelve men of the hoſpital, by way of ſuppliment, were appointed to watch in the court below. Then an alarm was given, that four men were ſeen at his window, in the upper ſtory, and in the middle of the night; but they could not be found, though ſtrict ſearch was made by the officer on duty; nor could they find any trace of ſuch an attempt, yet this fiction was propagated for an infallible truth, by an addition of a number of ſmiths and bricklayers to wall up the doors (except one) to bar up all the windows, and the very chimnies.

orders

" orders given in conſequence of it, *as if intended* A. D.
" to confirm it; a report ſo injurious to me, and 1756.
" ſo abſolutely without foundation.—And I can-
" not here avoid obſerving, that all charge of
" keeping me in cuſtody ſeems to be taken from
" the marſhal, and committed to the governor of
" the hoſpital, who ſeems diligent in diſtinguiſh-
" ing himſelf in the ſervice of his country, by
" impoſing upon me all the indignities and incon-
" veniences, that power can enable him to do;
" being——reſtrained and diſtreſſed by all the
" methods power can impoſe, and perſonally di-
" ſturbed day and night, with unparallelled treat-
" ment and unprecedented hardſhips and incon-
" veniencies [n]." And being denied the right of ſending for an additional number of witneſſes, he writes [o], " My caſe is very ſufficiently hard, if in-
" dulged with every legal advantage: for I have
" too much reaſon to believe, that my proſecution
" is carried on by perſons too powerful for me to
" contend againſt, whoſe influence muſt add great
" weight to their accuſations againſt me."

After the whole art of political necromancy had been exhauſted, in conjuring up alarming ſpectres

[n] See Byng's letter to the ſecretary of the admiralty, dated September the 14th 1756.

[o] D°. October the 17th 1756. *N. B.* When he was brought to Greenwich hoſpital; though he was an admiral, the ſon of a peer, and a member of parliament, he was hoiſted up to the top of the hoſpital, into an apartment, where people were in bed, after midnight, and was obliged to lay himſelf down on the floor, with his portmanteau for a pillow, for refreſhment, the remainder of the night.

of

A. D. 1756. of cowardice, treachery and treaſon, and the witneſſes were arrived from the Streights, the admiral

Ordered for trial. was ordered to prepare for his trial; in which his fate ſeems at laſt, to be determined upon a diſputable point of diſcipline only, or by a law quibble, upon the words of the 12th article of the ſtatute 22 Geo. II. But this will beſt appear from the proceedings of the court martial.

Where and by whom. The place appointed for this trial was on board his Majeſty's ſhip the St. George, in Portſmouth harbour, and the court was compoſed of four admirals and nine captains [p]. They ſat one and thirty days, Sundays excepted [q], examining witneſſes, and hearing the priſoner's defence; which he made in the following words, or to that effect:

GENTLEMEN,

Admiral Byng's defence. "THE articles of the charge exhibited againſt me, are of ſuch a nature, that every thing "which can be ſuppoſed intereſting to a man, is "concerned in the event of this cauſe. My cha- "racter, my property, and even my life are at "ſtake; and I ſhould indeed have great reaſon

[p] Thomas Smith, Eſq; Vice Admiral of the Red, Preſident—Francis Holburne, Eſq; Rear Admiral of the Red—Harry Norris, Eſq; Rear Admiral of the White—Thomas Brodrick, Eſq; Rear Admiral of the Blue—Captain Charles Holmes — Captain William Boys — Captain John Simcoe — Captain John Bentley — Captain Peter Dennis — Captain Francis Geary--Captain John Moore—Captain James Douglaſs —The Honourable Captain Auguſtus Keppel.

[q] From the 28th of December 1756, to the 27th of January 1757.

"to



A. Walker sculp.

The Hon.ble JOHN BYNG Esq.r

Admiral of the Blue.

" to be alarmed, were not I conſcious of my in- A. D.
" nocence, and fully perſuaded of the juſtice and 1756.
" equity of the court.

" It is no new thing, gentlemen, to be ac-
" cuſed: court martials have of late, been very
" frequent. I have been a long time under the
" diſagreeable ſituation of a confined priſoner, of
" a man accuſed, and conſequently condemned
" by many. *No means, no artifice has been omitted*
" *by my enemies, to injure my reputation.* However,
" I will not take up your time with a detail of
" theſe matters, but beg leave to obſerve, that
" the nature of a ſea ſervice is complicated, de-
" pending on ſo many circumſtances, and ſubject
" to ſuch variety of accidents, that for a com-
" mander even of the greateſt capacity, to pro-
" vide againſt all contingencies, is impoſſible.
" But to ſet upon a ſoft chair and cenſure, and,
" after the event of an action, to point out how,
" and by what means it might have ſucceeded bet-
" ter, is extremely eaſy. This ſort of ſcience re-
" quires no other abilities, than a great deal of
" ill-nature and little wit. Even thoſe actions,
" which have been attended with the greateſt ſuc-
" ceſs, and reflected the greateſt glory on this na-
" tion, have not eſcaped the venom of theſe ma-
" licious critics; and, perhaps, there never was
" an action ſo complete, but it might have been
" better conducted, were it poſſible to have fore-
" ſeen all circumſtances attending it. But I con-
" fide in the candour and the equity of this court,
" that my enemies will be diſappointed.

" As

A. D. 1756. "As to the article exhibited againſt me, relating to my making any unneceſſary delay in "ſailing of the fleet from St. Helen's to Gibraltar, "and from thence to Mahon, the teſtimonies of "the evidence have, doubtleſs, ſufficiently proved "the contrary; I ſhall therefore trouble the court "with nothing further on that head.

"As to the other articles exhibited againſt me, "I hope to make my innocence appear, by a con-"ciſe relation of the whole of my conduct." Which he began with the account, as related above, on page 276 to 283, and then, added:

"This behaviour will, I hope, appear to the "court to be ſuggeſted by prudence, all that "could have been attempted in the ſpace of an "hour, and the moſt advantageous ſtep, which "could have been taken on that occaſion. It "proves that I did not depend on the hear-ſay "evidence which I had received even from the "beſt authorities at Gibraltar, nor on the united "opinion of every officer at that place; but that "I was determined to be certified of the true "ſtate of the harbour and citadel from General "Blakeney himſelf, as I expected that Captain "Scroop, who, together with all the ſoldiers and "marines of Mr. Edgcumbe's ſhips, and 100 "ſeamen, had been left to reinforce the garriſon, "would come off in his barge, and bring me a juſt "relation of every circumſtance neceſſary to be "known; and though I mentioned in my letter "of the 25th of May, 'That it was the opinion "of all the ſea and land officers, that they could

"render

" render no ſervice to the garriſon, as no place was A. D.
" covered for the landing of any men, *could they* 1756.
" *have ſpared any*;' in this I only gave my opinion
" agreeable to that of all the other officers. Their
" opinion had no influence on my conduct, and
" was only meant to ſignify what might have
" been the event ſuppoſing the French fleet had
" not appeared at that time.

" So far then I hope it will appear to the court,
" that neither knowledge in my profeſſion, pru-
" dence in conducting the expedition, or duty to
" my King and country, appear to be deficient
" in me.

" My letter to General Blakeney, ſent by Mr.
" Harvey, though never delivered, for reaſons
" immediately to follow, will, I think, evince this
" truth.

" My firſt care, after coming in ſight of the
" port, was to know the true ſtate of the harbour
" and garriſon, to encourage the General and ſol-
" diers, by acquainting him that I was arrived to
" his ſuccour, and deſiring to know how it might
" moſt effectually be put in execution.

" Thus then I hope all things will appear to
" the court, to be well conducted to the time of
" the French fleet's appearing in view; when, on
" ſeeing the enemy, conſiderations of another na-
" ture took place, and it became neceſſary to defer
" the execution of all reſolutions, which I had
" taken ſince I ſaw Mahon, and to recall the men
" of war which I had diſpatched to reconnoitre
" the harbour, and procure intelligence from

General

A. D. 1756. "General Blakeney. It was now to no purpose "to know the state of the citadel and harbour, "before I had engaged the French fleet; I had "no soldiers to land, but what made part of the "complement of my ships, and served as marines; "and if I had been provided with them, it would "have been absolutely imprudent to have landed "them before the engagement with the enemy, "and thereby render that force less, which was "already too little, for the intent it ought to "have been sent upon. Landing the troops would "have rendered the fleet unfit for action, and ob- "liged it to flee before the enemy. Had I be- "haved in that manner, such a preposterous act "could not have failed rendering me justly delin- "quent, and unequal to the command I presided "in.

"I was very sensible that if success was the con- "sequence of engaging the French, that I should "have it more in my power to relieve the citadel, "as far as landing the troops, which served as "marines, could effect it. But I suspected also, "and with reason, that I might probably be ren- "dered unable to keep the seas, though I obtain- "ed the victory, and therefore prevented from "effectually succouring the citadel.

"So far all, I hope, will appear to the court "to have been conducted with knowledge and "prudence.

"Am I deserving of blame for not seeking the "enemy in the disabled condition I was in after "the engagement?

"To

" To what purpoſe would this ſecond engage- A. D.
" ment have been attempted with a fleet originally 1756.
" ſo greatly inferior to the French, and now ren-
" dered much more ſo by the damages received in
" the late battle? A total defeat, in all probabi-
" lity, is the anſwer of reaſon; and if Monſ. la
" Galiſſionere had fought it, which providentially
" he did not, it is a reaſonable preſumption that
" the whole Engliſh ſquadron would have periſh-
" ed, or fallen a prey to the French, ſince there
" was no port to ſhelter them. Whereas, had I
" been in the Mediterranean before the arrival of
" the French at Minorca, a defeat on my ſide
" even might have ſaved the iſland: I could have
" then ſaved my ſhattered remains in Mahon, and
" though conquered at ſea, by means of the ſailors
" and ſoldiers, have preſerved St. Philip's, and
" probably the iſland. Thus a defeat of our fleet,
" had it been timely ſet out, would have done more
" ſervice than a victory, after St. Philip's was in-
" veſted.

" It has been the ſettled rule of all generals,
" that no commander ſhould ever riſque an en-
" gagement, but when there is greater expecta-
" tion to gain by a victory, than to loſe by a de-
" feat.

" When then, from the inferiority of the Engliſh,
" nothing could be reaſonably expected but miſ-
" fortune and diſgrace; or if, by the greateſt
" efforts of good fortune, victory ſhould declare
" for our fleet, that no advantage could be drawn
" from it; when the riſque of loſing the whole

" fleet

A. D. 1756. "fleet was the reſult of an unanimous council of "war; and the nation, conſidering the real ſtate "of the Engliſh and French navies, ſo little able "to ſuſtain a loſs of that kind; when Gibraltar "would have been left defenceleſs, and fallen of "courſe to the enemy; could the ſeeking the "French admiral, by a commander who foreſaw "theſe probable conſequences, with not only an "inferior, but a ſhattered fleet, and no other "ſhips in the Mediterranean to reinforce him, "have been juſtified in the judgment of men, "who have ſtudied the nature of military at- "chievements, or according to the rules and ob- "ſervations of ancient and modern writers on this "head?

"The utmoſt advantage could have been but "a prolongation of the ſiege, without the leaſt "probability of raiſing it; becauſe the fleet, un- "able to keep the ſea, muſt have retreated to Gi- "braltar, the port of Mahon being ſtill command- "ed by the enemies batteries.

"Are commanders then at all events to ſhow "no other token of generalſhip, but what is to be "learned from brutes? an exceſs of courage "only? and are all who uſe the ſuperior attributes "of the human underſtanding, to be conſidered "as delinquents in their duty to their King and "country? What commander of common ſenſe "will ſerve his country under ſuch diſcouraging "conditions, where, unleſs he fights againſt all "kinds of diſadvantage, he is to be ſtigmatiſed "with the eternal infamy of *cowardice*; and if he

"does

" does engage his enemy, and does not ſucceed A. D. 1756.
" againſt this great ſuperiority of force, he is to
" be deemed a *coward* alſo, and be given up to the
" rage of the multitude? It appeared impracticable
" to relieve Mahon, and probable, that Gibraltar would be attacked, and therefore the determination of proceeding thither, was become
" the moſt prudent deciſion, which could have
" been made; the moſt likely to conduce to the
" nation's ſervice, and a juſt reſolution of the
" council of war.

" It is a matter of conſequence to conſider, that
" though two fleets may be of equal number,
" they may yet be of unequal force, as it has happened in this inſtance: and a ſickly ſquadron,
" without means of providing for the diſeaſed and
" wounded, or recruiting their ſeamen and ſoldiers,
" of which, more than a thouſand ſick, which at
" their return to Gibraltar, were ſent to the hoſpital, was a conſideration that ought greatly to
" influence at that moment; eſpecially when it
" was evident, beyond all contradiction, that
" the enemy poſſeſſed every advantage, which I
" was in want of, having a power of procuring
" recruits of ſeamen from the 200 tranſports, and
" ſoldiers from the camp of the beſiegers."

Evidences againſt him. Of Admiral Weſt.

But Admiral Weſt having depoſed, That there appeared to him no impediment, why Admiral Byng and his diviſion could have got up to the enemy, and engage them as cloſe as the van did;

10

A D. 1756. did [r]; and that the ſignal for chaſing was never made: Lieut. General Blakeney having depoſed, That boats might have paſſed with great ſecurity on the 20th of May, between the garriſon and the fleet; and that if the detachment ordered from Gibraltar had been landed, he could have held out till Sir Edward Hawke came with more effectual relief: Mr. Boyd having depoſed, That the ſuccours were wanted, and might have been certainly thrown in: Captain John Philips having depoſed, That there was not ſail enough made at the firſt; and that he never ſaw nor heard of any ſignal made by the Admiral for more ſail: Capt. Thomas Bailie having depoſed, That the admiral's diviſion was never within a proper diſtance to engage: Captain Ourry having depoſed, That there was wind ſufficient to have carried the Admiral down cloſe to the enemy, during the time of engagement: Captain Young [s] having depoſed, That he did not perceive the loſs of his fore-top-maſt occaſioned any impediment to the rear diviſion from going down and engaging; nor that it endangered any ſhip being on board him; that if the rear diviſion had bore down as the van did, they might have come up as near the enemy, as if they had bore in a line of battle abreaſt; there would have been no danger of their being on

General Blakeney.

Mr. Boyd.

Captain Philips.

Captain Bailie.

Captain Ourry.

Captain Young.

[r] Confirmed by the evidence of Captain Everit, Lieutenant Bover, Lieutenant Higgs, Lieutenant Wood and Lieutenant Man, all of the Buckingham, Captain Gilchriſt and the Hon. Captain Harvey.

[s] Of the Intrepid.

board

board each other, as every ſhip appeared to him to have room to wear; that there was no poſſibility of bringing on a general engagement, without the admiral and the rear diviſion going down right before the wind upon the enemy; that the ſpoiling of his ground-tier of powder, and his defect in men were no detriment to him in his engagement: and Captain Gardiner, of the Ramillies, having depoſed, That he had adviſed the admiral to bear down, without being able to prevail with him ſo to do; that the admiral, on the 20th, took the whole command of the ſhip from him, and that nothing was done, that day, but what he ordered: the court, upon ſumming up the evidence, were of opinion [t]. "That Admiral Byng did not do his utmoſt to relieve St. Philip's caſtle, in the iſland of Minorca; then beſieged by the forces of the French King: That during the engagement between his Majeſty's fleet, under his command, and the fleet of the French King, on the 20th of May laſt, he did not do his utmoſt to take, ſeize and deſtroy the ſhips of the French King, and to aſſiſt ſuch of his Majeſty's ſhips as were engaged in fight with the French ſhips: That the admiral [u], notwithſtanding he did ſee the enemy's fleet approaching, ought to have left the frigate to endeavour to land the military officers: That when the Britiſh fleet, on the ſtarboard tack, were ſtretched abreaſt, or about the beam of the enemy's line, the admiral ſhould have tacked the fleet al-

A. D. 1756.

Captain Gardiner.

Opinion of the court.

[t] Art. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37.

[u] Art. 7 and 11.

A. D. 1756. together, and immediately have conducted it on a direct courſe for the enemy; the van ſteering for the enemy's van, the rear for their rear, each ſhip for her oppoſite ſhip in the enemy's line, and under ſuch a ſail as might have enabled the worſt ſailing ſhip, under all her plain ſail, to preſerve her ſtation: That the admiral, after the ſignal [w] was made for battle, ſeparated the rear from the van diviſion, and retarded the rear diviſion of the Britiſh fleet from cloſing with and engaging the enemy, by his ſhortning ſail, by haling up his foreſail, backing his mizen top-ſail, and backing, or attempting to back his main top-ſail, in order that the Trident and Princeſs Louiſa might get a-head again of the Ramillies: That inſtead of ſhortning ſail, the admiral ought to have made the Trident and Princeſs Louiſa's ſignals to make more ſail; and that he ought alſo to have ſet ſo much ſail himſelf, as would have enabled the Culloden (the worſt ſailing ſhip in his diviſion) to have kept her ſtation with all her plain ſail ſet, in order to have got down, with as much expedition as poſſible, to the enemy, and thereby have properly ſupported the van diviſion: That [x] after the ſhips, which had received damage in the action, were as much refitted, as circumſtances would permit, the admiral ought to have returned with the ſquadron off St. Philip's, and have endeavoured to open a communication with that caſtle; and to have uſed every means in his power for its relief,

[w] Art. 19, 20. [x] Art. 32.

before

before he returned to Gibraltar." They then came to the following RESOLUTIONS[y], That the admiral appears to fall under the following part of the twelfth article of the articles of war: to wit, "Or "shall not do his utmoſt to take or deſtroy, every "ſhip which it ſhall be his duty to engage; and "to aſſiſt and relieve all and every of his Majeſty's "ſhips, which it ſhall be his duty to aſſiſt and re-"lieve." And as that article poſitively preſcribes death, without any alternative left to the diſcretion of the court, under any variation of circumſtances, they adjudged him to be ſhot to death.— But as it had appeared by the evidence of Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner and other officers of the ſhip, who were near the perſon of the admiral, "That they did not perceive any backwardneſs in him, during the action, or any marks of fear, or confuſion, either from his countenance or behaviour; but that he ſeemed to give his orders cooly and diſtinctly, and did not ſeem wanting in perſonal courage; and from other circumſtances, the court did not believe that his miſconduct aroſe either from *cowardice* or *diſaffection*; and did therefore unanimouſly think it their duty, moſt earneſtly to recommend him as a proper object of mercy." So that when they made a report of this ſentence of death, of which they found him guilty, theſe ſame members of the court martial, added the following remon-

A. D. 1756.

Reſolutions of the court.

Sentence him to be ſhot.

Acquitted of cowardice and diſaffection.

Recommend him to the admiralty for mercy.

[y] Art. 36 and 37. See alſo the report made by the ſaid court martial of their ſentence.

A. D. 1756. ſtrance, to the lords of the admiralty, in favour of the criminal.

"We the underwritten, the preſident and members "of the court martial, aſſembled for the trial of "Admiral Byng, believe it unneceſſary to inform "your lordſhips, that in the whole courſe of this "long trial, we have done our utmoſt endeavours "to come at truths, and to do the ſtricteſt juſtice "to our country and the priſoner; but we cannot "help laying the diſtreſſes of our minds before "your lordſhips, on this occaſion, in finding our-"ſelves under the neceſſity of condemning a man "to death, from the great ſeverity of the twelfth "article of war[z], part of which he falls under, "and which admits of no mitigation, even if the "crime ſhould be committed by an error in judg-"ment only; and therefore for our own conſci-"ences ſakes, as well as in juſtice to the priſoner, "we pray your lordſhips in the moſt earneſt man-"ner, to recommend him to his Majeſty's cle-"mency."

Lords of the admiralty apply

The lords of the admiralty, in purſuance of this recommendation from the court martial, preſented

[z] *Twelfth article of war*, 22 *of Geo.* II.

"Every perſon in the fleet, who through cowardice, *neg-*"*ligence*, or diſaffection, ſhall in time of action, withdraw "or keep back, or not come into the fight or engagement, or "ſhall not do his utmoſt to take or deſtroy every ſhip which it "ſhall be his duty to engage, and to aſſiſt and relieve all and "every of his Majeſty's ſhips, or thoſe of his allies, which "it ſhall be his duty to aſſiſt and relieve, every ſuch perſon ſo "offending, and being convicted thereof by the ſentence of "a court martial, ſhall ſuffer DEATH."

a memo-

a memorial to his Majeſty, in which after ſetting forth the proceedings and ſentence of the ſaid court upon Admiral Byng, and the repreſentation of the ſaid court, and the petitions of George, Viſcount Torrington, Nephew to the unhappy Admiral, for his Majeſty's mercy, ſay, That after their moſt ſerious and deliberate conſideration of the proceedings of the court-martial, doubts had ariſen with regard to the legality of the ſentence, particularly whether the crime of *negligence*, which is not expreſſed in any part of their proceedings, can, in this caſe, be ſupplied by implication; and that they found themſelves obliged to beſeech his Majeſty that the opinion of the twelve judges might be taken, whether the ſaid ſentence was legal.

A. D. 1756.

to his Majeſty for the opinion of the 12 judges.

His Majeſty not only referred the ſentence to the twelve judges, to conſider thereof, as requeſted; which was pronounced by them to be a legal ſentence: but after a warrant had been ſigned by the Lords of the Admiralty, for carrying the ſentence paſſed upon Admiral Byng into execution, certain members of the court-martial having expreſſed their ſcruples, alledging that they had ſomething to diſcloſe relative to the ſaid ſentence, which greatly affected their own conſciences, and which, it was neceſſary, ſhould be diſcloſed in order to do juſtice to the ſaid Admiral John Byng; and one of them applying to the Houſe of Commons, praying to be releaſed, by act of parliament, from that part of the oath of ſecreſy

The ſentence referred by the King to the judges.

Declared to be legal.

Execution ſuſpended at the requeſt of ſeveral members of the court-martial.

A. D. 1756.

[a] relative to the ſubject in queſtion; his Majeſty, agreeable to his uſual tenderneſs for the lives of his ſubjects, conſented to the ſaid act and reſpited his execution till the bill had paſſed the Houſe of Commons, and the parties had paſſed a ſeparate examination upon oath in the Houſe of Lords, to find out what ground there was for that application.

Bill to abſolve thoſe members from the oath of ſecrecy.

The bill for this purpoſe paſſed the Houſe of Commons with great rapidity; but in the Houſe of Lords, at the ſecond reading, each member of the ſaid court-martial being called ſeparately, was aſked in ſubſtance as follows, "Whether he knew any "matter that paſſed, previous to the ſentence "pronounced on Admiral Byng, which might "ſhew that ſentence to have been unjuſt; or to "have been given through any undue practice or "motive; and was deſirous that the bill then un-"der the conſideration of the houſe, for diſ-

[a] "I *A. B.* do ſwear, That I will duly adminiſter juſtice, "according to the articles and orders eſtabliſhed by an act, "paſſed in the twenty-ſecond year of the reign of his Majeſty "King George the Second, for amending, explaining, and "reducing into one act of parliament, the laws relating to "the government of his Majeſty's ſhips, veſſels, and forces "by ſea, without partiality, favour, or affection; and if "any caſe ſhall ariſe, which is not particularly mentioned in "the ſaid articles and orders, I will duly adminiſter juſtice "according to my conſcience, the beſt of my underſtanding, "and the cuſtom of the navy in the like caſes; and I do "further ſwear, That I will not, upon any account, at any "time whatſoever, diſcloſe or diſcover the vote or opinion of "any particular member of this court-martial, unleſs there-"unto required by act of parliament."

"penſing

" penſing with the oath of ſecrecy, ſhould paſs A. D.
" into a law; and whether he was of opinion, 1756.
" he had any particulars to reveal, relative to the
" caſe of, and the ſentence paſſed upon Admiral
" Byng, which he judged neceſſary for his Ma-
" jeſty's information, and which he thought likely
" to incline his Majeſty to mercy?" but they ſeparately anſwering thoſe queſtions in the negative; the ſaid bill was rejected; and the criminal [b] was accordingly executed on the 14th of March. Rejected. Admiral Byng executed.

[b] During theſe proceedings to ſave the Admiral's life, the public were preſented with the two following letters, one from the Marſhal de Richelieu to the celebrated M. de Voltaire, written originally in French; the other written in Engliſh, by M. Voltaire to Mr. Byng, under ſentence of death for that very conduct which extorted, the praiſe of a generous enemy.

Clux delices pres de Geneve.

SIR,

Though I am almoſt unknown to you, I think 'tis my duty to ſend you the copy of the letter which I have juſt received from the Marſhal Duke de Richelieu: Honour, humanity, and equity order me to convey it to your hands. This noble and unexpected teſtimony, from one of the moſt candid as well as the moſt generous of my countrymen, makes me preſume your judges will do you the ſame juſtice.

I am with reſpect, Sir, &c.

To the Hon. J. Byng, Eſq; VOLTAIRE.

SIR,

I am very ſenſibly concerned for Admiral Byng; I do aſſure you whatever I have ſeen or heard of him does him honour. After having done *all* that man could reaſonably expect from him, he ought not to be cenſured for ſuffering a defeat. When two commanders contend for victory

A. D. 1756. March 1757, on board his Majeſty's ſhip Monarque in Portſmouth harbour, for the ſake of juſtice, and of example to the diſciplining of the navy, and for the ſafety and honour of the nation, as his Majeſty's meſſage to both houſes of parliament on the 26th of February did ſignify.

A few minutes before he was called out of the cabin to die, the Admiral addreſſed himſelf to the Marſhal as follows: "Sir, theſe are my thoughts "on this occaſion: I ſhall give them to you, that "you may authenticate them, and prevent any "thing ſpurious being publiſhed, that might tend "to defame me. I have given a copy to one of "my relations."

victory, though both are equally men of honour; yet one muſt neceſſarily be worſted; and there is nothing againſt Mr. Byng, but his being worſted; for his whole conduct was that of an able ſeaman, and is juſtly worthy of admiration. The ſtrength of the two fleets was at *leaſt* equal; the Engliſh had thirteen ſhips and we twelve much *better equipped* and *much cleaner*. Fortune that preſides over all battles, and eſpecially thoſe that are fought at ſea, was more favourable to us than to our adverſaries, by ſending our balls into their ſhips with greater execution. I am perſuaded, and it is the generally received opinion, that if the Engliſh had obſtinately continued the engagement, their whole fleet would have been deſtroyed.

In ſhort, there can be no higher act of injuſtice than what is now attempted againſt Admiral Byng, and all men of honour, and all gentlemen of the army, are particularly intereſted in the event.

RICHELIEU.

I received this original letter from Marſhal D. de Richelieu, the 1ſt of January 1757, in witneſs of which I have ſigned my name. VOLTAIRE.

The

The paper was wrote in his own hand, and contained as follows: A. D. 1756.

On board his Majeſty's ſhip Monarque in Portſmouth harbour, March 14, 1757. His laſt words delivered to the Marſhal in writing.

" A Few moments will now deliver me from
" the virulent perſecutions, and fruſtrate the
" farther malice of my enemies;—nor need I
" envy them a life ſubject to the ſenſations my in-
" juries, and the injuſtice done me muſt create.
" —Perſuaded I am, juſtice will be done to my
" reputation hereafter—The manner and cauſe
" of raiſing and keeping up the popular clamour
" and prejudice againſt me, will be ſeen through.
" —I ſhall be conſidered, (as I now perceive
" myſelf) a victim, deſtined to divert the
" indignation and reſentment of an injured and
" deluded people, from the proper objects.—My
" enemies themſelves muſt now think me inno-
" cent.—Happy for me at this laſt moment, that
" I know *my own* innocence; and am conſcious,
" that no part of my country's misfortunes *can*
" be owing to me.—I heartily wiſh the ſhedding
" my blood may contribute to the happineſs and
" ſervice of my country —but cannot reſign my
" juſt claim to a faithful diſcharge of my duty,
" according to the beſt of my judgment, and the
" utmoſt exertion of my ability, for his Majeſty's
" honour and my country's ſervice.—I am ſorry
" that my endeavours were not attended with
" more ſucceſs, and that the armament under my

" com-

A. D. 1756. "command proved too weak to ſucceed in an "expedition of ſuch moment.—*Truth* has pre- "vailed over calumny and *falſhood*, and *juſtice* has "wiped off the ignominious ſtain of my *ſuppoſed* "want of perſonal courage, or diſaffection—my "heart acquits me of theſe crimes,—but who "can be preſumptuouſly ſure of his own judg- "ment? If my crime is an error in judgment or "*differing* in opinion from my judges; and if yet, "the error of judgment ſhould be on their ſide, "—God forgive them, as I do; and may *the* "*diſtreſs of their minds, and uneaſineſs of their con-* "*ſciences, which in juſtice to me* they have repre- "ſented, be relieved, and ſubſide, as my reſent- "ment has done.—The ſupreme Judge ſees all "hearts and motives, and to him I ſubmit the "juſtice of my cauſe."

JOHN BYNG.

Thus ended the enquiry into the conduct of General Fowke and Admiral Byng, with the ſingular puniſhment of the Governor of Gibraltar broke and diſmiſſed his Majeſty's ſervice, for not complying with inſtructions or orders he could not underſtand, and appeared to him inconſiſtent and contradictory: and of the Admiral for adhering to a council of war, and for not doing all that, in the opinion of others, was in his power to do, for diſtreſſing the enemy, and for the relief of Minorca.

We

We have thrown the proceedings of this remarkable caſe together, though they were, by ſeveral incidents, protracted nine months, or thereabouts, to prevent any unneceſſary digreſſions: and we have been more particular in this narrative, becauſe, on the part of the Commander in Chief, in this expedition to defend or relieve Minorca, it exhibits the beſt view of the cauſes of its loſs; which he attributes, primarily to the neglect of the miniſtry; to the weakneſs of his ſquadron, and to a want of land-forces ſufficient to raiſe the ſiege: and on the part of the miniſtry, it ſhews how far the influence of a court intereſt is able to ſkreen men in power from the reſentment of the nation; and how far they are able to expiate their own guilt with the blood of that ſervant, who dares to complain of their miſconduct. But more eſpecially, becauſe this act of juſtice upon a perſon of a noble extraction; and this example, the diſciplining of the navy in the perſon of an Admiral, the ſon of an Admiral enobled for his ſervices, contributed greatly to convince the people that his Majeſty would ſpare nobody, of what rank or degree ſoever, if found deficient in his duty; that he would do all, in his power, for the ſafety and honour of his people; and that he was determined to maintain diſcipline, as well as to puniſh cowardice and treachery in his navy. In the mean time his Majeſty, by warrant dated November 22d, appointed Sir John Ligonier, General Huſke and General Cholmondeley, to enquire why Major-General Stuart, and the Colonels Cornwallis, and

A. D. 1756.

Reaſons for ſo circumſtantial an account of Admiral Byng's caſe.

Enquiry into the conduct of the land-officers ſent to Minorca.

A. D. 1756. and the Earl of Effingham, did not join their reſpective commands in the iſland of Minorca? and whether they had uſed their utmoſt endeavours to throw themſelves into Fort St. Philip's? and why, being only paſſengers, they aſſiſted at the ſea-council of war; which adviſed Mr. Byng to return immediately to Gibraltar? To which they pleaded, That it was not in their power to be at Minorca before Mr. Byng's fleet; that they were ready and willing to join their commands, but had no means to land them at Fort St. Philip: and that they aſſiſted at the council of war by order of the Admiral, under whoſe command they thought themſelves to be; and that they thought it their duty to co-operate with the ſea-officers, to the utmoſt of their power, for the advancement of his Majeſty's ſervice. Upon which the Board ſubmitted to his Majeſty, That in their moſt humble opinion, the conduct of theſe three officers was clear from any ſuſpicion of diſobedience to orders, or neglect of duty.

Their pleas.

Acquitted.

Parliamentary enquiry into the loſs of Minorca.

When the parliament met, one of their proceedings was to enquire into the cauſes of the loſs of Minorca, and they addreſſed his Majeſty for all papers, that might explain that intricate affair. To which his Majeſty condeſcended. But they whoſe ſafety depended upon intricacy, confuſion and a majority, ſo managed, that this enquiry was committed to the whole Houſe, and the papers were ſwelled into ſuch a prepoſterous number, that it required more time to digeſt them, than a whole ſeſſion of parliament

How baffled.

liament would allow [c]. However, though this method of enquiry may be ſaid to deliver ſome people from the loud accuſations of the people, under the protection of a parliamentary approbation of their conduct, which on this occaſion declared that the miniſtry had done all in their power both by ſea and land to ſave Minorca; yet it muſt be allowed, that it was this countenance and diſpoſition of the King to gratify his faithful ſubjects with all the lights he could help them to, and to inflict exemplary puniſhment on delinquents, without diſtinction, that diſcouraged and terrified ſuch, as knew themſelves to be obnoxious and guilty, and brought about that grand change both of men and meaſures, which delivered the nation from a timorous and inactive miniſtry; and revived that courage and conduct, for which our progenitors had been univerſally eſteemed, and without which not only Minorca, but our colonies, our allies, and theſe kingdoms, muſt have fallen a prey to an enemy, whoſe courage was founded upon our timidity, and whoſe ſucceſs was owing to our negligence; as will more fully appear from a due attention to the facts in the ſequel of this hiſtory, compared with thoſe already publiſhed in this book.

A. D. 1756.

Its effects.

[c] The moſt material facts in thoſe papers are to be found in page 234 to 254.

THE

THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE LATE WAR.

BOOK II.

Containing its progreſs in the Eaſt Indies and North America. Our operations by ſea and land. The German war, wherein the Auſtrians, Ruſſians, French, Swedes, Saxons, and Imperialiſts were confederate againſt the King of Pruſſia: And the French invaſion of Heſſe Caſſel and the Electoral dominions of his Britannic Majeſty: to the concluſion of the year 1757.

A. D. 1756. THE voice of the people having prevailed with the Sovereign to reſolve upon vigorous meaſures; and his Majeſty provoked to declare war againſt the French, by an actual invaſion of his dominions, and with threats to pour a numerous army into Great Britain; they omitted nothing that might convince him of their willingneſs to ſupport him in ſo juſt and neceſſary a war. Great as the ſupplies were, granted by parliament, the national generoſity diſcovered itſelf in many

many laudable aſſociations for the public good. The landholders and corporations, thinking that their property and rights were at ſtake, not only ſubmitted with pleaſure to the reſolutions of their repreſentatives; but raiſed great numbers of men, for the ſervice of their country, by voluntary contributions and large premiums. Nay, ſome merchants of London, convinced, by the difficulties the ſtate met with in manning the navy, upon ſuch an immergency, that there was a neceſſity to train up a young nurſery, from whence the government might always draw an immediate ſupply on any occaſion, joined heartily in that extenſive and moſt commendable plan, called the *Marine Society*; and by their exemplary ſubſcriptions engaged ſuch a fund, as, during the courſe of the war, equipped for the ſea ſervice on board his Majeſty's ſhips many thouſand orphans, friendleſs and forlorn boys; who were thereby reſcued from miſery, and made uſeful members of the commonwealth [d].

A. D. 1756.

Marine ſociety.

The

[d] *Some account of the Marine Society, from a letter addreſſed by a member to the public.*

In order to make an account of the views of this ſociety generally underſtood, it is neceſſary to premiſe that the officers of every ſhip of war, which carries 60 guns and 400 men, have a right to carry 30 ſervants, and to receive their wages, which wages are conſidered as part of the officer's pay.

Theſe ſervants are generally boys between thirteen years of age and eighteen; for when they are at or near their full growth, as they can then rank as ſeamen, and receive pay in

A. D. 1756. First object of the court.

The first object of the court, after the loss of Minorca, (which the ministry could not but be sensible, that class, it is not to be supposed they will be content to enter on board as an officer's servant, for fifty shillings a year, which is their stated wages.

The government therefore has allowed this number of boys to officers, not only because they are necessary in the ship; but because by this means every ship becomes a nursery of young seamen, who acquire skill and strength together, and are not only able, but expert sailors before they are one and twenty years of age.

These servants, however, it has been found very difficult to procure; the poor vagrants, who are covered with filth and rags, and subsist either by begging or by pilfering, had no immediate inducement, wretched as they were, to enter on board a ship, where they must at once renounce their lounging and idleness for constant activity and labour; and if they had at any time a transient wish for such a change of situation, they did not know how to apply to bring it about: the officers, who wanted them, had neither time nor opportunity to search and sollicit them, and the gentlemen who reside in the country, though they might be inclined to render the children of the poor thus serviceable to their country, there being no establishment to which they could apply, had no means of putting their intention into practice.

But besides that it is desirable for every ship to have its complement of boys, it is desirable, in a time of war, that not more than one third of the number should be less than sixteen or seventeen; because it would be too long before those, that are younger, can be rated as seamen; nor can they create a quick succession of youth into the service of officers, as a state of qualification. It must also be observed, that the youth, that are procured, lose several advantages by the difficulty of procuring others; for an officer, when he loses a servant, loses his wages, and he will naturally be unwilling his servant should be rated as a seaman, when he knows not how to get another.

ſenſible, had fallen to the French arms, through their neglect of that iſland, occaſioned by too much attention paid to the French threats to in- A. D. 1756.

The view of this ſociety, therefore, is to encourage the induſtrious poor to ſend their children to ſea, and invite the vagabond and pilferer, not only boys and lads, but men, to become uſeful to the ſtate by the following advantages.

1. They ſhall be received immediately upon application, and taken care of in a proper place, where they will be accommodated with fire and beds, and three meals a day, of good bread and broth, and roots, and meat, till they are ſent on board.

2. If any that offer are diſtempered, they are immediately put under proper methods of cure, and when they are ſent on board they are compleatly fitted out with cloathing and bedding.

Thus are men and boys ſtripped of their rags, cured of their diſtempers, and ſent clean and well cloathed, with as good bedding and accommodations as any common ſeaman on board. As to the lads, if they are ſixteen or ſeventeen, they are very ſoon qualified to receive wages as ſeamen; and as to the men, the diſtinction between landmen and ſeamen on board, which uſed to create animoſity, and ſubject the landmen to ſome hardſhips, is loſt, as they are no longer known by their apparel.

Theſe accommodations, beſides that they are an immediate inducement to lads and men to enter, are ſo neceſſary to health and life, that for want of them many have miſerably periſhed, who might otherwiſe have been of ſingular ſervice to their country.

The advantages are not leſs to the community than to the individual; for it procures a ſpeedy ſupply of ſtout mariners in the room of thoſe, who, in the proſecution of a war, muſt neceſſarily be cut off, at the ſame time that thoſe evils are prevented, which the idle and diſſolute poor of the riſing generation would produce, if they had continued at home.

A. D. 1756.

vade theſe kingdoms) was the defence and ſecurity of our colonies and territories in North America. From which object it was very evident the French intended to draw the Britiſh councils, by attempting to carry the ſeat of war into the Mediterranean. For, there was nothing in the conqueſt of Minorca of that ſingular importance to the French, as to prefer it to the ſupport of their American ſchemes; except we look upon it, as we ought to do, to be a feint to keep England employed in a conteſt for that iſland in the Mediterranean, while their marine from Breſt, &c. might be at liberty to recruit and ſupport their forces and encroachments in America.

Why Minorca was now diſregarded.

Therefore Minorca was ſuffered to remain under the dominion of France, till a more proper time ſhould favour our arms to retake it, or it ſhould be reſtored at a peace.

Meaſures purſued for North America.

His Majeſty had promiſed to prefer the ſecurity of his American ſubjects, and the chaſtiſement of the French uſurpations and hoſtilities in North America, to all other conſiderations. For this purpoſe, it was thought neceſſary not only to ſend more troops, but to have the army, on that continent, better officered. We have ſeen that Lord Loudon was appointed Commander in Chief, with powers, that were ſuppoſed ſufficient to remove all the delays, and the cauſes of thoſe obſtructions, which had defeated moſt of the former operations, and ſalutary meaſures, propoſed for their common defence: and General Abercrombie was

Lord Loudon appointed Commander in Chief.

ſent

ſent before [f] with two regiments, and with orders to ſupercede General Shirley. A. D. 1756.

Every one wiſhed for, and turned their thoughts towards an American war; and looked upon theſe meaſures to preſage a vigorous effort to drive the French out of their uſurpations, and to avenge the inhuman practices of their Indian allies. But, as if procraſtination had been the favourite meaſure of that adminiſtration, his Majeſty's good intentions, and the people's expectations were once more diſappointed, by a detention of the Earl of Loudon, who was charged with the chief directions of the operations and plans in North America; but ordered to wait for certain foreign officers of experience, invited from Germany, to command in a royal American regiment, conſiſting of four battalions, to be raiſed in Virginia; and of which the Earl was to be Colonel. So that notwithſtanding the preparations made by the provincials under General Shirley, to open the campaign early in the year, they were obliged to halt at Albany, for the arrival of a Commander in Chief, and of the regular forces from England, till the latter end of June, when General Abercrombie arrived there, and took the command of the two regiments led off by Dunbar, after the defeat of Braddock, two battalions raiſed in America, two regiments brought with him from England; four old independent companies belonging to New York, a New Jerſey regiment,

Obſtructions and delays in the North American meaſures.

General Abercrombie arrives in North America.

The number of forces.

[f] In March 1756. It was the latter end of May before the Earl of Loudon ſailed.

A. D. 1756

four companies levied in North Carolina, and a body of provincials ſent from New England only.

Reſolutions for the operations this ſummer.

It had been reſolved[g] in the council of war held laſt year, at Albany, by Mr. Shirley, &c. to endeavour to cut off the French communication, between Canada and Louiſiana, by the reducing of fort Niagara, ſituate between the lakes Ontario and Erie: which alſo would have obliged their new forts on the Ohio, to ſubmit to the Britiſh arms, without much bloodſhed: to cover the borders of New York, and ſecure the navigation of Lake Champlain, by the conqueſt of Ticonderoga and Crown Point: to beſiege Fort du Queſne on the Ohio; and, while theſe ſeveral and diſtant ſervices were carried into execution, to alarm the capital of Canada by a body of troops detached up the river Kennebeck[h].

Why not executed.

But Abercrombie, though approving of the plan, thought it, by far, too extenſive, for the forces under his preſent command, to be carried effectually into execution. Beſides the ſeaſon was too far advanced, to promiſe ſucceſs. He therefore waited the arrival of Lord Loudon: and by that determination another year was loſt; the provinces left expoſed to the invaſions and barba-

[g] See page 166.

[h] The troops deſtined for the campaign on Lake Ontario, were intended to march for Oſwego, thence to be carried over in 200 whale boats, built long, round and light, laſt winter at Schenectady, on Mohawks river, and already brought into the lake,

rities

rities of the enemy; and the French[i] at liberty to ſtrengthen their poſts, and to diſtreſs the Britiſh ſettlements with impunity. A. D. 1756.

During this ſtate of inactivity, and of dependance upon reinforcements from their mother country, the army received the diſagreeable news of the enemy's entring the country of the Five Nations, our ancient allies; where they reduced a ſmall fort, garriſoned by 25 Engliſh, whom they put to the ſword, and butchered in a moſt barbarous manner. Operations of the French.

The French improved the opportunity: they formed a camp at Ticonderoga of 330 tents and 70 log houſes, with 3000 troops at that place and Crown Point, and daily increaſed their numbers. But the defence of this fort was not their only object; and as they were perfectly informed of the orders for the Engliſh army not to undertake any expedition, till the arrival of Lord Loudon; and that his lordſhip could not land in North America, before the time would be elapſed, either to attack Crown Point, or to prevent Oſwego falling into their hands; the enemy reſolved upon the ſiege of Oſwego: and in order to facilitate their operations againſt that fort, ambuſcades were formed to harraſs and intercept any reinforcement, or convoy of proviſions, &c. which might be ſent to Oſwego, from Albany, or from Schenectady.

[i] Who received a reinforcement of about 3000 men, under the command of M. Montcalm, from Europe, under a ſtrong convoy of men of war.

A. D. 1756.

However, a conſiderable convoy of proviſions and ſtores was conducted thither very ſafely by Colonel Bradſtreet, before the ambuſcade was laid. But in his return down the river Onondaga, and ſtemming the ſtream with his battoes, formed in three diviſions, he was ſaluted [k] by a party of Indians, ſecreted amongſt the buſhes and trees, on the north ſhore, with the war-hoop and a general diſcharge of muſquetry: which killed about 70 of the battoe men. Colonel Bradſtreet landed his men immediately on the oppoſite bank, and took poſſeſſion of a ſmall iſland [l], where he with ſix men only, drove off 40 of the enemy, who forded the river to attack them. Then quitting the iſland, and collecting his whole ſtrength of about 200 men, he marched to meet another party of French and Indians, who had forded the river a mile higher; whom he with only 40 men, fell upon, ſword in hand, in a large ſwamp, and cut moſt of them in pieces or drowned them: then he boldly marched up and attacked the main body of the enemy, conſiſting of 660 men, which had paſſed at another ford, and entirely routed them alſo. This action laſted upwards of three hours. Our chief loſs was amongſt the battoe men, by the firſt fire from the buſhes: but the enemy had about 200 killed and 70 taken priſoners; and had not the reſt been favoured in their flight by a heavy rain, and the ſwelling of the waters, which put an end to Bradſtreet's purſuit, it is very probable, that the whole

Colonel Bradſtreet's advantage over the enemy.

Loſs of the enemy.

[k] July 3, 1756.

[l] About nine miles from Oſwego.

detach-

detachment, conſiſting of 700 French and Canadians chiefly, would have been entirely cut off: for, Colonel Bradſtreet was joined the ſame night by Captain Patten and his grenadiers, marching from Oneida to Oſwego; and next morning by 200 men detached to his aſſiſtance from Oſwego. So that theſe parties ſeparated. Bradſtreet made the beſt of his way to Schenectady: and the others marched together for Oſwego. A. D. 1756.

By the priſoners brought in by Colonel Bradſtreet, General Abercrombie was informed that Oſwego was the immediate object of the French arms, and that its ſiege was determined upon by a large body of Europeans, encamped on the eaſtern ſhore of Lake Ontario. The ſiege of Oſwego reſolved upon.

The importance of this place, to interrupt the commerce, as well as the motions of the enemy; and its being the only place to build veſſels, for the navigation, upon that lake or inland-ſea; and to ſecure an intereſt with the Indians, that had not declared againſt us; determined General Abercrombie to detach a regiment of regulars, under the command of Major General Webb, to its relief. But, notwithſtanding the advantage, which the loſs of Oſwego would give the enemy in all their future operations, and meaſures; and altho' the Engliſh army at Albany could muſter 2600 regulars, and 7000 provincials, or thereabout, under the command of General Winſlow[m], beſides a conſiderable number of battoe men; their Its defence how delayed.

[m] At Fort William Henry.

march

A. D. 1756. march was ſtopped by the arrival of Lord Loudon, while the neceſſaries were providing for their ſubſiſtence on the road. For, his Lordſhip, how much ſoever inclined to forward General Abercrombie's orders for the relief of Oſwego, was ſo peremptorily and obſtinately oppoſed, in that meaſure, by New England, New York and the adjacent provinces, which inſiſted upon the reduction of Crown Point previous to all other operations, that, although they were at laſt prevailed with to conſent to the march of Major General Webb, with the regiment firſt ordered by General Abercrombie, it was the 12th day of Auguſt, before this ſupply could ſet out from Albany, and indulged the enemy with ſuch an unaccountable opportunity to complete their plan againſt Oſwego, that, by the time Major General Webb could reach the Carrying Place, between the Mohawk's river and Wood's Creek, he met with the diſagreeable news, that the French were maſters of Oſwego, and had made the garriſon, and 300 workmen and ſailors, employed to defend the paſſes between the fort and Burnet's field, priſoners of war.

The ſiege of the Forts Ontaria, Oſwego, &c.

By this misfortune the nation loſt the two forts Ontario and Oſwego [n]: Forts, that had been run up in a hurry, unfiniſhed, and untenable againſt a regular force. The Marquis de Montcalm, an enterprizing officer, and ſucceſſor to Mr. Dieſkau, was charged with this expedition, having under

[n] See page 164 and 165.

his

his command 1300 regulars, 1700 Canadians, and a conſiderable number of Indians. His firſt care was to prevent ſuccours and intelligence between Oſwego and Albany; which he effected by poſting a ſtrong body of Canadians on the road by land, and by blocking up Oſwego by water with two large armed veſſels. This done, he, without oppoſition, or danger of being diſturbed, tranſported [o] his ſtores and artillery over the lake to the Bay of Nixouri, appointed the place of general rendezvous for this expedition. A. D. 1756.

The approaches of the French againſt Fort Ontario.

Having proceeded with all the caution in his power to prevent a ſurprize; and, in caſe of a miſcarriage, to ſecure a ſafe retreat, he made the neceſſary diſpoſitions for the ſiege, and opened the trenches before Fort Ontario, with about 5000 men, and 32 pieces of cannon, from 10 to 18 pounders, beſides ſeveral large braſs mortars and hoyets (part of the artillery which had been taken from General Braddock) about midnight, on the 12th of Auguſt, at the diſtance of 90 toiſes (or fathoms, of ſix feet each) from the foſſe of Fort Ontario, and like unto a parallel of about 100 toiſes in front, and in ground vaſtly embarraſſed with trunks of trees, and ſuch like obſtructions. The parallel was finiſhed at five in the morning, when the workmen began to erect the batteries in the midſt of a hot fire, kept up by the garriſon very briſkly from day break to ſix o'clock at night, and killed their chief engineer in the trenches.

[o] From Fort Frontenac, where he had arrived on the 29th of July.

But,

A. D. 1756. But, as Colonel Mercer apprehended, that the fort was not tenable againſt ſuch a ſuperior force, and ſeveral pieces of heavy cannon mounted on a battery at no more than 60 yards from it; he, about three in the afternoon, having received an account from the commandent, of his bad ſituation, ordered him to fire away all his ſhells and ammunition, to ſpike up the cannon, and to make the beſt retreat he could to Oſwego. Which was punctually executed by deſtroying the cannon, ammunition and proviſions, and paſſing the river ſo as to join the troops on the weſtern ſhore, without the loſs of a man.

Againſt Oſwego. The French General, informed of this deſertion of Fort Ontario, immediately took poſſeſſion thereof, and ordered the communication of the parallel to be continued to the bank of the river; where, early in the ſame night, he began a grand battery, formed in ſuch a manner, that it could not only batter Fort Oſwego, diſtant about two miles Engliſh, and ſecure the way from thence to Fort George, ſituate on a hill, about four miles and a half up the river, but annoy the entrenchment of Oſwego.

Behaviour of the garriſon. On the part of the Engliſh, the troops, to the number of 370, or thereabout, which had retreated from Fort Ontario, were ordered to join Colonel Schuyler immediately, who was charged with the defence of the fort on the hill to the weſtward of the Old Fort, under the direction of Mr. Mackellar the engineer. But the advantages, propoſed by a communication between theſe two forts,

forts, were ſoon fruſtrated; not ſo much by the fire from the enemy acroſs the river, who at that diſtance could never have pretended to batter in breach, and to have reduced Oſwego to the neceſſity of ſurrendering; but from a bold action of a body of 2500 Canadians and ſavages, who ſwam over the river in the night between the 13th and 14th, and cut off the communication between the two forts. A. D. 1756.

At the ſame time the enemy were very buſy in bringing up their cannon; and raiſing a battery of 10 cannon, 12 pounders, on the eaſt ſide of the river, againſt the Old Fort: tho' there was kept up a conſtant fire of cannon and ſhells, from the Old Fort and works about it.

On the 14th day, General Mercer, informed that a large party of the enemy had croſſed the river to fall upon him on the weſt ſide, ordered Colonel Schuyler to march againſt them with 500 men. But this order was annulled by a cannon ball, which, a few minutes after, killed Colonel Mercer. Colonel Mercer killed.

Colonel Littlehales, who ſucceeded Mercer in the chief command, being better informed of the numbers of the enemy, that had croſſed the river; that they were 2500 men; countermanded the detachment under Colonel Schuyler; and obſerving, that the enemy had, with great celerity, raiſed a battery of nine guns, and another of mortars ready to play: that there were 2500 irregulars and Indians on the back of his garriſon, ready to ſtorm them, on that ſide, and 2000 regulars ready to land. Council of war called.

A. D. 1756. land in front, under the fire of their cannon, and that all the places of defence, under his command, were either enfiladed or ruined by the conſtant fire of the enemy, he called a council of war; who, after taking the opinion of the engineers, were unanimouſly of opinion, that the works were no longer tenable; and that it was by no means prudent to riſk a ſtorm with ſuch unequal numbers.

Reſolved to ſurrender.

A capitulation was accordingly reſolved upon; a white flag was hung out, and the chamade was beat, and the firing ceaſed on both ſides; though not without great reluctance of the ſoldiery, who for ſome time kept and uſed their arms, declaring their reſolution rather to die, than yield and ſurrender to the French. But the officers, though they had behaved like men, determined to diſpute their poſt and liberty to the laſt extremity; yet, to prevent a mutiny, and any miſcarriage, that might happen by the bad uſe the enemy could make of the interval of this ceſſation of arms, two of them are ſaid to have been inconſiderately ſent out to the French General, not with the conditions, a brave garriſon has a right to demand, and ſeldom fail of gaining by a proper countenance in their diſtreſſed circumſtances; but, — but to *know the terms he was willing to grant:* and the enemy were permitted openly to bring up more cannon; to advance the main body of their troops, within muſket ſhot of the garriſon; and, to prepare every thing for a ſtorm, while the treaty for a ſurrender was carried on. The Marquis of Montcalm

Not agreeable to the ſoldiery.

Miſconduct in the propoſals.

Montcalm informed by theſe officers of the difficulty, with which the garriſon were brought to ſubmit to a capitulation, anſwered, That the Engliſh were an enemy he eſteemed; that none, but a brave nation, would have thought of defending ſo weak a place ſo long againſt ſuch a ſtrong train of artillery and ſuperior numbers; that they might expect whatever terms were conſiſtent with the ſervice of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty. But tied them down to the following propoſals, *viz.* A. D. 1756.

"The Marquis of Montcalm, Army and Field "Marſhal, commander in chief of his moſt Chri- "ſtian Majeſty's troops, is ready to receive (a "capitulation) upon honourable conditions, ſur- "rendering to him all the forts: he requires them "to be priſoners of war: they ſhall be ſhewn all "the regard the politeſt of nations can ſhew: I "ſend an Aid de Camp on my part, *viz.* Monſ. "de Bougainville, captain of dragoons; they "need only ſend the capitulation to be ſigned: "I require an anſwer by noon: I have kept Mr. "Drake for an hoſtage. The propoſals for a capitulation.

"MONTCALM."

Auguſt 14, 1756.

And accordingly the following demand was made:

The

A. D. 1756. *The demand made by the commandant of Oſwego from the Marquis of Montcalm, Army and Field Marſhal to the King, commander in chief of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's troops in North America.*

ARTICLE I.

The capitulation. "THE garriſon ſhall ſurrender priſoners of "war, and ſhall be conducted from hence "to Montreal, where they ſhall be treated with "humanity, and every one ſhall have treatment "agreeable to their reſpective ranks, according to "the cuſtom of war.

"II. Officers, ſoldiers, and individuals ſhall "have their baggage and cloaths, and they ſhall "be allowed to carry them along with them.

"III. They ſhall remain priſoners of war until "they are exchanged."

To which the Marquis de Montcalm gave anſwer as follows:

"I Accept of the above articles in the name of "his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty, under the con-"dition of delivering up faithfully the fortifica-"tions, ammunition, magazines, barks and bat-"toes, with their appurtenances.

"I give full power to Monſ. de la Pauze, Ma-"jor-General, to reduce this preſent capitulation, "and to agree upon the manner of becoming "maſter of the ſaid fort, of which our troops ſhall "take poſſeſſion, and to inſure the garriſon from "receiving any inſult.

"Given at the camp before Oſwego, the 14th "day (at eleven o'clock in the morning) of "the month of Auguſt, 1756.

"MONTCALM."

By

By virtue of this capitulation we loſt Oſwego, our only poſt on the Great Lakes; the garriſon laid down their arms, and ſurrendered priſoners of war; and the French immediately took poſſeſſion of Oſwego and Fort St. George, which they entirely deſtroyed, agreeable to their orders, after removing the artillery, warlike ſtores and proviſions; with the loſs of no more than one engineer, one Canadian, one ſoldier and one gunner killed, and 20 ſlightly wounded, on the part of the enemy. Whereas we loſt Shirley's and Pepperel's regiments, and part of Schuyler's militia, in all 1600 men, including 80 officers; 121 pieces of artillery, (ſeven were braſs) 55 of which were cannon of different bores, and 14 braſs mortars, 23000 wt. of powder, 8000 wt. lead and ball, 2950 bullets, 150 bombs of nine inch. and 300 of ſix inch. 1476 grenades, 730 fuzees for grenadiers, 340 common fuzees; 704 hogſheads of biſcuit, a very great quantity of pork, beef and meal.

A. D. 1756.

The forts deſtroyed by the French.

Loſs of the French.

Of the Engliſh.

A magazine of ſo great importance, depoſited in a place deemed altogether indefencible and without the reach of immediate ſuccour, gave the nation great room to ſuſpect the integrity or to impeach the underſtandings of thoſe, who, for the ſake of gain, by agencies and contracts, or through ignorance of its ſituation and ſtrength, expoſed ſo valuable a prize to the firſt invader.

Remarks on this magazine.

There were at Oſwego ſeven armed ſhips, *viz.* one of 18 guns, one of 14, one of 10, one of eight guns, and three others mounted with ſwivels, beſides 200

A. D. 1756. battoes of different ſizes, whoſe officers and crews were included in the capitulation.

Future conduct of the French. As ſoon as the forts were demoliſhed the French marched with the utmoſt ſpeed, with their priſoners[n] and booty, to join their army at Ticonderoga, and to oppoſe the motions of the provincial army, of about 7000 men, which ought to have long before attacked Crown Point; but had laid idle, under General Winſlow, till reduced by ſickneſs and deſertion to 4000, and till the French were now in a condition to hold them at defiance. The provincials deſerted, becauſe they were diſheartned by an inactive campaign; and the new-raiſed troops contracted many diſorders, for want of care and cleanlineſs. But no enemy appearing, they proceeded to Montreal, and thence to Quebec, where the priſoners were immediately embarked and ſent to Portſmouth in a cartel ſhip.

Remarks on this loſs. Thus within the ſpace of four days, from the time the trenches were opened before Fort Ontario, we have ſeen the loſs of the only poſt Great Britain had on the Great Lakes; much in the ſame way as Mahon was loſt in the Mediterranean; though it was of as much or greater importance to maintain this poſt on the continent of North America, to overawe the wavering and hoſtile Indians, to protect our allies, to cover our ſettlements and to chaſtiſe our enemies; as to preſerve

[n] Such as were left alive; for, contrary to the faith of the capitulation, Montcalm not only ſuffered the garriſon to be ſtripped and many of them to be murdered by his army; but he delivered twenty of them up to the mercy of the Indians, by way of atonement for the loſs of their friends, that had fallen in battle.

Fort St. Philip's in Europe. For, though the vaſt quantity of artillery, ammunition, ſtores, and proviſions of all ſorts, and the number of workmen employed in building, and of others in the navigation upon Lake Ontario, is a convincing proof that the perſons concerned in the management of the American war, were not inſenſible of the importance of this poſt, both for defence and offence; yet nothing can appear more notorious, except the procraſtination of the defence of Minorca, that this poſt was alſo loſt by delays and neglect, and, at laſt, by not doing all that was in the power of a garriſon to do; as will more fully appear from the following review of the ſtate of Oſwego for ſome time before; when there was the greateſt reaſon to expect a viſit from the French, who made no ſcruple to call it an encroachment, or an invaſion upon the French King's territory, made in the time of a profound peace; and it was declared that they would attack, take and deſtroy it, as ſoon as opportunity would permit. A. D. 1756.

How Oſwego had been neglected.

Nevertheleſs Oſwego was ſo neglected, that the French might have executed their deſign upon it in the ſpring of the year 1755, when this fort was garriſoned only by 100 men, under Captain King, had no works but the Old Fort, mounting eight four pounders only, and ſo commanded by an eminence directly a-croſs a narrow river, whoſe banks were covered with a thick wood, that made it utterly incapable of defence; or to command any reſpect upon the Lake. As was the caſe on the 24th and 26th of May 1755, when 41 battoes, with 15 men in each, in all 600 men, paſſed in

A. D. 1756. ſight, and bid defiance to a fort, which they might then have reduced in a few hours with one ſingle mortar.

A reſolution was then taken to enlarge the fort, or rather to erect ſome additional forts, to build veſſels upon the lake, to increaſe the garriſon, and to provide every thing neceſſary to annoy an enemy, and to render the place tenable. Accordingly Captain Bradſtreet was diſpatched with a reinforcement of two companies, ſome ſwivel guns, and the firſt ſet of workmen to build veſſels: but theſe men were employed in building ſuch craft, that, when, ſoon after, 11 more French battoes, with troops on board paſſed by Oſwego, and we had a greater number of thoſe boats in the harbour, they were ſuffered to paſs unmoleſted, to the great danger and terror of our back ſettlements; our battoes not being ſtiff enough for the ſoldiers to ſtand to fire off at ſea; ſo tickliſh that the inadvertent motion of one man would overſet them, and ſo ſmall, as not able to carry more than ſix men each. Yet, if that was the real caſe, no care was taken to build their boats upon a more ſerviceable plan, againſt any future emergency, and to maintain the dominion of the lake. But there was another moſt unpardonable overſight in thoſe, who had the direction of theſe works. Capacious ſtout veſſels require a conſiderable deal of iron work in their compoſition. The managers had provided ſmiths enough: but there was no more than one pair of bellows. So that the firſt accident, which might unavoidably happen to that neceſſary

neceſſary inſtrument, would ſtop all the operations of the forge at once. A. D. 1756.

The next ſtep, towards improving the naval force at Oſwego, was a ſchooner of 40 feet in the keel, with 14 oars and 12 ſwivel guns, launched on the 28th of July 1755. This was the firſt veſſel of force we ever had on this lake, and, with 320 men, was all the ſtrength we had to defend this poſt in the beginning of July, that year: and the French were expected daily to attack it, on the 13th of the ſame month, when General Shirley, with all his forces, was 300 miles diſtant, without making all the expedition, the ſervice required: for, it was the 8th of Auguſt before that General arrived at Oſwego, and the 31ſt before the laſt diviſion arrived under Colonel Mercer. Where this army, at that unſeaſonable time of the year, ſerved only to eat up the provincial ſtores, and brought on ſuch a ſcarcity of proviſions, that they were almoſt famiſhed, and the party, left to ſecure the important Carrying Place at Wood's Creek, were actually obliged to deſert it for want of food.

About the middle of September four other veſſels [o] were got ready, as per margin, with which armed veſſels, and a conſiderable number of thoſe battoes, which had been reported unſerviceable, or too ſmall to live, and to diſpute with an ene-

[o] A decked ſloop, eight guns four pounders, thirty ſwivels. A decked ſchooner, eight guns four pounders, twenty-eight ſwivels. An undecked ſchooner, fourteen ſwivels, 14 oars. Ditto, twelve ſwivels, fourteen oars.

A. D. 1756. my upon the lake in the calmeſt weather, General Shirley prepared to attack Niagara, under another moſt unhappy circumſtance, the want of proviſions to carry his army in ſight of the enemy, and the impoſſibility of getting any ſupplies within 300 miles of the place they were going againſt. However, the improbability of ſucceeding in an expedition, undertaken without victuals, was diſcovered time enough to countermand the orders to embark; and a friendly ſtorm, ſays an officer then preſent, prevented an embarkation, when a ſtock of proviſions was got together, ſufficient to prevent the men from eating one another, during the firſt twelve days. All thoughts of attacking Niagara were laid aſide; the General, indeed, made a great ſhew of his intention to maintain the poſt of Oſwego, by the directions given for ſtrengthening the old, and for building new forts [r]; but his leaving the place before the additional works were completed, and permitting the veſſels belonging to the fort to be unrigged and laid up, without having been put to any uſe, while a French veſſel was permitted to cruize on the lake, and to carry ſupplies to Niagara, without interruption, and five more, as large as ours, were ready to launch at Frontenac; and while our garriſon at Oſwego increaſed, by inſenſible degrees, to the number of eleven hundred, without pay, and in perpetual terror, on the brink of famine; it gave very little reaſon to believe that his inten-

[r] As related before on page 163 to 165.

tion

tion was real, and filled every one with ſad apprehenſions for the fate of that important poſt. A. D. 1756.

The reaſon, why the French did not ſtrike the blow, when Oſwego remained in this defenceleſs ſtate, was founded upon good policy, and not to be aſcribed to any overſight or neglect in their commanders. They knew that it would be impoſſible for their arms from Canada to complete their grand ſcheme on the Ohio, without the aid of the Indian tribes, or at leaſt againſt the united ſtrength of the Indians and Engliſh. They alſo were acquainted with the ſentiments, which the Indians entertained of the proceedings of the Ohio company, and particularly of their objection to the erecting fortifications at Oſwego [s], which they made the grounds of their refuſing to join him in the pretended expedition againſt Niagara. Therefore, they firſt tried to inflame the Indians againſt the proceedings of the Engliſh on the lake Ontario; caſt upon them the ſole cauſe of the miſeries to which their country was expoſed by war; conciliated the friendſhip of the moſt conſiderable tribes, with promiſes to protect them from the encroachments of the Engliſh upon their lands, and prevailed with them to aſſiſt in the reduction of Oſwego, with a promiſe to raze the forts to the ground; and, as ſoon as theſe Indians were, by thoſe means, alienated from the Engliſh, and the French operations on the Ohio were thought to be irreſiſtible, they, as you have read, put their deſign in execution. Why not attacked by the French before.

[s] See page 109 and page 165.

A. D. 1756.

Extraordinary cauſes of delay in the defence of Oſwego.

General Shirley continued inactive from September 1755 to March 1756, when he reſumed the project of his execution againſt Niagara or Frontenac, making proper proviſions at a prodigious expence: but upon the criſis for carrying this plan into execution, orders arrived from England to attempt nothing till Lord Loudon ſhould arrive, early in the ſpring, as it was ſignified by the ſame expreſs. But this Lord's departure from England was attended with ſuch delays [t], that, before he reached the army in North America, Montcalm had time to arrive from France at Canada with 3000 men, and to take the field before us; notwithſtanding the navigation of the river of

[t] Not only the departure of Lord Loudon was protracted to an unreaſonable and to an unſeaſonable time, for an American campaign; but the inferior officers of his Lordſhip's regiment, together with arms, ammunition, and other military preparations, lay at Portſmouth ſo late as the 12th of June, waiting for tranſports; which were not then hired to take them on board. And when the military ſtores were ſhipped, it was done in ſuch a manner as to make the riſque of the voyage as great as poſſible: for the cannon were put on board one ſhip; the carriages, on which they were to be mounted, were ſhipped on board another; the balls on board a third, and the gunpowder on board a fourth. By which contrivance the chance of defeating the whole expedition, was encreaſed, as four to one; for the loſs of any one of the four ſhips, would have made the contents of the other three uſeleſs. And as if there was never to be an end of this conduct, the powder ſent upon this important expedition, which conſiſted of five hundred barrels, was bought of the Dutch, and taken away without proof of its capacity. So that, when it came into uſe, it was found no better than ſaw-duſt.

St.

St. Lawrence being ſhut up with ice till the month of May. Whoſe ſucceſs againſt Oſwego entirely depended upon his activity, during the time that our armies were under orders, not to march in queſt of the enemy, nor to defend our own forts; and the northern provinces, filled with apprehenſions for their own ſafety only, oppoſed the expedition againſt Niagara, and the neceſſary ſupplies for the defence of Oſwego. A. D. 1756.

Thus, we ſay, fell the key of the lake Ontario, by the neglect of the managers; the impropriety and inſufficiency of the means to defend it from the attacks of an enemy; from the delays that prevented a ſeaſonable or timely relief, and from too great a fear for the preſervation of New York, and New England: as Minorca, the key of the Mediterranean ſea in Europe, was loſt by the terrors of a pretended and impracticable invaſion, which locked up our ſhips and ſoldiers at home, when they ſhould have attacked the enemy on their own coaſts; by paying no regard to the intelligence, given concerning the real deſign of the enemy againſt that iſland; by neglecting the neceſſary means to recruit and ſtrengthen the garriſon, and by ſending an inſufficient force, and at a time it was impracticable to ſave it. The importance of this loſs.

But the loſs of this poſt, and of the garriſon, and of the impliments of war, which had been ſtowed up there without diſcretion, was not the worſt effect of ſuch fatal miſconduct. It was followed with that imprudent meaſure of immediately ſtopping up Wood's Creek, our only communication from the Its ſad effects.

A. D. 1756. the Mohawks river to Oneida, with great logs and trees for ſeveral miles; and of deſerting and deſtroying the forts at the great Carrying-Place; which, after the loſs of Oſwego, was become our moſt advanced poſt into the country of the Six Nations; though there were at that time three thouſand men, including 1200 battoemen, at that poſt: a poſt ſo ſtrongly fortified, and ſo inacceſſible to the enemy's artillery, that it might have defied the whole French army in North America, to take it. Which, with General Webb's retreat with his forces to a place called the German Flatts, about 60 miles nearer to Albany, and ſoon after to Schenectady, not more than 17 miles from that city; having expoſed the Six Nations, and all the adjacent country, to the mercy of the enemy (who were at liberty to over-run the fine country on the Mohawks River down to Albany, and to penetrate into the provinces of Penſylvania, Maryland, New Jerſey and Virginia) either encouraged the Indians to join our enemies, or to obſerve a ſtrict neutrality, when they found, that we were either not able, or not willing to protect them; and that the French had not only conquered, but performed their promiſe to deſtroy the forts at Oſwego [u].

Beſides, during the ſtate of inactivity, ſo fatal to the Britiſh nation, this year, both in Europe

[u] It is remarkable, that while the French were buſy in demoliſhing the works at Oſwego; we, to ſave them the trouble and hazard of attacking the forts at the great Carrying-Place, had them demoliſhed by General Webb, in his retreat.

and

and North America, there were above 1000 inhabitants of the weſtern parts of Philadelphia maſſacred in cold blood by the Ohio Morians; againſt whom, nothing was attempted, till Colonel Armſtrong, with a party of 280 provincials, marched from Fort Shirley, on the Juniata [w] river, (150 miles weſt of Philadelphia) to Kittanning, an Indian town, and the rendezvous of the Morian murderers, ſituate about 25 miles above Fort du Queſne, on the Ohio, a rout of 140 miles through the woods; with whom he came up, in the morning early of the fifth day, while the Indian warriors were regaling themſelves at a dance. Colonel

A. D. 1756.

Some advantages gained on the Ohio.

[w] In order to revenge the particular cauſe of the inhabitants and of Fort Granville, on this river, which is thus related in a letter from Philadelphia, dated Aug. 19. That on the 30th of July, Captain Ward marched from the fort, with his enſign, and all the men belonging to it, except 24 under the command of Lieutenant Armſtrong, to guard ſome reapers in Shearman's valley: that ſoon after he left the fort it was attacked by about 100 French and Indians, who took Juniata creek, and creeping under its banks to a gut about 12 feet deep, came within 30 or 40 feet of the fort, where the ſhot from our men could not hurt them, and there, by gathering together pine knots, and other combuſtible matter, they made a pile, and ſet fire to the fort. The enemy called to the beſieged, offering them quarters, if they would ſurrender; on which one John Turner immediately opened the gates, and gave them poſſeſſion; 22 ſoldiers, three women, and five or ſix children were made priſoners, of which the French took the young men and women, and the Indians the old men and children; and having loaded them with flour, &c. they ſet off in triumph; but when they had marched a little way, the French commander ordered Captain Jacobs back to burn the fort, which he did.

Armſtrong

A. D. 1756. Armſtrong diſcovered their ſituation by their whooping; and, halting about 100 perches below the town, on the bank of the river, he prepared his men, and began the attack as ſoon as it was light.

Captain Armſtrong's expedition.

Captain Jacobs, the chief of the Indians, gave the war whoop, and defended his houſe bravely through loop-holes in the logs. The Colonel offered them quarter; but they, fearful of our ſincerity to pardon the many and inhuman murders they had been guilty of, upon the innocent and defenceleſs Britiſh ſubjects, moſt of them refuſed to ſubmit priſoners of war. Wherefore Colonel Armſtrong ordered their houſes to be ſet on fire; which was immediately and with great activity done by the officers and ſoldiers. By this obſtinacy many were ſufficated and burnt; others were ſhot in their attempt to reach the river [x]; and Captain Jacobs, his ſquaw and a boy, called the King's ſon, were ſhot as they were getting out of a window, and were ſcalped.

Theſe Indians had a large quantity of arms loaded in their houſes, and of gunpowder. The loaded arms went off in a quick ſucceſſion, as the fire reached them; and the gunpowder, which was ſtowed in every houſe, completed their deſtruction, by blowing up the houſes and all that were found in them, when it took fire.

Eleven Engliſh priſoners were happily releaſed from captivity, or violent death; who informed

[x] They were 40 in all that periſhed in this aſſault.

the

the Colonel, that on that very day two battoes of Frenchmen, with a large party of Delawares and French Indians were expected to join Captain Jacobs, in order to proceed in an expedition concerted for attacking and reducing Fort Shirley, and that an advanced party of 24 warriors had been detached, the preceding evening, to reconnoitre and alarm the country. This was ſoon after confirmed by Lieutenant Hogg, who upon the report of the ſcouts, that there were not above four Indians about a fire, on the road, about ſix miles from Kittanning, was ordered, the night before, to halt with 12 men, and to endeavour to ſurprize them, and to bring them up to the main body: but the Lieutenant, upon his approach, found them to be the 24 warriors above mentioned. They ſtood upon their defence, killed three of his men, mortally wounded the Lieutenant, and put the other nine men to flight; who abandoned their commander, not able to help himſelf, when Colonel Armſtrong ſent out a party to bring him and his men into the conquered town. A. D. 1756.

Theſe, we apprehend, are ſome of the bad circumſtances to which Lord Loudon refers in his letter to the governors of the provinces, after the loſs of Oſwego. "As, ſays his lordſhip, by "accounts I have received, his Majeſty's fort and "garriſon of Oſwego, together with the naval "armaments and ſtores, have, by a *ſeries of bad* "*circumſtances*, fallen into the hands of the "French; and as from the condition and number "of the troops left to me, when I came to my "command,

Lord Loudon's letter after the loſs of Oſwego.

A. D. 1756. "command, I can ſcarce hope to do more than "to reſiſt French power in that quarter: I moſt "earneſtly recommend to you, to conſider with- "out delay, how far the provincials, now in arms, "are expoſed to the weight of the French, in "the parts towards Crown Point; and the dan- "gerous events of any accident happening to "them in conſequence of theſe circumſtances, "and what forces you can ſend immediately to "reinforce them, as it ſeems abſolutely neceſſary "to do, for the ſecurity and ſafety of the country. "Therefore, in conſequence of the power given "to me by his Majeſty's commiſſion, under the "Great Seal; and of his orders ſignified to you "by his Secretary of State, I do demand of you "an aid of as conſiderably a body of men, with "arms, as you can ſend off, as faſt as raiſed; and "alſo a number of carriages and ox-teams, where- "with I may be able to tranſport proviſions, as "this province alone is not able to ſupply all [y]."

Remarks on this letter. By this letter it is evident, That his lordſhip, the commander in chief of the Britiſh forces in North America, gave up all thoughts of acting offenſively againſt the French this year. But how juſt ſo ever his lordſhip's reaſons were for that inactive reſolution, it is certain that the delay, which followed our retreat from the lakes, when we had a ſufficient force in the field, raiſed, maintained and ſupplied with all things neceſſary for the ex-


[y] Dated at Albany, October 20, 1756.

pedition

pedition againſt Crown Point, which was the only meaſure, that could promiſe to retrieve our late loſs; and waſting the remainder of the ſeaſon in entrenchments at Lake George; and fortifying Fort Edward and Fort William Henry, gave the enemy time to ſtrengthen Crown Point, to recruit and to refreſh their forces, and to improve their late ſucceſs. A. D. 1756.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

2691897 v.1


2 in
3
4
5 cm
6
7
8
9
10